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According to the concept underlying the European Treaties, the prices of goods and 
services  are  usually  formed  by  market  economy  principles,  independent  of  State 
intervention.  This  statement only  has  to be qualified  for  certain fields  where  the 
market economy "laws" either cannot provide a yardstick of scarcity at all or cannot 
do so  to the best economic  and  social effect.  The EEC Treaty contains no  specific 
price rules. 
As  against this.,  the Member States take numerous price formation and price control 
measures  whose  methods  and  intensity  are  hard  to  determine.  These  measures 
pursuant to price laws and regulations are generally considered to include all direct 
price  control measures  taken by  the State-in particular  those described  as  "close 
to the market".  Such measures have many legal forms-maximum prices, minimum 
prices, fixed prices, price margin and price publicity arrangements, in particular.  The 
economic impact of State price arrangements-especially on competition policy-is 
complex.  The present study has been rendered necessary by the varied nature of the 
subject matter and the extreme difficulty of ascertaining with sufficient accuracy  the 
economic  effects  on  the  common  market  of  varying  national  price  laws  and 
regulations. 
Professor  Jurgensen,  for  many  years  head  of  the  Institut  fur  europiiische  Wirt-
schaftspolitik of Hamburg University, deserves praise for  the attempt he has  made 
to  study  exhaustively  the  impact  of  national  price  provisions  in  the  European 
Economic  Community.  His  study  is  based  on  a  list  of  current  price  provisions 
(situation  1968) drawn up  in co-operation  with Member  State experts.  It works 
out  the  effects  of  the  national  price  provisions,  first  in  a  closed  economy  and 
secondly  in  an  open  economy;  a  distinction  being  made  between  provisions  to 
influence and control price formation and provisions to regulate price levels directly. 
The special, novel feature of the study would appear to be that it constitutes the first 
analysis ever of the conformity of the fairly numerous price provisions still effective 
in  the individual Member States to the system postulated by not only  the national 
but  also  the  Community  concepts  of  the  way  in  which  the  economy  should  be 
ordered.  This forms  the theoretical basis  from  which  action  can  be  taken.  With 
the help of tables and diagrams  a clear summary is  given of all national price pro-
visions  which  Professor Jurgensen  considers  inconsistent  with the  conception  de-
veloped of the way in which the economic union should be organized, and therefore 
to require practical measures  on the part of the Community.  The compiler makes 
the final  pragmatic point that national price  provisions  are only  one  of the many 
kinds  of  intervention  likely  to  hamper  the  growth  and  affiuence  expected  from 
integration, so that the required, feasible measures to harmonize price legislation or 
co-ordinate  price  policy  can  only  make  a  small  contribution  towards  completing 
the economic community and union on economically sound lines. 
The  Commission  considers  that  the  report-whose  contents  cannot,  of  course, 
prejudice in any  way  its own attitude to  the many  individual points  examined-
affords and excellent basis for the continuation of present work on harmonizing the 
economic laws of the individual States. 
3 FOREWORD 
The present study contains  a description of the  price  controls  currently in force  in 
the Member States of  the European Economic Community, a theoretical deduction 
of the effects of these controls and an  assessment of these effects.  The original plan 
was  to  aseertain  the  effects  empirically.  But,  while  it is  easy  to  plan  the  broad 
outlines of a study of  this  kind, it very  soon  proved  extremely difficult  in practice 
to  assemble  the information  needed  to  carry  it out.  Faced  with the impossibility 
of  compiling  the necessary  documentation on the markets  subject  to  price control, 
and with the great difficulty  of collecting the necessary details on the structure and 
application of  these  controls,  a more  modest way  of  analysing  their effects  had to 
be found. 
Starting from  the principle that every economy based on the division of labour finds 
itself  faced,  whatever  the  ruling  economic  order,  with  problems  of  development, 
allocation  and  distribution,  seven  price  regulation  functions  (Steuerungsaufgaben) 
have been formulated,  which the State can  either leave  to the automatic operation 
of  the market,  or can  ensure  through  the  autonomous  action  of  economic  policy. 
The analysis assumes  that, under the ruling conception of economic order, all  these 
regulating functions  are left to the operation of the market mechanism, and goes on 
to inquire into the effects  of price controls  on  these  functions.  In order to assess 
these  effects,  consideration  is  then  given  to the  way  in  which,  under  the  ruling 
economic  order,  competence  in  respect  of  these  regulating  functions  is  divided 
between  the  EEC  and  its  Member  States  and  an  opinion  is  expressed  on  the 
extent to which the controls discussed  are  consistent with the economic order. 
While  it was  originally  intended  that  concrete  recommendations  should  be  made 
to  the  economic  policy  authorities  on  the  basis  of  the  empirical  findings  of  the 
research,  the change  in the conception of  the task  has  meant  that this  Report can 
only  serve  as  a basis  for  further  work  in  this  field.  It nevertheless  constitutes  a 
contribution towards a more systematic study of the operation of mixed economies, 
as  well as  providing concrete  elements for  wider empirical  studies. 
The  basic  document  for  the  description  of  price  systems  has  been  an  Opinion 
addressed  to the Commission  of  the EEC by  the  Institute of Comparative Law  of 
the University  of  Paris,  with the  co-operation  of  Professor  Champaud.  In order 
to fill  the gaps in this document, and partly to obviate the approximations resulting 
from  repeated translations, other publications available in Germany have been used, 
and  the  national  authorities  of  the  EEC  Member  States  have  been  invited  to 
co-operate.  With  the  exception  of  the  Netherlands,  all  countries  have  provided 
valuable  additions  and  corrections  to  the  description  of  existing  controls.  In the 
case  of  France,  the experts  named  above  were able  to  provide further  particulars. 
Since personal contacts were ruled out for  reasons  of cost, it has  not been  possible 
to clear up every question.  In assessing the effects, it has  therefore sometimes been 
necessary  to  make  working  assumptions,  the  validity  of  which  cannot  be  tested 
here.  In every case,  it has  been  taken as  a principle that the controls in force  are 
applied by the State in question and observed by the economic transactors concerned. 
For example,  the opinion cited above contains the warning that the practical effect 
of  the French  controls  should  not  be  overestimated,  since  the  authorities  in  that 
country often prefer  to make  a parade of  force,  rather  than  actually  using  it, and 
the effects  inferred in this  Report may  therefore  seem  greater than they  really  are 
in  practice.  It has  been  impossible  in  this  study  to  take  account  of  the  fairly 
5 widespread illegal practices,  and it must be left to the  economic policy  authorities 
to assess the true extent of the effects discussed in this study. 
In spite of  every  effort  to ensure  completeness,  it  cannot  be  guaranteed  that  all 
controls  have  been  included.  To facilitate  the  application  of  the  analysis  to  any 
control  which may  have  been  omitted,  the general  comments  on  individual  types 
of control have been kept relatively broad. 
Our warmest  thanks  are  due  to all  those  who  have  co-operated  in  this  research. 
fiARALD  JURGENSEN 
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OBJECTS  AND  CRITERIA  OF  THE  STUDY CHAPTER  1 
OBJECTS  AND  PLAN  OF THE STUDY 
Ever  since  the  signature  of  the  Treaty  constituting 
the European Economic Community (the EEC Treaty), 
on 25 March  1957  at  Rome,  the signatory  countries 
have  been  endeavouring  to  create  the  conditions  of 
an  internal  market  within  the  whole  economic  area 
which  it is  desired to integrate.  To this end,  it was 
decided  not only  to institute  a common  market,  but 
also  to  harmonize  and  unify  the economic  policies  of 
each Member State.  Although the "Founding Fathers" 
regarded  the  economic  community  as  a first  step  to-
wards political union,(~) the criterion set by the Treaty 
for  assessing the degree of harmonization of economic 
policies  is  not  political  identity  or  unification,  but 
economic expediency, in the light of the agreed objec-
tives  and  procedures.  In view  of  this  limitation,  all 
economic policy measures must be analysed in the light 
of  their  consistency  with  the  objectives  set  and 
with  the  economic  order  envisaged.  This  limitation 
no  doubt  complicates  the  work  of  the  Commission 
responsible  for  applying  and  enforcing  the  Treaty, 
but it also gives all Member States a great opportunity 
for  a  new  and  rational  orientation  of  their  national 
economic  policies. 
In  considering  national  price  controls,  the  present 
study is concerned with one of the most controversial 
categories of economic policy measures and of economic 
science.  It will  have  achieved  its  object  if  it serves 
both to facilitate  the  action  of  the  Commission  and 
to  stimulate  national  reflection  on  the  soundness  of 
the different economic  policies. 
The present study consists of a description of national 
price  controls,  an  analysis  of  their  effects  and  an 
assessment  of  their  consistency  with  the  ruling  eco-
nomic  order.  · 
The  descriptions  of  the  controls  and  the  analysis  of 
their effects  are grouped in Part II, which is  planned 
in  the  light of the classification  outlined  in  the  next 
following  section of this introduction.  In the descrip-
tive  part we  have  tried  to  give  the  fullest  possible 
description  of  the  controls,  but we  cannot  guarantee 
(1)  It is  an  interesting  historical  sidenote  that  Lbdc  advanc-
ed  the  same  idea  in  connection  with  the  trade  unification  of 
Germany:  '·'Trade  unity  and  political  unity  are  twin  sisters. 
One cannot come  to birth without the other." List, Friedrich, 
Collected  Works,  Vol.  7:  Die  politisch-okonomische  National-
einheit der  Deutschen;  Aufsl:itze  aus  dem  Zollvereinsblatt und 
andere  Schriften  der  Spl:itzeit  (Ed.  Lenz  F.  and  Wiskemann 
E.)  Berlin,  1931,  p.  276. 
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that  there  are  no  omissions,  since  our experience  in 
compiling  the  documentation  inspires  us  with  a 
certain mistrust. 
The analysis  of the effects  is  designed  to show how, 
and with what results, the economic process is  affected 
by  the  national  controls  within  each  State  and  the 
controls  affecting  intra-Community  relations.  It  is 
certainly  impossible  within  the  framework  of  the 
present study to make an  empirical inquiry, owing to 
the  large  number  of  controls,  the  products  covered, 
and the information which would have to be compiled 
on  the true facts  of the markets controlled.  We have 
therefore  had  to  confine  ourselves  to the  theoretical 
plane in inferring the possible results.  Since  competi-
tion  and  market mechanisms  play  an  undoubted,  but 
variable,  role  in  regulating  economic  phenomena  in 
all Member States, Part II is  devoted to a deduction, 
on  the basis  of  the  criteria  set  out  in  Section  3  of 
Part I, of the possible effects  on the market mechan-
isms  and  the  driving  force  of  the  market,  namely 
competition.  In the case  of each control, we consider 
first  the  national  and  then  the  international  effects. 
In the  separate  consideration  of  national  effects,  we 
disregard  the  interdependence  of  markets  from  the 
point of view of external trade.  The field  of applica-
tion of the price controls and  the market area  of the 
products  are  then  identical.  The  conditions  of  com-
petition of all market participants in direct competition 
with  each  other  are  defined  by  the  same  controls. 
The  duty  to  act  or  to  refrain  from  acting  can  be 
escaped only by abandoning the price-controlled activ-
ity or by  resorting to illegal  practices. (2) 
In  theory,  this  part  of  the  analysis  corresponds  to 
the  premises  of  a  closed  economy.  In  practice,  it 
virtually  corresponds  to.  the  situation  of  the  EEC 
countries  before  the  commencement  of  institutional 
integration.  No  doubt external  trade  already  existed 
at  that epoch,  but it could  be  limited  or  halted  by 
economic policy measures in order to avoid disturbance 
to the national economy.  It would nevertheless be  a 
mistake  to think that the underlying premises of this 
section are  bound to lead  to unrealistic results  under · 
existing  conditions.  In  the  first  place,  the  effects 
(2)  Owing  to  the  severity  of  the  punishments  meted  out  by 
States,  the  controls  will  not  be evaded  unless  they  are  felt 
to  be  particularly  intolerable;  we  have  therefore  largely  dis-
regarded  in  this  study  the possibility  of  illegal  practices. inferred in the context of a closed economy also make 
their appearance as  a trend in an open economy.  The 
importance which they may  assume in each  particular 
case  depends  essentially  on  the question whether  the 
products are capable of external trade or not. e)  The 
subsequent  enlargement  of  the  framework  of  the 
analysis  thus  calls  in  the  first  case  for  a modification 
in  the  fundamental  tendency,  while  no  change  is 
needed  in  the  case  of  products  inherently  incapable 
of  external  trade.  Secondly,  the  whole  of  the  inte-
grated  territory  of  the  EEC  resembles  a  closed  eco-
nomy.  While the individual Member States are hardly 
any longer in a position to adopt a protective economic 
policy  in  their  external  trade,  the  EEC  is  well  able 
to close  its  markets  to  third countries. 
The  subsequent  consideration  of  the  effects  which 
follow  if  the analysis  allows  for  the interdependence 
of  the different  economies,  corresponds  in  theory  to 
the premises of an  open economy,  and, in practice, to 
the  existing  situation  of  Member  States.  In  these 
conditions,  the  field  of  application  of  the  controls 
and the distribution area of products capable of exter-
nal  trade  are  no  longer  identical.  The  State  which 
controls  prices  has  no  means  of  preventing  market 
participants from  diverting their efforts  to attack  the 
markets  of  EEC Member  States  where  such  controls 
do not apply;  it can do so, in the case of third country 
markets, only with some difficulty, owing to the obliga-
tion to submit to a common trade policy.  Supply and 
demand  may  shift  with  perfect  legality  from  one 
country to  another, foreign  markets acting as  a safety 
valve  against  the possible  creation  of illegal  markets. 
Even  assuming  the  strictest  application  of  the  cor-
responding  controls,  it would  be  a mistake  to  think 
that the conclusions  of  Part II mean  that the effects 
in question must inevitably occur in each EEC Member 
State  or  in  the  whole  of  the  Community  territory. 
In practice, market disturbances as a result of controls, 
inferred  theoretically,  become  important  only  if  the 
ruling economic order in fact assigns the corresponding 
task of regulation to the price and market mechanism. 
It is  therefore only in Part III of this document that 
the  degree  of  plausibility  in  the  appearance  of  the 
effects can  be  judged, by considering price controls in 
the light of their consistency with the economic order 
actually  existing or aimed  at by  the EEC. 
In order to assess consistency with the economic order, 
the first  thing,  in  Part III, is  to  ascertain  the ruling 
conception  of  the  economic  organization. of  Member 
States  and  of  the EEC.  In practice,  when  the  econ-
(3)  A  product  may  be  directly  or  indirectly  capable  of  ex-
ternal  trade.  A  product  is  directly  capable  of  external  trade 
if  there  is  no  natural  or  technical  obstacle  to  its  import  or 
export.  A  product  is  indirectly  capable  of  external  trade  if, 
while  it  cannot  itself  be  the  subject  of  international  trade, 
it  enters  as  an  essential  input  into  the  production  costs  of 
products  directly  capable  of  external  trade. 
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omies  of  all  EEC  Member  States  are  commonly 
called "market economies" because economic decisions 
are  taken  there  by  a  great  number  of  economic 
transactors, (
4
)  all  that is  really  meant is  that,  funda-
mentally,  these  economies  are  not  administered  by  a 
central  authority.  In  order  to  achieve  its  aims,  a 
modern  State does  not  rely  solely  on issuing  orders; 
it may  use  with equal  success  indirect means  such  as 
financial  incentives  or  disincentives,  and  while  the 
concept of market economy mentioned above no doubt 
gives  some indication of the decision-making centre, it 
does  not  tell  us  who  finally  controls  the  economic 
process.  If this  role  is  played  by  the  wishes  and 
behaviour  of  consumers  as  reflected  in  their  price 
offers, we can talk of regulation by the market mecha-
nism.  But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  the  stress  is  laid 
on  the  action  of State authorities,  we  shall  speak  of 
regulation  by  the  autonomous  action  of  economic 
policy,  even  if  the  aims  are  set  in  the  light  of  con-
sumers'  wishes  and  if  the  measures  merely  influence 
the free  formation of market prices. 
A rapid  survey  of economic  policy  indicates  that the 
concept  of  market  economy  has  a  varied  content  in 
each  country,  from  the  point  of  view  of  regulating 
the economy.  In addition to the possible diversity of 
aims,  the  essential  cause  of  variations  in  the  mix 
between  automatic  regulation  by  the  market  and 
autonomous  regulation  by  economic  policy  is  to  be 
found in divergent conceptions of the choice of those 
of the functions  indicated in section  3 of the present 
introduction which can  be  satisfactorily discharged by 
market  mechanisms  in  the  context  of  given  or  con-
ceivable  market  conditions. 
We shall therefore inquire into the mode of economic 
regulation applied, or intended to be applied predomi-
nantly,  in  the  EEC  Member  States  and  within  the 
EEC, in the light of the different aims  of such  regu-
lation. The characteristics of these modes of regulation 
cannot  be  defined  on  the  basis  of  any  written  pro-
gramme of economic organization, except for the EEC 
itself.  For  the Member  States,  hardly  any  full  basic 
programmes  are  available,  and,  furthermore,  official 
statements  of  attitude  often  conflict  with  the nature 
of  the  measures  taken. (
5
)  The attempt has  therefore 
(
4
)  Cf.  e.  g.  Groeben,  H.  von  der:  Die  Entwicklung  der 
EWG  und  ihre  Auswirkungen  auf  die  Wirtschaftsverfassung 
in  den  Mitgliedstaaten;  Die  offentliche  Unternehmung  in 
der  zweiten Stufe des  gemeinsamen  Marktes;  IIIrd European 
Conference  on  Public  Economy,  Berlin,  1965,  p.  21. 
(5)  In this connection,  Wessels  makes  the following  pertinent 
comment:  "To render lip-service to the market economy seems 
to  be  part  of  the  stock-in-trade  of  everyone  responsible  for 
economic  policy.  But this  profession  of faith  is  often follow-
ed  up  by  the  declaration  that  the  special  situation  of  the 
branch  or  country  in  question  naturally  calls  for  numerous 
limitations  on  competition."  Wessels,  Th.:  Uber  wirtschafts-
politische  Konzeptionen  des  Wettbewerbs,  Wirtschaft,  Gesell-
schaft und Kultur (Miscellany presented to A.  Muller-Armack, 
Ed.  F.  Greiss  and  F.  W.  Meyer)  Berlin,  1961,  p.  23. been  made  to  infer  the  conception  of  an  economic 
order  from  the  economic  policy  followed  since  the 
war.  Naturally,  in  drawing our conclusions,  we  have 
taken account  solely  of  the  main  lines  of  action,  and 
not  of  isolated  measures,  since  policy  guidelines  do 
not cover  all  particular problems  and  the  exceptional 
cases  encountered by  day-to-day  administration.  This 
inductive method will  also  show  whether the nature 
and number of price controls considered in the present 
study are explained solely by  exceptional situation, or 
whether such controls are a normal instrument of the 
economic policy followed.  It must also be ascertained 
what  competence  in  price  matters  is  in  principle 
assigned  to the State  under the  current legal  system. 
The study of the possible effects of price controls and 
the classification of conceptions of economic order have 
been carried out according  to the same  criteria.  It is 
therefore relatively easy to assess how far each function 
of  regulation  conforms  to the  economic  order.  If a 
control  is  calculated  to  interfere  with  the  market 
mechanisms  in  discharging  a  function  of  regulation 
which  is  theoretically  assigned  to  those  mechanisms, 
then  that  control,  from  this  point  of  view,  is  not 
consistent  with  the  order.  If the  individual  assess-
ments on all the functions of regulation are uniformly 
favourable  or  uniformly  unfavourable,  an  overall 
assessment  can  then  be  made  of  the  corresponding 
controls.  Naturally, if both favourable  and  unfavour-
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able  judgments  are  formed,  it is  impossible  to  make 
a  scientific  overall  assessment.  The  importance  of 
each function of regulation can be assessed  only from 
the  political  point  of  view,  and  it  is  generally  im-
possible  to  quantify  the  amount  of  interference  or 
support  affecting  each  function,  with  the  result  that, 
in  these  cases,  overall  assessment  must  be  left  to 
those responsible for  economic  policy. 
Any  assessment in  the light of the conception of the 
economic order of the EEC must be formulated from 
two  different  points  of  view,  corresponding  to  two 
different  stages  of  integration.  In the  first  stage,  it 
must be borne in mind that the fundamental  aims  of 
the  Treaty  are  to  be  sought  only  by  the  means 
expressly specified in the Treaty.  In this case,  enact-
ments cannot be regarded as  unfavourable unless they 
disturb  the  flow  of  factors  and  products  between 
Member States.  In another  stage,  still in the future, 
it is assumed that the foundations, implicitly contained 
in the Treaty, have been laid for a common and unified 
economic  order.  In this  case,  enactments  must  also 
be  rejected  as  inconsistent  with  the  economic  order 
where  their  directly  deducible  effects  remain  limited 
to  each  national sphere. 
Having thus outlined the objects of the study and its 
overall plan, we go on in the next Chapter to introduce 
the  subject  of  the  study  and  to  attempt  to  classify 
existing  controls  by  types. CHAPTER 2 
CONCEPT  AND  TYPES  OF PRICE CONTROLS 
1.  Price  controls  are  obligations  imposed  by  the 
State  to  act  or  to  refrain  from  acting  in  matters 
directly connected with prices.  Economic  science  de-
fines  "price"  as  the  expression  of  exchange  value. 
In modern economies, "exchange" is generally effected 
against  money  and  relates  to  products  (goods  and 
services),  factors  of  production,  or another  currency. 
We therefore have:  ( 
1
) 
(a)  product prices, i.e. the price of goods and services; 
(b)  factor  prices,  i.e.  the  price  for  the  use  of  the 
factors  of  production,  namely,  land  ( =  rent), 
labour  ( = wages)  and capital  ( = interest); 
(c)  the  exchange  rate  of  money,  i.e.  the  price  of 
foreign  currency. 
The present  study  is  not  concerned  with the  special 
problems  raised  by  national  exchange  control  enact-
ments.  In  our  analysis  of  effects,  we  assume,  in 
accordance  with current practice,  that exchange  rates 
are  fixed.  The  present  work  deals  mainly  with  the 
control of product prices.  Nevertheless, since the EEC 
Treaty  includes  provisions  designed  to  improve  the 
mobility of factors of production as well as of products, 
and since under the theory of external trade these two 
mobilities  can  under  certain  circumstances  be  substi-
tuted for each other, consideration will also  be given, 
so far as available documentation allows, to the control 
of  factor  prices. 
National economic policy makes use of instructions and 
prohibitions  concerning  product  prices  and/  or  factor 
prices  in order directly  or indirectly  to influence  the 
level of prices.  Direct action takes the form of fixing 
a specific figure for the total price or for the mark up 
and prohibiting the charging of prices  other than the 
prescribed prices.  In this case the formation of prices 
on  the  market  would  be  ruled  out  as  a  matter  of 
principle where the market prices  did not satisfy  the 
enactment.  When the influence  is  indirect,  the  level 
of prices  is,  in  principle, fixed  according  to the laws 
of  the  market.  But  price  formation  is  influenced  by 
( 
1
)  In so  far as  it defines  price as  "the consideration normally 
paid  in  money  under  certain  contracts  of  exchange,  mainly 
contracts  of  sale,  lease,  farm  letting,  work  or  services"  (a), 
(Helm,  H.  G.  Preisrecht,  in  HdB,  Vol.  III,  3rd  edition, 
entirely  rewritten,  Stuttgart,  1960,  §  4408)  legal  language, 
owing to its -inflexibility  is  not  appropriate  to  the analysis  of 
the  complete  price  system  in  a  given  economy. 
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enactments  which  compel  economic  transactors  to 
follow  certain  behaviour.  We therefore  define  price 
controls as  obligations to act or to refrain from  acting) 
imposed  by  the  State  to  influence  or  control  price 
formation)  as  well as  directly to fix  the level of prices. 
Economic  policy  actions  which  affect  the  volume  of 
supply  or  demand  and  thus  bear  only  indirectly  on 
prices,  and  action  on  costs  through  the  medium  of 
taxes  and  subsidies,  therefore fall  outside  this  defini-
tion of  price  controls. 
2.  The  first  category  of  enactments  concerns  price 
formation.  In a market  economy,  prices  are  formed 
by  the confrontation of supply (quantities offered and 
price  asked)  with demand  (quantities  demanded  and 
price  offered) on the market.  These  enactments  may 
therefore  operate  on  the  price  asked  by  the  sellers 
or  the  price  offered  by  the  buyers;  they  must  be 
regarded in part as  an  element in the law of competi-
tion. e)  There are no enactments in the EEC countries 
governing the prices offered by buyers. (3)  In grouping 
the enactments of this kind binding on the seller,  we 
can  be  guided  by  the fact  that the  process  of  price 
formation takes place in three phases; first, ascertaining 
the  necessary  and  possible  level  of  price  demands, 
secondly,  determining  prices,  and,  thirdly,  bringing 
them to the notice of  customers.  State influence may 
therefore be  exercised by: 
(a)  enactments  governing  price  formation; 
(b)  enactments  concerning  the  general  limitation of 
price levels; 
(c)  enactments governing publicity, supplemented by 
measures  of supervision. 
( a)  The  first  group  must  be  taken  to  include 
enactments  concerned  generally  with  the  freedom  to 
establish  autonomous  price  demands.  Controls  may 
protect  this  freedom  as  well  as  limit  it.  A  typical 
e)  The  frontiers  between  the  law  of  competition  and  price 
controls  are  fluid:  this  is  particularly  clearly  seen  in  the 
practice  of  the  Scandinavian  countries,  where  the  law  of 
competition  always  takes  the  form  of  price  control.  Cf.  on 
this  subject,  Stocker,  P.:  Wettbewerbspolitische  Erfahrung 
europaischer  Staaten,  in:  SchwZNu  St,  101st  year,  1965, 
p.  264. 
(3)  The legal  power  which  generally  exists  to  take  measures 
along  these  lines  has  not  so  far  been  used. measure of protection is the prohibition of resale price 
maintenance  (Verbot  der  vertikalen  Preisbindung). 
Resale  price  maintenance  exists  whenever  an  entre-
preneur (generally the manufacturer) binds the resellers 
whom  he  supplies  "to  maintain  determined  resale 
prices  and  to impose  the same  obligations  on subse-
quent  acquirers  until  sale  to  the  final  consumer". (4) 
This  practice-also  inaccurately  called  Preisbindung 
der  zweiten  Hand (5):  second  party  price  mainten-
ance--deprives the commercial  stages  down  the line, 
by  virtue of  a contract  under private  law,  protected 
by  the  State, of  the power freely  to determine  their 
price demands. The prohibition of resale price mainten-
ance therefore guarantees the distributors at all stages 
the right freely  to fix  their price demands. 
Enactments restricting the freedom of price formation 
may require certain conditions to be satisfied or certain 
rules  to  be  followed.  The  first  form  includes  the 
"stability  contracts"  (contrats  de  stabilite)  and  the 
"programme contracts" (contrats de programme) under 
French law,  briefly  known  as  the  "system  of  condi-
tional liberty", considered in greater detail in Part II. 
The  second  form  includes  the  prohibition  of  price 
discrimination and the control of rebates.  The prohibi-
tion  of discriminatory  price  practices  not only  limits 
the  level  of  prices,  but  requires  each  price  demand 
to  be  established  on  the  principle  of  "equal  prices 
for  equal services  from  the same  seller".  Differential 
prices  are  prohibited  unless  they  correspond  to  dif-
ferences in cost.  Similarly, the control of rebates does 
not  lead  to  a general  limitation  of  price  levels,  but 
merely fixes  a maximum figure for the level of rebates. 
This form  of control therefore affects  the relationship 
between gross prices and net prices. 
(b)  Enactments  concerning  the general  limitation  of 
price levels do not set maximum prices in figures,  but 
merely lay down principles for determining or assessing 
price  levels,  which  may  relate  to  a  minimum  price 
limit as  well  as  to a maximum price limit.  Prices are 
prohibited  which  do  not  conform  to  the  minimum 
and  maximum  values  resulting  from  these principles. 
The EEC countries make  little use  of controls  fixing 
minimum  price  levels  in  this  form;  reference  needs 
only  be  made  to  the  prohibition  in  France  of  sales 
below  cost  price.  Much  more  widespread  are  rules 
of costing which lay  down principles  for  taking into 
account cost components  and profits in calculating or 
assessing  upper  price  limits.  It  is  true  that  the 
maximum  price  is  not  uniformly  fixed  in  this  way, 
but the  enactments,  sometimes  very  detailed,  enable 
it to  be  calculated  easily  enough  in  each  particular 
(
4
)  Koning, D.:  Vertikale Preis- und Konditionenbindung nach 
deutschem  und  EWG-Kartellrecht,  Berlin,  Frankfurt/Main, 
1965,  p.  1. 
(
5
)  Cf.  in  this  connection,  Roper,  B.:  Die  vertikale  Preis-
bindung  bei  Markenartikeln,  Tiibingen,  1955,  pp.  6  and  fol-
lowing. 
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case.  It is infinitely harder to determine the maximum 
authorized  under  enactments  which  merely  contain 
general principles  for  assessing  the price  level.  This 
applies  to the "normal price  rule"  and  the  "prohibi-
tion of overcharging", referred to below. 
(c)  The  rules  of  publicity  oblige  sellers  to  inform 
the  public  of  their  prices.  Among  the  enactments 
applicable in the EEC countries, only the compulsory 
display  of retail prices falls  within this category. 
Among the rules for  the verification of sellers'  prices 
may be cited the simple compulsory reporting of prices, 
the compulsory  reporting  accompanied  by  a right  of 
veto,  and  the  compulsory  authorization  of  prices. 
Their object  is  to enforce the special  controls and to 
verify the economic expediency or political desirability 
of generally free prices. 
The  simple  compulsory  reporting  of  prices  merely 
requires  the price or price changes  to be reported to 
the  authorities  for  information.  The  compulsory 
reporting  accompanied  by  the  right  of  veto  obliges 
the seller to report his  price changes  and entitles the 
authorities  to  object  to  the reported prices  within  a 
specified  time.  While  the prices  reported under  this 
procedure can be charged after the expiry of the time 
limit, under the system of direct compulsory reporting, 
each new price must be the subject of express author-
isation.  The difference between these  two systems  is 
therefore  purely  administrative.  Skilfully  used,  they 
can take the place of price freezes. Compulsory report-
ing accompanied by the right of veto, and compulsory 
authorisation may  therefore be classified, according to 
the way  in which they are used, among  the measures 
designed to influence price formation, or among those 
designed directly to control the price level. 
3.  While the types of control so far considered leave 
the  setting  of  price  levels  largely  in  the  hands  of 
private  economic  transactors,  direct  price  control 
enactments,  on the other hand, impose  a much  more 
serious  restriction  on  the  freedom  of  the  market  to 
form  its  own prices.  Controls  of  this  kind set  price 
limits  in  terms of  actual  figures.  They may  take the 
form  of  setting a maximum  price (ceiling price)  or a 
minimum price (floor price) or of fixing  maximum and 
minimum  points  between  which  prices  or  margins 
may  fluctuate  (fixed  price  or  price  brackets).  Such 
enactments  may  relate  to  the  total  price  charged, 
thus  affecting  the  services  rendered  at  all  stages,  or 
to a single  stage only, generally by  fixing  the margin 
between  the buying  price  and  the  selling  price  of  a 
product (the mark up or trading margin), in absolute 
or relative  terms. 
According to the manner in which the controlled prices 
are  calculated,  a  distinction  may  be  drawn  between 
mandatory prices, calculated by  the authorities (staat-Iiebe kalkulierte Preise)  and frozen prices (Stoppreise). 
The former  are  calculated on the basis  of costs.  The 
latter are  the market prices  on a reference  date,  and 
may  be  influenced  not  only  by  costs  and  the market 
situation, but also by restraints on competition. 
( a)  Maximum  prices  are  the  commonest  form  of 
direct price controls in the EEC countries.  Maximum 
price  controls  are  introduced  when  the prices  estab-
lished  by  market  conditions  reach  levels  which  are 
deemed undesirable from  the point of view of policy 
for  the  distribution  of  wealth  or  for  other  reasons. 
The aim  is,  by  means  of  mandatory  prices  or frozen 
prices to compel the suppliers to lower their prices or 
to  refrain  from  raising  them,  thus  favouring  the 
consumers. 
A maximum  price  may  be  calculated on the basis  of 
the individual costs  of  each  seller,  or  on  the  average 
costs  of  "a well  managed  enterprise".  If unit  costs 
vary  from  one  seller  to  another,  the  first  method 
leads  to maximum prices which vary according to the 
enterprise, but standardizes  the maximum unit profit. 
The equalizing  effect  of  this  instrument of  maximum 
price policy from the point of view of the distribution 
of  wealth is  therefore  substantial.  Under the second 
method  a maximum  unit price  is  fixed  which  allows 
the  continuance  of  differences  of  profit  if  the  unit 
costs  differ.  If it is  desired to avoid a fall  in supply, 
the calculation must be based on the costs of marginal 
producers.  The higher  it proves  necessary  to fix the 
unit price  the higher  will be  the production revenue 
of  the  sellers  with  relatively  favourable  costs.  The 
effect  on  the  distribution of  wealth is  therefore  less 
marked  than that of  the former  method. 
If the actual market prices  seem  acceptable,  and it is 
desired  to prevent further rises,  this  can  be  done by 
freezing  prices.  Here  again,  it is  possible  either  to 
freeze  all  individual  prices,  or  to  choose  what  is 
regarded as  a representative price as  the frozen  price. 
(b)  Minimum  price  controls  are  introduced when it 
is  desired  to  favour  the  sellers,  generally  when  free 
price  formation  would  entail  an  "exploitation"  of 
the seller  by  the buyer.  In this case,  also,  the price 
level may  be  mandatory or may  be  adopted from  the 
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market  price.  It  is  true  that  market  prices  are  in 
danger  not only  of  serving  to  support a branch,  but 
also  of  preserving  menaced  forms  of  monopolistic 
markets.  But  since  the  sellers  are  generally  in  a 
stronger  position,  this  instrument  is  rarely  used  in 
practice.  Only minimum wage controls have a certain 
importance. 
(c)  The  types  of  control  so  far  discussed  all  take 
the  form  of  the  legal  limitation  of  price  movements 
in one direction only.  The combination of these types 
in  fixed  prices  or  price  brackets  limits  price  move-
ments  in  either  direction.  Fixed  prices  and  price 
brackets  are  designed  to  protect  both  buyers  and 
sellers  from  "exploitation" by  the other party. 
Fixed  prices  apply  mainly  in  two  fields,  namely  the 
price  of  products  of  public  enterprises,  generally 
sheltered from  the competition of private enterprises, 
and the prices on markets which are in disequilibrium. 
In the first case the fixed  price, from the formal point 
of  view,  does  not represent  any  intervention  by  the 
authorities  on the  market,  but the  fixing  within  the 
enterprise of the desired price,  in the same  way  as  is 
done  by  a  private  entrepreneur.  But  there  may  be 
differences  in  substance  if,  in  fixing  prices,  the State 
has other objects than those of a private entrepreneur. 
In the  second  case,  the fixed  price  is  an  instrument 
of market  organization. 
In normal  times,  the price  bracket  system  allows  the 
free formation of prices between a floor  and a ceiling. 
It is  simply  designed  to prevent major price  fluctua-
tions due to temporary disparities between supply and 
demand.  The system thus also  favours  market organ-
isation in a situation where absolutely free price forma-
tion  would  have  undesirable  results  for  the  national 
economy. 
This attempt to classify price controls gives  an overall 
view of the obligations to act or to refrain from acting 
applied by  the EEC  countries  in  the  matter of price 
control, and at the same time supplies an outline plan 
for analysing the effects of these controls.  But before 
going on to this point the different categories of effects 
and the methods by which they can be inferred must 
be described. CHAPTER  3 
THE CRITERIA OF THE STUDY 
1.  THE  STARTING  POINT  FOR  AN ANALYSIS 
OF THE  EFFECTS  IN A CLOSED  ECONOMY 
The  effects  can  be  analysed  by  inquiring  into  the 
possible incidences  on competition and on the market 
mechanisms.  The  starting  points  of  this  study  will 
be  established by  the  inquiry which follows  into the 
results  and  conditions  of  the  functioning  of  market 
mechanisms.  Since,  according  to  Mason,  there  are 
as  many  definitions  of  functional  competition,  and, 
therefore of market mechanisms, as there are functional 
national  economies e)  we  cannot  adopt  a  general 
definition;  we  must  therefore  first  inquire  into  the 
tasks which must be performed by market mechanisms 
if they  are  to  be  regarded  as  functioning  properly. 
We shall  then go  on  to  indicate the prior conditions 
which must be  satisfied if the market mechanisms  are 
to fulfil  the functions  described. 
Competition and market mechanisms  are not ends in 
themselves,  but  merely  means  of  achieving  different 
ends.  In the context of the present economic analysis, 
we  are  concerned  with  competition  solely  as  the 
driving force of market mechanisms, and with market 
mechanisms  solely  as  instruments  for  the  regulation 
of the economic process for the achievement of overall 
long  term  economic  aims.  If price  controls  affect 
competition and the market mechanisms, they thereby 
further or retard the achievement of these aims.  The 
analysis  of their effects  should  therefore envisage  the 
adaptation of  controls  to  the  aims. 
The  starting  points  for  the  long  term  aims,  in  all 
economies  based  on  the  division  of  labour,  are  the 
major  problems  of  production  and  distribution,  the 
problem of production being  in tum subdivided into 
problems of the level  of production and  problems of 
the  pattern  of  production.  The  problem  of  level 
relates  to  the  determination  of  the  amount  of  the 
national  product.  The  problem  of  patterns  covers 
questions  relating  to the composition of the national 
product (pattern  by  branch  or pattern of outputs), to 
the combination of factors by means of which a given 
quantitative or  qualitative  result  of  production  is  to 
be obtained (pattern  of inputs or of the utilization of 
factors) and to the territorial distribution of economic 
activity  (regional  pattern).  Finally,  the  problem  of 
(
1
)  Cf.  Mason,  E.  S.:  Economic Concentration  and the Mono-
poly  Problem,  Cambridge  (Mass.)  1957,  p.  381. 
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distribution  concerns  the distribution of  the  benefits 
of the national product obtained. 
The aims  sought by the EEC countries in connection 
with these fundamental problems are largely the same. 
With regard  to  level,  the  aim  is  maximum  growth, 
and  with  regard  to distribution,  the  aim  is  a  more 
equalitarian distribution.  Among  the theoretical aims 
connected with the problem of patterns, those affecting 
the pattern of inputs and outputs are generally subor-
dinate to the growth target, while the place of regional 
policy  goals  is  not always  clear.  Similarly,  the short 
term goals  of  the "magic triangle"  (full  employment, 
price  stability,  and  the  equilibrium  of  external 
payments),  which  can  be  regarded  as  by-products  of 
the  aims  of growth  and  distribution,  have  the  same 
value  in all  European  countries. e) 
In  the  context  of  the  guidelines  set,  autonomous 
regulation through economic policy is directed towards 
concrete  aims,  which  are  to  a  large  extent  freely 
chosen.  Market mechanisms,  on  the other hand,  can 
only  discharge  well  defined  functions  of  regulation, 
and  can  therefore  merely,  in  certain  circumstances, 
make  a  contribution  towards  the  achievement  of 
certain  aims.  In our  view,  market  mechanisms  are 
functional  when  they  discharge  the  following  func-
tions (3)  in connection with the fundamental problems 
and  aims: 
(I) The  development  function,  concerned  with  the 
question  of  level,  and  directed  towards  the  increase 
and improvement of the factors  of production, which, 
in  the  last  analysis,  determine  growth;  it  operates 
through: 
( 1  )  the  quantitative  adjustment  of  the  economic 
production mechanism to the aggregate variations 
in  demand  (quantitative  development  function), 
and 
e>  Cf.  e.g.  the  classification  of price  stability  under  the  aim 
of  distribution  in  Bonbach,  G.:  Preisniveaustabilitat,  wirt-
schaftliches  W achstum  und  Einkommensverteilung,  in  Schw-
ZfVuSt,  95th year/1959,  pp.  19  and foil. 
(l)  The following  functions  have been developed  on the basis 
of Kantzenbach's  functions  of competition.  We do  not,  how-
ever,  always  describe  them  as  such,  since  competition  is 
merely  a  necessary  condition,  and  not  a  sufficient  condition, 
of  the  operation  of  market  mechanisms.  Cf.  Kantzenbach, 
E.:  Die  Funktionsfiihigkeit  des  Wettbewerbs,  GOttingen, 
1966,  p.  16.  . ( 2 )  the  extension  and  reinforcement  of  technical 
knowledge  about  the  factors  of  production, 
production  methods  and  products  (qualitative 
development  function). 
(II) The  allocation  function (
4
)  concerned  with  the 
question of patterns, which governs  the utilization of 
the disposable factors of production, and which should 
fulfil  the following tasks in the light of the individual 
problems  which  arise: 
( 3)  to regulate the pattern of outputs in the light of 
purchasers'  preferences  as  reflected in price  rela-
tionships; 
( 4)  to  regulate  the  overall  pattern  of  inputs (5)  in 
the  light  of  the  productivity  of  the  factors  of 
production  and  of productive enterprises,  and 
( 5 )  to  regulate  the regional  pattern  in  the  light  of 
regional  cost  advantages. 
(III) On  the  question  of  distribution,  the  function 
of the market mechanisms is to distribute, in the light 
of the services  performed by the market, the benefits 
of  the  national  product  obtained  (distribution  func-
tion). In modern economies, where money operates as 
a  title  to  a  share  in  the  results  of  production,  the 
distribution  function  has  a  monetary  element  and  a 
real element:  (6
) 
( 6)  to  regulate  the  distribution  of  incomes  in  the 
light  of  the  services  rendered  by  the  market 
(monetary  distribution  function);  and 
( 7)  to  regulate  the  personal  distribution  of  goods 
and  services  in  the  light  of  the  assessment  of 
marginal  utility  and  the  readiness  of  buyers  to 
pay the price asked (real distribution function). 
A  market  mechanism  of  this  kind  is  not a universal 
and infallible force of nature, but "a cultivated product 
of civilisation"  (ein  kulturelles  Zuchtungsprodukt) e) 
(
4
)  To  avoid  any  mtsmterpretation,  it  should  be  noted  that 
this  function  should  ensure  "allocation  as  movement"  as 
advocated  by  Clark  and  Stegeman.  There  is  therefore  no 
question  of  aiming  at  a  social  and  economic  optimum,  but 
merely  of  trends  in  this  direction,  which  are  interrupted  by 
any  change in the data and subsequently resume  their course. 
Cf.  Clark,  J.  M.:  Competition  as  a  Dynamic  Process,  Wash-
ington,  D.  C.,  1961,  p.  16  and  pp.  70  and  foll.  Stegemann, 
K.:  W ettbewerb  und  Harmonisierung  im  Gemeinsam  Markt, 
Cologne,  Berlin,  Bonn,  Mi.inich,  1966,  pp.  83  and  following. 
e)  It should be made clear  that the regulation of the pattern 
of  inputs  affects  the substitution  between  factors  of  produc-
tion  as  well  as  the  shift  of  production  among  productive 
enterprises. 
(
6
)  It should  be added  that the market mechanisms  discharge 
their  distribution  function  only  when consumers  are  satisfied 
in  descending  order of  their  readiness  to  pay  the  price,  and 
that,  personal  relationships  of  marginal  utility  being  equal, 
this  readiness  is  determined  by  the  service  rendered  on  the 
market. 
(1)  Cf.  Albert, H.:  Der Marktmechanismus im sozialen  Krafte-
feld;  Systeme  und Methoden  in  den  Wirtschafts- und Sozial-
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which  can  function  properly  only  on  certain  specific 
conditions.  The first is  a market system under which, 
by  the free confrontation of supply and demand, rela-
tions  of  exchange  between  goods  and  services  and 
their  counterpart,  or in  other  words,  prices,  can  be 
formed  in  such  a way  as  to  establish  a  quantitative 
equivalence  between  supply  and demand. 
The  relations  of exchange (
8
)  between products  must 
therefore  be  flexible,  or  in  other  words,  they  must 
necessarily increase when 
(a)  the volume of demand in a given period exceeds 
the  production  capacity  (price  rises  connected 
with  demand),  or 
( b)  the rise in factor prices  is  not offset  by  gains  in 
productivity  (price  rises  connected  with  costs); 
Conversely, these relations must necessarily fall  when 
(c)  competition  becomes  keener  (price  reductions 
connected with competition). 
The second condition is  that prices must influence the 
direction  of  the  economic  activity  of  the  economic 
transactors concerned. (
9
)  Directional impulses with a 
utility for  all  the functions  of the economy  can occur 
only  when  there is  competition  on both sides  of  the 
market.  The competition necessary to the functioning 
of the market mechanisms must also manifest itself in: 
(a)  "the autonomous  propensity of  sellers  or buyers 
( competitors) reciprocally  influencing each other 
by  their economic  success  to enter into business 
relations  with  third  parties  (customers  or  sup-
pliers),  in  the  expectation  of  optimum  business 
conditions" eo) (market competition) (Marktwett-
bewerb) as  well as  in 
(b)  the  effort  to  create  possibilities  for  favourable 
business  conditions  (preparatory  competition) 
(Vorbereitungswettbewerb ). 
Under existing conditions, market competition operates 
through  the parameters  of  action  of  prices, (
11
)  qual-
wissenschaften,  Miscellany  presented  to Beckerath,  Tiibingen, 
1964,  p.  100. 
(
8
)  In thus  closely  following  the  general  concept  of  "price", 
it  must  be  noted  that  not  every  absolute  monetary  price  is 
bound  to  be  flexible.  The  exchange  relation  of  a  product 
may  theoretically  vary,  while  its  absolute  monetary  price 
remains  constant  in  value,  as  a  result  of  variations  in  the 
absolute monetary price of  all other products, or of variations 
in  quality.  In  practice,  the  market  mechanisms  should  no 
doubt  work  less  well  on  the  occasion  of  such  modifications 
in  exchange  relations  than  in  the  event  of  variations  in 
absolute  monetary  prices. 
(
9
)  It is  for  this  reason  that  the  market  mechanisms  are 
also  known  as  price  mechanisms. 
(1°)  Borchardt,  K.  and  Fikentscher,  W.:  Wettbewerb,  Wett-
bewerbsbeschrankung und Marktbeherrschung, Stuttgart, 1957, 
p.  15. 
(
11
)  I.e.  basic  price;  rebates,  discounts,  transport  costs  and 
terms  of  payment. ity e 2)  and  terms  of  delivery. (13) e 4)  Preparatory 
competition,  being  forward-looking,  is  actuated  by  a 
desire to change the data applicable to the parameters 
of  action  of  market  competition.  Its  parameters  of 
action  are  therefore  investments es) and  management 
action  aimed  at  increasing  production  capacity,  at 
rationalization  and  at the encouragement  of  research 
and development. 
But these  two forms  of competition are not mutually 
independent.  In the long run, neither can exist without 
the  other.  Without preparatory competition,  market 
competition  would  soon  collapse.  In  strict  theory, 
the  final  outcome  of  a  trend  determined  by  market 
competition  alone  would  be  stagnation  in  an  equili-
brium  of  perfect competition.  Similarly,  preparatory 
competition is not infinitely conceivable in the absence 
of market  competition.  Here  again,  in  strict  theory 
its outcome would be  a state of stagnation  in  which 
each  entrepreneur had a monopoly of his  production. 
Every  stage  of  competition  therefore  contains  the 
elements  of an impetus  towards  the next  stage. 
It  is  now  necessary  to  inquire  into  the  conditions 
which must be satisfied on  the side of supply  and of 
demand,  if  this  two-stage  competition  is  to  operate 
between the parties in  line with the functions  of the 
market mechanisms. 
The supply side  of the market must be made up of a 
number of sellers, possessing both the objective power 
to  compete and  the  subjective will  to compete.  The 
elements  in  the  power  to  compete  are  institutional 
freedom  of action  and  the  feasibility  of action  along 
the parameters of action listed above. 
The first  element demands, in addition to freedom  of 
enterprise  and  freedom  to  trade,  freedom  to  reduce 
prices,  already  referred  to.  Action  is  feasible,  if  the 
variation of the quantity or quality of supplies depends 
mainly  on  human  will  (if  reproduction  is  possible), 
and  if  the  actual  or  potential  suppliers  also  have 
certain financial  resources  to enable  them  to act  (the 
capacity to finance  investments). 
(1
2
)  Including  the  quality  of  the  product  and  the  after-sales 
service  desired. 
(
13
)  Essentially,  delivery  dates. 
(1
4
)  Advertising,  which  is  often  added  to  this  list,  is  merely 
a medium  of information about conditions of sale.  If it steps 
beyond  this  role  and  itself  becomes  a  parameter  of  action, 
we  end  up  on  the  macro-economic  plane  with  a  waste  of 
productive forces.  Cf.  also on this  subject:  Brosse, U.:  Volks-
wirtschaftliche  Verschwendung  durch  Werbung?  in:  WuW 
1967,  pp.  320  and  foil. 
(1
5
)  Investment  is  interpreted  to  include  any  use  of  the 
factors  of  production  to  maintain,  enlarge  or  improve  the 
resources  of  factors  of  production  or  technical  knowledge, 
other  than  in  the  case  of  households. 
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The originating  cause  of  the spirit  of competition  is 
the  personal  interest e
6
)  which  necessarily  generates 
the desire to maximize long term profits by producing 
marketable  products.  This  desire  is  manifested  by 
the producer's effort to increase, or at least to preserve, 
his  share  of  the  market.  The  spirit  of  competition 
springs  only  partly  from  spontaneous  impulse;  far 
more  important  on  the  whole  is  the  indirect,  and, 
above  all,  the  direct,  compulsion  to  improve  the 
services  rendered.  A  spontaneous  impulse  can,  in 
general,  come  into  being  only  when  there  is  some 
possibility that competitors will be found to react, not 
directly to the act of competition, but to the resulting 
shift in demand.  In this case,  the spontaneous  attack 
on the market  position  of  competitors  amounts  to a 
direct compulsion on them to react by competition on 
their own part if they are not resigned  to accepting a 
diminution  of  their profits  and of  their  share  of  the 
market.  In developed  economies,  the  major  driving 
force  of indirect compulsion becomes  powerful if the 
majority of suppliers, ignorant of, and alarmed by the 
competitive  projects  and  activities  of  their  fellows 
become apprehensive of shifts in demand and prepare 
themselves  for  "preventive  warfare".  In  such  a 
"climate", further competitive drives are always to be 
expected,  which  will  sustain  the  desired  process  of 
the reduction of prices and costs and the improvement 
of quality. 
The  existence  of  these  conditions  allows  supply  to 
behave  in line  with  the  action  of the market mecha-
nisms  described  in  listing  the  functions  above. e 7) 
The question whether this  behaviour with a view  to 
maximizing profits  is  rational,  and therefore plausible 
in the long term, depends on the state of demand. 
On  the  demand  side  there  must  be  a  number  of 
consumers  who  in  their  personal  interest  desire  to 
achieve  the  maximum  long  term  material  utility  by 
the acquisition of goods.  In addition the freedom  of 
choice of  the contracting parties  must not be limited 
by State or individual action.  In these conditions we 
('
6
)  In this  connection it should  be noted  at  the outset  that 
the  profit  motive  need  not be  the  direct  stimulus  to  action; 
it is  enough  if profit  is  regarded  as  a  success  symbol  (e.g. 
by  conferring  power,  prestige  or  security).  Furthermore  we 
can  agree  with  Seidenfus  that  it  is  only  the  maximizing  of 
long-term  profits  which  can  bring  about  the  optimum  func-
tioning  of  the  competitive  economy,  and  not  the  existence 
of  "profit  grabbers"  whose  aim  is  to  "get  as  much  as  pos-
sible"  out  of  the  market,  as  quickly  as  possible,  without 
reinvesting  their  gains.  Cf.  Seidenfus,  H.  St.:  Kurzfristige 
und  langfristige  Wirkungen  des  Wettbewerbs,  Systeme  und 
Methoden  in  den  Wirtschafts- und  Sozialwissenschaften  (Ed. 
Kloten,  N.;  Krelle,  W.;  Muller,  H.;  Neumark,  F.),  Tiibingen, 
1964,  p.  684. 
('
7
)  These  are  also  the  conditions  for  a  positive  elasticity  of 
suppliers'  prices,  an  elasticity  which  is,  however,  not  al-
ways  necessary  to  the functioning  of  the  market  mechanisms 
in  the  case  of  direct  reactions  of  the  volume  of  supply  to 
variations  in  the  volume  of  demand. may expect to find in each market a negative elasticity 
of  the  volume  of  demand  in  relation  to  the  price 
variations of each supplier. 
But these  minimum conditions for  the functioning  of 
the  market  mechanisms  do  not,  however,  guarantee 
that  the  functions  will  be  satisfactorily  discharged, 
qualitatively  and  quantitatively,  from  the  point  of 
view of the economy  as  a whole.  The quality of  the 
results, i.e.  the line of  action of the mechanisms,  can 
correspond to overall economic goals,  only  if there is 
at least approximate identity between the costs to the 
community  and  to  individuals  and  the  results.  The 
quantitative  results  are  reflected  in  the  speed  with 
which the market mechanisms  function.  If the mini-
mum  conditions  only  are  satisfied,  we  can  only 
expect a very clumsy  ex post co-ordination.  In order 
to  speed  up  ex  post  co-ordination  and  to  establish 
anticipatory and evaluative ex ante co-ordination, sup-
pliers and consumers must have adequate possibilities 
of creating market transparency  as  to the situation of 
their opposite numbers and  its  development.  The ex 
ante  co-ordination  of enterprises  results  from  action 
on the basis  of expected price impulses.  In order to 
prevent mistakes in forecasting from leading to excess-
ive  surplus capacity,  it is  absolutely  essential for  the 
supplier to have a certain minimum knowledge of the: 
prospective action  of his  competitors.  But  since  the 
transparency of the behaviour and reactions of competi-
tors at the same time reduces uncertainty and insecur-
ity  and  thus  strengthens  the  tendency  of  sellers  to 
adopt  concerted  restrictive  behaviour, es)  too  much 
knowledge  is  undesirable  owing  to  the  great  im-
portance of indirect pressure for  the will to compete. 
The  latent  tendency  of  suppliers  towards  collusive 
restraint or competition is also favoured if the freedom 
of action of consumers  is  materially or institutionally 
restricted  for  certain  products. e
9
)  Such  limitations 
involve  a  serious  reduction  in the  price  elasticity  of 
aggregate  demand.  The  result  is  that  competition 
policy has  a special task of supervising markets which 
are  highly  transparent as  between suppliers  and their 
competitors and markets where the price elasticity of 
aggregate demand is  very low. 
This  outline  of  the  conditions  and  results  of  the 
functioning of market mechanisms leads to the follow-
(18)  On  this  point,  cf.  also  Mestmacker,  E.-J.:  Probleme  des 
Bestmoglichen  in  der  Wettbewerbspolitik,  Probleme  der  nor-
mativen  okonomik  und  der  wirtschaftspolitischen  Beratung, 
SdVfS,  new  series,  Vol.  29,  Berlin,  1963,  p.  316. 
( 
19
)  Institutional  limitations  exist,  for  example,  where  the 
State  prescribes  the  purchase  of  certain  products,  or  forbids 
it  to  the  detriment  of  certain  substitute  products.  Material 
limitations  exist  where  there  are  no  substitute  goods  and 
consumers  are  forced  to  take  the  decision  to  buy  (e.g.  in 
order  to  subsist).  In  the  second  case,  the  price  elasticity 
of  aggregate  demand  may  even  be  positive  (Giffen's  case). 
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ing conclusions  for the analysis  of the effects  of price 
controls in a closed economy. 
In studying the effects  on competition we  shall  start 
with  their influence  on  the  ability  to  compete.  This 
will be affected if the enactments in question influence 
the  institutional  freedom  of  action  to  reduce  prices 
in  a  system  of  market  competition or the  feasibility 
of action  to  finance  investments  under  a  system  of 
preparatory  competition.  But  since  the  degree  of 
market transparency  is  also  important to the exercise 
of  the  ability  to  compete,  we  shall  also  study  the 
influence of price controls on market transparency on 
the side both of supply and of demand. 
From the point of  view  of the spirit of competition, 
we  want  to  know  if the  controls  are  calculated  to 
affect the spontaneous impulse and the direct pressure 
as  well  as  the important  indirect  pressure  to engage 
in  competition. 
The next stage is  to inquire whether the price controls 
allow  price  rises  motivated  by  costs  and  price  rises 
motivated  by demand.  On  the  basis  of  the  results 
arrived at, it then becomes possible briefly to indicate 
how  these  influences  operate  on  the  results  of  the 
market  mechanisms.  The  conclusion  of  this  part of 
the analysis  of  the effects  is  therefore constituted  by 
the  transposition of the results  achieved at  this  stage 
to  the  functions  of the  market  mechanisms;  in  this 
connection,  the  orientation  of  the regional  structure 
will  be  disregarded,  since  it  cannot  generally  be  the 
subject of any useful deduction. 
An  analysis  of  this  kind  is  valueless  in  cases  where, 
for  other reasons,  the  conditions  for  the  functioning 
of the market mechanisms  are  not satisfied and when 
they  cannot  or should  not be  introduced for  reasons 
of economic policy.  In such cases, it would be better 
to  inquire  whether  the  introduction  of  appropriate 
measures  could  simulate  the  functional  effects.  But 
since  a classification  of  this  kind  for  each  market  is 
not always possible in  the present study, this method 
can  be  adopted  only  when  the  absence  of  the prior 
conditions  appears  manifest. 
2.  THE  STARTING  POINT  FOR  AN  ANALYSIS 
OF  THE EFFECTS  IN AN OPEN  ECONOMY 
In addition to the effects inferred in a closed economy, 
additional effects may become apparent in an economy 
which  is  open  in  both directions.  In the  first  place 
price  controls  may  affect  the  results  of  integration 
expected from  the opening of markets, and,  secondly, 
the  opening  of  markets  may  modify  the  conditions 
for  the proper implementation of the controls  and,  in 
consequence,  the effects  found  in  the earlier  part of the analysis.  The definition of the starting points for 
this new phase in our study calls in the first  place for 
an  examination  of  the plausible  effects  of  integration 
corresponding  to  fundamental  economic  aims. 
The opening of markets consists of eliminating between 
previously closed economies  obstacles  to the mobility 
of products  and  factors.  If the economic  systems  of 
these  countries  are  governed  by  market  mechanisms 
integration will subject all these economies to common 
mechanisms.  This extension may involve an intensifica-
tion  of  competition  and  may  improve  the  market 
results  for  the  whole  of  the  integrated  territory,  if 
prices  can  vary  as  described  in  the previous  section. 
The tendency towards keener competition also results 
from  the  positive  effects  on  the  conditions  of  that 
competition.  The elements  in  the  ability  to compete 
are affected  as  follows.  The integration of the market 
widens  the  range  of  institutional  freedom  of  action. 
Prices may be reduced for the benefit of a wider circle 
of  consumers,  so  that  a larger  flow  of  demand  than 
before integration becomes possible.  This wider range 
thus  gives  powerful  competitors  greater  chances  o£ 
improving  their aggregate profits, thus tending to im-
prove  their  feasibility  of  action.  This  feasibility  is 
further strengthened by  easier access  to the factors of 
production  and  by  the  additional  possibilities  of 
making ''economies of scale" which often result from 
increased demand.  Specially important is  the influence 
of integration on the will to compete.  At the moment 
of integration the sellers in the different countries have 
neither  concerted modes  of  behaviour  nor  the  senti-
ment of solidarity; eo)  in other words, there are very 
few psychological or traditional obstacles to aggressive 
behaviour  on  the  market.  The  probability  of  spon-
taneous impulses should therefore be heightened, at any 
rate for  a certain time, in consequence of integration. 
The increase in the number of competitors, moreover, 
reduces  the transparency of  the market on the supply 
side for all  sellers.  The result is  greater indirect pres-
sure.  Since the importance of direct pressure depends 
essentially on the elements in the spirit of competition 
already  cited,  it may  therefore be expected  that they 
will all be stimulated by integration. 
On the basis  of  this  review  of  individual  economies., 
it  is  now  possible  to  ascertain  the  consequences  of 
integration on  the overall effects  of the market mech-
anisms.  We shall  start by  setting  out the  effects  to 
be expected under the classical theory of external trade 
and we shall then classify those effects according to the 
functions  of  the  market  mechanisms  indicated  in  the 
preceding section. 
On  the  assumption  of  constant  levels  and  constant 
decisive  factors  of  demand,  determining  structures, 
e')  Cf.  on  this  point  Stegemann,  K.:  Wettbewerb,  op.  cit., 
p.  78  and foil. 
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constant aggregate availability of factors of production 
and constant production techniques, the classical theory 
of external trade  infers  the  trends which  lead  to the 
theoretical marginal values  of the trade optimum and 
the maximum  relative  and  absolute production. 
The trade  optimum characterizes the maximum utility 
to consumers for  a given production and  a given dis-
tribution of income.  It is  achieved when the marginal 
rates  of  substitution  for  all  goods  for  all  consumers 
of those goods are equal to the reciprocal of their social 
values  (price =  marginal  social costs).  If before inte·-
gration there is optimum internal trade in each member 
country and if the relations cited have different values 
in the different countries,  the result is  that the intro-
duction  of  perfect  mobility  of freely  traded products 
(exclusively  determined  by  prices)  involves  a  new 
distribution  in  the  integrated  territory  of  the  given 
results of production, increasing the aggregate utility. 
The  relations  of  marginal  rates  of  substitution  and 
prices are equalized in the countries concerned. (2
1
) 
In the  following  example-in which  transport  costs 
are  disregarded-the sign  of  inequality  between  the 
relations for Germany (D) and France (F) is  changed 
into an  equal sign  for goods  (x) 1 and 2: 
oxw  p2D  p2F  OXiF 
-----:;e-----
OX2D  - Pw  PiF  - ox2F 
The institution in the integrated territory of uniform 
price  relations  of  products  generates  differences  be-
tween  the  price  of  products  and  marginal  costs  in 
different member countries.  If the factors  of produc-
tion  are  perfectly  mobile  within  member  countries, 
these differences  will induce national variations in the 
pattern of  outputs which,  in  extreme cases,  will lead 
to  the achievement of maximum  national production. 
In the course of this process, the relations of the mar-
ginal  costs  of the  countries  will be harmonized both 
among  themselves  and  with  the  European  relations 
of  product  prices.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the 
whole  of  the  integrated  territory,  the  result  is  a 
division  of  labour  in  the  light  of  comparative  cost 
advantages,  and,  therefore,  the  relative  maximum  of 
production. 
In  the  following  formula,  cited  as  an  example,  the 
inequality  sign  is  again  converted into an  equal sign: 
Ki1D  p1E  Ki1F  1st index:  products  1 and 2 
--= -- :;C -- 2nd index:  countries D and F 
Ki2D  P2E  Ki2F  E = Europe. 
According  to Heckscher and  Ohlin's law of  compen-
sation, the equalization of the price of products already 
(2
1
)  For  the  theoretical  details,  d.  e.g.  Giersch,  H.:  Das 
Handelsoptimum;  in  WA,  Vol.  75/1956  I, pp.  6  and  foiL involves,  even  in  the  absence  of  mobility  of  factors 
within  the  Community,  a  tendency  for  factor  prices 
to come into line, and a consequent partial achievement 
of  the absolute  maximum of production for  the inte-
grated  territory.  Taking  very  restrictive  conditions, 
Lerner and  Samuelson  have proved that the  mobility 
of products may be a perfect substitute for the mobility 
of factors and may therefore lead to an absolute equal-
ization  of  factor  prices  and  a  full  realization  of  the 
absolute  maximum  of  production.  But  it is  hard  to 
imagine less  realistic conditions. (22 ) 
In  comparatively  more  realistic  conditions,  we  can 
count  on  a  tendency  to  the  absolute  maximum  of 
production if the factors  of production are  also  fully 
mobile  in  the  integrated  territory.  Since  the  equal-
ization  of  the  relation  of  marginal  costs,  referred  to 
above,  still leaves  differences  subsisting  between  one 
State  and  another  in  the productivity  of  factors  and 
their prices, the countries with high factor productivity 
and  high  factor  prices  will  attract  the  factors  from 
countries  where  their  price  is  low.  The  resulting 
tendency  to  harmonize  factor  prices  and  productivity 
will involve Member States not only in further changes 
in the pattern of outputs, but also in a change in the 
pattern of  inputs.  The theoretical  marginal  value  of 
these  processes  is  the division  of labour  in  the light 
of  absolute  cost  advantages,  and  the  full  realization 
of the absolute maximum of production for the whole 
of the integrated territory. 
If  we want to represent these phenomena by a formula, 
we  can  start from  the  equality of marginal  costs  for 
the production of a given good which can be expressed 
as  the  sum  of the  quotients  of  factor  prices  and  of 
their productivity 
n 
q'i 
OXi 
OVi 
i=l 
(i = factor  1, 2, ... n) 
Where product prices and marginal costs for a product 
are  equal,  differences  peculiar  to  a  State  in  the 
remuneration  of  equal  factors  are  accompanied  by 
differences  in  the productivity  of factors: 
e
2
)  For fuller details on the substitution of mobility of products 
for  mobility of factors,  cf.  Ohlin, B.:  Interregional and Inter-
national  Trade,  Cambridge  (Mass.);  Samuelson,  P.  A.:  Inter-
national  Trade  and  the  Equalization  of Factor  Prices,  in  E}, 
Vol.  58,  1948,  pp.  163  and  foil.;  id.  International  Factor 
Price  Equalization  Once  Again, in EJ, Vol.  59,  1949,  pp.  181 
and foil.  (these two articles  have been  translated into German 
and  reproduced  in  Rose,  K.  (ed);  Theorie  der  internationalen 
Wirtschaftsbeziehung,  Cologne,  Berlin,  1965,  pp.  69  and 
foil.);  Haberler,  G.:  Aussenhandel  (Theorie)  in  HdSW-,  Vol. 
I, Stuttgart, Tiibingen,  GOttingen,  1956,  pp.  463  and  foil. 
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if:  qw  ~  qiF 
Oxw  OXiF 
then: --iD  ~ --
ovw  OVil' 
The introduction of the  mobility  of  factors  between 
States  makes  it  possible,  in  these  relations  also,  to 
change inequality signs into equal signs. 
Viner contrasts with these favourable  effects  for wel-
fare-which  can  be  regarded  as  the  result  of  the 
appearance  of  trade  between  the  integrated  territo-
ries-the adverse  effects  of  the diversion of trade  of 
third countries, which are, however, irrelevant for our 
purpose. (23 )  Furthermore,  in  the  method  of  presen-
tation  which  we  have  selected,  these  effects  cannot 
appear,  since  we have started from  the principle that 
national economies, previously entirely closed, are inte-
grated in an  economic unit which is  also closed to the 
outside world. 
The effects of integration, resulting from the extension 
of the territorial :field  of  action  of the  market  mech-
anisms, may be regarded as theoretical marginal values 
for  the  free  functioning  of  these  mechanisms  in  the 
integrated  territory,  in  regard  to  the  trade  optimum 
for the real distribution function and the absolute and 
relative  maximum  of  production  for  the  three  com-
ponents of the allocation function.  But this covers part 
only  of  the list  of functions.  Classical  theory  treats 
monetary distribution and quantitative and qualitative 
development  as  established exogenous  data. 
Recent  extensions  of theory,  however, e
4
)  regard  the 
favourable  effects  on  the  development  function  as 
precisely  the  most  important  effects  of  integration, 
calculated  to  increase  production  and  welfare.  We 
share  this  view.  But  the  market  mechanisms  cannot 
satisfactorily discharge the development function with-
out  the  incentives  derived  from  the  other  functions 
and it would therefore be  a mistake to disregard  the 
allocation and distribution functions. 
With regard to the quantitative development function, 
we  can  expect,  at  least  temporarily,  an  increase  in 
growth  investments,  thus  increasing  both  aggregate 
demand  and  production  capacity.  A  direct  effect  of 
the  operation  of  the allocation  function  is  that  new 
investments can  be made  without obstacle and to the 
extent  which  may  be  necessary  in  the  sectors  and 
countries  favoured  by  integration,  whereas  disinvest-
(
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)  Cf.  on all  these questions:  Viner, }.:  The Customs Union 
Issue,  New  York,  London,  1950);  Meade,  }.  E.:  The Theory 
of  Customs  Unions,  Amsterdam,  1955;  Lipsey,  R.  G.:  The 
Theory  of  Customs  Unions:  Trade  Diversion  and  Welfare; 
in  Economica,  Vol.  XXIV,  1957,  pp.  40  and  foll. 
(2
4
)  Cf.  Scitovsky,  T.:  Economic  Theory  and  Western  Econ-
omic  Integration,  London,  1958;  Balassa,  B.:  The  Theory  of 
Economic  Integration,  1st  ed.  London,  1962;  Berg,  H.:  Al-
lokations- und  Wachstumeffekte  der  EWG;  in  JFS,  Vol.  17, 
1966,  pp.  64  and  foil. ' 
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ment in the less  favoured zones  can  result only  from 
the renunciation of replacement investments. (
25
)  An-
other  cause  is  the  improved  possibilities  of  tapping 
foreign  financial  resources  owing  to  the  introduction 
of freedom of capital movements.  Support of a general 
character is  also  afforded by the elimination of obsta-
cles  to the free  movement of workers. 
The  operating  conditions  for  the  qualitative  devel-
opment  function  should  also  improve;  in  the  first 
place,  keener  competition  means  in  practice  that 
greater use  must  be  made  of  existing  possibilities  of 
qualitative  improvement,  and,  secondly,  the  enlarge-
ment  of  the  market  offers  additional  possibilities  of 
making economies  of  scale. (26) 
Furthermore,  the  general  competitive  pos1t1on  may 
create a tendency towards equalization in the distribu-
tion of  incomes. 
As  the above discussion already  indicates,  the plan of 
study  adopted  in  the  preceding  section  can  equally 
well be applied to the consideration of the supplemen-
tary effects of price controls in an open economy.  In 
this  case,  however,  the  focal  point  of  the  study  is 
international economic  relations. 
The  question  to  be  asked  is  therefore  what  effects 
price controls may have, in each national economy, on 
the  ability  to  compete  internationally  and  the  deter-
mination  to face  foreign  competition.  Here,  too,  the 
field  of study includes  institutional freedom  of  action 
to  reduce  prices,  the  feasibility  of  action  to  finance 
investments and the elements of the will to compete. 
Following this plan, we shall have  to study the effect 
on the behaviour both of a seller from a country where 
prices are free,  selling on a controlled foreign market, 
and of a seller from  a price-controlled country, selling 
on a free foreign  market. 
(2
5
)  Cf.  on  this  point  the  comments  on  the  integration  ac-
celerator,  going  back  to  MAHR,  in  Loh,  D.:  Die  Beeinflus-
sung  der  Investitionsguternachfrage  durch  wirtschaftliche  In-
tegration  mehrerer  Volkswirtschaften;  in  ZfN,  Vol.  XXIV, 
1964,  pp.  260  and  foiL 
(2~)  On  the  causes  of  effects  of  scale,  see  Balassa,  B.:  The 
Theory  ...  op.  cit.,  p.  121,  142  and  foil.  and  144  and  foil. 
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The consideration of these effects on competition will 
then  make  it possible  to  infer,  from  the  macro-eco-
nomic  point  of  view,  the  possible  effect  of  price 
controls  on  the  international  functioning  of  market 
mechanisms.  Once  again,  the  frame  of  reference  is 
constituted  by  the  different  functions  of  the  market 
mechanisms.  The most definite answers obtainable are 
those  to the questions if, and how far,  price controls 
conflict  with the  equilibrium of factors  and  products 
between one country and another,  thus counteracting 
the  tendencies  towards  the  trade  optimum  and  the 
maximum relative and absolute production.  It should 
be  said  straight  away,  for  the  sake  of  clarity,  that 
adverse effects  may  be reflected  not only  in  too little 
trade, but also  in  too much trade. 
The  next  question  is  whether,  in  the  light  of  the 
effects of more far-reaching economic policy measures, 
the  price  control  in  question  is  even  possible  in 
the context of continuing integration. This corresponds 
to the second question put at the outset on the effects 
of  integration  on  the  functional  efficiency  of  price 
controls. 
Having thus laid the practical basis  for  an  analysis  of 
the effects, we must make one comment on its techni-
cal execution.  As  already  indicated,  the plan of Part 
II is  based on  the attempt  to  classify  price  controls. 
Where a control of a given type exists in one country 
only,  we  start by  describing  it (a);  we then go  on to 
examine its effects in a closed economy (b), and finally 
its  supplementary effects  in  an  open economy  (c). 
If, on the other hand, controls of the same  type exist 
in several countries, the first stage is to infer in general 
terms  the  possible  effects  of  this  type  in  a  closed 
economy (a).  The description of the enactments appli-
cable will be followed by consideration of the question 
whether the special  national character of  the  type  in 
any country involves any modification in our inference 
of  the effects  (b).  The analysis  of  the supplementary 
effects in an open economy (c) in principle follows  the 
same plan, but the preliminary study conducted under 
(a) and  (b) makes  it possible  to shorten this  analysis 
and minimizes the distinction between the examination 
of  classes  and  the examination of  actual  instances. PART  II 
THE  EFFECTS  OF  PRICE  CONTROLS A.  THE EFFECTS  OF ENACTMENTS  GOVERNING  PRICE  FORMATION 
CHAPTER 4 
ENACTMENTS  ON PRICE FIXING 
1.  THE  PROHIBITION 
OF  RESALE  PRICE  MAINTENANCE 
(a) Enactments on resale price maintenance (vertikale 
Preisbindung) are  found  in nearly  all  EEC countries. 
We  shall  therefore  preface  the  analysis  of  specific 
enactments  with  a  general  typological  study  of  the 
prohibition  of  resale  price  maintenance.  Since  this 
prohibition  is  designed  to  counter  the  effects  which 
would follow if prescribed prices were lawful  we shall 
start  by  considering  those  effects.  Prescrib~d resale 
prices  have  simultaneous  effects  on  several  stages  of 
the economic process.  Competition and market mech-
anisms  n:ay  therefore be influenced both at the stage 
where pr1ces are prescribed (e.g. the distribution stage) 
and at the stage which prescribes them (e.g.  the pro-
duction stage). 
Since those who prescribe the prices fix and control the 
trading margin the re-sellers whose prices are prescrib-
ed lose  the freedom to fix  their prices  autonomously. 
Thus,  retail  traders  cannot  increase  their  share  of 
the  market  by  cutting  prices.  Similarly  the  disap-
pearance of the absolute monetary price as a parameter 
of  action  in  market  competition  cannot  be  compen-
sated by increased use of other parameters of action. 
Terms  of payment and delivery play no part in most 
final consumption markets where prices are prescribed. 
The  quality  of  the  product  is  determined  by  the 
producer.  The  possibilities  of  improving  sales  and 
after-sales service in such a way as  to improve compe-
tition  are  strictly  limited.  Furthermore,  it  is  often 
doubtful whether consumers take these considerations 
~nt<_> account in the!r buying decisions, and in any event 
lt  1s  extremely  d1fficult  to  quantify  the  differences. 
On  the  whole,  therefore,  resale  price  maintenance 
results  in  the almost  complete suppression of  institu-
tional freedom of action in market competition in  the 
products whose prices are prescribed.  For this  reason 
any  improvement in the feasibility  of action  becomes 
insignificant  for  competition in these  products, but it 
may  lead to distortions in competition in other prod-
ucts  not subject  to price  maintenance. 
What influence is  to be expected on the feasibility  of 
action?  While prescribed prices  prevent the increase 
of profits  by  the extension of individual outlets, they 
do guarantee many  sellers  relatively high unit profits. 
In  order  that  resellers  may  be  strongly  inclined  to 
acquire their products, the authors of prescribed prices 
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in practice fix them at a level which will ensure a profit 
even  for  low productivity  traders.  The reference  to 
the  productivity  of  marginal  distributors  leads  to 
relat~vely high prices  and  margins. (1)  The more  pro-
ductive traders can  then earmark their relatively high 
unit profits for investment in preparatory competition, 
o.r  ev~n directly in price reductions in market competi-
t~on m products whose prices are not prescribed.  But 
smce  the return on rationalization investments cannot 
be redistributed to the buyers of products whose prices 
are  prescribed,  the  first  policy  will  often lead  on  to 
the  second.  Prescribed  prices  favour  the  calculation 
of consolidated costs (Mischkalkulation) and thus lead 
to a further loosening, at the retail stage, of the already 
loose  link  between price  and  costs.  We shall  revert 
to the effect of this distortion when we come to con-
sider  the  influence  of  this  practice  on  the  market 
mechanisms. 
Resale  price maintenance increases  the price  transpar-
ency  of markets both for consumers  and for retailers. 
But  since  it cannot affect  the behaviour of  traders  in 
competition  in  prescribed  price  products  or  guide 
buyers in the choice of a trader, the system is  entirely 
ineffective  in this connection. e> 
Having thus established that retail price  maintenance 
deprives retailers of practically all possibilities of com-
petition  in  the  products  in  question,  we  shall  now 
c~msider its  possible effects  on  the  spirit of competi-
twn. 
Although the precise psychological components of the 
spirit  of  competition  are  no  doubt  not  linked  to  a 
product, this spirit nevertheless depends on the extent 
of  the  possibilities  of  competition.  In  view  of  the 
fact that, for all price prescribed products, spontaneous 
impulses  are  impossible,  owing  to  the  lack  of  possi-
bilities  of  competition,  direct  or indirect pressure  re-
sulting from  the actual or probable behaviour of com-
petitors are equally lacking.  If the proportion of the 
price prescribed product in the whole selling range  is 
(I)  Cf.  e.g.  the table  of empirical  price  calculations  in:  Hax 
H.:  V ertikale  Preisbindung  in  der  Markenartikelindustrie: 
Cologne-Upladen,  1961,  pp.  16  and  foiL 
(2)  We  shall  revert  below  to  the  importance  of  price  trans-
parency  for  the  choice  of  consumers  between  different  prod-
ucts  of  the  same  nature  and  the  behaviour  of  suppliers  at 
the  production  stage. reduced,  the  spirit of competition  may  remain  unaf-
fected and may reinforce competition in other products. 
On the  other  hand,  if  a  large  part  of  the  range  is 
excluded from  free  price formation, there is  reason to 
fear  that this enforced behaviour of the "distributor" 
may generate an  attitude of mind in which the whole 
of  the  spirit of  competition  at  this  stage  is  limited, 
or even lacking. 
Furthermore,  resale  price  maintenance  expressly  de-
prives  retailers  of  the  power  to  raise  their  prices  in 
the light of  conditions  of cost  and demand.  But this 
constitutes  a serious  handicap only in certain isolated 
cases in the face  of some special trend which does not 
affect  the  whole  of  the branch.  On the other hand, 
if the whole of the branch is  affected by cost increases 
or by  substantial growth  in  demand,  the  authors  of 
the  prescribed prices  will  not fail  to  adjust  them  to 
this turn of events. 
At  the  stage  where  the  prescribed  prices  are  deter-
mined, the possibilities of price competition no doubt 
continue to subsist, but the prospects for  the effective 
use of prices as a parameter of action in market compe-
tition are less favourable.  Even if the spirit of compe-
tition really exists, frequent variations in the price  to 
the  final  consumer come  up  against  certain objective 
difficulties.  The  maintenance  of  a  vast  network  of 
dealers  and  the  conversion  of  advertising  take  time 
and  money.  Frequent  price  rises  or  reductions  also 
weaken  the  argument  often  put  forward  that  pre-
scribed prices have the merit of stability.  It can hardly 
be expected in  practice that the spirit of competition 
of the authors of prescribed prices  will  remain  unaf-
fected by resale price maintenance. 
The reduction in the total number of potential parti-
cipants  in  price  competition  for  a  product  and  the 
public announcement  of fixed  consumer prices  enable 
all  producers  to  take  an  overall  view of the market. 
The transparency  of final  consumer prices  is  perfect. 
Thus, suppliers need no longer fear that they will learn 
of their competitors' price reductions only through the 
falling-off  of  their  own  sales.  Since  the  authors  of 
prescribed  prices  may  base  themselves  either  on  an 
oligopolistic structure or on market behaviour of this 
kind,  each  supplier  must  necessarily  assume  that  his 
competitors  will  react  to  price  variations  before  the 
buyers.  But if such a price reduction brings about no 
appreciable  increase  in  the  volume  of  demand,  it is 
no longer a rational way  of maximizing profits. 
Resale  price  maintenance  therefore  decisively  dimin-
ishes  the  spontaneous  impulse  and  indirect  pressure 
towards  price  competition  and  strengthens  the  tend-
ency  towards  tacit  co-operation.  It is  thus  found  in 
practice that price competition largely disappears from 
final  consumption  markets  where  the  prices  are  pre-
scribed.  There is  no  doubt sometimes competition in 
profit  margins  at  the  retail  stage.  But  since  such 
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advantages cannot be passed on to the final consumer, 
this form of price competition cannot lead to any sound 
impetus for  the economy as  a whole.  The other para-
meters  of action for  market competition,  such as  the 
quality  of  products  and,  to  a  certain  extent  also  of 
after-sales  service,  are in great favour on oligopolistic 
markets,  since  imitation by  competitors  takes  longer 
and there is  often less  publicity.  But, from  the point 
of view  of the economy  in general,  these  parameters 
cannot guarantee the sound orientation of the branches 
of  activity  concerned,  since  they  often  over-estimate 
the ability of consumers  to  take rational buying deci-
sions.  This inability is further accentuated by the fact 
that the authors of prescribed prices, anxious to attract 
the  preference  of  buyers,  often  suggest  to  them,  by 
advertising,  that their products have  special  qualities. 
The prevalence of competition through quality already 
indicates  that  resale  price  maintenance  is  no  bar  to 
investment in preparatory competition.  Owing to the 
reduced  intensity  of  market competition,  the  profits, 
and therefore the feasibility of action, at the production 
stage  are no doubt often found to be improved.  It is 
true  that it cannot  be  inferred from  this  that resale 
price  maintenance  reinforces  the  tendency  towards 
preparatory competition.  The firmer  the  tacit  agree-
ment among suppliers to confine themselves to peaceful 
competition,  and  the harder  it  is  made,  by  common 
action, for newcomers  to enter the market,  the more 
it is  to be expected that preparatory competition will 
fall  off. 
To sum up, it may  therefore be taken that resale price 
maintenance generally  lessens  the intensity of compe-
tition  both  between  the  authors  of  the  prescribed 
prices  and between the economic  transactors who are 
bound  by  them.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the 
economy in general, this is  reflected in less satisfactory 
conditions  for  the  functioning  of  the  market  mech-
anisms. 
Resale  price maintenance leads  to relatively high unit 
profits  for  traders  and  producers,  these  profits  not 
being  the  consequence of the excess  of demand over 
aggregate  production  capacity.  The  distribution  of 
incomes  is  therefore determined not so  much by  the 
services  rendered  on  the  market  as  by  the  effect  of 
price maintenance in restricting competition.  But the 
real  distribution  corresponding  to  the  evaluation  of 
marginal  utility  and  the purchasing  capacity  of  con-
sumers remains untouched.  In the sphere of the distri-
bution  function,  therefore,  we  merely  find  an  inter-
ference  with the monetary  distribution function. 
The overall pattern of outputs influenced by  prescribed 
prices does not correspond to the preferences of buyers, 
since,  owing  to the  relatively  high  prices,  too  small 
a proportion of demand  is  satisfied  in  the prescribed 
price sector.  If  the high unit profits on price prescribed 
products are used  in  competition to reduce the prices in sectors where prices are free,  the degree of satisfac-
tion  of demand in those sectors  is  too high. 
By  blocking  the  aspiration  of  the  most  productive 
commercial  enterprises  to  enlarge  their  share  of  the 
market,  resale  price  maintenance  also  interferes  with 
the  influence  of  productivity  on  the  overall  pattern 
of inputs.  Resale price maintenance tends  to preserve 
the existing pattern of inputs;  cases  are even conceiv-
able where the resulting incentive to retain the system 
of  consolidated  costing  may  generate  a  tendency  to-
wards  a  less  efficient  pattern  of  inputs.  This  may 
happen  when  the  range  of  retailers  is  differentiated 
and productive commercial enterprises, with no reserve 
profit  fund  derived  from  prescribed  price  products 
are driven out of the market by non-productive enter-
prises which possess such a fund. 
In the sphere of  the allocation  function,  resale  price 
maintenance must necessarily be expected to interfere 
with the pattern both of outputs and of inputs. 
For  equal  quantities  marketed,  higher  unit  profits 
improve  the feasibility  of  action  to  extend  capacities 
and  to  improve  the  quality  of  products,  production 
methods  and  factors  of  production.  Owing  to  the 
adverse effect on the spirit of competition, it is  to be 
feared  that  the  additional  possibilities  of  qualitative 
improvement  will  not  be  fully  used.  On  the  other 
hand,  there is  no  reason  to expect  any  weakening  of 
the desire for the quantitative adaptation of production 
capacities. In the sphere of the development function, 
we can expect, alongside the disturbance of the quali-
tative  development  function,  a  reinforcement  of  the 
quantitative  development  function. 
Although,  in  general,  it  does  not  seem  to  us  to  be 
feasible  to  evaluate  the  extent  of  interference  with 
or strengthening  of  functions,  it can  be  admitted  in 
this case that the favourable effects on the quantitative 
development  function  do  not compensate  overall  for 
the adverse effects on the other functions.  Since access 
to  foreign  capital  is  not  an  insoluble  problem,  in 
developed  economies,  for  enterprises  whose  market 
position  enables  them  to  prescribe  resale  prices,  the 
possible favourable  effect  of resale  price maintenance 
can come to fruition only in the event of an extremely 
large  growth  of  demand  per  unit  of  time,  which 
experience  proves  to  be  relatively  rare.  Thus,  the 
overall judgment on permitted resale price maintenance 
is adverse.  The prohibition of this practice is therefore 
calculated  to  counter  the  specific  adverse  effects  of 
resale  price  maintenance.  Having  thus  established 
that the prohibition of resale  price maintenance has  a 
favourable  effect  on  the  functioning  of  the  market 
mechanisms,  we shall  consider  in  the  next  following 
section in what cases and how far this judgment needs 
modification in the  case  of  the price controls  actually 
in force. 
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(b)  In Belgium,  resale  price  maintenance  is  not pro-
hibited.  Resale  price  maintenance  agreements  are  in 
principle  lawful  and  entitled  to the  legal  protection 
of the State.  But in the event of misuse, the Govern-
ment can intervene under the general provisions of the 
Act of 27  May  1960 on protection against  the misuse 
of economic power.  But since such misuse is  difficult 
to prove, the adverse effects of resale price maintenance 
already described can be countered only if this form of 
restraint  of  competition  is  widespread.  The  Act, 
therefore, does  not yet  seem  to have been applied to 
resale  price  maintenance.  In theory,  the  prohibition 
of the State. But in the event of misuse,  the Govern-
be welcomed, but it has  little or no practical value in 
overcoming the adverse effects of resale price mainten-
ance. 
In  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  resale  price 
maintenance is  governed by the Act of 27  July  1957 
on  restraint  of  competition  (  Gesetz  gegen  W ettbe-
werbsbeschrankungen ).  Article 15 of the Act no doutb 
stipulates a general prohibition of resale price mainten-
ance, e) but under the exceptions specified  in  Article 
16  this  does  not  apply,  under  certain  conditions,  to 
branded goods or printed matter (Verlagserzeugnisse). 
Resale  price  maintenance  is  legitimate  in  such  cases 
if the producer who  prescribes  the  prices  is  in price 
competition  with other producers  and if he  makes  a 
written report to the  Federal Cartels  Office  (Bundes-
kartellamt).  The report must in particular specify the 
amount of  the prescribed  price  and  of  the mark  up, 
which are recorded and are open to  inspection by  the 
public.  Legitimate  prescribed  prices  are  subject  to 
supervision by the Office as  a protection against abuse, 
and  may,  in  certain  cases,  be  prohibited  under  the 
provisions  of  Article  17. (
4
)  The making  of  a nullity 
order  is  most  probable  in  cases  where  resale  price 
maintenance  leads  to  a  rise  in  the  price  of  the  pre-
scribed  products  which  is  unjustified  from  the  point 
of view of the economy in general, or prevent a price 
reduction.  In  view  of  the  difficulty  of  proof,  an 
amendment to the Act in  1965 introduces a presump-
tion of enhanced prices if the prescribed prices are not 
universally  observed  or  if  the  suppliers  split  their 
selling  prices.  The first  case  arises  where  the  "black 
market" prices  are  well  below  the  prescribed  prices, 
e)  So  far  as  this  general  prohibition  applies,  recommended 
prices  are  also  illegal  under  Article  38(2)(ii)  if  they  involve 
concerted  behaviour.  According  to  the  Federal  Court  of 
Justice such behaviour exists where the recommended consum-
er  prices  are  communicated  not  only  to  traders,  but  also  to 
consumers.  Cf.  Judgment  of  the  Federal  Court  of  Justice 
("4711") of  8 October 1958  in WuW, 1958, pp. 783  and foil. 
(
4
)  While  non-binding  recommended  prices  are  lawful  pur-
suant  to  Article  16,  they  are  also  subject  to  supervision 
against  abuse.  This  extended  supervision  of  misuse,  through 
the  interpretation  of  the  Act,  gave  rise  for  the  first  time 
in  December  1966  to  the prohibition of  recommended  prices. 
Cf.  Kartellamt  hebt Preisempfehlung auf;  alle  gross en  W asch-
mittelmarken  betroffen,  Die  Welt,  19  December  1966. and the second where the supplier practises split prices 
for  the same product. 
It is  a  disputed  question  whether  legal  proceedings 
can be taken  against  excessive  price  rises  as  a  result 
of resale  price maintenance under Article  2(a) of the 
Economic Offences Act (Wirtschaftsstrafgesetz), which 
we  have  not yet  considered. (5)  Under  this  provision 
a  manufacturer's  prescribed  price  would  be  wholly 
null and  void under civil law, (
6
}  pursuant to Article 
134 of the Civil Code.  The large number of exceptions 
has  virtually  deprived  the  prohibition  stipulated  in 
Article 15 of all effect.  In recent years, however, the 
Cartel Office has been led to make more frequent use 
of its power to annul.  The present  Federal Govern-
ment  and  Parliament  include  among  their  members 
many advocates of the annulment of prescribed prices 
for branded goods, and it may therefore be hoped that 
this  will  contribute  in  future  towards  increasing  the 
importance of the general prohibition. 
On the question of  the general  prohibition of  resale 
price  maintenance,  reference  may  be  made  to  the 
favourable  effects  of  this  type  of  control  already 
discussed in general terms above.  With regard to the 
exceptions  for  branded  goods  and  printed  matter  it 
may may be maintained that the adverse effects inferred 
in  the  case  of  legitimate  resale  price  maintenance 
cannot manifest themselves, since resale price mainten-
ance  is  legitimate only when it is  enforced by  a pro-
ducer who is in price competition with other producers. 
The distributors could,  moreover,  rule out the fixing 
of  excessive  consumer  prices  by  deliberately  intro-
ducing  the  presumption  of  abuse  arising  out  of  the 
imperfect  observation  of  the  prescribed  prices.  It 
should be noted in this connection that the conditions 
of legality do not as  a general rule prevent the elimi-
nation of the desirable competition at the distribution 
stage  for  a  specific  product  of  a  producer  who  pre-
scribes prices.  In the first  place, only a few dynamic 
and  productive  commercial  enterprises  are  interested 
in  price  reductions,  and,  secondly,  simple  dumping 
by a seller is  not yet treated as  a derogation from the 
general  observance of the prescribed prices.  If there 
is  to  be  a  deliberate  introduction  of  the  statutory 
presumption of abuse,  there must always  be-and it 
must be admitted that the case  is  relatively rare-the 
simultaneous  action  of  a  whole  group  of  dynamic 
traders. 
The need for  price competition at the stage of those 
who fix  the prescribed prices may, in any event, obviate 
( 5)  This  is,  for  example,  the  practice  followed  by  the  Lands-
ratamt  of  Alzenau-Bavaria  in  taking  action  against  the  sale 
of  toothpaste  at  excessive  prescribed  prices.  Cf.  Die  Welt, 
No.  46  of  23  February  1967,  p.  20. 
(
6
)  Cf.  Muller-Henneberg,  H.  and  Schwartz,  G.  (ed.):  Gesetz 
gegen  W ettbewerbsbeschrankung  und  Europaisches  Kartell-
recht,  Gemeinschaftskommentar,  2nd  edition,  revised,  Colo-
gne,  Berlin,  Bonn,  Munich,  1963,  p.  514. 
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the most harmful consequences  of  resale  price  main-
tenance.  For it is not only the complete disappearance 
of  price  competition,  but also  the diminution  in  its 
intensity  which  reflects  a  deterioration  in  the  condi-
tions  for  the  functioning  of the market  mechanisms. 
The necessary  conditions for  legality  and  the corres-
ponding  supervision  of  abuse  may  therefore,  on the 
best assumption, obviate the worst adverse effects on 
distribution, allocation  and development.  In view of 
the fact  that the special  treatment of branded goods 
and printed matter has no major overall advantage, our 
essentially  adverse  judgment  on  the  effects  of legit-
imate  resale  price  maintenance  also  applies  without 
serious  modification  to  the  system  of  exceptions  in 
force  in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
In France, the Decree of 24 June 1958 on the mainten-
ance and restoration of free competition (incorporated 
in Price  Ordinance  No.  45-1483)  includes  in Article 
37(4) a general prohibition of resale price maintenance. 
It  forbids  "prescribing,  maintaining  or  imposing  a 
minimum for the prices of products or services or for 
trading margins, either by means of rates or scales or 
under agreements  ('ententes')  of  any  nature or form 
whatsoever". (1) 
A  circular  issued  by  the  Ministry  for  Economic  Af-
fairs (8) calls for the strict application of the prohibition 
and states that there should be deemed to be a breach 
of the law wherever, even in the absence of price lists, 
there is an attempt to prescribe a minimum resale price 
by other means (including marks, labels or particulars 
shown  on invoices).  According  to Krasser, (
9
)  subse-
quent  judicial decisions  indicate  that the courts  have 
adopted this  strict interpretation.  The Act makes  no 
exception  to  the  prohibition  of  prescribed  prices. 
Temporary  exemption  may,  however,  be  applied  for 
on the following  main grounds:  (
10
) 
(  i)  the novelty of the product or service, 
(ii)  exclusivity  resulting from  a  patent of invention, 
(iii)  or from  a working licence, 
(iv)  or from the filing of a model or the requirements 
of specifications stipulating a guarantee of quality 
and the condition of  the product. 
In every case of exception, however, guarantees must 
be given  that the products  are  delivered  to the con-
C)  Cf.  German  translation in:  Ulmer, E. (Ed.):  Das  recht  des 
unlauteren  W ettbewerbs  in  den  Mitgliedstaaten  der  Europii-
ischen  Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft,  Vol.  IV,  Krasser,  R.:  Frank-
reich,  Munich,  Cologne,  1966,  pp.  467  and  fall.  (hereinafter 
cited  as  Ulmer-Krassner,  op.  cit.). 
(
8
)  Fontanet  Circular  of  31  March  1960,  Official  Gazette, 
2 April 1960, p. 3084, cited in Ulmer-Krassner, op.  cit., p. 473. 
C)  Cf.  ibid.,  p.  507. 
('
0
)  Cf.  ibid.,  p.  468. sumer  at  the lowest  possible price  and  that  they  are 
in competition with other products.  Up to 1960 about 
a  hundred  exceptions  had  been  allowed,  generally 
limited to one year. ( 
11
) 
It will thus be seen that the prohibition of resale price 
maintenance goes much further in France than in Ger-
many.  France  prohibits  not  only  agreements,  but  in 
general  all  action  which  in fact  leads  to a prescribed 
price.  This broad conception is particularly interesting, 
since  the prohibition of contractual resale price main-
tenance is  often circumvented by the practice of "rec-
ommended prices" suggested by the makers and volun-
tarily observed by the resellers. (1
2
)  Since this practice 
is  very widespread in France and  the resellers comply 
with  it  to  the  extent  of  about  90%,  the  French 
Council  of  Ministers  has  partly  endorsed  the  recom-
mendation of the  Fontanet circular and has  subjected 
recommended  prices  to  supervision  against  abuse. (
13
) 
Under the Ordinance of 6 September 1967 made under 
the  Act  conferring  special  powers  to  ensure  the 
recovery of the French economy,  recommended prices 
may  be prohibited if  the  selling  prices  to  the public 
are manifestly excessive.  This measure is also de_signed 
to  limit  the  very  widespread  practice  in  France  of 
allowing  extremely  high  rebates  on  sale  to  the final 
consumer by the retailer. (  14) 
Like  the general  prohibition  in  force  in  the  Federal 
Republic  of Germany,  the French  provisions  may  be 
expected to have the favourable effects indicated above. 
But, market conditions being equal, it is  highly prob-
able  that  the  effects  will  be  considerably  more 
marked (1
5
)  in  France  than in  Germany, owing to the 
wider scope of the French legislation.  This favourable 
(1
1
)  Cf.  Lassier, Jacques:  L'application aux produits de  marque 
des  lois  fran~·aises sur  la  concurrence,  Revue  de  la  propriete 
industrielle,  1960,  p.  170  (cited  in  Ulmer-Krasser,  op.  cit., 
p.  507). 
(
12
)  According  to  an  estimate  of  the  Chairman  of  the  Cartel 
Office,  Dr  Gunther,  recommended  prices  are  observed  in 
Germany  in a  proportion which  varies  between 75  and  90%. 
Unverbindliche  Preisempfehlung  werden  meinstens  eingebal-
ten  in  Handelsblatt,  No.  237,  8-9  December  1967,  p.  10. 
{
13
)  Cf.  Verschiirfung  des  Wettbewerbsrecht  in  Handelsblatt 
of  12  September  1967. 
{'
4
)  Cf.  Franzosische  Bankvollmacht  zur  Bekiimpfung  unlau-
teren  Wettbewerbs  in  Industriekurier,  No.  136  of  9  Septem-
ber  1967,  p.  4. 
(
15
)  A  survey  by  R.  Sachot  indicates  the  extent  to  which 
the  price  competition  at  the distribution  stage  made  possible 
by  the  general  prohibition  has  its  repercussions  on  the 
production  stage.  In the  view  of  this  writer,  the  "price  col-
lapse"  at  the  distribution  stage  (to  which  a  downward  limit 
will  no  doubt  be  imposed  by  the  prohibition  of  sales  below 
cost,  which  Sachot  does  not mention-author's note)  compels 
the French  makers  of  branded  goods  to  call  upon  the  State 
to  fix  minimum  retail  prices  by  law.  Cf.  Sachot,  Raymond: 
Franzosische  Markenartikelindustrie  auf  dem  W eg  in  den 
Gemeinsamen  Markt,  address  given  on  25  and  26  June 1966 
at  the  "W  ochenendgesprachen  auf  dem  Peters  berg"  organiz-
ed  by  the  Deutscher  Markenverband;  reproduced  in  Der 
Markenartikel,  28th  year,  1966,  No.  7,  pp.  441  and  foil., 
especially  p.  446. 
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assessment  is  also  influenced  by  the  fact  that  the 
margin  allowed  for  possible  exceptions  is  much  nar-
rower.  Tribute  must  be  paid  here  to  the  refusal  to 
make statutory exceptions, which reverses  the burden 
of proof compared with German legislation.  In France 
it is not the State which must prove the abusive charac-
ter of a legitimate prescribed price;  it is  the supplier 
who is interested in maintaining prescribed prices who 
must  establish  the  necessity  and  advantages  of  an 
exception limited in time. 
If one tries, on  the basis  of the exceptional elements 
cited above as  justifying a derogation, to draw conclu-
sions as  to the economic significance of the possibility 
of authorizing price maintenance, it can be interpreted 
in all the first three cases as encouraging the qualitative 
development  function.  In practice  these  three  cases 
basically concern new products for which the producers 
have  generally  made  development  investments,  paid 
licence royalties or spent large sums on launching and 
advertising.  But the development or launching  of  a 
new  product  is  a  sound  way  of  maximizing  profits 
only if the manufacturer can  count on a large part of 
the development  and launching costs  being recovered 
in the early years  through relatively high unit profits. 
If  market  conditions  are  conceivable  in  which  this 
prospect seems improbable owing to price competition 
at the distribution stage, temporary price maintenance 
may  have  a  wholly  favourable  effect.  This  could 
happen,  for  example,  where  large  commercial  firms 
start  by  attracting  a  great  part  of  the  demand  by 
lowering prices  to the detriment of their own margin 
and then use  the market power they have acquired to 
bring pressure on  their purchase prices,  thus compro-
mising  the  recovery  of  launching  and  development 
costs.  In this  case,  the  temporary  price maintenance 
prevents  the  concentration  of  demand  and  thus  tem-
porarily fortifies  the maker's high unit profit, justified 
by his  market service. 
The request for the authorization of price maintenance 
under  the  fourth  exception  should  relate  mainly  to 
branded  goods  which  are  also  specially  treated  in 
Federal Germany.  In this case  the economic objective 
is  not  directly  apparent.  It is,  however,  interesting 
to study the conditions for this exception, which differ 
in  France  and  the  Federal  Republic  of Germany.  It 
is  true  that the guarantee  of  the constant  quality  of 
the  product  is  an  argument  often  relied  upon,  in 
Germany,  too,  by  the  makers  of  branded  goods  in 
favour of price maintenance, but there is  no  scientific 
control  of  this  guarantee.  In  France,  on  the  other 
hand, the State is not inclined to authorize a temporary 
limitation  of  competition  unless  it can  supervise  the 
guarantee of  quality  offered  as  a counterpart. 
On the  whole,  the  effects  of  any  exceptions  always 
depend on administrative action.  If it is accepted that 
exceptions  are  granted  only  when  price  maintenance 
promises  to  encourage  the  market  mechanisms,  the French regulations on  the subject can be unreservedly 
assessed  as favourable. 
In Italy  there is  no special legislation on resale  price 
maintenance;  in  general,  agreements  on  this  subject 
are lawful.  A contract of  this kind, however, binding 
the parties  to  strict  observance  of  the  agreed  prices, 
has no direct effect on third parties. e
6
)  The producer 
therefore  cannot  proceed  against  a  retailer  who  sells 
merchandise  acquired  from  a  wholesaler  below  the 
prescribed  price  and  who  has  not  bound  himself  to 
charge  the  prescribed  price.  Under  Italian  judicial 
decisions,  the  sale  of  goods  below  the  prescribed 
price does not normally amount to unfair competition. 
Resale  price  maintenance contracts  are  very  common 
practice  in  the  food  industries,  ready-made  clothing, 
perfumery, household electrical appliances, the optical 
and photographic industry, as  well as  pharmacy.  The 
extent  to  which  they  are  observed,  however,  varies 
widely between different branches. e
7
) 
An intermediate form between contractual price main-
tenance  and  prices  fixed  by  the  authorities  is  the 
declaration that a prescribed price is generally binding. 
Booksellers, for example, are bound by  law to respect 
the prices prescribed by  publishers. 
In the absence of any control over resale price mainten-
ance  the  adverse  effects  of  the system  have free  rein 
in  Italy.  The  partial  refusal  of  legal  protection  can 
hardly  have  any  appreciable  favourable  effect  in  a 
closed  economy.  In addition,  the  declaration  of  the 
general binding force  of prices  prescribed by  the pri-
vate  sector  not  under  State  supervision,  seems  the 
complete  negation  of  any  overall  regulative  function 
of the market mechanisms. 
The prohibition of resale price maintenance in Luxem-
bourg  is  very  similar  to  the  French  system.  Under 
Article  1 of  the Grand-Ducal Decree of  9  December 
1965 e 8
)  resale  price  maintenance  "by  any  means 
whatsoever"  is  forbidden. e
9
)  In  consequence,  sug-
gested  prices,  recommended  prices,  maximum  prices 
or the maximum limits of  profit margins fixed  by the 
Price  Department  or  the  maximum  consumer  price 
which  must  compulsorily  be  shown  on  the  packing 
of  goods,  must  not  be  treated  as  minimum  prices. 
The  law  specifies  exceptions  for  books,  newspapers 
(1
6
)  Cf.  for  the legal  treatment of price  maintenance  in  Italy: 
Ulmer,  E.  (editor):  Das  Recht  des  unlauteren  Wettbewerbs 
in  den  Mitgliedstaaten  der  Europaischen  Wirtschaftsgemein-
schaft, Vol.  V,  Schricker,  G.:  Italien, Munich,  Cologne,  1965, 
pp. 267  and foil. (hereinafter cited as Ulmer-Schricker, op.  cit.). 
(
17
)  Cf.  Mehr  Preisbindungen  mit  mehr  Lochern  in  Italien 
in Handelsblatt,  19  December  1966. 
(1
8
)  Cf.  Memorial  of  15  December  1965. 
(1
9
)  Cited  from  the  text  reproduced  in  Ulmer,  E.  (editor): 
Das  recht  des  unlauteren  W ettbewerbs in  den  Mitgliedstaaten 
der  Europiiischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, VoL  II/1; Wunder-
lich:  Luxemburg,  Munich,  Cologne,  1967,  p.  767  (hereinafter 
cited  as  Ulmer-Wunderlich,  op.  cit.). 
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and  other publications.  In addition,  exceptions  may 
be allowed on application in the following cases: 
(i)  novelty of the product or service, 
(ii)  exclusive manufacture under licence, 
(iii)  goods  and services  launched in conjunction with 
an  advertising  campaign. 
Since  these  provisions  are  virtually  the  same  as  the 
French provisions, they need not be separately discus-
sed.  The effects  of  the Luxembourg controls call  for 
an  unreservedly  favourable  assessment  on  the  same 
grounds as  the French system. 
It follows  from  the principle of abuse, which governs 
the  Netherlands  legislation (
20
)  on  competition,  that 
resale  price  maintenance is,  in  principle, lawful.  But 
this  principle  lost  a  great  deal  of  its  force  in  1964 
following  two Government Decrees e
1
)  declaring that 
certain  prescribed  prices  were  not  binding.  Under 
these  Decrees  the  following  have  no  binding  force: 
(i)  arrangements  for  collective  resale  price  mainten-
ance  or the collective enforcement of resale price 
maintenance, e
2
) 
(ii)  individual  resale  price  maintenance  in  respect  of 
consumer  durables. (
23
) 
The declaration  of  invalidity  does  not  apply  to con-
tractual  stipulations  prohibiting  sale  below  the  pur-
chase price.  The duration of  the second Decree cited 
above  is  limited in the first  place to five  years, but it 
may  be extended by  a formal  Act. 
As  already  pointed  out in  the  case  of  Belgium,  the 
general  prohibition  of  abuse  cannot  be  regarded  as 
adequate protection against the adverse effects of resale 
price maintenance, which are in principle lawful.  The 
declaration  of  the  invalidity  of  certain  prescribed 
prices, on the other hand, is  already  a measure which 
restores to sellers their institutional freedom of action 
on  the  markets  which  concern  them  and  which  can 
therefore  counteract  the possible  disturbances  of  the 
market  mechanisms.  Since  no  functional  regulative 
impulse can be expected from selling prices below the 
(
20
)  Cf.  Act  of  28  June  1956  on  economic  competition  (Wet 
economische  mededinging -WEM)  in  Staatsblad Nos.  401  and 
412,  1956. 
(2
1
)  Decree  of  1 April  1964  in  Staatsblad,  No.  110,  1964  and 
Decree  of  31  August,  1964  in Staatsblad,  No.  353,  1964. 
(2
2
)  Cf.  Ulmer,  E.  (editor):  Das  Recht  des  unlauteren  Wett-
bewerbs,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II/2,  Baeumer,  L.  and  Van  Manen, 
W.  C.:  Netherland,  Munich-Cologne,  1967,  pp.  334  and  foll. 
(hereinafter  cited  as  Ulmer-Baeumer-Van  Manen,  op.  cit.). 
(2
3
)  Defined  in  a  schedule  to  the  Decree  as  follows:  wireless 
sets,  television  sets,  record  players  and  tape  recorders,  re-
frigerators,  toasters,  mixers,  vacuum  cleaners,  washing  ma-
chines,  driers,  irons,  electric  razors  and  hairdriers,  private 
cars,  cameras,  flashlight  cameras,  cinema  cameras,  photograph 
and  film  projectors  and  records. purchase  price--except  in  certain  special  cases-the 
fact that such stipulations are permitted cannot modify 
our essentially  favourable  assessment.  It is  true that 
the declaration of invalidity merely involves  the with-
drawal of legal protection from contractual prescribed 
prices  and  does  not prevent  the  maker  from  in  fact 
fixing  the  consumer  price  by  other  means.  Having 
regard to the importance, which can also be observed 
in other countries, of suggested prices with no binding 
force,  and  other  substitutes  for  prescribed  prices,  it 
is  questionable whether their practical effect  really  is1 
to  prevent  the  possible  disturbances  of  the  market 
mechanisms. 
(c) It must now be considered whether, and how far, 
the national resale price maintenance systems, and the 
restrictions  on them  affect  economic  relations  among 
Member  States.  Since  it can  be taken  that the sales 
area  at  the distribution  stage  is  generally  limited  to 
the  national  territory,  we can  mainly  limit  ourselves 
to considering the international competition of sellers 
at the production stage. 
Neither  resale  price  maintenance,  nor  the  controls 
described can prevent a foreign  seller from  practising 
price  dumping  on  a  national  market.  Institutional 
freedom  of  action  in market competition  is  therefore 
unlimited.  On the other hand,  the differential  treat-
ment  of  resale  price  maintenance  in  Member  States 
does  not seem  to be without effect  on the feasibility 
of action.  The analysis made of a closed economy has 
shown  that  resale  price  maintenance,  other  market 
conditions  being  equal,  allows  higher  profits  than 
would  otherwise  be  made.  In  consequence,  since 
integration  does  not  affect  resale  price  maintenance, 
the feasibility  of  action of sellers  coming  from  coun-
tries  where  price  maintenance  is  legal  tends  to  be 
greater  than  of  sellers  from  countries  where  it  is 
prohibited. 
The financial  superiority resulting  in such  cases  from 
resale price maintenance could be used in international 
competition, for  example,  to cut export prices by  the 
cost  of  market  penetration, or to extend  production 
capacities. e
4
)  It would  counteract  the  expected  ef-
fects  of  integration  in  increasing  well-being  and  en-
couraging  growth,  if  it  allowed  the  elimination  of 
enterprises  which,  while  producing  at  lower  costs, 
have been unable to accumulate  profits  owing  to the 
prohibition  of  resale  price  maintenance. 
(2
4
)  It is  obviously  this  possibility  which  the  French  author-
ities  have  in  mind  when  they  authorize,  as  we  have  seen, 
exceptions  from  the general  prohibition  of  resale  price  main-
tenance  in  the form  of  discreetly  negotiated  special  treatment 
whenever  enterprises  can  establish  that  internal  profits  will 
be  used  to  foster  exports.  Cf.  Ferber,  Gustav:  Frankreich, 
Unterstiitzung durch  Entwicklunghilfe, in Handelsblatt No.  19 
of 26-27  January  1968,  p.  13. 
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But this prospect is  improbable-at least in  the long 
term-because  integration  cannot  fail  to  affect  the 
prescribed prices of products capable of external trade. 
In countries where resale price maintenance is  illegal; 
the material possibilities of trade created by integration 
will enable low cost producers to sell below the high 
prescribed prices  on  the corresponding  national  mar-
kets.  If the will to compete at the distribution stage 
is atrophied by long familiarity with prescribed prices 
and replaced by the aim of a minimum margin, foreign 
makers  are  obliged to allow margins  at least  as  high 
as  those allowed by the national makers who prescribe 
the prices.  If, on the other hand,  there are dynamic 
commercial  enterprises  which  wish  to use  the newly 
offered  freedom  of  action  to attack  the share of  the 
market held by traditional enterprises, the result may 
be a reduction of relatively  high trading margins.  In 
any  event, the high prescribed price to the final  con-
sumer  and,  in  consequence,  the  accumulated  profits 
of  the  author  of  the  prescribed  price  will  be  en-
dangered. (
25
)  If the authors of prescribed prices  are 
obliged  to  suffer  a  fall  in  sales  or if  they  are  con-
strained to cut their home prices, they lose the materia] 
basis for  a national price discrimination policy  which 
might hamper  the  international division  of  labour in 
the light of costs. 
The risk is even greater in the case  of high prescribed 
prices if distributors who want to play the competitive 
game  have  the  possibility  of re-importing.  Products 
exported  abroad  at  relatively  low  prices  can  be  re-
imported without falling  under the ban of prescribed 
prices and can therefore be sold below those prices. (26) 
In  this  way,  the  authors  of  prescribed  prices,  con-
strained to adapt their prices,  also  lose  the means  of 
following  a  price policy  in conflict  with the  interna-
tional division of labour. 
In the case  of products  directly  capable  of  external 
trade,  the  resale  price  maintenance  system,  legal  in 
(2
5
)  The  motor  tyre  market  in  the  Federal  Republic  of  Ger-
many  is  an  example  of  the  way  in  which  foreign  trade  can 
prejudice  price  maintenance.  The  share  of  imports  (without 
prescribed  prices)  in  the  total  turnover  of  dealers  rose  from 
14%  in  1965  to  20-22%  in  1966  and  the  leading  German 
manufacturers  therefore  found  themselves  obliged,  at  the be-
ginning of  1967, to cut their prices by 1 to 2% and to exempt 
many  types  of  tyre  from  price  maintenance. (
3
)  But  since  the 
new  lower  prescribed  prices  were  often  accompanied  by  un-
disclosed  rebates,  the  whole  system  should  disappear  in  the 
near  future. 
(a)  Cf.  Gerter,  M.:  Aiissenseiter  rollten  die  Reifenpreise  auf, 
in  Die  Welt,  No.  2  of  3 January  1967, p.  1. 
(
26
)  The  decision (a)  of  the  EEC  Commission  and  the  Court 
of  Justice  of  the  European  Communities  in  the  Grundig-
Consten  case  shows,  inter  alia,  that  the  importance  of  the 
possibilities  of re-importing for  the functioning  of  the market 
mechanisms  has  been  recognized  by  the  European  author-
ities. 
(
3
)  Cf.  the  text  of  the  judgement  of  the  Court  of  Justice 
of  the  European  Communities  in  VWK-Europa,  No.  134/66 
of  14  July  1966,  pp.  1/3 and  foll. S
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 Belgium,  the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and 
the  Netherlands,  cannot  therefore  provoke  any  per· 
sistent  distortion in  the channels  of  trade.  Theoreti-
cally  it  would  be  different  in  the  case  of  products 
indirectly  capable  of  external  trade,  but  the  risk  is 
negligible in practice since price maintenance is  gener-
ally  applied only to pure consumer goods. 
The conclusions  as  to the incidence on the efficacy  of 
the spirit of competition between Member States may 
start from  the fact  that, under identical conditions, it 
will  tend  to  be  more  marked  among  the  sellers  in 
countries  where price maintenance is  prohibited than 
among  those  in  countries  where  it  is  legitimate.  If 
the  disparities  are  not offset  by  other influences,  or 
even  inverted,  they  will  encourage  the  tendency  to 
undermine  the current prescribed prices.  Thus,  inte-
gration at least leads to a reinforcement of constraints 
in  countries  where  resale  price  maintenance  is  legiti-
mate.  This reinforcement of the spirit of competition 
as  a result  of integration  is,  however,  plausible only 
at the production stage.  If  the same thing is to happen 
at the  distribution stage  it will  at  least be necessary 
to  form  dynamic  commercial  enterprises  abroad  or 
subsidiaries.  But the process of integration in the EEC 
so  far gives  us few examples  which would allow such 
a conclusion. 
This examination by countries shows that the national 
controls over resale  price maintenance do not prevent 
the  expected  effects  of  the  extension  of  the field  of 
action  of  market  mechanisms.  The  integration  of 
countries  which leave  a relatively  large  field  to price 
maintenance (Belgium,  Federal Republic of Germany, 
Italy and the Netherlands) with countries which apply 
strict general prohibitions (France, Luxembourg) gives 
no reason to fear any lasting major change in automatic 
regulation by the market. 
Even more, in the case of products capable of external 
trade, it is infinitely more probable that with freedom 
of  trade  and  re-import  possibilities,  the  controls  in 
force  in  France  and  Luxembourg,  as  well  as  in  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and  the  Netherlands, 
will  lead  to a weakening  of  resale  price  maintenance 
throughout  the territory to be  integrated.  It is  true 
that controls whose field of application is  limited to a 
single  country can  in  no  way  prevent  the practice  of 
price  maintenance  in  the  others;  they  can,  however, 
help  to bring  down  excessive  prescribed prices,  thus 
allowing  the  equalization  of  product  prices.  In this 
way integration widens the effective field of application 
of  the  prohibition  of  resale  price  maintenance  and 
warrants  the  expectation  of  a  favourable  effect  on 
market  mechanisms,  even  in  countries  where  this 
practice is  legal. 
On the other hand, in the case of home trade products 
which also include commercial services, it is impossible 
to  infer  comparable  favourable  effects  with  equal 
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certainty.  In general, an intensification of competition 
as  a  result  of  integration  is  possible  if,  thanks  to 
greater mobility of factors,  the end result is  the crea-
tion  of  dynamic  foreign  enterprises  which  will  re-
vitalize the sluggishness of home markets.  In addition, 
integration  may  lead  to reductions  in  the margin  on 
commercial  services  when,  in  spite  of  price  mainten-
ance,  there is  a keen  spirit of competition which  can 
find  its  expression  in  market  competition  in  conse-
quence  of  the increase  in  the  number  of  substantial 
possibilities of buying.  It is' hardly possible to assess 
the probabilities of an increase in spontaneous impulses 
as  a result of integration,  since  this  factor  cannot be 
isolated. 
In conclusion, it may be noted on the last point in our 
plan  of  study,  that integration  in  no  way  prejudices 
the retention of the prohibition of resale price main-
tenance. 
2.  STABILITY CONTRACTS 
Stability  contracts  (contrats  de  stabilite)  were  intro-
duced  in  March  1965  with  a  view  to  relaxing  the 
general price freeze  instituted in 1963  as  a first  form 
of the system,  peculiar to France, of  conditional free-
dom of prices.  Stability contracts are, strictly speaking, 
not a form  of price  control under general law, but a 
sort of contract which may be made for a year between 
the price control authorities and business groups.  The 
contract  is  always  freely  entered  into.  Individual 
firms  are not bound by it unless they expressly declare 
to the Directorate of Prices that they wish to subscribe 
to it.  But since  the alternative is  the continuance of 
price freezing,  stability contracts to some extent form 
part of price control. 
By  signing  a stability contract, enterprises acquire  the 
freedom  to  vary  certain  prices  provided  that  they 
undertake  not  to  increase  the  overall  price  level  of 
their production programme.  Certain prices  can  thus 
be increased while at the same time others are reduced. 
Price  variations  are  weighted  by  the  quantities  pro-
duced  at  the  moment  of  variation  so  that  aggregate 
income remains constant.  The stability contract is thus 
an  effort  to  convert  the  general  freeze  of  1963  into 
a freezing of price levels.  Weighting is generally based 
on  constant  components  of  production  costs.  Only 
increases  in  the  cost  of  raw  materials,  electricity, 
transport  and  imports  can  be  passed  on.  Wage  in-
creases,  on  the contrary,  cannot be passed  on  in  the 
price of products. 
In principle,  each  enterprise  undertakes  to  stabilize 
the  price  level  of  the  whole  of  its  production  pro-
gramme.  In  exceptional  cases,  however,  a  contract 
can  be  made  for  part of the programme only,  and  in cases  of very advanced specialization the contract may 
extend  to  the  price  levels  of  the  whole  branch. (li) 
Enterprises must produce their price lists to the author-
ities  on  request  to  enable  them  to  verify  that  the 
contract  is  being  observed.  If the  authorities  find 
that enterprises are  at fault they can be brought back 
under  the freeze.  On the expiry of  the contract  the 
revision  of  certain  prices  can  be  negotiated  with 
authorities. 
As  of  27  June  1966  34  stability contracts  had  been 
concluded.  According  to the list given  in Annex, es) 
they affected 58 products or groups of products.  But 
the real effect of this type of conditional price freedom 
scarcely  appears  from  the figures,  since  it depends  on 
the  number  of  applications  for  accession  and  the 
relative dimensions of the firms which have made such 
contracts. 
(b) The introduction of stability contracts is  the first 
attempt by the French government to achieve the aim 
of stability of price levels without creating a manifest 
obstacle to growth.  Economic growth is  accompanied 
in practice by structural changes which in turn imply 
or impel modifications in the terms of trade.  As  will 
be  seen  in  greater  detail  below,  the  price  freeze  in 
force since  1963 necessarily involves  a loss of growth 
whenever the variations in price structure impelled by 
growth can  be  reflected  only  by  large  differentiated 
reductions in prices in absolute value.  In theory this 
is  no doubt conceivable, but in practice the possibility 
is  negligible.  Under more realistic conditions, the sta-
bility of price levels  is  possible in an expanding econ-
omy  only  if  the  weighted  sum  of  the price  increases 
necessitated by growth is  equal to  the weighted  sum 
of the price  reductions  made  possible  by  growth. e
9
) 
Experience teaches us that while sellers are very certain 
to  react  to  increased  costs  and  increased  demand  by 
raising  their  prices,  they  are  rarely  so  quick  to pass 
on their  cost  reductions  by  price  reductions. (30)  By 
merging upward and downward price movements into 
a  single  whole,  the  stability  contract  endeavours  to 
obtain by constraint the price reductions permitted by 
growth. 
This  interpretation  seems  to  indicate  that  this  new 
instrument is  better adapted to the conditions for  the 
functioning of the market mechanisms than the general 
freezing  of  retail prices.  Our analysis  of  the effects, 
e
7
)  For  example,  in  the  case  of  man-made  textiles,  where 
an  overall  contract  was  facilitated  by  the  high  concentration 
of  the branch. 
(2
8
)  Cf.  Annex,  p.  133. 
(
29
)  Cf.  also  on  this  point:  Jurgensen,  H.:  Ursachen  der 
Geldentwertung  und  Ansatzpunkte  zu  ihrer  Vermeidung,  in 
Der  Deutsche  Volks- und  Betriebswirt,  1964. 
(
30
)  In  particular,  this  will  not  happen  when  the  aggregate 
demand for  the product in question increases  sharply, even  at 
the  old  price. 
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however, does not relate to improvements of this kind, 
but  to  the  consequences  in  a  situation  where  the 
market  mechanisms  function  in  absolute  freedom  of 
prices.  However,  before  examining  the  possible  in-
fluences on competition and on the market mechanisms, 
we should like to verify how far  the stability contract 
constitutes  a means  of  ensuring  the  stability of price 
levels.  Since  the  phenomena  of  inflation  are  merely 
a sign of more deep-rooted causes,  we shall first  con-
sider  the direct  influence  on  the  signs  and  then  the 
indirect repercussions  on  their causes. 
In considering the signs, it must be asked whether the 
price variations permitted under the prescribed weight-
ing  procedure are  in fact  without effect  on the price 
levels.  Since  turnover is  deemed  to be indifferent  to 
price  variations,  the  requirements  of  the  contract 
relate  to  the  quantities  produced  at  the  time  it  is 
signed,  regardless  of their possible  variations.  If the 
demand for the products of an enterp·rise is  absolutely 
inelastic,  no  variation in volume  should follow.  The 
enterprise would define  its price policy  exclusively  in 
the  light  of  its  costs  and  price  changes  would  in 
practice remain neutral in their effect  on price levels. 
But  in  practice  this  condition  is  satisfied  only  in 
extremely rare and exceptional cases.  Enterprises then 
decide  their price policy  in  the light not only  of  the 
trend of costs  but also  of  the  state  of  demand.  In 
the short term, or if national income is constant, they 
therefore  tend  to increase  the prices  of  products  for 
which the price elasticity of demand is less  than unity 
and-if the costs situation allows-to lower the price 
of  products  for  which  it  is  greater  than  unity.  In 
the  longer  term  income  elasticity  also  becomes  a 
criterion of decision.  Price elasticity should, however, 
always retain its dominant role in considering the state 
of demand if  the growth rate of  the national income 
is  low and if income elasticity is  low for all products 
manufactured.  When  growth  rates  are  high,  and/  or 
when  income  elasticity  is  high,  price  rises  may 
nevertheless be judicious for products with high price 
elasticity if production capacity is inadequate to absorb 
the whole of the  additional demand. 
In other words, the weighting rule is  not, in practice, 
a bar to all  increase  in  turnover;  it merely  prevents 
increases  resulting  solely  from  higher  prices  without 
any  quantitative  growth.  In  simple  language,  the 
stability  contract  thus  compels  the  enterprise  which  • 
desires  to  increase  its  turnover  to follow  a policy  of 
quantity. 
But the greater the macro-economic disequilibrium, the 
more  numerous  are  the  sectors  in  which  a  greater 
volume of production can be marketed at higher prices. 
In these  cases,  the sum  of  price reductions  weighted 
by the real volume of production may be less  than the 
sum of weighted price increases.  The price level rises. 
In a situation where demand is  too great, the stability 
contract cannot eradicate  the  sign.  Since  no  one  can increase  his  turnover  without  increasing  the  volume 
of  products, the result will be to some extent to halt 
price rises.  The fact remains that, in these conditions, 
the stability contract is calculated to have a favourable 
effect  on the  sign  of  an  inflationary  tendency.  But 
if inflation is not to be merely staved off, its underlying 
causes  must be attacked. 
The  main  causes  are  generally  taken  to  be  excess 
aggregate demand, general pressure on costs and insuf-
ficiently  keen  competition.  With regard  to  the  first 
of  these  causes,  the  obligation  to adopt  a "policy of 
quantity"  referred  to above,  introduces  a certain im-
provement.  In addition an  indirect  influence  may  be 
expected  on  the general  trend  of  costs  and demand. 
The  prohibition,  under  stability  contracts,  of  passing 
on  wage  increases  in  product  prices  must  manifestly 
strengthen the resistance of enterprises to wage claims 
in  excess  of  productivity  gains.  Each  enterprise  is 
therefore  compelled  to  base  its  wage  policy  on  its 
productivity.  If this  prohibition  is  applied  strictly, 
wages  thus  cease  to  be  the  decisive  factor  in  the 
pressure  on  costs  as  well  as  in  the  general  increase 
of  demand.  But as  it is  not  absolutely  fixed,  it can 
also  be used by enterprises  with high productivity  as 
a means  of attracting new workpeople.  The stability 
contract  also  limits  the  profit  of  the  enterprise  and 
thus  tends  to reduce  the  demand  for  private  invest-
ments.  No doubt this effect  is  favourable only in the 
short term, since in the long term it entails a reducdon 
in  the  capacity  to  supply.  On the  other  hand,  the 
other components of aggregate demand are not affect-
ed.  Since  the question  of effects  on competition  will 
be considered below, it can be said by way of a partial 
conclusion that while it cannot be denied that stability 
contracts have a certain stabilizing effect,  they cannot 
by  themselves  stabilize  the  long  term  price  level. 
What present effect on competition can be looked for? 
It is unquestionable that the stability contract does not 
hamper institutional freedom of action to reduce prices 
in  market  competition.  But  in  a  state  of  aggregate 
excess  demand competition is  not determined on this 
plane.  Since production capacity is  inadequate in vast 
sectors of the economy, there is hardly any inducement 
to  lower  prices  and  the  stability  contract  makes  no 
great  change.  Competition  operates  much  more  on 
the  plane  of  preparatory  competition  and  takes  the 
form  of  efforts  to increase  production capacity.  The 
feasibility  of investment  action  for  the  purposes  of 
this competition is,  however, reduced by  the stability 
contract owing to the limitation of profits.  If  all enter-
prises were equally affected by this state of affairs, this 
effect  would have  to be assessed  in  the same way  as 
a cyclical  rise  in  income tax.  But a stability contract 
can be signed only by enterprises producing a number 
of  products,  including  some  whose  costs  are  falling. 
Since this condition is generally satisfied only by fairly 
large  enterprises  making  a  range  of  products,  these 
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enterprises  are  favoured  in  preparatory  competltlon. 
The tendency to concentration is also reinforced by the 
fact that enterprises producing only articles whose costs 
are  rising,  or  the  demand  for  which  is  inelastic  in 
relation to price, will seek to extend their production 
to  goods  whose  unit costs  are  falling  or the  demand 
for which is relatively elastic in relation to prices.  The 
simplest  way  of extending production programmes  is 
the merger of enterprises which satisfy these conditions 
and  which,  in  any  event,  follow  a  price  reduction 
policy.  There  is  nothing  inherently  adverse  in  this, 
since  the extension of production units  may  improve 
the  overall  pattern  of  inputs  for  the  economy  as  a 
whole,  and  may  be  the  only  way  of  making  use  of 
the cost advantages derived from mass production and 
sale or the co-operation of research and development. 
But such cost advantages can emerge only in enterprises 
whose  products  are  related  to each  other or  at least 
dependent on each  other from  the  point of  view  of 
demand.  The concentration processes  to be expected, 
however,  are  not primarily  designed  to  achieve  cost 
advantages of this kind, but to escape the general price 
freeze.  It is  not out of  the question,  therefore,  that 
many  of  the  concentrations  will  merely  strengthen 
the  market  power  of  those  concerned,  without  any 
resulting  cost  advantages  to  the  national  economy. 
The market strength of a combine embracing  a wide 
range  of  products  is  also  reflected  in  its  ability  to 
meet attacks on the price front by  a policy of selling 
below cost  price,  making up the losses  by profits on 
unthreatened  markets.  With  the  appearance  on  the 
market of a combine of  this kind,  enterprises with a 
tight production programme can  no longer  take price 
action, except at enhanced risk.  The stability contract 
may  thus  reduce  not  only  the  absolute  number  of 
sellers,  but  also  the  number  of  those  who  really 
inclined  to  spontaneous  competition.  In addition  to 
reinforcing  the feeling  of  solidarity  as  a result of  the 
reduction  of  possibilities  of  action  likely  to affect  all 
sellers,  this  is  an  essential  reason  to  fear  that  the 
stability  contract  may  lead  to  a  weakening  of  the 
spirit  of  competition,  without  it  being  possible  to 
count, in most cases,  on a reinforcement of the possi-
bilities of competition due  to costs.  The consequent 
slackening,  all other things being equal, of  the keen-
ness  of competition tends  in  the  long  run  to disturb 
nearly all  the functions  of the market mechanisms. 
If, in  inferring  the  relatively  short  term  effects,  we 
assume  that the  spirit of competition is  not  affected, 
the main cause of a possible modification in the market 
mechanisms  lies  in  the fact  that legitimate price rises 
do  not  necessarily  correspond  to the  possibilities  of 
rises  due  to demand. 
By limiting the possibilities of exploiting excess  aggre-
gate  demand  and  monopoly  situations  through  price 
action, the stability contract counteracts the formation 
of incomes which do not result from individual services on  the  market.  But  it  may  hamper  the  monetary 
distribution function if it limits the making of profits 
which might be regarded as  premiums for  the timely 
detection  of  favourable  market  prospects  due  to 
changes  in the pattern of demand.  Since  the pattern 
of demand rarely varies except in the long  term, and 
since  growing  demand  generally  also  affords  great 
possibilities  for  cost  reductions  and  therefore  bigger 
chances  of  profits,  it  is  true  that  this  possibility  of 
disturbance  may  become  important only  in  the  long 
term.  In any  event,  the  stability  contract  results  in 
a tendency towards the equalisation of the distribution 
of incomes. 
But if other measures  are not taken to do away  with 
a  persistent  excess  of  demand,  the  real  distribution 
function  may  be  found  to be  affected.  In practice, 
if the supply of goods  at the prices prescribed by the 
contract  is  too  modest,  the  products  are  distributed, 
no longer in the light of the buyers' propensity to buy, 
but at  the discretion  of  the  sellers.  Even  when,  in 
the  matter  of  distribution,  the  importance  of  the 
monetary distribution function is  enhanced, this effect 
may  lose  all  significance  as  a  result  of distortions  in 
the real distribution function. 
In the context of stability contracts, sectoral increases 
in  demand  can  lead  only  to  limited  price  rises.  A 
distortion in the adaptation of the pattern of outputs 
to the new pattern of  demand  can  therefore  not  be 
ruled out.  But, as  has  already been said,  such effects 
are likely only in the longer term. 
If the incentive for each  enterprise to lower its costs 
in  the  face  of competition  is  slight  owing  to excess 
demand, the limitation of the freedom  to raise prices 
may reinforce these effects and thus have a favourable 
influence  on  the  pattern  of  inputs.  Adverse  effects, 
on  the  other hand,  are  possible  when  concentration 
processes due to stability contracts offer no cost advan-
tage  and  forestall  concentrations  aimed  at  such  ad-
vantages. 
In the case  of the allocation function,  we  may  there-
fore mainly expect, in the short term, an improvement 
in  the conditions for  exercising  the function  of regu-
lating the pattern of inputs.  In the long term, adverse 
influences on the pattern both of inputs and of outputs 
can no doubt not be ruled out. 
There is no fear of a slackening of effort at quantitative 
adaptation and qualitative improvement as  a result of 
stability contracts.  The limitation of profits, however, 
lessens  the  capacity  to  finance  the  necessary  invest-
ments.  In  the  case  of  the  development  function,  a 
distortion of  the quantitative component is  therefore 
probable and it is possible that the qualitative develop-
ment function may  be prejudiced. 
It should be recalled, in conclusion, that the long term 
effects  may  be  accentuated  by  the  tendency  already 
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referred  to  towards  a  weakening  of  the  will  to 
compete. 
(c) The stability contract does  not constitute an  insti-
tutional obstacle to international trade in goods.  The 
prices  charged  by  foreign  sellers  on  French  markets 
are unaffected  and  French  makers  can  export on the 
conditions of the foreign  markets. 
But  the  maximum  price  element  contained  in  the 
stability  contract  means  that  the feasibility  of action 
of French entrepreneurs tends  to be less  than that of 
enterprises  which can  exploit excess  national demand 
through prices.  Whereas  sellers  from  other countries 
can  use  the  profits  resulting  from  their  position  on 
the home  market  to subsidise  exports,  such  national 
price  discrimination  is  largely  impossible  for  French 
firms  which  have  entered  into  a  stability  contract. 
Obviously,  the French government desires  to counter 
this  possible  disadvantage  by  also  accepting  export 
price  reductions  as  a  counterpart  to  the  increase  of 
home prices. (31)  But, as we have already demonstrated 
in considering resale price maintenance, national price 
differentiation  cannot  have  the  effect,  if the  possi-
bilities of trade, imports and re-imports are free in all 
directions  on  the  territory of  the EEC, of producers 
with a cost advantage being driven out of the market 
by producers without such  advantages.  Furthermore, 
in so  far  as  it does not involve any  weakening of  the 
will  to compete internationally,  the  stability  contract 
does  not seem  to  affect  the  international working  of 
the market mechanisms.  It is  true that this would be 
a hasty conclusion, since the maximum price element is 
calculated, in certain conditions, to prevent the equal-
ization of prices  throughout  the  integrated  territory. 
If the price of products  on foreign  markets  is  higher 
than the contract price on the home market, the desire 
to  maximise  profits  encourages  an  export  drive.  If 
production capacity  is  fully  used,  this  will  act  to the 
detriment of supplies on the home market, leading to 
a  (potential)  rise  in  market  prices  in  France.  But 
stability contracts  prevent French producers from  at-
taining the home market prices which would otherwise 
be  possible.  They  therefore  divert  their  supplies  to 
these foreign  markets up  to the point where  the dif-
ference  between the foreign  price and the contractual 
home price is equal to unit transport costs.  If foreign 
demand  is  sufficiently  strong,  the  potential  home 
market  price  may  be  well  above  the  foreign  price 
without putting an end to the shift of supplies.  Since 
the  prices  charged  by foreign  sellers  are  not  subject 
to  the  ceiling  prices  on  the  French  market,  these 
sellers  can  obtain  the  high  home  market  price  and 
e
1
)  Cf.  Aufhebung  der  Preisblockade  in  Frankreich  in  Zeit-
schrift  der  Deutsch-Franzosischen  Wirtschaft  (published  by 
the  Official  Franco-German  Chamber  of Commerce,  Paris)  3/ 
1967,  p.  13. satisfy the unsatisfied French demand.  In the extreme 
case,  the paradoxical result may  therefore be reached, 
at  any  rate  temporarily,  whereby  French production, 
with cost  and  price  advantages  in  the context of the 
EEC, is sold mainly on the markets of Member States, 
while supply at free, but relatively unfavourable, prices 
from  France's partners fills  the gaps  in supply on the 
French  market.  An  evolution  of  this  kind  distorts 
the  tendencies  to  the  optimisation  of  trade  and  the 
maximisation  of  production.  If the  legitimate  maxi-
mum price under the stability contract covers produc-
tion costs and provides a satisfactory profit, the French 
producers will tend, in the long term, to extend their 
production  capacities  in  order  to be  able  once  again 
to satisfy the whole of the internal demand.  Similarly, 
in order to benefit from  the price  freedom  applicable 
to  foreign  products,  they  will  contemplate  increasing 
their  production  capacity  through  their  subsidiaries 
existing or to be created abroad.  As it is possible that 
in  this  choice  of location, cost considerations may  be 
relegated  to  the  background,  the  stability  contract 
may  lead  to  a  "sub-optimum"  regional  pattern. 
The  loss  of  well-being  resulting  from  the  distortion 
of  the  real  distribution  function  and  the  allocation 
function  will  no  doubt  primarily  affect  France,  but 
its subsequent repercussions  will extend to  the whole 
of  the  integrated  territory.  Nevertheless,  since  the 
loss of well-being in France will be relatively apparent 
Summary Table showing the possible effects of  the French 
stability  contract  on  the  functions  of  the  market 
mechanism. 
Effects on market mechanisms: 
Functions of market mechanisms 
In  France  in a 
closed economy 
I.  Development function 
1.  quantitative  -
2.  qualitative  -
II.  Allocation  function 
3.  pattern of outputs  -
4.  pattern of inputs  + 
5.  regional pattern 
III.  Distribution function 
6.  monetary  + 
7.  real  -
Legend: 
.  = no major  effect  inferable  or pr• 1bable, 
- =  adverse effect, 
+  =  favourable effect. 
In the EEC in 
an  open 
economy 
-
-
-
-
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in the broad light of day, it is  to be expected that the 
economic policy-makers of that country will then react 
by modifying or abolishing stability contracts.  It thus 
appears,  here  too,  that, in  the  case  of  goods  capable 
of  foreign  trade,  integration  makes  it  impossible  to 
follow  a price policy  in conflict with  the laws  of  the 
market. 
3.  PROGRAMME  CONTRACTS 
(a) This most recent form of conditional price freedom 
was  introduced  in France by  an  Order of  10  March 
1966.  As  its name (programme contract - contrat de 
programme) implies, this is  also a contract, but in this 
case it should be treated, by analogy, as a price control, 
since  enterprises  which  accept  it  thus  legally  escape 
the general freeze.  Like the stability contract, a prog-
ramme  contract,  made  between  the  Ministry  of 
Finance  and  Economic Affairs  and  trade associations, 
gives  rise  to  a  Ministerial  Order;  freedom  of  price 
formation, granted on certain conditions by the Order, 
may  be exercised  by  member  firms  if  they  expressly 
adhere  to  the  contract.  This  contract  may  also  be 
entered into by manufacturers making a single product 
only,  or by  enterprises  making  special  capital  goods 
for  which  there  is  no  current price list. 
Accession  to a contract gives  enterprises the freedom 
to increase their prices within the limits of the growth 
rates specified in the Vth Plan. e
2
)  But the authorities 
retain the right to object  to prices which  they  regard 
as  too high.  Although specially fixed  for  each branch 
of  the  economy,  the  conditions  to  be  observed  are 
inspired in each  case  by  the targets  of the V  th Plan 
and  relate  to  the  volume  of production,  the amount 
of investments, wage levels, productivity increase  and 
exports.  The observance  or performance  of  the  con-
ditions  is  regularly  checked.  These  checks  determine 
whether  conditional  price  freedom  should  be  main-
tained or limited.  Programme contracts are valid until 
the  end  of  the  period  of  the  current  Plan  (end  of 
1970). The annexed list of major programme contracts 
shows  15 items. e
3
)  According to van Meerhaege, the 
number has  since  risen  to 66. (
34) 
(b)  This  unconventional  instrument  of  government 
price policy is not only a form of price control (maxi-
mum  price  element), but at  the same  time an  instru-
ment for achieving the Plan.  As in the case of stability 
contracts,  the  aim  is  "stable price  levels  without loss 
(3
2
)  For  industrial  products,  for  example,  the  Vth  Plan  pro-
vides  for  a maximum  annual  price  increase  of  1  to 2%. 
(1
3
)  Cf.  Annex  p.  135. 
(
34
)  Cf.  Meerhaege,  M.  A.  G.  van:  Prior  Notification  of 
Price  Increases  as  an  Instrument  of Price-Stabilization  Policy, 
in  Kyklos,  Vol.  XXI/1968,  p.  32. of  growth".  We shall  therefore  consider,  first,  how 
far  the  contract  is  calculated  to  do  away  with  the 
symptoms  and  causes  of  an  inflationist  trend  and, 
secondly,  its  probable  influence  on  competition  and 
the market mechanism. 
The  setting  of  maximum  price  limits  enables  the 
desired action to be taken to deal with the symptoms. 
In addition, the programme contract acts  directly and 
deliberately on the causes  of inflation in so far as  the 
policy of the enterprise is  linked with the Plan.  The 
calculated rate of price variation is bound to correspond 
with market conditions, if the Plan correctly forecasts 
the variations in the level and pattern of demand and 
the possible trend of supply and if adequate accounting 
techniques  are  applied  which  allow  for  real  inter-
dependences.  If  the calculations are accurate, the only 
causes  of price rises  are  errors  in  assessing  the  trend 
of supply and demand. 
Since  the  rate  of  price rises  adopted in  the Plan can 
be used by  enterprises  only if their  policy  is  in  line 
with the Plan, the programme contract  also  helps  in 
realising the assumptions of the Plan as  to the volume 
of  supply,  investments,  wages,  productivity  growth 
and  exports.  This  positive  action  on  the  causes  of 
inflation  is  naturally  not  enough  on  its  own  to  do 
away  with  them  entirely.  In  the  first  place,  the 
programme contract does  not affect  all  the  elements 
of demand;  secondly,  the number of contracts  so  far 
signed  is  relatively  low.  It must nevertheless  be re-
cognised  that  the  simultaneous  application  of  the 
contract  to  the  symptoms  and  the  causes  reflects  a 
finer  understanding of the economic  process  than  the 
stability  contract.  If corresponding  action  is  taken 
simultaneously with the unaffected branches,  the pro-
gramme  contract  affords  favourable  and  lasting  pros-
pects  for  the stabilisation of the price level.  But we 
are  mainly  concerned  with the "side-effects",  that  is 
to say,  the  effects  of  these  contracts  on  competition 
and  the market mechanisms. 
The programme contract is  no obstacle to institutional 
freedom  of action to lower prices  in market competi-
tion.  The attempt, by lower prices, to conquer a larger 
share  of  the  market  and  bigger  profits,  is,  however, 
not very sound if the terms of the contract set absolute 
ceilings  for  the  volume  of  production,  investments 
and  wages.  Such  ceilings  limit  institutional  freedom 
of  action  in  preparatory  competition  and  may  thus 
prevent the extension of individual capacity to supply. 
But lower prices cannot contribute towards the target 
of  maximum  profits  unless  the  possible  growth  in 
demand can  also be satisfied by the enterprises whose 
prices  are  lowered.  By  fixing  ceilings  in  this  way, 
the programme contract therefore prejudices competi-
tion. (35 )  But according to Fikentscher, the authorities 
es) The  conditions  of  each  contract  are  individually  agreed, 
but  as  we  have  been  unable  to  inspect  any  individual 
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are  so  pleased  to  see  enterprises  disposed  to invest, 
that  they  have  no  desire  to  limit  the  share  of  the 
market,  for  example,  by  government  loans  or quasi-
contracts. (
36
)  It may  therefore  be assumed  that  the 
contracts  specify  minimum  values  for  the volume  of 
production,  investments,  productivity growth and  ex-
ports.  To all  appearances,  this  is  not true of wages. 
If this assumption is correct, the restriction of market 
competition  referred  to  can  no  longer  emerge,  in  a 
state  of  full  employment,  unless  enterprises  are  pre-
vented from  using  their productivity gains  to engage 
personnel.  Minimum conditions for  the other magni-
tudes  may,  however,  contribute,  in  a  state  of  brisk 
expansion,  to  reinforce  the  causes  of  inflation,  thus 
adversely  affecting  the aim  of stability. 
If the  figures  adopted  in  the  Plan  for  demand  and 
costs  remain  below  the  true  figures,  the  maximum 
price  element is  effective.  Since,  in these circumstan-
ces, higher profits would be possible if price formation 
were free, the programme contract results in a potential 
limitation in the feasibility of action.  In addition, the 
spirit of competition is  gravely  threatened.  The pro-
gramme contract calls for a review of enterprise policy. 
The action of enterprises must be based no longer on 
their own assessment of the market trend, but on that 
of  the  Office  of  the  Commissioner-General  for  the 
Plan.  So  long  as  it is  only  a question  of forecasting 
the trend of aggregates  of demand, the spirit of com-
petition cannot be  affected.  But if,  in  addition,  it is 
possible  in  one  way  or another,  to infer  indexes  for 
the  production  capacity  of  each  enterprise (37
)  the 
result would be action counter to the need of oligopo-
listic  producers  for  security.  If the enterprises  par-
ticipating in a market are broadly satisfied with their 
respective  shares,  the  conditions  of  the  programme 
contract may provide a pointer towards the orientation 
of economic behaviour in the direction of peace.  Thus, 
the  programme  contract  largely  relieves  enterprises 
which enter into it from  the fear  that their share of 
the market will be  threatened by the attacks  of com-
petition.  In practice,  such  a  threat  can  then  come 
only from newcomers on the market.  But in a closed 
economy  of the size  of  France,  this  potential danger 
must  be  regarded  as  negligible  in  many  branches  of 
industry.  The manufacturers'  interest in  oligopolistic 
coiiusion  often  embraces  the  whole  of  the  national 
market and the appearance of new production of com-
petitive  importance  generaily  involves  considerable 
contracts,  we  can  unfortunately  only  assert  this  as  an  as-
sumption. 
(
36
)  Cf.  Fikentscher,  W.:  Rechtstechnische  Aspekte  der  franz-
osischen  planification  in  wettbewerblicher  Sicht,  in  Fikent-
scher-Hoffmann-Kugler:  Rechtsfragen  der  Planifikation,  Stutt-
gart,  1967,  p.  75  and  foil. 
(3
7
)  Dis-aggregation  down  to  enterprise  level  should  not  be 
done  by  the Office  of the Commissioner-General  for  the Plan. 
The  trade  associations,  which  officially  take  part  both  in  the 
work  on  the  Plan  and  in  the  conclusion  of  programme 
contracts,  could  do  this  job  unofficially. difficulties and loss of time.  As  shown in the annexed 
Table,  the  programme  contract  is  mainly  used  in 
branches  where  the market  form  is  oligopolistic.  It 
may  therefore be feared  that one  consequence of  the 
programme contract on the elements  in  the tendency 
to  competition  will  be  at  least  a  lessening  of direct 
pressure.  But,  as  the  contract  system  becomes  more 
familiarly  known,  an  adverse  influence  is  not  impos-
sible on spontaneous impulse, and  therefore on direct 
pressure.  The overall effect will to all  appearances be 
a lessening in the intensity of competition which will 
prejudice  the  operating  conditions  of  the  market 
mechanisms. 
The  effect  of  programme  contracts  on  the  different 
functions  of the market mechanisms  may  be regarded 
as  similar  to  that  of  the  stability  contract.  The 
maximum price element and the reference to the Plan 
have a favourable effect on the distribution of money. 
But  unless  monetary  demand  is  successfully  limited 
to  the  real  supply,  adverse  effects  on  the  real  distri-
bution function  cannot  be ruled out. 
With regard to the allocation function,  the maximum 
price  element  prevents  the  pattern  of  outputs  from 
adapting itself to demand increases not corresponding 
to  the  Plan,  and,  in  the  event  of  unforeseen  cost 
rises,  allows  a  reduction  in  supply  which  does  not 
correspond to the preferences of buyers.  The possible 
weakening of the spirit of competition may  also  lead, 
in the longer term, to a sub-optimum pattern of inputs. 
If  competition is  relatively slight at the moment when 
the  programme  contract  is  introduced,  favourable 
effects  are,  on  the  contrary,  very  likely  in  the  short 
and medium term.  In so far as  costs increase in excess 
of the permitted rates of price increases, all producers 
are  compelled  to improve  their productivity. 
The  same  factors  which  may  have  a  favourable  in-
fluence  on monetary distribution,  hinder  quantitative 
adaptation  in connection  with the development func-
tion,  and  make  it possible  that  qualitative  improve-
ment will  tend to fall  off. 
(c)  The programme contract does  not prevent French 
enterprises  from  charging  on  external  markets,  or 
foreign  manufacturers  from  charging  on  the  French 
market,  prices  commensurate  with  their  respective 
costs.  Institutional freedom  of action in international 
competition  is  therefore  not  restricted.  But  since, 
unlike  French  entrepreneurs,  foreign  manufacturers 
are  not,  so  far  as  we  know,  prevented  from  taking 
advantage in their price policy of any excess in French 
demand, the maximum price element in the programme 
contract may  lead to a one-sided  strengthening of the 
feasibility  of  action  of  the  manufacturers  of  other 
Member countries.  Such  a possibility  is  certainly not 
negligible for  the long  term development of the com-
petitiveness  of  French  enterprises.  But  if  one  looks 
merely  at  comparative  costs,  without  taking  account 
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of  the  reasons  why  they differ,  programme  contracts 
cannot provoke the replacement of supply at relatively 
favourable  costs  by  a  supply  at  unfavourable  costs. 
No  adverse  effects  can  therefore  be inferred  on  the 
tendency  towards  a  competition  valuable  to  inter-
Community  trade.  Furthermore,  the  growth  in  the 
number of potential competitors, connected with inte-
gration,  is  calculated  to stimulate French competition 
which  may  be  weakened  by  programme  contracts. 
Nevertheless, from  an  overall economic point of view, 
the favourable effects on growth and well-being of an 
extension of the field of influence of the market mech-
anism  may  be  disturbed.  Like  the stability contract, 
the programme contract makes  it impossible  to bring 
product prices  in  the  integrated territory into line in 
the  event of prices  on  external  markets  rising  above 
the  permitted  contract  price  on  the  French  market. 
The desire of the French enterprises to take advantage 
of  their  prospects  of  enhanced  profits  on  external 
markets  may,  in  this  case  too,  but much  faster,  lead 
to a limitation of domestic  supply  unjustified by  the 
market. 
This  happens  when  the  link  between  wages  and  the 
Plan prevents profits from being used to attract extra 
labour  by  higher  wages.  Furthermore,  if  real  wages 
are  higher  abroad  than  in  France,  an  emigration  of 
French workers may  theoretically be expected.  If the 
wage conditions  in programme contracts preclude the 
equalization of factor prices in the integrated territory, 
the  emigration  of  factors  may  go  well  beyond  the 
limits  possible  in  a free  market.  As  a  result  of this 
absolute limitation of production possibilities, a more 
favourable  cost  position  of  French enterprises  in  the 
integrated  territory may  become  relatively  immaterial 
to  their  share  of  the  market,  since  they  can  satisfy 
only  a  limited  portion  of  the  demand.  In  such  a 
situation, it is highly probable that the desire to shake 
off  the  restrictions  of  programme contracts  will  take 
precedence,  among  French  producers,  over  pure con-
siderations of costs.  A strong incentive may  therefore 
be expected  for  production  to  shift  abroad,  without 
any cost motive. 
It is  therefore conceivable  that programme  contracts 
may constitute a check on the tendency towards opti-
mum  trade  and  the  relative  and  absolute  maximum 
production.  The following  are  the  consequences  on 
the  functions  of  the  market  mechanisms  in  the  inte-
grated  territory. 
With regard  to the distribution function,  no  supple-
mentary  effects  are  observed  on the functional  mon-
etary  distribution. 
But the check on the tendency towards optimum trade 
reflects  a distortion  of  the  real  distribution function. 
Since  French consumers can, if  they wish, acquire the 
quantities of products they lack from abroad, at market prices  corresponding  to  their buying  preferences,  the 
regulation  of  the  pattern  of  outputs  is  not  affected 
by  the  components  of  the  allocation  function.  But 
if  programme  contracts  prevent  the  concentration  of 
production in the enterprises with the most favourable 
costs,  the overall  pattern of  inputs  in  the  integrated 
territory  is  not  optimum.  The  same  applies  to  the 
regional  pattern,  which  may  also  be  still  further 
deteriorated  by  a  shift  of  factors  not  motivated  by 
overall cost advantages.  No effect on the development 
function can be inferred. 
In conclusion,  it  must  no  doubt  again  be  assumed 
that  the  French  Government  would  counteract  any 
appearance  of  the  effects  described  above,  since  the 
French  economy  would be  the first  to be  hit by  the 
loss  of  well-being  and  growth.  It may  nevertheless 
be asked whether the appearance of these trends would 
be  detected  from  the  outset  and  whether  it  would 
lead, even at that stage to the reform or abolition of 
programme contracts. 
Summary Table showing the possible effects of  the French 
programme  contract  on  the  functions  of the  market 
mechanisms. 
Effects on market mechanisms 
Functions of market mechanisms 
In France in a I  In the EEC in an 
-------------I-closed economy  open economy 
I. Development function 
1.  quantitative 
2.  qualitative 
II.  Allocation function 
3.  pattern of outputs 
4.  pattern of inputs 
5.  regional  pattern 
III.  Distribution function 
6.  monetary 
7.  real 
Legend: 
.  =  no major effect inferable or probable, 
- = adverse  effect, 
+ =  favourable  effect. 
+ 
+ 
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4.  THE PROHIBITION OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
(a)  Price  discrimination  (sometimes  called  price  dif-
ferentiation)  is  said  to  exist (38)  when  a  seller  asks, 
or  a  buyer  offers,  different  prices  for  the  same (3
9
) 
service.  Since  the  prohibitions  in  force  in  Federal 
Germany, France and Luxembourg mainly affect  price 
discrimination by the seller, we  shall confine ourselves 
to that type. 
There may be two different motives for prohibiting it; 
from  the legal point of view, prohibition is based on 
the principle of equality enshrined in the Constitution. 
Even if  this principle is  not always  expressly invoked 
as  the foundation  of the prohibition, (
40
)  it can  often 
be divined underlying  the reasoning.  The connection 
with  the  principle  of  equality  s~ms to  raise  the 
prohibition of discriminatory practices to the level of 
a  manifest  requirement  of  justice,  which  makes  it 
harder  in  any  way  to  discuss  its  merits. (
41
)  But, 
according to Mestmacker, this appearance is deceptive 
and the principle of equality applies to spheres of life 
other  than  relations  under  private  law. (
42
) 
From the point of view of the national economy,  this 
prohibition is  based on the old  static theory of com-
petition, under which the equilibrium of perfect com-
petition  is  the  ideal  to  be  attained.  If this  equili-
brium is  reached,  the prices  of  all  sellers  correspond 
to  unit  costs,  augmented  by  minimum  profit.  Any 
difference  between  the  selling  prices  of  producers 
which  is  not  justified  by  costs  reflects  monopolistic 
power.  Prohibition, therefore, merely aggravates  mo-
nopolistic behaviour. 
{38)  Cf.  Ellinghaus,  U.  W.:  Die  Grundlagen  der  Theorie  der 
Preisdifferenzierung,  Tiibingen,  1964,  p.  7. 
(3
9
)  Machlup (a)  rightly  points  out  that  the  reference  to  the 
"same"  service  (which  includes,  of  course,  similar  goods) 
is  too  narrow,  and  gradually  disappears  when  certain  differ-
entiations  of  the  product  are  taken  into  consideration.  Price 
discrimination  essentially  raises  the  question  of  variable  pro-
portions  between  the  prices  and  costs  of  the  seller  (or  the 
income  of  the  buyer)  where  it  is  immaterial  whether  the 
products  are  identical,  similar  or  entirely  different.  Machlup 
therefore  defines  price  discrimination  as  "The  practice  of  a 
firm  or  group  of  firms  of  selling  (lea!Ung)  at  prices  dispro-
portionate to the  marginal  costs  of the products  sold  (leased) 
or  of  buying  (hiring)  at  prices  disproportionate  to  the  mar-
ginal  productivities  of  the  factor  bought  (hired)".  If we 
have  nevertheless  adopted  the  vaguer  definition  cited  above, 
this  is  because  it corresponds  more  closely  to  the  legal  pro-
hibitions  of  price  discrimination. 
(a)  Cf.  Machlup,  F.:  Characterization  and  Types  of  Price 
Discrimination  in:  Business  Concentration  and  Price  Policy 
(issued  by NBER), Princeton,  1955,  pp.  398  and  foiL 
(b)  Cf.  e.g.  Gutenberg,  E.:  Grundlagen  der  Betriebswirt-
schaftslehre.  Vol.  2,  4th  ed.  revised,  Berlin-Gottingen-Heidel-
berg,  1962,  p.  316. 
{40)  The rule is  invoked, for example, by Summerer, L.:  Rechts-
form  und  wirtschaftliche  Bedeutung  des  Verboten  der  Preis-
diskriminierung;  in:  WuW,  5th  year/1955,  p.  365. 
{
41
}  Cf.  Mestmacker,  E.-J.:  Diskriminierung,  Dirigismus  und 
Wettbewerb, Part I;  in:  WuW,  7th year/1957,  p.  22. 
(
42
)  Cf.  ibid. But  the  present  study  is  primarily  concerned  with 
competition  and  the  market  mechanisms  neither  as 
instruments for  ensuring equality, nor as  a means  of 
reaching  an  equilibrium  of  perfect  competition,  but 
as  a  means  of  regulating  an  evolutionary  economic 
system.  Before  analysing  its  effects,  therefore,  we 
must inquire whether price discrimination in any  way 
interferes with the regulation of the economic  system 
by  the market. 
A  seiier  cannot  impose  different  prices  for  the  same 
product unless  there are, on the demand side,  groups 
of  buyers  for  whom  the  product  ranks  differently  in 
the  scale  of  utilities,  and/  or  who  assess  this  utility 
differently.  It must  be  possible  for  these ·groups  of 
buyers  to be  supplied  separately,  without any  chance 
of  option.  In addition,  the seiier  must either be  the 
only  one on  the entire market, or must enter partial 
markets, where the intensity of competition is variable. 
To  ascertain  whether  the  market  mechanisms  can 
function, we shall concentrate on the market situations 
requisite, on the supply side, for price discrimination. 
If the seiier is  the only one on an  entire market, the 
conditions are not satisfied for the proper functioning 
of the market mechanisms when  this monopoly situa-
tion is  attributable to factors which do not flow  from 
the merits  of the  seller,  such  as  the natural  data  of 
supply,  or  a  legal  privilege.  On the  other  hand,  if 
the  seller's  monopoly  position  is  based  on  better 
performance  than  that  of  his  potential  competitors, 
his  temporary appearance  may  indeed be the expres-
sion  of  the  proper  functioning  of  the  market  mech-
anisms, or, more accurately, it represents the temporary 
result  of  the qualitative  development  function.  This 
reasoning also applies by analogy to the case of variable 
intensity of competition on partial markets.  For exam-
ple, if a seller pioneers a previously neglected potential 
market, the relatively high price and unit profit which 
are  possible  are  at  the  same  time  the  reward  of  his 
success  and an incentive to the inflow of new sellers. 
It is  only when price  differences  unjustified  by  costs 
last  for  a long  time  that it can  be  assumed  that the 
market mechanisms  are  no longer functioning.  Thus, 
monopolistic  situations  may  appear  temporarily  even 
when  the  market  mechanisms  are  functioning  weii. 
Price discrimination is  therefore a sign of disturbance 
only  when  it is  practised  over  a  long  period. 
It foilows  from  this  at least  that general  prohibition 
of price discrimination is pointless.  It could, however 
be maintained that prohibition prevents  the  exploita-
tion  of  the  consumer  if the  market  mechanisms  are 
faulty,  and merely  speeds  up their functioning  in  the 
contrary  case,  by  shortening  the  time  for  the  appli-
cation of the lowest price  on  ali  the partial markets. 
If this were  so,  the effect  of prohibition  would have 
to be regarded  as  absolutely favourable.  This  propo-
sition  can  be  checked  by  analysing  the  effects  of  a 
general prohibition of price discrimination.  We shall 
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confine  ourselves  to  two  cases:  perfect  monopoly  of 
supply, where we assume that the market mechanisms 
are  faulty,  since  certain  prior  conditions  are  not 
satisfied, and variable intensity of competition on par-
tial markets, where we assume  that the market mech-
anism  is  functioning  properly. 
The  situation  of  perfect  monopoly  on  an  aggregate 
market  enables  the  seller  to  maximize  his  profits  by 
imposing on all the partial markets prices correspond-
ing  to  Cournot's  points.  The  prohibition  of  price 
disparities  unjustified  by  costs  no  doubt  obliges  him 
to fix  a unit price, but does not determine its amount. 
The  monopolist  can  therefore  no  longer  realize  his 
maximum  profit  on  each  partial market,  but, on  the 
contrary,  the  prohibition  does  not  stop  him  from 
maximizing his profit on the aggregate market.  Cour-
not's  single  price  for  the  aggregate  market  should 
therefore not in general be the lowest price previously 
charged.  But  the  result  of  this  is  to  moderate  the 
exploitation of all  the consumers  who previously had 
to pay a higher price, while, in contrast, the consumers 
who were previously supplied at lower prices are more 
exploited,  or must withdraw from  the  market. 
The  aggregate  volume  of  supply  would  remain 
unchanged if  the increase in demand from  the former 
high-price  markets  equalled  the fall  in  demand  from 
the  former  low-price  markets.  But  this  cannot  hap-
pen-geometricaily  speaking-unless  all  the  curves 
of demand  on  the  partial  markets  to  be  aggregated 
are straight lines or foiiow the same conformation. (
43
) 
But  since  it  is  more  likely,  according  to  Robinson's 
analysis (
44
)  that the elastic curves  of demand will be 
more  concave  than  the  inelastic  curves,  the  total 
volume  of  outputs  will  generally  be  smaller  with  a 
single price than with differential prices for the partial 
markets. (45 )  The prohibition  of  price  discrimination 
therefore makes it harder for the monopoly  to supply 
the market quantitatively.  If, as  a result of this quan-
titative  reduction,  marginal  costs  increase,  the  unit 
price will  be higher  and  the quantity of outputs will 
be smaller than if marginal costs  are  stable or falling. 
To  sum  up,  it  can  be  said  that  the  prohibition  of 
discriminatory price practices does not stop the exploi-
tation of the consumer by the monopoly, but spreads 
it  differently.  At  the  Cournot  price  fixed  for  the 
aggregate  market,  the  profit  of  the  monopoly  is  cer-
tainly  smaiier and real  distribution is  effected  on  the 
(
43
)  For the theoretical details,  see  Robinson, Joan:  The Econ-
omics of Imperfect Competition.  Vol. V:  Price Discrimination, 
London,  1965,  pp.  179-208,  and  Ellinghaus,  U.  W.:  Die 
Grundlagen  der  Theorie  der  Preisdifferenzierung,  op.  cit., 
pp.  192  and  foil. 
(
44
)  Cf.  Robinson,  Joan:  The  Economics ... ,  op.  cit.,  p.  192 
and  foil.  especially  p.  201  and  foil. 
(
45
)  This  effect  can  also  be  illustrated  relatively  simply  by 
comparing  the quantity of outputs in the case  of perfectly de-
( cont.  on  p.  44.) aggregate  market  in  accordance  with  the  real  distri-
bution function  of the market mechanisms.  But it is 
not certain that this is enough to warrant a favourable 
judgment  on  the  prohibition  of  discrimination.  In 
practice,  if the  consumers'  scale  of  utilities  is  about 
the same, price reductions essentially increase the con-
sumers' rents and the satisfaction of the needs of high 
income earners.  On the other hand, price rises and the 
limitation  of  supply,  diminish  the  consumers'  rents 
and  the  satisfaction  of  the  needs  of  low  income 
earners.  Even allowing for the difficulties of comparing 
utilities  between  one  person  and  another,  it can  be 
said in this case  that the prohibition of price discrim-
ination  would  diminish  well-being  rather  than  in-
crease  it. 
We now  turn to the  second  case,  where the question 
is  whether prohibition can  speed  up  the  general  dif-
fusion  of low prices  in  a market  which  is  no  doubt 
functioning  properly, but where variations  in  the  in-
tensity of competition allow temporary price discrimi-
nations.  On partial markets the speed-up effect might 
glomerative discrimination (a)  and of  the fixing  of monopolistic 
unit  prices:  If the  monopolist  is  in  a  position  to lower  the 
Aggregate  demand 
price  corresponding  to  each  consumer's  assessment  of  utility, 
he may  make a profit equivalent to the whole of the consum-
er's  rent  (area  of  triangle  ABC).  Thanks  to  the quantitative 
return  ox  2  and  the  prices  shown  by  way  of  example,  he 
will  maximise  his profit.  If the prohibition  of  discrimination 
compels  him  to  impose  a  unit  price,  he  is  precluded  from 
completely  exhausting  the  consumer's  rent.  The  maximum 
profit  here  is  the  price  PE  which  corresponds  to  the  point 
of  intersection  of  marginal  income  (F')  and  the  curve  of 
marginal  cost  (K').  But  in  order  to  impose  this  price,  he 
must  cut  back  his  quantitative  output  to  xi. 
(
8
)  Cf.  for  the  distinction  between  "aglomerative"  and  "de-
glomerative"  price  differentiation:  Weber,  K.:  Zur Frage  der 
Preisdifferenzierung  bei  Einproduktunternehmen;  in  SchwZ-
fVuSt,  92nd year/1956,  pp.  17  and  foil. 
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make  itself  felt  at  the  moment  of  the  introduc-
tion of the prohibition, by a once and for all alignment 
of  all  prices  for  each  partial  market  on  the  lowest 
previous price, and later, by  the persistence of keener 
competition.  Normally,  the prohibition of discrimina-
tory  price  practices,  here  again,  merely  compels  the 
determination  of  a  single  price,  without  fixing  it  at 
a  given  level.  But  since  he  is  no  longer  alone  on 
the  aggregate  market,  the  seller,  in  fixing  his  single 
price, must take  account, not only of the reactions  of 
demand and  of  his  own  cost  function,  but, also  and 
above  all,  of  the  price  policy  of his  competitors.  If 
they  do  not  themselves  practice  discrimination,  their 
price  behaviour  will  not  be  directly  affected  by 
the  introduction  of  the  prohibition.  The  seller  at 
discriminatory prices must therefore necessarily say to 
himself  that  any  increase  in  his  prices  on  the  low 
price  markets  will  considerably  restrict  his  outlets 
there.  His  decision  as  to  the  amount  of  the  single 
price will therefore depend on the relative importance 
of  his  profits  on  each  partial  market  in  comparison 
with his aggregate profit and the variation of his costs 
in relation  to the quantities  marketed.  According  to 
the situation on the partial markets, it may  be sound 
to  choose  as  the  single  price  the  price  previously 
obtained on the low price market,  an  optimum mean 
price  or  even  the  price  previously  charged  on  the 
high  price  market. 
In order  to  clarify  this  problem  of  decision,  let  us 
consider  the  example  of  the  graph  below  where  an 
enterprise occupies  a position of perfect monopoly on 
a  partial  market  (I),  while  on  another  (imperfect) 
partial  market  (II) (46)  it  is  in  competition  with  a 
number of other sellers.  We further assume  that the 
production  conditions  of  the  seller  at  discriminatory 
prices are represented graphically by a rectilinear evo-
lution of the cost function and that the seller's search 
for profit is reflected in the maximisation of the extent 
to which costs are covered (surplus over variable costs). 
We  shall  consider  two  cases  distinguished  by  a  dif-
ferent level of marginal costs  [K't(x) =  mean variable 
costs]. 
If marginal  costs  are  at  the  level  K'  1  (  x) and  if  price 
discrimination is legitimate, the enterprise will sell the 
quantity  x1M  at price  p1M  on partial market I  and  the 
quantity x1  at price  P1  on partial market  II.  In this 
case  the profit is  greater on  the  monopolistic  market 
(ABCD)  than  on  the  competitive  market  (abed).  If 
price  discrimination  is  forbidden,  we  get  for  the 
aggregated  demand  curve  for  the  aggregate  market 
(Nm)  three points  of  intersection  between  the  curve 
of marginal income  [ E' (  x)]  and the curve of marginal 
(
46
)  The  selected  evolution  of  the  demand  curve  may  be 
expected,  according  to Jacob,  when  the goods  in competition 
are  differentiated  mainly  by  quality.  Cf.  Jacob,  H.:  Preis-
politik.  Wiesbaden,  1963,  pp.  138  and  foll. p  Price  policy  where  price  discrimination  is  legitimate 
Partial  market  1 
(Monopdly  market) 
Partial  market  II 
(Competitive  market) 
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cost  [D' (x)], the  central  one,  moreover,  not having 
to  be  taken  into  consideration. (47)  It is  therefore 
important to decide whether the unit price taken will 
be  the  former  monopoly  price  (p1M)  or  the  mean 
optimum price (p1M}.  Since  the surplus (mnop) which 
can  be  realised  with  a  price  P1E  and  a  quantity  x1E 
(
47
)  For the significance of this point of intersection, cf.  Jacob, 
H.:  Preispolitik,  op.  cit.,  p.  146. 
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is  smaller than the profit which can be realised on the 
monopolistic market alone (ABCD) the seller will have 
to give  up  the competitive market.  In this  case,  the 
prohibition of price discrimination  therefore does  not 
result  in  a  relatively  low  unit  price  for  all  markets. 
Differential  prices  continue  to  exist;  they  are  simply 
realised by a number of sellers instead of by one only. 
Furthermore, since  the  seller  at discriminatory prices 
gives  up  partial  market  II,  a  slight  price  increase 
cannot be ruled out. In a  system  of  legitimate  discrimination,  if marginal 
costs  are  at the level  [K'2 (x)], the quantity  xzM  will 
be sold at price  pzM  on partial market I  and quantity 
x2  at price pz  on partial market II.  In this  case,  the 
profit on the monopolistic market (EFGH) is  smaller 
than  on  the  competitive  market  (  efgh).  After  the 
prohibition  of  price  discrimination,  three  points  of 
intersection are  again found on the aggregate  market, 
the first  and the last of which influence  the decision. 
Here the option as  to the unit price will lie between 
the  monopoly  price  (pzM)  and  the  competitive  price 
(Pz = PzE ).  In this  case,  the  competitive  price  will 
be taken as  unit price, since  the surplus (qrst) which 
can be realised with pzE  and  xzM  is  more than that on 
the  monopolistic  market  (EFGH).  In these  circum-
stances, it may be taken as  confirmed that the process 
of price  reduction  is  speeded  up by  the introduction 
of  the prohibition of  price  discrimination. 
Even  if  the  latter  case  were  more  frequent  overall 
than the former,  this  would not warrant a favourable 
judgment on prohibition, since we have merely inferred 
here an  effect which happens once only.  Considerably 
more important is  the effect on the speed of function-
ing  of  the  market  mechanisms.  The  prohibition  of 
discriminatory price practices  affects  neither the insti-
tutional freedom  of  action  to  make  general  price  re-
ductions nor the freedom to increase prices uniformly 
in  the light of costs  and  demand.  Sellers  are  merely 
deprived of the liberty to make limited price variations. 
As  we  have  seen,  the  prohibition  entails,  at  the 
moment  it is  introduced,  a  diminution  in  the  profit 
of  enterprises  which  practice  discrimination,  or  in 
other words,  it provokes,  at  least  once,  a  restriction 
of the feasibility of action.  An increase in the intensity 
of  competition  and,  in  consequence,  of  the  speed  of 
functioning  of  market  mechanisms  can  therefore  no 
longer  come  about except  by  a considerable  increase 
in the spirit of competition. 
The  spirit  of  competition  is  generally  not indifferent 
to the form of  the market.  We shall  therefore adopt 
below  the  assumption  of  oligopoly  for  the  whole 
market, since this is  the most important form in prac-
tice.  In competition on an oligopolistic market, sellers 
must  take  account,  as  well  as  their production  costs 
and the reactions of demand, of the prospective actions 
of  their competitors, who  often  react  to  price  reduc-
tions  faster  than  the  buyers, (  48 )  thus  checking  the 
hoped-for  affiux  of demand,  so  that  the  tendency  to 
price  competition  is  relatively  slight  on  such  mar-
(
48
)  Thus,  the  German  electrical  appliance  industry,  on  the 
announcement of a substantial reduction in the price of colour 
television  sets  by  the  Neckermann  mail  order  house,  im-
mediately  reacted  by  reducing  the  prescribed  price  it  had 
already  announced,  even  before  Neckermann  had  delivered  a 
single  set.  Cf.  on  this  subject,  "Elektro-Industrie will  Preise 
fiir  Farbfernsehgerlite  senken"  in:  Die  Welt  No.  146  of  27 
June  1967. 
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kets. (
49
)  But  price  competition  is  not  generally 
completely  abandoned.  Price  reductions  as  a  means 
of  increasing  the  share  of  the market  are  no  longer 
practised unless  there is  no  fear  of immediate  retali-
ation by competitors.  On oligopolistic  markets  price 
competition mainly  takes  the  form  of limited  and/  or 
concealed  price  reductions  which,  as  experience  has 
proved,  often  lead  to  general  price  pressure. (
50
)  By 
prohibiting limited price reductions, a general prohibi-
tion  of  discriminatory  practices  does  not  encourage 
the  tendency  to  price  competition,  but  accentuates 
the previous inflexibility of prices.  Prohibition there-
fore  does  not  speed  up  the  general  process  of  price 
reduction, but actually helps  to check it.  Finally, this 
prohibition has  the effect, among others, of leading to 
relatively high unit costs and profits.  It may, however, 
be doubted whether this will lead to an intensification 
of  preparatory  competition,  since  the  diminution  in 
the  intensity  of  market  competition  is  accompanied 
by a lessening of the constraint to practise preparatory 
competition. 
In relation to the functions of the market mechanisms, 
therefore,  the effects  of a general  prohibition of  dis-
criminatory  price  practices  may  be  summed  up  as 
follows;  with regard to  the distribution function,  the 
real  distribution  does  not  vary.  By  the  increase  of 
oligopolistic collusion, the monetary distribution may, 
however, be modified to the benefit of enterprises and 
generally  to the benefit  of  high  income  earners. 
The pattern of outputs is  distorted if the inflexibility 
of high prices for products resulting from  the diminu-
tion  of  price  competition  does  not  affect  all  sectors 
equally.  A disturbance in  the regulation function can 
therefore  not  be  ruled  out.  The  regulation  of  the 
overall  pattern of inputs is  essentially  dominated  by 
the  productivity  of  factors  and  enterprises.  Impedi-
ments to market competition may, however, from two 
points of view, lead to a renunciation of the advantages 
of  mass  production.  In  the  first  place,  the  smaller 
aggregate  volume  of  production  owing  to  the higher 
market price, may be an argument against it.  Secondly, 
the diminished chances  of  an increase without risk to 
the  individual  share  of  the  market,  may  have  the 
same  effect.  Furthermore,  owing  to  the  diminished 
(
49
)  The reluctance  to  lower  prices  has,  for  example,  induced 
the  Isenbeck Brewery  to  announce  that its  efforts  to conquer 
the  North German  market  for  high  fermentation  beer  would 
be  made  in  a  climate  of  "fair  competition"  and  that  "there 
was  no  question  of  conquering  the market  by  price  action". 
Cf.  on  this  subject:  "Altbier- Welle  schwappt  nach  Ham-
burg"  in:  Die  Welt,  11  March  1967. 
(
50
)  A  seller,  for  example,  who  has  succeeded  by  clandestine 
competition,  in  increasing  demand  to  such  a  point  that  he 
can  adopt  cheaper  production  methods,  will  also  be inclined, 
on  the  basis  of  such  a  lead  in  preparatory  competition, 
openly  to  practise  general  price  reductions  if he  thinks  that 
his  competitors,  because  of  their  costs,  will  not now  be  able 
to  match  his  own  lower  costs. threat  from  competitors,  the  pressure  for  a  current 
adaptation of  the combina6on of factors  to the devel-
opment of their productivity is lessened.  A disturbance 
in  the pattern of inputs therefore seems  possible. 
The  effort  towards  the  quantitative  adaptation  of 
production capacities is  not prejudiced by the prohibi-
tion  of  discriminatory  practices.  Owing  to  the  im-
proved feasibility  of action, it may  even be envisaged 
that  the  corresponding  function  will  operate  faster. 
The  possible  effect  on  the  qualitative  development 
function  should,  on  the  contrary,  be  more  than 
counterbalanced by the adverse influence of the lesser 
intensity  of  market  competition.  In  practice,  in-
vestment  in  research  and  development  calls  for  a 
certain  willingness  to  accept  risk,  which  is  generally 
in positive correlation with the intensity of the threat 
to the market share of the enterprise concerned.  With 
regard to the development function, quantitative adap-
tation  will,  to  all  appearances,  be  favoured  and  a 
disturbance  of  the  qualitative  development  function 
is  possible. 
On the completion of our general analysis of its effects, 
the image  of  a  general  prohibition  of  discriminatory 
practices  is  therefore  fairly  unfavourable.  It is  pre-
cisely  for  this  reason  that we  must not fail  to point 
out that there are many partisans of prohibition.  The 
gist  of  their  arguments el)  may  be  summed  up  by 
saying  that  in  their  eyes  prohibition  is  necessary  to 
prevent the use  of discrimination in "dissuasive com-
petition". 
According  to  this  school  of  thought,  price  discrimi-
nation is  a very special instrument of dissuasive  com-
petition where: 
(i)  a  seller  charges  a  buyer  (distributor)  a  higher 
price than his competitors in order to enforce on 
him a given behaviour prejudicial to competition 
(e.g.  observance of recommended selling prices): 
(ii)  a  seller  deliberately  undercuts  his  competitors' 
prices to drive them out of the market: 
(iii)  a  buyer,  owing  to  the  volume  of  his  demand, 
imposes  on  his  supplier  a  lower  purchase  price 
than  that  charged  to  his  competitors  so  as  to 
force  them  out  of  the  market  owing  to  higher 
selling prices. (51) 
In the first  case  there is,  indeed,  a use of discrimina-
tion which distorts the market mechanisms.  In order 
(
51
)  A  selection  will  be  found  in  Mestmacker,  E.  }.:  Dis-
kriminierung,  Dirigismus und Wettbewerb, Part I; in:  WuW, 
7th year/1957,  p.  21.  e
2
)  Schultes  therefore  recommends  a  provision  prohibiting 
buyers  from  "requiring,  obtaining  or  granting  discriminatory 
advantages  in the form  of  rebates  or special  terms".  Schultes, 
W.:  Preisdifferenzierung unter wettbewerbspolitischen Aspekt: 
FIW-Schriftenreihe,  Cahier  14,  Cologne-Berlin-Munich,  1963, 
pp.  159  and  foiL 
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to counter such practices it is not necessary to prohibit 
price  discrimination  in  general.  Since  the  differential 
prices  in  this  case  are  linked with a collateral  agree-
ment  in  restraint  of  competition,  it  is  enough  to 
prohibit the combination of  price discrimination with 
obligations  in restraint  of  competition. 
In the second case,  it may  be noted that the competi-
tion essentially consists in taking customers away from 
competitors by  more  advantageous  offers  and  ultima-
tely  driving  them  out  of  the  market.  Any  price 
undercutting based on  service  therefore has  a favour-
able effect on the market mechanisms. (53 )  Price under-
cutting is  therefore open to criticism only if relatively 
unproductive  but  financially  strong  enterprises,  by 
temporary offers below cost, drive relatively productive 
but financially  weak  enterprises  out  of  the  market. 
But  this  will  not happen,  in  this  case  either,  unless 
the unit costs of the first type of enterprise are higher, 
even  after  the additional gain  in  demand,  than those 
of  the  second  type. (
54
)  It is  immaterial  for  the  ap-
pearance of the adverse effect on the market mechan-
isms  in this case  whether such prices  are  charged on 
a few partial markets or generally.  In order to prevent 
such  effects,  a prohibition of sale below cost,  subject 
to certain exceptions, (
55
) and limited to practices which 
are  open  to  criticism,  is  more  appropriate-even  if 
perhaps less  practicable-than the prohibition of dis-
criminatory practices. 
Even  in  the  last  case,  the  need  for  a prohibition  of 
discriminatory practices is  not apparent.  In principle, 
the desire for the most favourable possible input prices 
is  an  essential element in  preparatory competition.  It 
is  therefore legitimate, in the light of a market econ-
omy  for  a buyer  to obtain from  a seller lower prices 
than his competitor.  If the seller, for his part, lowers 
his  selling price and threatens the market share of his 
competitors, they are  also  obliged to envisage favour-
able purchasing conditions.  The buyer's initiative thus 
involves  general  price  reductions  due to competition. 
Thus, it is  maintained that sellers will be constrained 
by  their very big customers  to  make  price  reductions 
from which less powerful buyers will not benefit.  As 
a  result  of  this  price  discrimination,  provoked  by 
demand,  productive,  but  small,  enterprises  may  be 
forced  out of  the  market  by  relatively  unproductive, 
but big  enterprises.  The  answer  to  this  argument  is 
that such  behaviour  on  the part of  sellers  would  be 
shortsighted  and  therefore unlikely.  If a  seller  were 
to charge his  small customers much higher prices than 
e
3
)  If a more  productive  seller  drives  a less  productive  seller 
out of  the market,  an  improvement is  obtained in  the overall 
pattern of  inputs  which  will  often  be more  appreciable  than 
the  possible  deterioration  in  primary  monetary  distribution. 
(
54
)  Cf.  in this connection our comments on lower price limits 
in  the  section  on  costing  rules. 
(
55
)  Cf.,  e.g.  in  the  study on  costing  rules,  the  exceptions  to 
the  prohibition in France  of  selling  below  cost. those he charged to their biggest competitors, he must 
very soon expect to find those customers allowed lower 
prices by his own competitors.  If  this danger is  slight, 
the  seller  in question  obliges  the  small  buyers  either 
to quit the market-thus increasing  the power of the 
big  buyers-or  to  form  a  purchasing  group,  which 
again  strengthens the contractual position of demand. 
If  the seller's unit profit is in negative correlation with 
the  market  power of demand,  it is  in  his  long  term 
interest  to  treat  big  and  little  buyers  on  relatively 
equal  .terms. (
56
)  The  prohibition  of  discriminatory 
practices  is  therefore not essential. 
Powerful  buyers  could  also  oblige  sellers  to  charge 
their  smaller  competitors  higher  prices  than  those 
which they themselves  have  to pay.  But, here  again, 
the  prohibition  of  discriminatory  practices  is  not  es-
sential to eliminate practices  of  this  kind:  it is  suffi-
cient,  as  already  advocated,  to  prohibit  practices  in 
restraint of competition. 
To  sum  up,  the  arguments  of  the  partisans  of  the 
prohibition  of  discriminatory  practices  are  not  suf-
ficiently  persuasive  to  make  us  revise  our essentially 
adverse judgment.  They may, however, to some extent 
help  towards  an  understanding  of  the national  regu-
lations which now remain  to be  considered. 
(b) While in  the Federal  Republic of Germany, price 
discrimination  is  not  expressly  regulated,  §  26(2)  of 
the Act on Restraint of Competition nevertheless lays 
down  a  general  rule  from  which  the  prohibition  of 
discriminatory  practices  can  be  inferred.  This  rule 
prohibits groups of enterprises and market dominating 
enterprises  which  impose  prices  from  unfairly  inter-
fering with other enterprises or discriminating against 
them  without  justifiable  reason.  The  ruling  legal 
opinion  is  that  price  discrimination  may  constitute 
unfair interference. 
The only thing which is  prohibited, therefore, is  price 
discrimination  by  dominating  enterprises  whenever 
it unfairly  interferes  with  the  business  relations  of 
other.  enterprises.  As  interpreted  by  the  lawyers e
7
) 
such interference exists when an enterprise is prevent-
ed, by excessive price variations, from obtaining value 
for  its  services  on  the  market,  the  reasonableness  of 
C
6
)  Factual  surveys  have  established  that  this  reasoning  is 
in  line  with  practical  reality.  Thus  Geisbiisch  reports,  in 
connection with rebates allowed to powerful purchasing groups, 
that  "Even  powerful  and  isolated  retailers  and  wholesalers 
not  belonging  to  any  group  often  benefit  from  special  ad-
vantages  equal  to  the  special  rebates  habitually  accorded  to 
purchasing  groups  in  the  branch,  since  manufacturers  are 
anxious  not  to  force  traders  to  join  groups  of  this  kind". 
Geisbiisch, H. G.:  Die organisierte  Nachfrage,  FIW-Schriften-
reihe,  Cahier  18,  Cologne-Berlin-Munich,  1964,  p.  48. 
(5')  Cf.  Miiller-Henneberg-Schwartz:  Gesetz  gegen  Wettbe-
werbsbeschrankung,  Kommentar,  Cologne-Berlin,  1958, pp. 576 
and  foil. 
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the action being  assessed  in  the light of  the interests 
of  both  parties.  This  interpretation  therefore  lays 
stress  not  on  the  proper  functioning  of  the  market 
mechanisms, but on protecting the freedom of compe-
tition.  Owing  to  the  imprecision  of  the  objective 
limitation,  the  prohibition operates  in  the  first  place 
to  protect  competitors  as  well  as  the  competitive 
system.  But  if, pursuant  to  this  interpretation,  the 
prohibition  merely  concerns  the "price war  of  a  big 
competitor against a small one by locally limited under-
cutting, (
58
)  there is  no fear of adverse effects on oligo-
polistic price competition.  If  big enterprises, producing 
at low costs, want to drive out of the market smaller 
enterprises with lower productivity, selling only in one 
or a few  partial markets, the prohibition of discrimi-
natory  practices  compels  them  to  lower  their  prices 
for the whole market.  They will not take this line if 
their additional  sales  are  not enough to make  up for 
the fall in their gross profit. In this case, any improve-
ment  in  the  aggregate  pattern  of  inputs  is  forgone. 
But  owing  to  the  relative  smallness  of  such  partial 
markets,  this  adverse  effect  can  be  disregarded.  An 
overall price reduction policy  is  sound if the volume 
of partial markets is  relatively large.  Compared with 
a situation in which price discrimination is  legitimate, 
we  find  here  a  favourable  effect  on  monetary  distri-
bution.  The other functions  are no doubt unaffected. 
In France the Decree on Competition of 24 June 1958 
(Ordinance No.  45-1483  on Prices, Art.  37, no.  1 a) 
prohibits,  inter  alia,  "the habitual  practice ...  of  dis-
criminatory price increases unjustified by corresponding 
increases in costs". (
59
)  The question whether there is 
a price  increase  above  the price habitually charged is 
determined by comparison with "net prices".  The net 
prices  are obtained by deducting all  discounts in cash 
or  kind,  including  the  annual  discount  and  other 
rebates.  The  wording  of  the  enactment  seems  to 
indicate  that  only  absolute  discriminatory  price  in-
creases are prohibited, but according to the interpret-
ation  given  by  the  Fontanet  Circular  referred  to 
above,  relative  price  increases  resulting  from  price 
reductions in  favour of certain buyers also  manifestly 
come  under  the  prohibition. (
60
)  There  is  so  far  no 
record of any  conviction for  discriminatory practices. 
Since  the  limitation  to  "the  habitual  practice"  of 
enhanced prices is  merely designed to simplify admin-
istrative action,  the French enactment may be regard-
ed  as  a  general  prohibition  of  price  discrimination, 
the effectiveness  of which  is  further  strengthened by 
the prohibition of refusal to sell.  The effects inferred 
C
8
)  Ibid.,  p.  577. 
(
59
)  German  translation  in Ulmer-Krasser,  op.  cit.,  p.  487. 
(~) In  the  words  of  the  circular,  "it  would  be  manifestly 
contrary  to the spirit of the  text if equality was  respected in 
appearance by  the application of uniform  prices  but infringed 
by the grant of substantial advantages which unfairly favoured 
certain  customers".  Cited  in  Ulmer-Krasser,  op.  cit.,  p.  488. in the general part of this section on competition and 
the market mechanisms  are  therefore  fully  applicable 
to the French enactment. 
In Luxembourg price discrimination is prohibited only 
in  two special  cases.  The Grand-Ducal  Order of  16 
July 1938, prohibits the offer, announcement or grant, 
on  the  purchase  of  merchandise,  of  rebates  to  cus-
tomers in their capacity as  members of associations or 
societies. (61 )  The  second  prohibition  relates  to price 
discriminations designed to circumvent the prohibition 
of resale price maintenance. 
Owing  to  its  limited  scope,  the  first  ru1e  has  little 
effect.  The  prohibition  of  discriminatory  practices 
designed to circumvent the prohibition of resale price 
maintenance  has  the  same  favourable  effects  as  the 
prohibition  of  resale  price  maintenance  itself.  The 
prohibition  of  the  grant  of  rebates  to  members  of 
societies  seems  to be  based on  non-economic  consid-
erations, connected with policy for the middle classes. 
The possibility of restraint on competition or disturb-
ance  of  the market  mechanisms  should be  negligible. 
(c) Turning now to the EEC as  a whole, we find  that 
the  national  prohibitions  of  price  discrimination  do 
not  compel  enterprises  to  charge  the  same  price 
throughout  the  EEC  territory.  Since  sellers  are  not 
prevented from offering their products abroad at prices 
below or above the home price, there is no restriction 
on  freedom  of  action  in  competition  beyond  the 
national frontiers. 
If the general prohibition of discriminatory  practices 
encourages  oligopolistic collusion  in the national con-
text, the competitiveness of the enterprises concerned 
will be  affected  as  a result.  The effect  is  favourable 
if the  price  rise  leads  to  an  increase  in  financing 
capacity:  it is  unfavourable  if the  reduced  intensity 
of  competition  leads  to  higher  production  costs.  It 
is  therefore impossible to infer any  relatively clear-cut 
influence  on material possibilities  of  action.  There is 
no  reason  to  think that the  tendency  to  competition 
beyond  the national  frontiers  will  be  affected  in  the 
case of sellers who are not entitled to charge discrimi-
natory  prices  in  their  own  country.  It is,  however, 
different in the case of foreign sales on a market where 
discrimination  is  prohibited.  So  long  as  the  sellers 
are  not really  established  on  the market in  question, 
the prohibition cannot weaken their spirit of competi-
tion.  If they  are  unwilling  or  unable  to  introduce 
their products immediately on the whole of the market, 
but only on a partial market, they feel no need for the 
faculty  to  charge discriminatory prices.  They will be 
all  the  more  inclined  to  storm  the  corresponding 
market,  the  better  seem  their  prospects  of  success. 
But  these  prospects  improve  when  national  sellers, 
(
61
)  Cf.  Ulmer-Wunderlich,  op.  cit.,  pp.  763  and  foil. 
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owing  to  the  prohibition  of  discrimination,  are  not 
entitled to defend their threatened share of the market 
by  price  reductions  limited  to  the  menaced  partial 
markets.  If the  shrinkage  in  profits  consequent  on 
an overall price reduction is  substantially greater than 
that resulting from  the loss  of outlets on the partial 
market, the national sellers will probably not react by 
way  of prices  unless  foreign  competition  has  already 
captured a substantial part of  demand  on the partial 
market.  In the  first  phase  of  integration,  a  general 
prohibition at national level of discriminatory practices 
may  therefore  have  a  favourable  effect  on  the  com-
petitive spirit of foreign  sellers. 
Summary Table showing the possible effects of  national 
prohibitions  of price  discrimination  on  the  functions 
of the  market  mechanisms. 
Functions of market mechanisms 
A.  Effects  in  the  national context in 
a  closed  economy 
I.  Development function 
1.  quantitative 
2.  qualitative 
II.  Allocation function 
3.  pattern of outputs 
4.  pattern of inputs 
5.  regional  pattern 
III.  Distribution function 
6.  monetary 
7.  real 
B.  Effects in the context of  the EEC 
in  an  open  economy 
I.  Development function 
1.  quantitative 
2.  qualitative 
II.  Allocation function 
3.  pattern of outputs 
4.  pattern of inputs 
5.  regional  pattern 
III.  Distribution function 
6.  monetary 
7.  real 
Legend: 
.  =  no major effect inferable or probable, 
- =  adverse  effect, 
+ =  favourable  effect. 
Germany  France  Luxem-
(FR)  bourg 
+ 
-
-
-
+  -
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ If, on the other hand, the foreign  sellers have already 
conquered  a  certain  fraction  of  the  market,  a  weak-
ening in  their  competitive  spirit is  probable,  for  the 
reasons  given  above.  They  have  a  better  chance  of 
extending their share of the market on a market where 
discriminatory  practices  are  legitimate. 
The very limited scope of the prohibition in force  in 
Luxembourg deprives it of all practical effect on com-
petition  among  Member  States.  It is  true  that  the 
German legislation  might theoretically have a favour-
able  short  term  influence  on  the  competitiveness  of 
foreign  sellers.  But since  legal  interpretation regards 
limited  price  reductions  as  a  justified  defensive 
measure, (
62
)  the German system, too, may be said to 
have no  influence on competition beyond the national 
frontiers. 
The case of France is  different.  It may  be taken that 
the French regulations  make  it easier  for  the  French 
market  to  be  penetrated  by  sellers  who  make  their 
first  appearance  there  as  a  result  of  the  suppression, 
in their branch,  of  relatively  high  Customs duties  or 
restricted quotas, thus strengthening their competitive 
spirit. 
All other things being equal,  therefore,  there may  be 
a speeding up of the tendency to harmonise the prices 
of  factors  and  products  for  goods  manufactured  at 
lower cost by France's partners.  The result is  favour-
able short term effects for the real distribution function 
and the allocation function. 
That completes our plan of study.  It merely remains 
to note that the existence  of  national prohibitions  of 
price  discrimination  is  in  no  way  prejudiced  by  the 
process  of integration. 
5.  CONTROL  OF  REBATES 
Rules  controlling  the  amount  of  rebates  are  found, 
within the EEC in  the Federal Republic of Germany 
and  Luxembourg.  They  do  not  prohibit  uniform 
changes in the gross price, or the fixing of differential 
prices, but they do limit the possibilities of adaptation 
to particular market situations by  granting rebates on 
a uniformly fixed  gross  price.  If the  sellers  want to 
reduce their net prices to a larger extent, the limitation 
on  the  legitimate  amount  of  rebates  compels  them 
to reduce their gross prices.  In certain cases, therefore, 
the control of rebates may have  effects  partly compa-
rable  to  those  of  the  prohibition  of  discriminatory 
price practices. 
In principle  institutional freedom  to  reduce  prices  is 
not affected.  The sellers  simply  cease  to be masters 
(
62
)  Cf.  Miiller-Henneberg-Schwartz:  Gesetz  gegen ... ,  op.  cit., 
1958,  p.  577. 
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of their own action on the nature of their price reduc-
tions and  the procedure for  applying them. 
No direct effect  can  be inferred on  the feasibility  of 
action.  It is  nevertheless necessary  to check whether 
possible pressure to reduce gross prices may  influence 
the sellers' spirit of competition.  The degree of prob-
ability  of  such  effects  depends,  in particular,  on  the 
form of market which exists in each case. 
On oligopolistic markets, it is  important to note that 
gross  prices  are,  as  experience  shows,  the  subject  of 
wider  publicity  than  the  rebates  and  the  net  prices 
which have  to  be calculated.  Rebates  are  also  often 
used  as  parameters  of action  in  differentiated  "clan-
destine competition" which, over a long period repre-
sents  practically  the  only  form  of  price  competition 
applicable  on oligopolistic markets.  If rebate control 
limits the possibilities of this non-public competition, 
the  seller's  uncertainty  as  to  his  competitors'  price 
policy  is  diminished,  as  it is  under  the  influence  of 
prohibition of price discrimination.  But  the effect  of 
indirect pressure on the competitive spirit is  also thus 
reduced,  a  pressure  which  is  particularly  important 
in oligopolistic  markets.  Since  there  is  no  reason  to 
believe that this tendency towards a weakening of the 
competitive spirit is  offset by any strengthening of the 
components  of  spontaneous  impulse  and  direct pres-
sure,  the intensity  of  market  competition  should  di-
minish  on oligopolistic  markets  at the same  time  as 
the competitive spirit, following the control of rebates. 
It must, of course, not be overlooked that the limita-
tion of rebates  also  helps  to make  the  market  more 
transparent for buyers.  In theory, the result could be 
a  speeding  up  of  the  functioning  of  the  market 
mechanisms.  But this  potential favourable  effect can-
not generally make itself felt on oligopolistic markets. 
In practice,  if  price  competition  becomes  frozen  be-
cause  of  the  greater  transparency  of  the  behaviour 
of  market  partners,  the  buyers'  fuller  knowledge  of 
the market becomes inoperative, as  it does in the case 
of prescribed prices.  Rebate control will therefore, in 
oligopolistic  markets,  have  the  same  effects  on  the 
functioning of the market mechanisms  as  the prohibi-
tion of price discrimination. 
On atomistic markets ("polypolistichen Markten"), on 
the other hand, indirect pressure is  only  of relatively 
secondary  importance  for  the  competitive  spirit.  In 
such  circumstances,  sellers  are  fully  able,  by  public 
reduction  of  their  net  prices,  to  attract  demand, 
without this policy being immediately defeated by  the 
counter-measures of their competitors.  The limitation 
of the possibilities of competition by rebates can  and 
will lead, on atomistic markets, to an intensification of 
public  competition  through  gross  prices.  In  such  a 
market situation,  therefore,  the adverse  effect  on the 
competitive  spirit  indicated  above  is  therefore  negli-
gible. But  in  this  case  the  greater  market  transparency 
enjoyed  by  the  buyers  may  lead  to greater  mobility 
of demand which will depend on the comparative per-
formance  of the sellers.  On atomistic markets,  there-
fore,  rebate  control  is  very  likely  to  speed  up  the 
functioning  of  the market  mechanisms.  With regard 
to  the different  functions  of  these  mechanisms,  such 
control may bring about a monetary distribution which 
owes  less  to  chance  and  more  to personal  success,  a 
real  distribution  determined  less  by  individual  com-
mercial skill than by the disposable purchasing power, 
a more efficient  overall pattern of inputs and a stim-
ulus  to  the  qualitative  development  function. 
(b)  In the Federal  Republic of Germany, the Act  of 
25  November 1933 on Rebates, limits the amount of 
cash  discount  at  the last  stage  of  distribution,  retail 
trade,  to 3% of the price  of  the  goods  or services. 
Until §  6 of  this  Act was  invalidated by  the Federal 
Constitutional Court in June 1967, any  form  of cash 
discount was prohibited to department stores, one-price 
stores  and chain  stores.  Quantity rebates  and special 
rebates  for  certain  groups  of  people  are  legitimate 
so  far  as  they  conform  to  trade custom. 
The motive for  this enactment may  be sought in  the 
desire  to protect the consumer against  enhanced arti-
ficial  prices, but although this idea is  expressed in the 
official Explanatory Memorandum, (
63
}  the main object 
of the Legislature was  to combat consumer co-opera-
tives and wholesalers. (
64
)  This original, non-economic 
aim  no doubt ran counter to the line of action of the 
market  mechanisms  and  rebate  control  was  naturally 
found to be unsuitable for the purpose.  The economic 
policy  authorities  today  no  longer  seek  to justify  the 
law  against  rebates  by  arguments  based  on  a  policy 
in  favour  of the middle  classes. 
In assessing the effects of this control, it is  important 
to distinguish between retail markets which are essen-
tially  oligopolistic,  and  those which are  atomistic.  If 
one  takes  account  only  of  sellers  on  the  aggregate 
market,  retail  markets  should  no  doubt be  classified 
as  atomistic.  But this  would be  to overlook the fact 
that the aggregate market is  made up of a great many 
partial markets,  the extent of which is  a consequence 
of location, range  of goods  offered and preferences of 
various kinds. (
65
)  On the other hand, in each partial 
market, the number of sellers, (
66
}  which is  important 
(
63
)  Cf.  Explanatory  Memorandum  to  the  Rebates  Act  in: 
Reichsanzeiger,  No.  284  of  5  December  1933. 
(
64
)  Cf.  also  Woll,  A.:  Der  Wettbewerb  im  Einzelhandel 
(Quaestiones  Oeconomicae,  ed.  Besters,  H.,  Vol.  2)  Berlin, 
1964,  p.  114. 
(
65
)  Cf.  on this point, Marzen, W.:  Preiswettbewerb  und Ver-
braucherpolitik,  Saarbriicken,  1964,  p.  21. 
(
66
)  Cf.  in  this  connection,  the  essay  on  the  typology  of 
retail  markets  in  Oppmann,  E.:  Binnenhandel  und  Binnen-
handelspolitik,  Berlin-Frankfurt,  1959,  p.  122  and  foiL 
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for  price  competition,  should  mainly  represent  an 
oligopolistic pattern.  But an  analysis  of effects  based 
solely  on the  number  of  sellers  would be misleading 
owing  to  the  peculiarity  of  these  markets.  Retail 
traders  are  not specialised  in  a  product  and  carry  a 
large  range  of merchandise.  The mobility  of demand 
is,  at  least  in  part,  greatly  checked  by  relations  of 
preference.  Owing to the extent of these preferences, 
an appreciable growth in demand can result only from 
relatively  large  price  reductions.  Furthermore,  since 
the  aggregate  turnover of  an  enterprise  results  from 
the  sale  of  a  great  many  products,  each  seller  can 
expect an  appreciable fall in his  sales  and profits only 
if  his  competitors  offer  a  relatively  high  number  of 
products  at  considerably  lower  prices.  That  is  why 
these  retail  markets  should  rarely  be  characterised  in 
practice  by  "total oligopolistic  interdependence"  but 
usually by simple  "partial interdependence". (67)  This 
means that sellers can vary their prices within a certain 
bracket without  fear  of  a  counter-offensive  by  their 
competitors.  In this  matter,  therefore,  they  can  be-
have either as  though there were a number of sellers 
or as  though there were a monopoly.  As  experience 
shows, open price competition can be found on retail 
markets in spite of the presence of a number of large 
sellers  corresponding  to  an  oligopolistic  market 
form. (68)  The German law on rebates  therefore exer-
cises  the influences  inferred in the general part above 
for the form of market with a large number of sellers. 
In Luxembourg the  Grand-Ducal  Orders of  23  Feb-
ruary  1963 (
63
)  and  23  December  1963, C
0
)  include, 
in addition  to  a  reform  of  the  control  of  premiums, 
provisions  on the grant of rebates.  Pursuant to Art. 
21  III § 2, progressive and functional price reductions 
are  legitimate only "if they  are  granted  according  to 
the  usual  custom  of  the  trade  among  manufacturers 
and  distributors  or  among  distributors". C
1
)  It  is 
important to verify in each case whether this condition 
is  satisfied. 
In  retail  trade  the  lawful  amount  of  rebates  and 
discounts, pursuant to Art.  21  IV, is  limited to 3%. 
In the case of the limitation of rebates in retail trade, 
our reasoning on the German law on rebates is equally 
applicable here; the same favourable effects may there-
fore  be expected. 
(
67
)  Cf.  the  theoretical  consideration  of  this  distinction  in 
Gutenberg,  E.:  Grundlagen  der  Betriebswirtschaftslehre,  Vol. 
2;  Der  Absatz.  4th  revised  edition,  Berlin-Gottingen-Heidel-
berg,  1962,  pp.  251  and  foil.,  pp.  263  and  foil. 
(
68
)  In France,  too,  where  the  practice  of  large  rebates  (25% 
and more) is  not only legitimate, but very  widespread in retail 
trade,  this  competition  by  rebates  is  generally  practised  in 
a manner  which  is  far  from  being  secretive.  Cf.  Franzosische 
Blankvollmacht  zur  Bekampfung  unlauteren  W ettbewerbs  in 
Industriekurier No.  136  of  9  September  1967,  p.  4. 
(
69
)  Cf.  Memorial  A  N.  11  of  1  March  1963. 
(1°)  Cf.  Memorial  A  No.  72  of  30  December  1963. 
(
71
)  Reproduced  in  Ulmer-Wunderlich,  op.  cit.,  p.  773. With regard  to  the general  limitation  to  the amount 
customary  in  the  trade,  it  may  be  noted  that  on 
oligopolistic markets,  sellers practice clandestine price 
competition with  a view  to increasing  their share  of 
the  market,  and  that,  to  all  appearances  they  apply 
price  reductions  which  are  definitely  above  the  trade 
custom.  In other words,  so  far  as  oligopolistic  mar-
kets  are  hit by  this  prohibition,  market  competition 
will no doubt be impeded.  With regard to the  effect 
on  the  functioning  of  the  market  mechanisms,  we 
refer  the  reader  to  the  considerations  set  out  in 
connection  with  the  prohibition  of  discriminatory 
practices. 
(c)  The  present  rebate  controls  should  not  affect 
competition among Member States.  The special rules 
applicable  to  retail  markets  are,  moreover,  of  little 
importance  for  intra-EEC  trade.  Similarly,  no  effect 
can  he  inferred  from  the  wider  general  limitation 
applicable  in Luxembourg,  since  foreign  sellers  pene-
trating  the  Luxembourg  market,  as  well  as  Luxem-
bourg enterprises defending their share of the market, 
will prefer, in  the first  stage  of integration, to lower 
their gross  prices  rather than grant higher  rebates. 
Furthermore, integration does not prejudice the main-
tenance of rebate controls. 
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Summary Table showing the possible effects of  national 
rebate controls on the  functions of  the niarket mechanisms. 
(Effects  in  the  national  context  only) 
Functions  of market  mechanisms  Germany 
I. Development function 
1.  quantitative 
2.  qualitative 
II.  Allocation function 
3.  pattern of outputs 
4.  pattern of inputs 
5.  regional pattern 
III.  Distribution function 
6.  monetary 
7.  real 
Legend: 
.  =  no major effect  inferable or probable, 
- = adverse effect, 
+ = favourable  effect. 
(FR) 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Luxembourg 
Retail  General 
trade 
+ 
+  -
-
+  -
+  -
+ CHAPTER 5 
GENERAL  PRICE CONTROLS 
1.  RULES  FOR  COSTING 
(a)  In Belgium,  Germany,  France  and  Luxembourg, 
there  are  rules  relating  prices  to  costs.  No  doubt 
these  rules do  not set  any  quantified  limit on prices, 
but  they  do  define  the  costs  or  profit  components 
which  can  or  must  be  taken  into  account  by  each 
enterprise  in  determining  its  own  prices.  In  this 
general form,  the rules  for costing may  impose either 
a maximum or a minimum limit on prices.  The effects 
of such rules depend partly on the limit set, and partly 
on the costs which they allow or compel to be included 
in prices. 
We shall first consider in general the effects of costing 
rules on the overall determination of minimum prices, 
and  we  shall  start with some  considerations  of  prin-
ciple relating to this  concept. (I)  The minimum price 
at which it is more economic to continue than to stop 
production  depends  on  costs.  In the  long  run it  is 
impossible to produce unless  the price of the product 
covers  at least the average  costs  ( =  long  term mini-
mum  price).  For  existing  enterprises,  however,  it 
may be more advantageous to resort in the short term 
to  prices  which,  without  covering  the  whole  of 
average  costs,  exceed  the  costs  which  vary  with  the 
volume of production, thus contributing to cover fixed 
costs or indirect costs.  In the short term, the minimum' 
price is therefore determined by average variable costs. 
The fixing of a lower price limit in every case restrains 
the institutional freedom to reduce prices.  But market 
mechanisms  are  not  thereby  necessarily  distorted.  If 
average variable costs  are fixed  as  the minimum price 
for  current  production,  a  costing  rule  of  this  kind 
merely  limits the possibilities of a price war founded 
not  on  production  costs  but  on  financial  potential. 
If the theoretical possibility of falling average variable 
costs  can  be  regarded  as  insignificant,  prices  below 
variable costs are not rational at micro-economic level 
unless  they  give  the  seller  concerned  the  chance,  in 
the long  term, through the disappearance of his  com-
petitors,  of  offsetting  or  more  than  offsetting  his 
losses  thanks  to considerably higher  monopoly prices. 
(')  Cf.  also  the detailed discussion  of this question by Deppe, 
H.-D.:  "Selbstkosten"  - eine  betriebswirtschaftlich  gerecht-
fertige  Preisunterbietung?;  in:  Fikentscher,  W.:  Die  Preis-
unterbietung  im  W ettbewerbsrecht,  2nd  enlarged  edition. 
Heidelberg,  1962,  p.  87  and  foiL 
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Since  this  process  may  prejudice the sound  operation 
of the market mechanisms,  a costing  rule  which  pre-
vents  such  a  situation  from  arising  is  bound  to  be 
favourable to these mechanisms. 
A  costing  rule  which  compels  lower  price  limits  to 
be  calculated on total average  costs  may,  on the con-
trary,  distort  the  action  of  the  market  mechanisms. 
If capital-intensive  enterprises,  for  example,  operate 
with high fixed costs but relatively low variable costs, 
their  average  total  costs  may,  up  to  a  certain  level 
of  the utilisation of capacity, be  higher than those of 
labour-intensive enterprises whose fixed  costs are low, 
but whose  variable costs  are  relatively  high. e) 
If the aggregate market is  not narrow enough for  the 
large  capacity  of  enterprises  with low  variable  costs 
to  be  deemed  without  long  term  economic  interest, 
the overall pattern of inputs will improve when capital-
intensive enterprises drive labour-intensive enterprises 
out of the market by prices  provisionally founded  on 
average  variable costs  and then sell at prices covering 
their overall unit costs, which are lower owing to the 
full  use  of  capacity.  If costing  rules  prohibit  prices 
below  average  total  costs  they  compel  precisely  the 
most productive sellers to quit the market.  The effect 
on the pattern of inputs is  adverse. 
Costing rules  designed to determine, in the long  term 
and  in  a  general  manner,  the  upper  limit  of  prices 
are bound to select the criterion of average total costs 
supplemented  by  the  profit  margin. e)  Since  they 
generally  allow  the  adjustment  of  prices  to  cost 
variations,  they  essentially  serve  merely  to  place  a 
ceiling  on  profits.  It may  be  taken  that  the  profit 
margin  corresponds  to  the  level  "customary  in  the 
branch" at the time the rule comes into force,  so  that 
there  is  no  fear  of  a  diminution  of  supply  at  that 
moment.  This  kind  of  costing  rule  does  not  limit 
the  institutional  freedom  to  lower  prices  any  more 
e)  In the graph given  below by way of  example,  the average 
variable  costs  (vDk)-which are  equal  to  the  marginal  costs 
(K')  on  the assumption  of  linear  cost  functions-of  seller  I 
are  always  below  those  of  seller  II.  But if  the capacity  of  I 
is  more  fully  used  than  that  of  seller  II,  the  average  total 
costs  of seller II may  be less  than those  of seller  I. 
(l)  Cf.  also  on  this  subject,  Diederich,  H.:  Der  Kostenpreis 
bei  olfentlichen  Auftriigen,  (publication  of  the  Forschungsin-
stitut  fiir  Wirtschaftspolitik,  University  of  Mainz,  edited  by 
Welter, E.,  Vol.  12)  Heidelberg,  1961,  p.  84. Capital-intensive 
Seller  I 
2  q  6  8 
than it prevents price rises due to costs.  On the other 
hand price  increases  connected  with demand  are  not 
authorised.  In the event of a rapid increase in demand, 
there is  a consequent tendency to limit the feasibility 
of action  in preparatory competition. 
With regard  to  the will  to  compete,  there  is  reason 
to fear  that the ceiling on the profit margin resulting 
from the regulations may, in the course of time, change 
the  nature of  profit  by  replacing  a  chance  based  on 
personal success by a right sanctioned by the State. A 
weakening  of  the  propensity  to  market  competition 
cannot therefore be ruled out.  But even the propensity 
to  preparatory  competition  may  be  affected  by  this 
form of profit limitation.  If the profit margin has  to 
be calculated as  a percentage of costs any fall in costs 
reduces the unit profit in absolute value.  In this case, 
the  spontaneous  drive  to  reduce  prices  is  at  least 
diminished if not completely eliminated.  These micro-
economic effects may have the following consequences 
on  the  functioning  of  the  market  mechanisms. 
With  regard  to  the  distribution  function,  the  real 
distribution remains unchanged.  In contrast, the limi-
tation of the level of unit profit may have an equalising 
tendency  on  monetary  distribution.  Such  limitation 
may,  indeed prejudice  the justifiable  remuneration  of 
a market service.  If it is  accepted that, in this event, 
a  better market  service  may  disappear,  the  effect  on 
the  monetary  distribution  function  can  be  called 
favourable.  In the case  of the  allocation  function,  a 
slower  adaptation  of  the  pattern  of  outputs  and  a 
disturbance in the orientation of the pattern of inputs 
must  be  envisaged  owing  to  the  tendency  towards 
less  feasibility  of  action  and  the  weakening  of  the 
propensity  to competition. 
The same  reasons  also  point  to  an  adverse  effect  on 
the  quantitative  and  qualitative  development  func-
tion. 
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Labour-intensive 
Seller II 
2  q  6  8 
These  arguments  against  the  general  fixing  of  price 
ceilings by costing  rules  may  be  unimportant if there 
is  no  appreciable  competition  on  the  market  and  if 
it cannot or should not be created.  In this situation, 
"it is  better to gear prices to costs, rather than allow 
them  to be fixed  unilaterally by the customer or the 
seller". (4)  It is  for  this  reason  that  the  application 
of prices based on costs should, in Diederich's view, (5) 
be  limited to the following cases: 
(i)  where a product in demand can be produced only 
by one  seller,  or by  a very few  sellers  who are 
not competitive  with each  other; 
(ii)  where the product demanded, e.g.  by the public 
authorities,  from  a  larger  number  ofpo  tential 
sellers either cannot be described (it may not yet 
have been made or developed), or cannot conve-
niently be disclosed (e.g. for the sake of secrecy); 
(iii)  where an  inelastic demand corresponds  to a per-
fectly  inelastic  supply  (situation  of  scarcity). 
Even if,  in  such  conditions, directed prices  are  to be 
recommended,  they  should  nevertheless  be  adopted 
only  in  a  form  which,  at  least  for  the  pattern  of 
inputs and the qualitative development function, allows 
an  adequate  incentive  to  competition.  The  exercise 
of  these  overall  functions  is  reflected,  at  micro-
economic level, by price reductions.  There is no doubt 
no  incentive  to  reduce  costs,  except  as  a  means  of 
increasing  profit.  Prices  which  are  made  up of  true 
costs  calculated by  post-costing,  and  a  profit  margin, 
can  hardly  afford  an  incentive  to  cut  costs.  If the 
legal  profit  is  fixed  as  an  absolute  figure,  it  is  not 
affected by cost variations.  If it is  fixed  as  a percent-
age  of unit costs,  increased costs  become a means  of 
maximising  profits. 
(
4
)  Diederich,  H.:  Der  Kostenpreis, ...  op.  cit.,  p.  54  and  foil. 
n c£.  ibid.,  p.  45. In contrast, the amount of unit profit becomes indepen-
dent of true costs  if the prices result from a forecast 
cost  estimate  and  are  quoted firm  (Kostenfestpreise; 
firm  prices based on estimated costs). (6)  If the sellers 
succeed  in  keeping  their  costs  below  the  estimate, 
their profit  increases.  The  incentive  to  reduce  costs 
is further strengthened if the profit margin is calculat-
ed  in  such  a  way  that it is  not  related  to costs. e) 
The  cost estimate  made  with  a view  to  determining 
a firm  production price should be based solely on the 
costs of an enterprise deemed to be efficiently managed. 
For orders of the same kind from  different  suppliers, 
a uniform price  should be  agreed. (8) 
While, in accordance with these comments, preference 
should always be given to firm prices based on estimat-
ed  costs,  where  the  market  mechanisms  cannot  or 
should  not  function,  owing  to  the  better  market 
results  afforded  by  these  prices,  it  is  impossible  in 
practice  completely  to  renounce  prices  based  on  true 
costs.  In effect,  these  firm  prices  cannot  be  applied 
unless the service desired can be clearly described and 
the  expected  costs  can  be  assessed. (
9
) 
(b) In Belgium,  the Ministerial Order of  1 July 1967 
governing  the  price  of  pharmaceutical  specialties, 
includes  rules  for  costing. (1°)  Article  4  specifies,  for 
specialties  made  and  packed  in  Belgium,  with  no 
equivalent abroad,  the costs  to be taken into account 
in calculating the producer's price  to the wholesaler. 
This enactment specifies the following ceilings for pro-
fit  margins, each  of which may be increased by 20% 
for  five  years  in  the  case  of new  products  resulting 
from  research  conducted  in  Belgium: 
Production cost 
Less  than  3  BFr 
3  BFr but less  than  10  BFr 
10  BFr or more 
Maximum profit margin 
120% 
90% 
60% 
Ceilings  are also fixed  for  the mark-up of wholesalers 
(12.5%  of  their  selling  price  to  pharmacists)  and 
pharmacists (30% of their selling  price).  If the final 
price to the consumer, thus calculated exceeds BFr 400, 
(
6
)  Cf.  Diederich,  H.:  Der  Kostenpreis  ... ,  op.  cit.,  p.  85  and 
102  and  foiL 
C)  Cf.  on this point, Welter, E.:  Der Staat als  Kunde, Heidel-
berg,  1960,  p.  250  and  foll. 
{
8
)  Cf.  Welter,  E.:  op.  cit.,  p.  249  and  foll. 
(
9
)  Cf.  Diederich,  H.:  Der  Kostenpreis ... ,  op.  cit.,  p.  105. 
(1°)  Cf.  Moniteur  Belge,  9  June  1967. 
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the producer, importer or packer must obtain the prior 
approval of the Minister of Commerce  for  the  maxi-
mum  price. 
For  pharmaceutical  specialties  with  a  foreign  equiv-
alent, the consumer price is  the same  as  the consumer 
price  abroad,  converted  at  the  official  exchange  rate 
(Art.  6 ).  This  provision  also  applies  to  imported 
products.  This  permitted  maximum  price  can  be 
exceeded  by  certain percentages  up to  30  June  1968 
(Art.  7),  the  percentages  diminishing  in  proportion 
as  the imports  increase. 
Under  this  price control  of  pharmaceutical specialties 
at  all  stages,  the costing  rules  apply  only  to products 
manufactured  or packed  in  Belgium  for  which  there 
is  no foreign  equivalent.  From this limitation to cer-
tain products,  it may  be  assumed  that possible  com-
petition among Belgian sellers is  not deemed sufficient 
in  itself.  The  need  for  official  price  control  is  ex-
plained,  in  particular,  in  this  case  by  the  fact  that 
aggregate demand for these products must be relatively 
inelastic in relation to price.  We can therefore refrain 
from  inquiring  into  the  effects  of  this  control  on 
competition, and devote  ourselves  solely  to the  ques-
tion whether the fact that profit margins are taken into 
consideration  may  be  deemed  to  have  favourable 
effects  on  competition.  If we  take  it that  the  level 
of  profit  margins  is  established  in  the  light  of  the 
average profits earned by other products, we can limit 
our inquiries  to  the  effects  on  the  pattern of  inputs 
and on qualitative development. 
Since  the  percentage  of  profit  falls  as  costs  rise,  an 
incentive to reduce costs  is  not ruled out.  The ques-
tion whether, and how far,  such  effects  are  plausible 
is  certainly  not unconnected  with  the special  way  in 
which  the sellers' profits  are  ascertained  and the  way 
in which the rates are applied.  The available documen-
tation does not indicate whether the percentages apply 
solely  to  the cost  brackets  indicated  or  at  the  single 
appropriate  level  for  the  aggregate  production  cost, 
either alternative being possible.  The tables and figures 
given below illustrate our comments. 
If  the percentages apply to each cost bracket indicated, 
the absolute unit profit increases, in spite of the lower 
margins,  as  costs  increase (cf.  graph I  a).  The fall  in 
relative  unit  profit  cannot  provide  any  incentive  to 
reduce costs if the aim  of the maximisation of profits 
is  reflected  in  the  search  for  a  maximum  unit  profit 
for  an  almost  inelastic  demand.  If we  look  at  the 
return  on  capital,  and  if we  can  assume  that  the 
capital {11)  committed in an enterprise for the produc-
tion  of  a  medicament  is  in  positive  correlation  with 
(
11
)  This  concept  of  capital  includes  not  only  the  fixed  cor-
poreal  assets  used,  but also  all  the financial  resources  needed 
to  achieve  the  trading  objective. the level  of costs, e
2
)  increased  costs  would  mean  a 
lower return on the working capital  (d. graph  I  b). 
In other words, if the sellers are aiming at the highest 
possible return on capital, in these circumstances cost 
reductions are a rational means of achieving their aim. 
In the case  of all  production  costs  exceeding  BFr  3, 
there is  an incentive to reduce costs. 
Profit  margin  specified  in  Belgian  costing  rules  for 
pharmaceutical  specialties  manufactured  or  packed  in 
Belgium, with no foreign equivalent. 
Unit  profit,  applying 
percentage 
rate  to 
Maximum  profit  on  production  Production 
cost under regulations  cost in Bfr 
Each  cost  Aggregate 
bracket  cost  BFr 
BFr 
---
Below BFr 3 =  120 %  1  1.20  1.20 
2  2.40  2.40 
2.99  3.59  3.59 
BFr 3 and above, but less than  3  3.60  2.70i 
10  BFr = 90o/o 
3.98  4.48  3.58 
4  4.50  3.60 
6  6.30  5.40 
8  8.10  7.20 
9.99  9.89  8.99 
BFr 10  and  above =  60 %  10  9.90  6.00~ 
12  11.10  7.20  I 
14.97  12.89  8.98 
15  12.90  9.00 
20  15.90  12 
If the  statutory rates  always  apply  to the  aggregate 
production costs,  cost  reductions  may,  on either for-
mulation  of  the  objective,  be  a  rational  means  of 
maximising  profit.  Under  this  system,  cost  increases 
do  not consistently  mean  an  increase  of  unit  profit, 
which will fall whenever the upper limit of the bracket 
is  exceeded  (d. graph  II a).  If the  production cost 
lies  within  the  bracket  between  BFr  3.00  and  3.98 
or 10.00  and  14.97, the unit profit  can  be increased 
by  reducing  costs  below  BFr  3  or  10  respectively. 
( 
12
)  On  the  subject  of  the  relation  between  capital  and 
costs, d. Bohm, H.-}.:  Die Maximierung der Kapitalrentabilitiit; 
in:  ZfB,  32nd year,  1962,  pp.  489  and  foiL 
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In this  case,  the  return on  capital does  not fall  pro-
gressively;  it drops  to a lower level  when one moves 
into  a  costing  bracket  representing  higher  costs  (cf. 
graph II b).  On moving from one bracket to another, 
return  therefore  increases  by  a  reduction  of  costs. 
It can therefore be said that the method of calculating 
profit, in cases  I b, II a and II b,  may  create,  at  any 
rate  in  partial  fields,  an  incentive  to  improve  the 
macro-economic  pattern  of  inputs.  By  the  20%  in-
crease in the profit margin for new products resulting 
from  research  conducted  in  Belgium,  the  regulation 
also  provides  for  the  encouragement  of  qualitative 
development.  The nature of this  costing  rule  applic-
able  at  the  production  stage  therefore  allows  the 
stimulation of adequate  effects  of competition. 
The  rate  of  unitary  limitation  of  the  mark-up  of 
wholesalers  and  pharmacists  no  doubt  relates  to the 
selling price at their respective stages, but the absolute 
value of the maximum mark-up is, in the last analysis, 
determined by the ex-factory price.  Since the mark-ups 
are  not linked  to  marketing  costs,  any  reduction  in 
those costs therefore means a higher profit.  The regu-
lations  therefore  afford  an  incentive  to  improve  the 
pattern of  inputs  at  the  wholesale  and  retail  stages. 
It nevertheless  follows  from  the coupling  of the per-
centage  rates with the  amount of the purchase  price 
that entrepreneurs who desire to maximise their profits 
may  have  no  interest in buying  more cheaply,  unless 
this  interest  is  imposed  upon  them  by  competition. 
The higher the ex-factory price, the higher the absolute 
value of the mark-up.  If the level of marketing costs 
is  independent of the value of the product,  the mar-
keting  stages  can  increase  their  profit  by  selling  at 
relatively high prices  products whose production cost 
is  relatively  unfavourable.  The  control  of  mark-up 
may  therefore  have  an  adverse  effect  on the pattern 
of inputs at the production stage, which runs counter 
to the favourable effects inferred above.  But the need 
for  approval  when  the  selling  price  to  the  public 
exceeds  BFr 400  points  to a certain  lessening  of  the 
interest of  charging  high  prices. 
The general price control of pharmaceutical specialties 
with  a foreign  equivalent  is  no doubt not  a  costing 
rule;  it will  nevertheless  be considered,  in  so  far  as 
it affects  the same group of products.  By  prohibiting 
selling prices above those charged on foreign markets, 
the  Belgian  Government  is  anticipating  the  harmon-
isation  of prices  expected  among  Member  States  as 
a result  of integration.  This  manifestly  assumes  that 
prices  on foreign  markets have  already been harmon-
ised.  Since  industrially  produced  medicaments  are 
generally  sold  at  a uniform  price  for  a given  region, 
and  transport  costs  therefore  only  enter  arbitrarily 
into the price calculation,  this  price  control  provides 
no  margin  for  transport costs.  If foreign  enterprises 
already offer  their products on  the Belgian market at Unit  profit 
OM 
16 
12 
8 
4 
Unit  profit 
OM 
20 
16 
12 
8 
4 
4  8  12 
Profit  Margin 
as specified by Belgian costing rules 
I.  Application to  each cost bracket 
16  20 
Production  cost 
OM 
0/o  Return 
4  8 
II.  Application  to  aggregate  production  cost 
Production  cost 
OM 
%  Return 
100 
80 
40 
20 
/ 
/ 
/ 
12  16  20 
Production  cost 
as  proportion  of 
capital  committed 
Production  cost 
as  proportion  of 
capital  committed their national prices, this rule has only a limited effect 
for  Belgian  producers.  But  it is  different  where  the 
foreign  makers  either  are  not  represented  on  the 
Belgian market or are unwilling to sell there at their 
national prices.  The foreign price converted into Bel-
gian Francs at the official exchange rate does not affect 
the  production  costs  of  the  Belgian  sellers.  These 
costs may therefore equally well be considerably above 
or considerably below the maximum limit applicable. 
If the production costs of Belgian enterprises, including 
certain  minimum  margins  for  the  marketing  stages, 
are  higher  than the maximum  prices  on  foreign  mar-
kets,  Belgian  demand  will be met by  an  insufficient, 
or even nil,  Belgian  supply. 
Since  price  control,  in  these  circumstances,  prevents 
the  appearance  of  high profits,  monetary distribution 
is  favourably  influenced.  But  the  real  distribution 
function, at the same time, becomes inoperative, since 
higher assessments of  utility or propensity to buy can 
no longer be reflected in price offers  above  the upper 
limit set  in  general  fashion.  The pattern of  outputs 
does  not correspond to the pattern of demand, since, 
in the light of buyer preferences, the supply should be 
greater.  But cost pressure may have a favourable effect 
on the pattern of inputs.  It is  true that quantitative 
and  qualitative  development  should  be  greatly  ham-
pered, if not totally halted, following  the considerable 
reduction in the feasibility  of  action. 
If,  on the  other  hand,  Belgian  production  costs  are 
below the statutory price limits, price control scarcely 
affects  the possibilities  of  competition.  A diminution 
of the competitive spirit is no doubt possible on oligo-
polistic markets, if  the maximum  legal  price operates 
as  a  guiding  price,  thus  ensuring  peace  among  the 
oligopolis ts. 
The tendency to reduce  prices  as  a result of competi-
tion  may  thus  be  checked,  disturbing  the  monetary 
distribution function.  In this event,  real distribution 
is  not affected.  While it is  legitimate to  assume  that 
the  demand  for  pharmaceutical  products  is  virtually 
inelastic  in  relation  to  price,  there  is  no  reason  to 
fear  a distortion of the pattern of outputs.  The dimi-
nution of  the  competitive  spirit,  on  the  other hand, 
points  to  an  adverse  influence  on  the  pattern  of 
inputs. 
With regard to the development function, quantitative 
development will probably be favoured by the greater 
feasibility  of action,  but the  adverse  influence  of the 
diminution  of  the  competitive  spirit  is  likely  to  be 
dominant  in  the  matter  of  qualitative  development. 
In the Federal  Republic of Germany costing rules  are 
applied  only  to  the  determination  of  the  cost  price 
(Kostenpreis)  of  public  contracts.  The  Decree  con-
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trolling  the  price  of  public  contracts (
13
)  applies  to 
the price of contracts placed  by  the Federal  Govern-
ment, the Lander, Communes and Syndicates of Com-
munes and other public corporations.  The price limits 
are  as  follows: 
(i)  market  goods  and  services;  the  market  price; 
(  ii)  comparable  goods  and  services:  the  maximum 
prices  based  on  the  market  price; 
(iii)  and  in  default:  the  cost  price,  pursuant  to  the 
provisions for calculating production costs. 
The price control regulations for public contracts give 
absolute  priority  to  the  market  price  over  the  cost 
price.  The concept of market goods  or services  must 
therefore be  interpreted very  widely. (1
4
)  If goods  or 
services are to be deemed non-market, it is not enough 
that the only buyers are public authorities.  The appli-
cation of cost prices is legitimate only in the following 
cases: 
(i)  where there is  no market price, or if it is  impos-
sible  to calculate  maximum prices  from  the  sta-
tutory price  controls  (Decree  on Price  Controls 
for Public Contracts, Art. 5  (1) (i) 3 and 4 ),  or 
(  ii)  in the case of scarce products or where the market 
price  is  subject  to  material  distortion  owing  to 
restraint of competition. es) (Decree cited above, 
Art. 5 (1) (ii) ). 
Similarly,  the special  regulations, (16)  for  the price of 
public  works  contracts  or  publicly-financed  works 
contracts, in principle give priority to the competitive 
price.  But they allow wider scope  to cost prices than 
the Decrees  cited above: 
(i)  competitive prices are accepted only so far as they 
are not flagrantly disproportionate to the services 
rendered, i.e when they are not appreciably high-
er than the cost price (Decree PR No. 8/55, Art. 
5 (1 )).  Otherwise a firm  price  must be applied, 
(
13
)  Decree  PR  No.  30/53  of  21  November  1953  of  the 
Federal  Minister  for  Economic  Affairs  (Bundesanzeiger,  No. 
244). 
(
14
)  Cf.  Diederich,  H.:  Der  Kostenpreis ... ,  op.  cit.,  pp.  58 
and  foll. 
('
5
)  Pursuant  to  the  directives  for  the  application  of  the 
Decree  on  price  controls  for  public  contracts,  addressed  to 
the  sponsoring  authorities,  restraint  of  competition  must  be 
deemed  to  exist  wherever  a  price  agreement,  monopoly  or 
a market-dominating  enterprise is  found.  Directives  of  1 July 
1955  by  the  Federal  Minister  for  Economic  Affairs  and  the 
Federal  Minister  of Finance  (Bundesanzeiger  No.  196,  p.  1). 
(
16
)  Decree PR No.  8/55 of  9 December  1955  by  the Federal 
Minister  for  Economic  Affairs  on  the  price  of  public  works 
contracts  (Bundesanzeiger  No.  249)  amended  by  Decree  PR 
No.  8/61  of  9  November  1961  (Bundesanzeiger  No.  223/18 
November  1961)  and  Directives  of  25  May  1940  on  the 
determination  of  cost  prices  for  public  works  contracts 
(RGB1  I,  p.  851)  and  amendments  of  12  February  1942 
(RGBI  I, p.  89). based  on  estimated  costs,  agreed  before  the 
contract  is  placed; 
(ii)  a firm  cost price,  based  on  estimated costs,  also 
takes  the place  of  a  maximum  price  where  the 
formation  of market prices  is  influenced,  on the 
side  of the seller,  by  a restraint on competition 
(Decree  PR No.  8/55, Art.  5.  (2) ). 
Where  these  provisions  authorise  a  price  based  on 
estimated costs, a firm cost price must be agreed where 
possible.  A price based on true costs  can  be applied 
only  if the  price  cannot be  determined  in  any  other 
way.  But even in this case,  the level of determinable 
costs  must, if possible, be limited by  contract. 
The  Directives  for  calculating  the  cost  price  specify 
that  profit  components  shall  be  taken  into  account 
as  follows: 
(i)  Entrepreneur's 
remuneration: 
(ii)  Interest on capi-
tal: 
(iii)  Personal risk: 
(  iv)  General risk 
of the entre-
preneur: 
absolute  value 
equal to the average salary of a 
comparable  salary-earner 
maximum  rate 
for  permanent capital  equal  to 
the Federal Bank discount  rate 
plus  a percentage  fixed  by  the 
Federal  Minister  for  Economic 
Affairs and the Federal Minister 
of Finance (17) 
absolute  value 
equal  to  the  true  amount  of 
losses  shown  over  a  long  pe-
riod (18) 
maximum  rates. (19) 
These  rates  are  related  to  the 
permanent  capital,  to  sales  at 
production  cost,  or  to  both 
magnitudes, provided that they 
shall  not  exceed  5.5%  of  the 
former. 
(v)  Profit on services  may  be  agreed  for  certain 
rendered:  economic,  technical  or  organ-
isational services. 
Since  the cost  price  is  applicable  only  in  the  absence 
of  a competitive price,  there is  no  point in  inquiring 
into  its  effects  on  competition.  We  shall  confine 
ourselves  to  considering  whether  the  nature  of  this 
rule  suceeds  in  simulating  the  effect  of  market  me-
(1
7
)  A Decree No.  15/54 of 23  December  1954 by  the Federal 
Minister for  Economic Affairs,  on  the determination  of theor-
etical  interest  rates  specifies  a  maximum  rate  of  6.5%  (BA 
No.  250,  p,  1  ). 
(1
8
)  Cf.  on  this  subject:  Schnettler,  A.:  Wagnispramie;  in: 
HdB,  Vol.  4,  col.  6141  and  foil. 
(
19
)  According  to  Diederich,  the  power  to  remunerate  risk 
arbitrarily  is  not  used  in  practice;  cf.  Diederich,  H.:  Der 
Kostenpreis,  op.  cit.,  p.  162. 
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chanisms on the pattern of inputs and the qualitative 
development function. 
It may  be noted at  the outset that the prority given 
to  firm  cost  price  over  true  cost  price  considerably 
limits  the possibility of "manipulating costs"  and the 
tendency to do so.  But is this favourable effect on the 
pattern of inputs reinforced by the way in which profit 
is  accounted  for? 
Among the profit components figuring in the Directives 
for  the  calculation  of  cost  prices,  two  are  fixed  in 
maximum relative and absolute value, while the profit 
resulting from  the performance of the  service proper 
requires  a special agreement.  The absolute maximum 
values  to be  fixed  for  the remuneration of the entre-
preneur and for his personal risk have no influence on 
the incentive to reduce costs.  Since it can be accepted 
that there are sufficient investment possibilities guaran-
teeing an  interest in excess  of the 6.5% fixed  for the 
permanent  capital,  these  rules  in  themselves  scarcely 
constitute an  incentive to employ capital in an excess-
ive  and  anti-economic  proportion.  But  if  we  look 
at this percentage in relation to the rule on the general 
remuneration  of  risk,  our  assertion  becomes  more 
questionable.  The  maximum  risk  margin  of  5.5% 
gives, with the theoretical interest, a remuneration on 
capital of  12%, which is  quite considerable in normal 
times.  If this  maximum  rate is  reached  in particular 
cases,  the  tendency ·to  employ  capital  in  conditions 
contrary  to the general  economic  interest  cannot  en-
tirely be  ruled out.  If, within the general  maximum 
limit  of  the  risk,  a  percentage  is  fixed  for  sales  at 
production costs, the absolute profit increases  as  costs 
rise.  It is  impossible to give a general  answer to the 
question whether this  control  may  result in consider-
able incentive to cost increases-at least apparent.  In 
the specific  case  the  effect  depends,  in  particular,  on 
the  amount  of  the  rate  linked  to  turnover  and  the 
extent  to which  the  general  risk  effectively  increases 
with  turnover.  But  it cannot  be  ruled  out a  priori 
that  cost  increases  may  be  regarded  as  a  means  of 
maximising profit when the rate is  relatively high and 
when the entrepreneurs assess  the real  risks relatively 
low.  The method of accounting for theoretical interest 
and  the  premium  on  risk  may  in  general  very  well 
induce adverse effects on the pattern of inputs and the 
qualitative development function.  In the most favour-
able case, it may certainly be expected in consequence 
that the profit components, with a ceiling  in relative 
value,  may  lead  to  cost  inflation  through the process 
of estimation, but also that the firm cost price as agreed 
on  the basis  of costs,  may  stimulate efforts  to reduce 
costs.  This  control would  therefore result in  a more 
effective  pattern  of  inputs  and  qualitative  improve-
ments  without these  advantages  benefiting  the buyer 
in the form of lower prices. 
Of the  three  costing  rules  applicable  in  France,  one 
is  designed  for  the general  fixing  of minimum  prices and the other two for  the general fixing  of maximum 
prices. 
The  minimum  price  results  from  the  prohibition  of 
sales below cost.  Pursuant to Article 1 of the Finance 
Act, No.  63-628 of 2 July  1963: 
"The resale of any  product in its existing condi-
tion at a price below its true purchase price plus 
the relevant turnover  taxes  on such resale,  shall 
be forbidden.  The true purchase  price  shall  be 
calculated  after  deduction  of  all  rebates  or dis-
counts  of  any  kind  allowed  by  the  supplier  on 
invoicing." (  20) 
Since  it  does  not  apply  to  products  which  are  the 
subject of further processing, the prohibition is limited 
to trade.  Rebates  on  the annual volume  of business, 
very common in France, are not taken into account in 
calculating  the  true  purchase  price,  since  they  are 
granted only on the final settlement of accounts. Simi-
larly,  increases  in  indirect  costs  are  not  taken  into 
account.  The prohibition does  not apply  to:  (21) 
(  i)  perishable  goods; 
(  ii)  seasonal  goods; 
(iii)  old-fashioned  or  technically  outdated  products; 
(iv)  products which can be replaced at lower prices; 
(  v)  products  whose  selling  price  is  aligned  on  the 
price lawfully charged for  the same  products by 
another trader in the same  zone  of activity; 
(vi)  clearance  sales  on  the  cessation  of  trading  or 
change  in  the  nature  of  the business. 
Under this rule, which applies  to trade only,  the con-
cept  of  "cost price"  covers  direct  costs  only,  which 
can be considered in relation to a product as  virtually 
identical with variable costs.  As  already said above in 
general terms,  the fixing  of lower price limits  in  this 
way cannot disturb the market mechanisms.  It serves 
much more to protect consumers against possible rises 
consequent  on unbridled competition not justified by 
costs and the constitution, not justified by the services 
rendered,  of  preferences  founded  on  specious  offers. 
The exceptions are designed to permit lower prices  if 
they  can  be deemed  to be in  the  national  economic 
interest.  In particular,  they  do not prevent  the for-
mation  of  a  uniform  competitive  price  based  on  the 
lowest costs. 
With regard to the different functions  of  the market 
mechanisms, this provision may have favourable effects 
{
20
)  Cf.  text  of  the  Act  (with  German  translation)  in:  Ulmer-
Krasser,  op.  cit.,  pp.  497  and  foil.,  and  pp.  614  and  foiL 
(2
1
)  Cf.  text  of  the  Act  (and  German  translation)  in:  Ulmer-
Krasser,  op.  cit.,  pp.  497  and  foil. 
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on monetary distribution, the pattern of outputs  and 
the development function. 
The  costing  rules  designed  for  the  general  fixing  of 
maximum  prices  are  the  "estimated  price  system" 
(regime  des  prix  sur  devis)  and  the  "price  range" 
(cadre  de  prix). 
The estimated  price  system  consists  in  fixing  a  price 
based on pre-costing at the time of placing a contract. 
The  pre-costing  must  be  carried  out  in  accordance 
with sometimes  very  meticulous  administrative direc-
tives (22)  the detail of which cannot be considered here. 
These  prescriptions  also  fix  the  profit  margin  and 
generally  include a revision clause.  The fixing  of the 
profit  margin  follows  no  general  rule.  Both absolute 
values  and proportions are  used.  The revision  clause 
specifies  the conditions  in  which  the  price  originally 
fixed  can be adjusted to variations in cost components 
occurring between the contract date and the delivery 
date.  A  price  revision  formula  is  used  for  this  ad-
justment,  based  on  the  indexes  of  wages  and  raw 
material costs  published by  the National  Institute of 
Statistics and Economic Studies (  INSEE  ). 
This  price  system  applies  mainly  to  capital  goods 
produced by the mechanical and electrical engineering 
industries.  The summary list, reproduced in Annex (
23
) 
includes  26 items.  The products concerned are  often 
the subject of public contracts, covering a long period 
and involving  substantial sums.  In the light of their 
object, these rules can be compared, at least partly, to 
the price controls for public contracts existing in other 
countries. 
The price  range  also  includes  pre-costing  rules.  This 
system, which applies to the production stage only, is 
also  designed  to  limit  profits.  The  only  difference 
from  the estimated price  system lies  in the nature of 
the production concerned.  Whereas the former relates 
to production  under contract, (2
4
)  the price  range  re-
lates  to market production. (
25
) 
The prices  charged  for  products  subject  to  the  price 
range  may  be fixed  by  the  producer himself,  in  the 
light of certain  costing  rules.  The prices  thus  calcu-
lated  are  maximum  prices;  no  prior  authorisation  is 
needed.  Neither  does  this  system  in  general  fix  a 
ceiling  for  profit  margins.  The  margin  is  fixed  for 
each product in absolute value, uniform rate or varia-
(22)  Cf.  e.g.  Comite  de  Coordination  des  Telecommunications: 
Instruction  for  determining  the  price  of design  and  supply  of 
telecommunications  and  electronic  equipment,  July,  1964. 
(2
3
)  Cf.  Annex,  p.  XIV  and  foiL 
(24)  This  system  therefore  applies  essentially  to  goods  prod-
uced  in  single  units  or in  relatively  small  runs  or  ranges. 
(2
5
)  This  system  therefore  applies  essentially  to  mass-produced 
goods  or  goods  produced  in  relatively  large  runs  or  ranges. ble  multiplier.  The  maximum  margins  for  pharma-
ceutical  products  are  given  below  as  an  example  of 
the last case. 
Maximum margin 
Industrial cost 
in Fr.Fr. 
Absolute  value  in  Multiplier applicable 
up  to 0.30 
0.31-0.60 
0 61-1.00 
1.01-2.50 
and so on, with a diminishing multiplier. 
Fr.Fr.  to each cost bracket 
0.35 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
A price fixed  at any time can be increased only in the 
event of an increase, established to the satisfaction of 
the  authorities,  in  the  cost  components.  The  list 
given in Annex, (2
6
)  which includes  9 items, will  give 
some  idea  of  the scope  of  this  control. 
Both  types  of control  are  identical in that prices  are 
calculated by pre-costing and represent firm production 
prices.  In  neither  case  is  there  a  single  rule  for 
determining profit margin.  Not knowing the products 
for  which  the  profit  margins  are  fixed  in  absolute 
values  or  in  relative  values  decreasing  with  the  rise 
of  costs,  we  must  be content  to  refer  the reader  to 
the general considerations  set out above.  If profit  is 
limited, as in the case of pharmaceutical products, by a 
degressive multiplier, we cannot expect any reinforce-
ment of the incentive  to  reduce  costs  unless  the aim 
set  is  to maximise return. (27) 
These considerations already imply that the functioning 
of market mechanisms is distorted, since the conditions 
for  this functioning  are  not satisfied,  economic  policy 
being powerless  to  satisfy  them.  A glance  at the list 
of products  whose  prices  are  controlled  in  this  way 
nevertheless shows that this cannot be accepted a prio-
ri,  at any  rate for  products  subject  to  a price  range. 
But if regulation  by  the  market  is  in  principle  pos-
sible  by  means  of  prices  determined  by  competition, 
the  possible  effects  of  the  French  costing  rules  on 
competition  and  the  market  mechanisms  are  sub-
stantial. 
(
26
)  Cf.  Annex,  p.  137. 
(2
7
)  If the press  is  to  be believed,  this  does  not often happen 
in practice.  Many  manufacturers  increase  their  absolute  mar-
gins  by  using  the dearest  possible  raw  materials:  Cf.  "In der 
franzosischen  Arzneimittelindustrie  ist  der Staat  Preiskommis-
sar"  in  Frankfurter Zeitung,  Blick  durch  die Wirtschaft,  11th 
year/o.  72,  25  March  1968,  p.  2. 
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The possibilities of competition are  adversely  affected 
if increased demand makes it possible to obtain prices 
higher  than  those  based  on  costs.  In this  case,  the 
costing rules have the same effect as  absolute ceilings. 
In  addition,  the  competitive  spirit  is  bound  to  be 
influenced  by  the  fact  of being  accustomed  to  profit 
margins  authorised by  the  State.  Such  margins  fixed 
by  the  State  are  no  doubt  not  enough  to  ensure 
oligopolistic  peace. 
With regard  to the different  functions  of the market 
mechanisms,  a  favourable  effect  may  therefore  be 
expected on monetary distribution, although this may 
sometimes  become immaterial when demand is  exces-
sively  inflated  owing  to  the  distortion  of  the  real 
distribution function. 
In the event of a considerable increase in demand, the 
reduction  in  the  feasibility  of  action  may  lead  to 
distortions  in  the  pattern  of  outputs  and  the  quan-
titative  development  function.  On  the  other  hand, 
no effect can be inferred on the pattern of inputs and 
the  qualitative development  function. 
In Luxembourg  public  contracts  are  subject  to  the 
provisions of  the Order of 29  December 19 56, laying 
down the clauses and general conditions for the award 
of publicly-financed contracts for works or supplies. es) 
Under Article 2 public contracts for works and supplies 
must generally be awarded by  advertised competition. 
Among the modes of tendering specified in the enact-
ment (Art.  12  and foil.)  only  the "award on produc-
tion costs" (adjudication  sur prix de  revient) (Art. 13) 
refers  to  costing.  Contracts  will  exceptionally  be 
awarded  at  production  costs  "where it is  impossible 
to  delimit  with  sufficient  precision  the  nature  and 
extent of the services  to be rendered.". In such cases 
firm  production  costs  are  calculated  on  the  basis  of 
direct labour and material costs, (
29
)  with a reasonable 
addition  for  overheads  and  profit.  The  Order  does 
not specify how profit is to be calculated.  In the event 
of substantial cost variations occurring after the award, 
the  agreed  price  may  be  varied  upwards  or  down-
wards  (Art.  21). 
There  is  similarly  no  need  to  study  the  effects  on 
competition  of  this  rule.  The  preference  given  to 
firm  production  cost  is  a  favourable  factor  in  the 
incentive  to  reduce  prices.  In  the  absence  of  any 
information  about  the  method  of  assessing  profit 
margins,  we  can  only  once  again  refer  the  reader  to 
our general considerations. 
(2
8
)  Clauses  et Conditions  generales  d'adjudication  des  travaux 
et  fournitures  pour  la  realisation  desquels  i1  est  fait  appel 
a des  fonds  ou a des  credits  publics.  Luxembourg,  1957. 
(2
9
)  Art.  19  (2)  on  this  subject introduces  a national  discrimi-
nation  by  specifying  that,  in  principle,  products  of  foreign 
origin  shall  not  be  used  if  the  producers  of  the  Benelux 
Customs  Union  can  provide  the  same  quality  at  appreciably 
the  same  price. (c)  It now remains  to consider whether  the  national 
costing rules are calculated to affect economic relations 
among Member States.  It will be  found in this  con-
nection  that,  in  general,  these  rules  do  not  prevent 
any seller on any market from asking for prices in line 
with  his  individual  cost  position.  The  institutional 
freedom  of action  to reduce  prices  in  market compe-
tition  is  therefore  not  limited  at  international  level. 
The rules in question, however, forbid the exploitation 
through prices of a monopoly  position or an increase 
in demand.  If this limitation is important, the feasi-
bility of  action for sellers subject to price control may 
be less  than that of enterprises  whose  prices  are  not 
subject  to  ceilings  in  the  same  way.  For  products 
directly capable of external trade, it naturally follows 
that enterprises will,  where appropriate,  make use  of 
markets where these price ceilings do not apply.  Fur-
thermore, the placing of ceilings on profits on products 
indirectly  capable  of  external trade  may  involve  cost 
advantages  in  favour  of  those  products  into  which 
price-controlled products  enter  as  inputs.  These pos-
sible  micr~economic effects  may be important for  the 
market regulation of the economic system in  the inte-
grated territory. 
The analysis of the effects of positive costing rules can 
disregard  the  German  and  Luxembourg  rules,  both 
of  which  apply  solely  to  public contracts  and  solely 
when  the  products  demanded  by  the  State  are  not 
subject  to competition.  There  is  therefore  no  effect 
either on  competition  or on  the  market  mechanisms. 
Under  the  Belgian  legislation  the  costing  rule  appli-
cable to pharmaceutical products for which there is no 
equivalent foreign offer may  also be without influence 
on competition  among  Member  States,  since  by defi-
nition  the  Belgian  supply  has  a  monopoly  position 
on  all  the  markets  of  the  integrated  territory. 
For the  sake  of simplicity,  let us  take  the case  of  a 
single Belgian seller; if prices were entirely free in the 
integrated  territory,  this  seller  would  try  to  get  the 
Cournot price on each national market, or-if arbitrage 
cannot be eliminated-he will try to impose the Cour-
not  price  for  the  whole  European  market.  It  is 
true that this price policy is  forbidden to him on the 
Belgian market by  the costing rule.  If his  capacity is 
sufficient, the monopolist will therefore try to maintain 
the monopoly price or prices  on foreign  markets and 
to satisfy  the  Belgian  demand  at the prices  resulting 
from  the  costing  rules. eo)  If the  price difference  is 
ea)  If  marginal  costs  increase,  the  seller,  as  in  the  case 
studied  by  Bronfenbrenner,  where  supply  is  divided  between 
a normal  market  and  a black market,  will  extend his  produc-
tion  to  the  point  where  marginal  costs  reach  the  same  level 
as  the  price  calculated  on  a  cost  basis.  He will  supply  ex-
ternal  markets  at  monopoly  prices  and  will  sell  the  rest  of 
his  production  on  the  controlled  Belgian  market  at  prices 
calculated on the basis of costs.  Cf.  Bronfenbrenner, M.:  Price 
Control Under  Imperfect Competition, in  AER, Vol.  XXXVII, 
1947,  pp.  111  and  foiL 
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large  and  if  the  market  mechanisms  can  come  into 
play,  the manceuvre will fail.  Following the arbitrage 
which will intervene, prices  will  fall  on  the external 
markets and will align themselves on the Belgian price, 
allowing for  transport costs and mark-up.  A national 
costing rule therefore has  the effect of reducing prices 
throughout the integrated territory.  If the monopolist 
is  not prepared to extend his  production, or if he  is 
not immediately in a position to do so, the satisfaction 
of the surplus foreign demand due to the lower price 
will in practice fall  upon the Belgian  internal supply. 
A shortage  of  supply  may  therefore make its appear-
ance,  at least temporarily, on the Belgian market;  the 
commercial  optimum  will  not  be  achieved  and  real 
distribution  will be distorted.  Since  the demand for 
pharmaceutical  products  is  generally  very  inelastic 
in  relation  to prices,  this effect  is  no  doubt not very 
important;  but it  will  always  appear  if  the  demand 
for  the  medicaments  in  question  increases  for  any 
other reason  (e.g.  because  they  are  allowed  on  social 
security  prescriptions)  in  any  foreign  country  where 
prices are free. 
Furthermore, in considering the Belgian system of price 
control for all pharmaceutical products, the eventuality 
cannot be  ruled  out of the  Belgian  monopolist  being 
induced  to  transfer  at  least  part  of  his  production 
capacity to subsidiaries set up in countries where prices 
are  free.  Such  a  shift  of  factors  is  not  necessarily 
motivated by the cost advantages of the new location, 
since  the constitution of a foreign  supply enables  the 
product  to  escape  the  field  of  application  ratione 
materiae of this costing rule.  In practice, if the foreign 
subsidiary  sells  at the uniform Coumot price  for  the 
integrated  territory,  the Belgian  market price  can  be 
increased to the corresponding level in Belgian Francs. 
In  this  event,  the  monetary  distribution  no  doubt 
becomes more uneven, but real distribution takes place 
in the light of the assessment of utility and propensity 
to buy of the consumers.  In the integrated markets, 
the Belgian costing  rule is  therefore not calculated to 
constrain the monopolist to adopt a behaviour in con-
formity  with competition. 
If there is  an  equivalent foreign  supply,  the  Belgian 
controls compel both national sellers and foreign sellers 
on the Belgian  market to charge prices  which  are no 
higher than the corresponding  prices  on foreign  mar-
kets.  This  stipulation is  a sort of prohibition of dis-
criminatory  prices  at  international  level,  which  has 
manifestly been introduced by  analogy  with the nor-
mal price rule considered below. If price freedom pre-
vails  on the foreign  markets,  the maximum  price  on 
the Belgian market depends  on the intensity of com-
petition on the external markets. Under the influence 
of this rule, a sale on the Belgian market remains ex-
actly as  remunerative as  a sale on an external market, 
and shifts in trade channels or transfers of factors  are 
therefore  improbable.  The obligation  to equalise the 
price of products accelerates  the tendency to the com-mercia!  optimum  and  maximum  production.  The 
effects  on  the real distribution function  and  the allo-
cation function in relations among  Member States are 
therefore favourable. 
Among  the French  price  controls,  the  prohibition  of 
sales  below  cost  does  not  affect  the  market  mecha-
nisms.  It cannot have an adverse  effect, since  it does 
not prevent either price increases  or price reductions 
to  the  general  benefit  of  the  economy.  But  neither 
can  it be  assigned  a  favourable  effect,  since  it  does 
not rule out an undercutting price war between French 
manufacturers  or foreign  producers. 
In so far as  controls of the "price estimate" or "price 
range"  type do  not apply  solely  to production which 
is entirely purchased by the French State, an influence 
on  economic  relations  among  Member  States  cannot 
be  ruled  out.  Since  these  controls  do  not  prevent 
either French or foreign sellers from reflecting in their 
prices their individual costs and the intensity of com-
petition,  they  cannot-at  least  in  the  long  term-
change  the  direction  of  trade  channels.  But  if  the 
state of demand in  the integrated territory  allows,  in 
the case of products directly capable of external trade, 
price  increases  prohibited by  the French control,  the 
volume  of  French  exports  may  become  "super-opti-
mum".  The  maximum  price  based  on  costs  then 
prevents  the  harmonisation  of  the  price of  products 
in  the  integrated  territory  and  therefore  distorts  at 
least the real distribution function. 
If the foreign manufacturers' price on the French mar-
ket  is  not subject  to  this  control,  the  appearance  of 
the paradoxical situation already indicated in  the case 
of  stability  contracts  is  not  impossible.  Relatively 
low-cost French producers may  market their products 
at  higher  prices,  mainly  on  foreign  markets  where 
prices  are  free,  and  relatively  high-cost  foreign  pro-
ducers may satisfy the shortage of supply on the French 
market at prices well above their national prices.  The 
pattern  of  inputs  and  the  regional  pattern  resulting 
from  the market mechanisms  would be changed by  a 
development  of  this  kind.  But  since  the  loss  of 
well-being  would  primarily  affect  France,  it may  be 
thought that French  economic  policy  would react  by 
amending  or  abolishing  the  system  of  prices  based 
on costs. 
If costing  rules  limit  profits  for  products  indirectly 
capable of external trade, the result may  be a compe-
titive advantage for products directly capable of exter-
nal  trade  into which  these  products  enter  as  inputs 
when  the prices  of the corresponding  input products 
are higher abroad.  If  effective demand is fully satisfied 
at  prices  based  on  costs,  control  cannot  have  any 
adverse  effect  either  on  the  direction  or  volume  of 
trade  flows  between  Member  States.  But  if  a  vig-
orously growing demand makes the production capacity 
for  supply  at controlled prices  insufficient,  the limita-
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tion of profits  may  retard  the necessary  extension  of 
capacities.  The  extension  of  the  supply  of  products 
directly capable of external trade will  thus be handi-
capped  if  the  input  product  cannot  be  replaced  by 
another.  As  market prospects improve for enterprises 
in  foreign  countries  where  prices  are  free,  it is  not 
impossible  that  the  capacity  for  the  corresponding 
input products directly capable of external trade may 
Summary Table showing the possible effects of national 
costing rules on the functions of  the market mechanisms. 
-----
Belgium 
Functions of market mechanisms 
A 
a  b 
----
A. Fijfocts in the national context 
in  a closed  economy 
I. Development function 
1. quantitative  -
2. qualitative  -
II. Allocation function 
3. pattern of outputs  -
4. pattern of inputs  + 
5. regional  pattern 
III. Distribution function 
6. monetary  + 
7. real  -
B. Effects  in  the  context  of the 
EEC in  an  open  economy 
I. Development function 
1. quantitative 
2. qualitative 
II. Allocation function 
3. pattern of outputs 
4. pattern of inputs 
5. regional  pattern 
III. Distribution function 
6. monetary 
7. real 
Legend: 
.  =  no major effect inferable or probable, 
- =  adverse  effect, 
+ =  favourable  effect. 
+ 
-
-
-
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
I 
France 
-----
B  c 
----
-
+ 
+  -
+  + 
I 
-
-
-
A  =  price control of  pharmaceutical specialties for which there is no equivalent 
foreign  supply: 
a = production costs of Belgian makers above foreign prices, 
b  =  production costs of Belgian makers well below foreign prices, 
B  =  prohibition of sale  below cost, 
C  =  price range and price estimates. be  extended,  even  though  their  productivity  is  less 
than  that of  the  French production.  Here  again  the 
costing rules  distort the regulation by  market mecha-
nisms of the pattern of inputs and the regional pattern. 
2.  THE  NORMAL  PRICE  RULE 
(a) This  rule,  valid in Belgium  and Luxembourg, sets 
an  upper  limit  for  prices  in  general  terms.  It lays 
down  that the maximum  price  is  constituted by  the 
"normal price".  "Normal price" is interpreted, broadly 
speaking,  as  the  price  charged  for  a  product by  the 
majority  of  sellers  operating  under  comparable  con-
ditions,  i.e.  the price  most  frequently  charged.  Like 
the  prohibition  of  discriminatory  practices,  this  pro-
vision  manifestly  flows  from  the  theory  of  static 
equilibrium.  From  this  angle,  it can  be explained  as 
follows. 
When the market mechanisms function properly, there 
is  only  one  price  on  a  market.  If there  are  price 
disparities,  it  may  be  concluded  that  the  market 
mechanisms  are  not functioning,  particularly because 
of  insufficient  transparency  and/  or of  consumer  pre-
ferences.  The normal price rule is  therefore designed 
to  prevent  the  exploitation  of  the  imperfections  of 
the market in the sphere of prices and thus to stimulate 
the equalising  effects  of  the  market  mechanisms. 
This  interpretation of  the rule brings  out its  kinship 
with the prohibition of  discriminatory  prices.  While 
the  object  of  the  latter  is  to  unify  the  prices  of  a 
single seller at a relatively low level, the normal price 
rule aims at a similar unification for all sellers operating 
in  the  same  conditions.  If "comparable  conditions" 
are  taken  to  mean  solely  equality of costs  regardless 
of the conditions  of demand  on each  partial market, 
the  rule  necessarily  involves  the  unification  of  unit 
profits  on  the  aggregate  market,  which  automatically 
involves a prohibition of discrimination.  But a single 
market price can  be  expected only if the costs  of  all 
sellers  are  identical.  In contrast, price discrimination 
is  not implicitly prohibited in general if comparability 
is  interpreted in the sense  of "the same  market".  If 
costs  are  disregarded,  the  rule  implies  a  single  price 
on each partial market, while allowing different prices 
on different  partial markets. 
Since, under the basic theory of our study, the market 
mechanisms also exercise an equalising effect on prices, 
it could be said that the normal price rule-whatever 
the definition  of comparable  operating conditions-is 
bound to speed up the functioning of the mechanisms. 
The rule  is  limited  to prescribing  a behaviour  which 
the  correct  functioning  of  those  mechanisms  would 
sooner or later impose.  But a closer consideration of 
the  possible  effects  on  competition  shows  that  this 
conclusion  is  highly  questionable. 
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It is  true that the normal price rule does not interfere 
:vith institutional freedom to reduce prices:  similarly, 
m  the  case  of  sellers  who  ask  high  prices  and  are 
cof?pelled  to  reduce  their  prices,  the  feasibility  of 
actton cannot be regarded, at macro-economic level, as 
greatly  diminished.  It is  a different matter with the 
possible  influence  on the competitive  spirit.  A  spon-
taneous  price  reduction,  as  we  have  already  said  is 
rati?~al  only  if the  seller  hopes  to  attract  eno~gh 
addtttonal demand to ensure that his  aggregate profit 
increases  in spite of  a  possible  reduction  in  his  unit 
profit.  Prices are all  the more rigid where the  sellers 
have  reason  to fear  that their competitors  will  react 
to price  reductions  faster  than  the  buyers,  and  thus 
forestall  the desired increase in demand.  Now, if the 
State  compels  competitors  to  adjust  their  prices  im-
~ediately, an  increase  in  demand  is  possible  only if 
It  corresponds  to  the  price  elasticity  of  aggregate 
demand and if it results from  the withdrawal of mar-
ginal sellers.  Such a strict rule should therefore result 
in  a decisive  lessening  of  the tendency  to price  com-
petition.  The result will be prices which are no doubt 
relatively uniform, but also relatively high. 
The normal price rule nevertheless requires the align-
ment of  all  prices  not on  the lowest  price  but only 
on the most current price.  It may  therefore be taken 
that the increased demand  expected  by  a  seller  who 
sP?ntaneously  reduces  his  price  is  not  precluded  by 
thts  rule.  No competitor will be constrained to align 
his  price demands  on each  reduction.  This argument 
is no doubt sound in theory, but it does not allow for 
the  fact  that,  in  reality,  competitors  react,  at  least 
partly, by price adjustments even if  there is  no regu-
lation which compels  them to do so. 
In a situation of oligopoly, in the narrow sense, nearly 
all sellers will immediately adjust themselves to a price 
reduction by one of their number.  Prices are therefore 
relatively  uniform.  But  the  close  interdependence  of 
sellers generally rules out any price competition.  The 
normal price rule is therefore pointless here.  No doubt 
it  has  no  adverse  effects,  but it  has  no  favourable 
effects either.  It affords no incentive either for market 
competition  or  for  preparatory  competition. 
Price competition nevertheless exists in an oligopolistic 
situation in the widest sense, where, in Kantzenbach's 
terms el) "the optimum  intensity  of competition"  is 
found.  If, adopting  Heuss's  terminology, (3
2
)  we  as-
sume  that in these markets  there are "dynamic entre-
preneurs" (initiative Unternehmer) (the pioneer spirits 
and  their  spontaneous  imitators),  and  "conservative 
entrepreneurs"  (  konservative  U nternehmer)  (reacting 
e
1
)  Cf.  Kantzenbach,  E.:  Die  Funktionsfiihigkeit  ... ,  op.  cit., 
p.  138.  e
2
)  Cf.  Reuss,  E.:  Allgemeine  Markttheorie  Tiibingen-Zii-
rich,  1965;  for  definitions,  see  pp.  9  and  foil.,  for  the  state 
of  the  market,  see  pp.  109  and  foil. I 
only under pressure, if  at  all),  the former  can expect 
the latter  to react  to price  reductions  only  after  the 
buyers, if  at all.  The existence of conservative entre-
preneurs  is  therefore  an  essential  condition  for  the 
existence  of  price  competition.  If at  least  half  the 
supply  comes  from  dynamic  entrepreneurs,  aligning 
themselves  spontaneously  on  a  price  reduction,  the 
price  is  usually  determined by  the demands  of  these 
entrepreneurs.  If the  normal  price  rule  obliges  the 
conservative  entrepreneurs  also  to  align  their prices, 
it simulates  the  conditions of an  oligopolistic  market 
in the narrow sense.  The dynamic entrepreneurs will 
therefore largely  refrain  from  price  reductions  if  the 
cost differences between sellers and/  or the price elas-
ticity  of  aggregate  demand  are  not  very  substantial. 
It is  only in oligopolies  in the wide sense (where the 
majority of entrepreneurs are of the conservative type) 
and in an atomistic market structure that the tendency 
towards a weakening of  the competitive  spirit which 
is  possible  there,  may  be  insignificant. 
Since  oligopolistic  market  situations  are  very  wide-
spread, the normal price rule should therefore, on the 
whole, result in a diminution of the competitive spirit 
which  slows  down  the  functioning  of  the  market 
mechanisms. 
Even  when  the  market  mechanisms  function  badly, 
the  normal  price  rule  cannot  be  expected  to  yield 
decisive  advantages.  Since  it  hardly  seems  possible 
in  practice  to  regard  the  normal  price  as  a  single 
price-it always appears merely  as  a price range-the 
rule can  enforce  reductions  only  on a few  high price 
sellers.  It can  therefore have a favourable effect only 
so  far  as  it  prevents  the  bare-faced  exploitation  of 
completely ignorant buyers. 
(b) The Belgian normal price rule results from Article 
1 of the Statutory Decree of 22 January 1945, on the 
punishment  of  offences  against  the  regulations  for 
the supply  of  the country. e
3
)  It is  linked with the 
prohibition in force since 1939 (Order of 9 September 
1939) against selling foodstuffs  or merchandise on the 
internal  market  at  prices  above  the  "normal  price". 
Although the rule is manifestly general in its effect, (
34
) 
its  application  in  practice  seems  to  be  essentially 
limited  to  the  distribution  stage.  According  to  the 
Courts,  the  normal  price  at  the  distribution  stage 
(3
3
)  Cf.  in  this  connection:  Ulmer,  E.  (editor):  Das  Recht 
des  unlauteren  W ettbewerbs  in  den  Mitgliedstaaten  der  Eu-
ropi:iischen  Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft,  Vol.  II, 1:  Schricker,  G. 
and  Wunderlich,  D.:  Belgien,  Luxemburg.  Munich-Cologne, 
1967,  p.  534. 
(3
4
)  Van Meerhaeghe  affirms  quite categorically:  "As a general 
rule,  prices  may  not be  higher  than  the normal  prices".  Van 
Meerhaeghe,  M.  A.  G.:  Prior  Notification  of  Price  Increases 
as  an  Instrument  of  Price  Stabilisation  Policy;  in:  Kyklos, 
Vol.  XXI,  1968,  p.  33. 
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is  "the  price  at  which  the  products  are  sold  to 
consumers  by  the majority of traders  trading in com-
parable conditions". (35 )  Pursuant to the third sentence 
of Article 1 (  2) the decision whether a price is  normal 
is  a  matter for  the  Courts  to decide  in  the  light  of 
the profits  made,  the  state  of  the  market  and costs. 
The list of these  criteria indicates  that the aim  is  to 
unify the unit profit on each potential market, so that 
price  differentiation  remains  legitimate  if the  condi-
tions of demand differ.  The decision  is  always  based 
on the price of specific merchandise and never on the 
price  level  of  the  whole  of  the  merchandise  of  the 
enterprise.  Excessive prices  on one article cannot be 
offset  by  prices  below  the normal  on  other  articles. 
Furthermore, only the prices actually charged are taken 
into  consideration.  Thus,  when  the  majority  of  re-
tailers trading under comparable conditions offer mer-
chandise at a price below an earlier list price or below 
the maximum  prices  fixed  by  the State, the charging 
of  the  list  price  or  the  maximum  price  is  equally 
unlawful. 
The application of the normal price rule was explained 
to us  as  follows,  on  19  June  1967,  by  the  Belgian 
Ministry for Economic Affairs  (Trade Administration, 
Prices Branch): 
"The normal  price  is  left,  in each  specific  case, 
to the discretion of the Courts and Tribunals, but 
it is  little  applied,  and  there  is  little  case  law. 
The authorities, in any event, do  not admit that 
a  price  is  normal  merely  because  it is  charged 
by  enterprises in the branch concerned, .without 
referring  to  the  cost  price  of  the  enterprise 
accused.'' 
Since  the rule  merely  serves  as  a basis  for  a control 
which is  left  to  the Courts,  and is  rarely  applied,  it 
should  have  little  practical  influence  on  the  price 
policy  of  enterprises.  It  is  therefore  impossible  to 
infer  from  it,  in  general,  any  diminution  of  the 
competitive  spirit,  unless  its  application  were to be-
come considerably more  frequent.  But in that event 
there would also be  some fear  of a weakening of the 
competitive spirit on the retail markets. If we assume 
for  these  markets-as  we  did  in  considering  the 
control  of  rebates (  36 )-a partial  oligopolistic  inter-
dependence,  the  sellers  will  no  doubt  not  need  to 
contemplate  spontaneous  adjustment  to  the  prices 
of  their  dynamic  competitors  within  a  certain  price 
range;  nevertheless,  a  very  substantial  increase  in 
demand  can  be achieved  only  within  the  sphere  of 
effective  oligopolistic  interdependence.  If, thanks  to 
his  price policy,  a seller gains  ground in this  sphere, 
his dynamic competitors will reduce their prices.  The 
(3
5
)  Judgement of the Court of Brussels  of 26 April  1961,  in 
Journal  des  Tribunaux,  1961,  502,  note  Von  Bunnen,  cited 
from  Champaud,  C.,  Part  I, op.  cit.,  p.  23. 
(l
6
)  C£.  pp.  98  and  foll.  above. "normal price"  being  thus  reduced,  the  conservative 
competitors will also be constrained to come into line. 
If the normal price  rule  is  strictly applied,  the  tend-
ency  to  penetrate  into  this  sphere  should  be  weak-
er. This  rule may  therefore have an  adverse effect on 
the intensity of market competition, without thereby 
involving  a favourable  effect  on preparatory competi-
tion. Since the appearance of this effect depends solely 
on  the  action  of  the Belgian  Courts  or the  Belgian 
Government, the market mechanisms may be affected. 
The  real  distribution  function  would  remain  un-
changed, whereas monetary distribution would be de-
teriorated as  a result of the weakening of price com-
petition. In the sphere of the allocation function,  the 
normal price rule involves  a distortion of the pattern 
of inputs and, if the effects of competition vary from 
branch to  branch, of the pattern of outputs.  Higher 
profits  would  no  doubt  offer  better  possibilities  of 
development,  but  a  favourable  influence  would  be 
probable only  for  the quantitative development func-
tion. With regard to the qualitative elements no very 
marked influence can be inferred. 
In Luxembourg, the normal price rule was introduced 
by  Grand-Ducal  Order  of  8  November  1944  and 
continued in the  Outline Law of 30 June 1961  cur-
rently  in  force. e
7
)  Under  this  regulation,  products 
for  which  the  price  formation  or  price  level  is  not 
subject  to particular control  must not be sold  above 
the  "normal price". 
The "normal" character of a price is  assessed  by  the 
J\1inister  for  Economic  Affairs  or his Delegate, or by 
the Courts.  According to the answer  given us  on 23 
May  196  7,  by  the  Luxembourg  Price  Department, 
the normal  price  for  Luxembourg products  "may be 
deemed  to be  the purchase price of the merchandise 
plus  the  profit  margin  usual  in  the  branch".  Since 
the normal price is  thus manifestly determined purely 
in the light of the cost position, this rule at the same 
time  limits  price  discrimination.  On the  assumption 
that  comparable  sellers  obtain  their  supplies  at  ap-
proximately the same  prices, the normal price should 
be___,as in Belgium-the price most commonly charged. 
The  Grand-Ducal  Order  of  15  February  1964,  pro-
vides  special  treatment  for  imported  products  and 
branded goods.  The normal price  for  these  products 
is  the  retail  price  charged  in  the  country  of  origin, 
converted  into  Luxembourg  Francs  at  the  official 
exchange  rate,  with  the  addition,  where appropriate, 
of  customs  duties  and  anciiiary  charges,  transport 
costs,  import duties,  etc. (
38
) 
The Luxembourg rules, like the Belgian, do not limit 
the institutional freedom  to reduce prices.  But, since 
(
37
)  C£.  Champaud,  C.  Part  I,  op.  cit.,  pp.  40  and  foil. 
(l
8
)  C£.  ibid.,  p.  42. 
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they  entirely  disregard  the demand position,  the  de-
termination  of  the  normal  price  may  mean,  for  the 
enterprises  which  it  affects,  a  diminution  of  the 
feasibility  of  action  in  the  event  of  a  substantial 
increase  in  demand.  It  seems,  however,  that  once 
again,  this  rule  essentially  applies  only  to  the  distri-
bution stage.  In this case, price rises  due to demand 
would  not  be  prohibited to producer  enterprises,  so 
that the resulting supplementary profits could be used 
for quantitative development.  The limitation of mark-
up at the marketing stage can only have an essentially 
favourable  effect  on the  distribution  function,  since 
capacity  at this  stage  does  not generally  need  to be 
extended.  The  Luxembourg  rules  seem  unlikely  to 
have any effect on the competitive spirit.  In practice, 
if "the profit margin usual in the branch" is  fixed  at 
rates  based  on  the  experience  of  several  years,  the 
reduction in  the margins  of  a number of sellers  will 
not constrain any of their competitors to follow their 
price reductions.  The Luxembourg rule therefore does 
not lessen  the  chances  of  conquering  additional  de-
mand.  An  adverse  effect  on  the  competitive  spirit 
can appear only if the statutory reference to "the profit 
margin usual in the branch" consolidates that margin. 
But  since  this  effect  directly  attributable  to  price 
control  cannot  be  very  important,  we  can  disregard 
it.  In short, with regard to the market mechanisms, 
a favourable  effect  can be  inferred only  on monetary 
distribution. 
(c) The nature and present frequency  of application 
of the normal price rule in the two countries has  no 
effect  on relations among Member States. 
If  the Belgian rule allows-as we have assumed-price 
rises  due to demand, its general and frequent applica-
tion would not arouse  any  fear  of adverse  effect  on 
the  functioning  of  the  market  mechanisms  among 
Member  States.  The institutional freedom  to reduce 
export  prices  is  not  limited,  either  for  national  or 
foreign  sellers.  The  possible  diminution  in  certain 
cases  of the feasibility of action of Belgian high-price 
sellers  can  only  be  judged favourably,  and  the dim-
inution of the competitive spirit, inferred for a dosed 
economy,  should  not  manifest  itself  in  competition 
among Member States, at any  rate in the first phases 
of integration.  Belgian sellers will react to the lower 
prices of foreign sellers by price reductions only when 
they have acquired some  experience of the degree  of 
interdependence  between  their  supply  and  foreign 
supply. 
In so far as no account is taken of the state of demand 
for internal products, the general and frequent appli-
cation  of  the  Luxembourg  rule  would  certainly  not 
exclude  a  distortion  of trade  channels.  In practice, 
if  the  state  of  demand  abroad  made  it  possible  to 
obtain  considerably  higher  selling  prices  and  profits 
than in Luxembourg, external markets would be  sup-
plied in preference to, and to the detriment of, supply 
to  the  Luxembourg  market.  In  extreme  cases,  it 
\ 
' I  Summary Table showing the possible effects of national 
normal  price  rules  on  the  functioning  of the  market 
mechanisms. 
(valid  only  in  the  case  of strict  and frequent  application) 
Functions of the market mechanisms  Belgium 
Luxem-
bourg 
--------------I·---A_j_B_ 
A.  Effects in the national context in a closed 
economy 
I. Development function 
1.  quantitative 
2.  qualitative 
II. Allocation function 
3.  pattern of outputs 
4.  pattern of inputs 
5.  regional pattern 
Ill. Distribution function 
6.  monetary 
7.  real 
B.  Effects  in  the  context  of the  EEC in 
an  open  economy 
I. Development function 
1.  quantitative 
2.  qualitative 
II. Allocation function 
3.  pattern of outputs 
4.  pattern of inputs 
5.  regional pattern 
III. Distribution function 
6.  monetary 
6.  real 
Legend: 
A  =normal price rule for Luxembourg products; 
B  =normal price rule for foreign products; 
•  =  no major effect  inferable or probable; 
- =  adverse  effect; 
+ =  favourable  effect. 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
is  possible,  here too,  that the  shortage of  supply  on 
the Luxembourg  market would be covered  by  some-
what unproductive  foreign  manufacturers,  since  they 
are not forbidden to charge higher prices.  We should 
then find,  as  was  shown in the case  of stability con-
tracts, (  39 )  adverse  effects  on  the  real  distribution 
function,  the  regional  pattern  and  the  pattern  of 
inputs. 
(39)  Cf.  pp. 38  and foil.  above. 
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But in such a situation the Luxembourg Government 
would no  doubt  react  by  amending  or repealing  the 
rule in question. Integration might therefore threaten 
the maintenance  of  the  existing  system. 
The special  rules  for  foreign  products-like the Bel-
gian  regulations  for  pharmaceutical  products (
40
) 
should  have  only  favourable  effects  on  the  market 
mechanisms.  The pressure to harmonise the price of 
products  might have  favourable  effects  on intra-EEC 
relations, on the real distribution function and on the 
components  of  the  allocation  function. 
3.  PROHIBITION  OF OVERCHARGING 
(a)  To the best of  our knowledge,  only  the  Federal 
Republic of Germany prohibits overcharging in general 
terms.  Article  2  of  the  Act  for  the  repression  of 
economic  offences,  of  9  July  1954 (
41
)  penalises,  in 
the case of goods  and services  of basic necessity,  the 
wilful  charging,  promise,  contracting,  acceptance  or 
grant of unfairly high remuneration (  42 )  as  a result of 
(i)  restraint of competition, 
(ii)  exploiting  a  dominant  position, 
(iii)  exploiting  a  state  of  shortage. 
In assessing the fairness  ( Angemessenheit) of a price, 
the  main  criterion  is  not  the  relationship  between 
costs  and  price,  but the  comparison  with a  national 
price  unaffected  by  the  special  market  situations 
listed. (  43 ) 
(b)  In  practice,  the  prohibition  of  overcharging 
amounts  to  the prohibition of excessive  unit profits. 
Since it is impossible to judge in the absolute whether 
a price is  "too high" and since a notional competitive 
price is  virtually incalculable, (
44
)  prices must in prac-
tice  be  assessed  in  the  light  of  costs.  If this  calcu-
lation  shows  a  high  unit  profit,  it falls  under  the 
prohibition only if it is attributable to one of the three 
types  of  market  distortion  listed.  In a  situation  in 
which demand plays its normal role, a high unit profit 
is  always  a  sign  of inadequate  supply.  Where  short 
supply in relation to demand results in prices deemed 
to  be  unfair,  the  causes  may  be either  objective  or 
subjective.  The obstacle to the adjustment of supply 
{
40
)  Cf.  pp.  62  and  foil.  above. 
(
41
)  Cf.  BGB1  I,  1954,  pp.  175  and  foil.  and  BGB1  I, 1958, 
p.  949. 
(
42
)  For  the  sake  of  completeness,  it  may  be  noted  that  ex-
cessive  prices  may  also  be  penalised  as  usury  under  the 
Criminal  Code  (Art.  302  a  to  e). 
(
43
}  Cf.  Helm,  J.-G.:  Preisrecht;  in:  HdB,  op.  cit.,  col.  4412. 
(
44
)  The  application· of  this  rule  to  the  price  of  land  has 
clearly  demonstrated  these  difficulties. to increasing demand is  objective when the extension 
of capacity  requires  time and capital.  If the  market 
mechanisms  are  functioning  well,  higher  profits  act 
both as  an  incentive and as  a  source  of finance,  and 
themselves  ensure the disappearance  of  this  obstacle. 
The  cause  is  also  objective  when,  temporarily  or 
permanently,  goods  cannot  be  reproduced  for  extra-
economic reasons.  In these circumstances, the market 
mechanisms  do  not  function,  and  a  higher  profit 
merely  has  an  adverse  effect  on distribution.  Exam-
ples  of  subjective  causes  are  the  failure  to  adjust 
production capacities, or deliberate delay in adjustment 
or  the  deliberate  limitation  of  supply.  Here  again, 
the profit merely has an adverse effect on distribution. 
Among the circumstances which give  rise to the pro-
hibition  of  overcharging,  the first  two  relate  to the 
subjective causes and the third to the objective causes 
of short supply.  If the "state of shortage" is  deemed 
to  exist  only  when  the  market  mechanisms  cannot 
overcome it within a reasonable time, the application 
of the prohibition of overcharging is  confined to cases 
in which the market mechanisms cannot in any event 
function.  This  rule  therefore  cannot  distort  these 
mechanism. Although it certainly cannot either support 
them  or  replace  them,  it  may  nevertheless  counter-
act  a  deterioration  in  monetary  distribution.  Its 
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application  to  prices  which  are  excessive  as  a  result 
of  restraint  of  competition  or  a  dominant  position 
may  also  bring about an  extension of supply since  it 
eliminates  the  higher  price  as  a  motive  to  restrict 
supply.  In  this  case,  it  also  helps  to  improve  the 
pattern of outputs. 
In practice, the prohibition of overcharging is difficult 
to  administer  without  a  cumbersome  machinery  of 
control and without a more precise definition of what 
is a fair price, so that it can only be expected to repress 
particularly gross  and flagrant  abuses.  Ebisch (  45 )  is 
nevertheless  of  opinion  that  "the mere  existence  of 
such a stipulation is  enough to impose an attitude of 
moderation and restraint in determining prices". 
(c)  The  prohibition  of  overcharging  cannot  affect 
competition  among  Member  States  or  international 
market mechanisms, since the measure is  applied only 
if these  mechanisms  have  in  any  event  ceased  to 
function. 
(
45
)  Ebisch,  H.:  Wirtschaftsstrafgesetz,  Berlin-Frankfurt  1959, 
p.  58  (the  statement  is  given  typographical  emphasis  in  the 
original). 
\ CHAPTER  6 
PUBLICITY AND  SUPERVISION 
1.  THE  DUTY  TO  PUBLISH  PRICES 
(a) The publicity rule obliges  sellers  to publish their 
prices.  In general,  this  rule  is  based  partly  on  the 
fact  that price publicity helps  the State in exercising 
supervision and in enforcing other price requirements 
and  partly on its value to consumers  and in ensuring 
the  transparency  of  the market.  Both arguments  are 
pertinent.  The first,  which  is  a matter of  administra-
tive technique, does  not concern us  here.  Underlying 
the  second  argument  is  the  idea  of  supporting  the 
market  mechanisms.  As  we  have  already  noted,  in-
creased  market transparency  in  favour  of buyers  un-
questionably speeds up the functioning of the market 
mechanisms.  It  would,  however,  be  premature  to 
conclude  from  this  that the  duty  to publish  price  is 
unreservedly  favourable,  since  it is  both parties  who 
get a better overall view  of the market. 
As  already pointed out in various forms,  competition 
on  oligopolistic  markets  is  favoured  precisely  by  the 
lack  of transparency  as  to  the  actions  and  reactions 
of  competitors.  A  favourable  influence  is  exercised 
on  the  competitive  spirit  if  a  particular  seller  hopes 
that his  competitors  will  learn  too  late of the price 
reductions he has  applied in order to set off the shift 
of demand for which he hopes, and if that seller fears 
that he  may  not detect in time the price offensive of 
his  competitors.  The competitive  spirit would  there-
fore diminish if, as  a result of compulsory price publi-
cation,  each  seller  can  be  informed  relatively  fastly 
and  simply  of  his  competitors'  price  policy.  The 
consequence  therefore  is  the  possibility  of concerted 
behaviour and a tendency towards the collective mono-
polistic  maximisation  of  profits. (  1)  As  competition 
died away,  the  improved  transparency  of the market 
would become valueless to consumers.  If the compul-
sory  publication  of  prices  applies  to  markets  where 
oligopolistic interdependence is  total,  the functioning 
of the market mechanisms  must be expected to slow 
down. 
On atomistic markets, on the other hand, compulsory 
price  publication  calls  for  a  favourable  judgment. 
e)  Chamberlin  had  already  concluded  that a  collective  mono-
polistic  maximisation  of  profits  would  appear  on  oligopolistic 
markets in the narrow sense,  if rational  action  could  be  based 
on  an  overall  and  full  view  of  market  conditions.  Cf.  Cham-
be;lin, E.-H.:  The  Theory  of  Monopolistic  Competition,  Cam-
bndge,  Mass.,  1933,  pp.  46  and  foiL 
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Since,  by  definition,  the  sellers  do  not react  directly 
to  the  actions  of  their  competitors,  the  improved 
overall  view  which  the  consumers  have  of  the  con-
ditions  of  supply  may  speed  up  the  functioning  of 
the market  mechanisms. 
(b)  If our  information  is  correct,  price  publication 
is compulsory in all EEC countries, except the Nether-
lands,  in  the  form  of  compulsory  price  ticketing  at 
the retail stage. 
In Belgium  a Ministerial Order of 30  April  1948 e) 
obliges  retail  traders  to  state  their  prices,  indicating 
the  unit  of  quantity  chosen.  The  same  applies  to 
those  rendering  services.  This  obligation  was  intro-
duced  for  the  better  supervision  of  price  controls, 
with  a view  to  the  direct  regulation  of  price  levels 
by  consumers  and  by the State. ( 
3
) 
In the  Federal  Republic  of Germany,  the  Decree  of 
6  April  1944 (  4)  on  price  ticketing  requires  retail 
traders  to  ticket  merchandise  displayed  in  windows 
or in  any  other manner.  For restaurants,  hotels  and 
craftsmen, it is  enough to display tariffs.  The avowed 
aim of price ticketing was to encourage price discipline 
and  to  facilitate  supervision  by  clearly  informing 
buyers of the prices. (  5) 
In France,  too, price ticketing is compulsory for retail 
trade. (
6
)  In some cases, the mark-up must be shown 
as  well as  the price. ( 
7
)  This requirement is based on 
the  desire  for  the  better  information  of  consumers 
and  the  hope  of  consequent  increased  price  com-
petition. 
In conjunction  with the  obligation,  essentially  based 
on  considerations  of  taxation,  of  invoicing  at  stages 
up the line, price ticketing helps the State to supervise 
prices from manufacture to consumption. 
(2)  Cf.  Moniteur  Belge,  12  May  1948. 
(l)  Cf.  Champaud,  C.  Part  I,  op.  cit.,  p.  25. 
(
4
)  Cf.  the text and explanations  of  the Decree  of  16  Novem-
ber,  1940  (RCBI  I,  1535)  on  price  ticketing,  in  the wording 
of  the Notice  of 6  April  1944  (RGBI  I  98)  in:  Stiegler,  H.: 
Preisauchzeichnung  in  der  Marktwirtschaft,  Berlin-Frankfort 
1962. 
e)  Cf.  Vormbaum,  H.:  Preisauszeichnung;  in:  HdB  Vol.  III, 
3rd  edition,  entirely  revised,  Stuttgart,  1960,  col.  4380. 
(
6
)  Cf.  Champaud,  C.  Part  I,  op.  cit.,  p.  32. 
C>  Cf.  ibid.,  p.  37. In Italy,  the compulsory  publication  of  prices  mani-
festly  extends only to products subject  to the regula-
tions for  the direct control of price levels,  for  which 
the  official  tariffs  and  retail  prices  must  be  dis-
played. (8 ) 
In Luxembourg,  the  Order of  6 December  1957 (9 } 
has  made  the  ticketing  of  retail  prices  compulsory. 
This  enactment  also  applies  to  merchandise  sold  in 
public markets, hotels and cafes,  to services  rendered 
and  to commercial hiring. 
As  already  indicated  in  connection  with  rebate  con-
trol (
10
)  most retail markets are characterised by simple 
partial oligopolistic  interdependence.  Direct  reaction 
by  competitors  to a seller's  price  policy  are  probable 
only if a relatively large number of articles in the sell-
ing  range  are  reduced  in  price  by  a  relatively  large 
amount.  The dangers of compulsory price publication 
for  market competition may  therefore be regarded  as 
relatively  slight compared with the favourable  effects 
of  improved  market  transparency  enjoyed  by  con-
sumers.  The  speeding  up  the  functioning  of  the 
market mechanisms is reflected in particular by favour-
able effects on the monetary distribution function and 
on  the pattern of outputs and  inputs. 
Summary Table showing the possible effect of national 
price ticketing  rules  on the functioning of the market 
mechanisms. 
(effects  in  the  national  context  only). 
Functions  of market  mechanisms 
I. Development function 
1.  quantitative 
2. qualitative 
II. Allocation function 
3.  pattern of outputs 
4.  pattern of inputs 
5. regional  pattern 
III. Distribution function 
6.  monetary 
7.  real 
Legend: 
Rules  existing  in  the  following 
countries: Belgium, Federal Republic 
of Germany, France,  Italy,  Luxem-
bourg 
+ 
+ 
+ 
·•  ,;,;  no major effect inferable or probable, 
+ =  favourable  effect. 
(
8
)  Cf.  Champaud,  C.  Part  I,  op.  cit.,  p.  57. 
(
9
)  Cf.  ibid.,  p.  43. 
(1°)  Cf.  pp.  51  foil.  above. 
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(c) Compulsory price publication limited solely to retail 
markets  has  no  effect  on  economic  relations  among 
Member  States  in  the integrated  territory.  The pos-
sibility  of  any  effect  on  the  functioning  of  market 
mechanisms  among  Member  States  can  therefore  be 
ruled  out. 
2.  THE DUTY TO REPORT PRICES: 
PRICE AUTHORIZATION 
(a) In the EEC countries there are three different kinds 
of rules for the supervision of prices:  the simple duty 
to report  prices,  the duty to  report,  accompanied  by 
a right  of  veto,  and  price  authorisation.  In general, 
reporting  or  authorisation  is  required  for  increases 
only, and not for  reductions. 
Although  the  simple  duty  to  report  prices  does  not 
directly  affect  autonomy  to determine  prices,  it may 
well  be  thought  that it is  not  without  influence  on 
price  formation.  In  practice,  compulsory  reporting 
was  certainly  not  introduced  purely  for  the  sake  of 
augmenting  the  mass  of  administrative  papers,  but 
because  the  government  was  determined  to react  by 
economic policy measures against prices which seemed 
for any  reason unfair.  If sellers are obliged to report, 
they  must  take  account,  in  their  decisions  to  vary 
prices,  not  only  of  the  reactions  of  demand  and  of 
their competitors, but also of the possible intervention 
of  the authorities.  It may  be  taken  in  general  that 
enterprises  liable  to  report  will  treat price  increases 
with  greater  caution  than  those  which  do  not  feel 
themselves  under  the  eye  of  the  State.  The  extent 
of  influence  on  the  prices  charged  by  an  enterprise 
will  depend  in  particular  on  the  experience  which 
that  enterprise  has  acquired  of  prices  which  lead  to 
intervention  by  the  authorities  directly  affecting  the 
reporting  enterprise.  If the  government  intervenes 
only  when  the price increase  reflects  the faulty  func-
tioning of the market mechanisms,  the effect  of com-
pulsory  reporting  is  wholly  favourable.  In the  first 
place,  it  may  dissuade  sellers  from  exploiting  their 
dominant  market  position,  and,  secondly,  it  may 
provide  economic  policy  makers  with valuable  infor-
mation  about  the  functioning  of  the  market  mech-
anisms. 
But  compulsory  reporting  may  prejudice  price  com-
petition on oligopolistic markets if all  price variations 
have  to  be  reported  and  if the  prices  reported  are 
accessible  to competitors  in  one  way  or  another. (11) 
In  this  case  the  arguments  advanced  against  com-
pulsory  price  publication  are  equally  valid  against 
compulsory  price  reporting. 
(
11
)  On  this  point, see  also:  Hoppmann, E.:  Preismeldestellen 
und Wettbewerb;  in:  WuW,  1966,  pp.  97  and  foil. There is  no practical difference, but purely a technical 
administrative  difference  between compulsory  report-
ing  with a right of veto and compulsory price author-
isation.  Whereas,  under  the  first  system  a  price  is 
deemed  to  be  authorised  if  no  objection  is  raised 
within  a  fixed  time  limit,  under  the  second  system, 
the  price  cannot  be  applied  until expressly  approved 
by  the authorities. 
The  effect  of  these  rules  depends  essentially  on  the 
practical use  made of them.  If the authorities decline 
to  approve  any  price  increase,  the  rule  amounts  to 
an  individual  price  freeze.  Since  the  effects  of  this 
system are  analysed  in detail in the section  on maxi-
mum prices, we shall not go into them at length here. 
If the  authorities  approve  "fair"  prices  or  price  in-
creases  from  the  macro-economic  point  of  view,  the 
effects  will  vary  according  to  the  definition  of  the 
concept  of  "fairness".  Leaving  aside  specific  extra-
economic objectives, fairness should be assessed in the 
light of the fundamental economic principles outlined 
at  the beginning of this  study.  Combining  questions 
of  structure  and  level  we  can  distinguish  in  general 
an  assessment  primarily  based  on  the  distribution 
function  and  one  based  on  the  production  function. 
The former treats the price as  a medium of profit and 
a decisive factor  in the income  of the enterprise.  As 
in the case of the old requirement of justum pretium, 
the definition of fairness depends essentially on consid-
erations  of  equity.  The  criterion  is  generally  "the 
customary profit of  the branch".  Compulsory author-
isation  then  amounts  to  freezing  profit  margins.  If 
the relevant rules are applied, compulsory authorisation 
certainly  does  not  prejudice  institutional  freedom  to 
reduce prices, but the prohibition of price increases or 
profits,  motivated  by  demand,  tends  to  reduce  the 
feasibility of action to adjust capacities.  If  compulsory 
authorisation  allows  the  constant  adjustment  of  the 
maximum  level  of unit profit  to  the customary  level 
of  the  branch,  it  further  substantially  reduces  the 
incentive  to  reduce  prices  and  the competitive  spirit 
in  general.  The application  of  compulsory  authorisa-
tion in  the light of the distribution function  is  there-
fore likely to prejudice the development and allocation 
functions  of the  market mechanisms. 
Since  the  modern  State  is  constantly  modifying,  or 
constantly  has  the  power  to  modify  the  primary 
distribution  of  incomes  in  the  light  of  its  concepts 
of justice, assessment in the light of production regards 
prices  primarily  as  an  instrument  for  influencing  the 
allocation  and  development  functions  of  the  market 
mechanisms.  Fairness is  assessed much more in terms 
of "rightness" than of "equity".  The fairness  of the 
costs  of a  given  firm  is  therefore  only  one  standard 
of reference in considering prices, it is  the  assessment 
of  their  incentive  power  which  is  decisive.  It  is 
certainly  very  rare  to  be  able  to  foretell  in  advance 
the impetus which a price will exercise on  the alloca-
tion and distribution functions  of the market  mecha-
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nisms.  One can  only confine  oneself  to verifying the 
existence  of  such  effects.  If the  conditions  for  the 
sound functioning of the market mechanisms, outlined 
in  Part I, are  satisfied,  the  examination  of  prices  in 
the  light  of  production  will  allow,  in  the  case  of 
growing demand, higher unit profits than the custom-
ary profits of the branch.  On the other hand, if these 
conditions  are not satisfied,  compulsory  authorisation 
will be used from  this point of view also in the light 
of distribution.  Such a use of compulsory authorisation 
cannot  have  any  adverse  effects  on  the  market 
mechanisms. On the contrary, it calls for a favourable 
judgment  if, with  a  better view  of  the market,  the 
authorities  are  in  a  position  to  act  quickly  enough 
to  counter  any  distortion  of  the  functions.  This 
method  of  use  also  lessens  the  danger  that possible 
reduction  will  not be made  for  fear  of encountering 
difficult  authorisation  proceedings  in  the  event  of 
increases  subsequently  again  becoming  necessary. 
It should be noted, in conclusion,  that a general pro-
cedure for compulsory authorisation may be introduced 
with  a  view  to stabilising  price  levels  even  without 
any  major  adverse  effect  on  market  mechanisms.  If 
the cause  of  an  inflationary  trend lies  in  a generally 
rising  climate,  the refusal,  limited to a  short period, 
to  authorise  any  increase  may  combat  the  expected 
inflation,  in so  far  as  it is  the cause  of rising  prices. 
(b) As long ago as 20 December, 1959, Belgium had in-
troduced simple compulsory reporting for certain mer-
chandise,  with a  view  to preventing,  limiting,  or at 
least checking price rises.  Over the years, the number 
of products concerned has been considerably increased. 
The Ministerial Order of 8 October 1959 (12)  stipulates 
that every price increase contemplated shall be reported 
to the Minister of Economic Affairs not later than 21 
days  before  its  application,  during  which  period  the 
authorities may  object to the increase.  In order  that 
this  compulsory  reporting  shall  not be  a  bar  to  any 
tendency  towards  reduction,  a  provision  introduced 
on  8  September  1961,  empowered  the  Minister  for 
Economic  Affairs  to  agree  with  sellers  giving  prior 
notification of a reduction (13)  on simplified conditions 
for  any  subsequent  increases.  A  Ministerial  Order 
of  2  September  1966 (1
4
)  has  finally  extended  com-
pulsory reporting accompanied by the right of veto to 
"all products, materials, commodities  or merchandise, 
and to all services" (Art. 2).  Reporting is also required 
for imported merchandise, though not for entirely new 
products  or products  whose  quality  has  been  greatly 
improved. (15)  The report must specify,  in particular, 
the conditions  of  sale  of products,  the old price  and 
(1
2
)  Cf.  Moniteur  Belge,  10  October  1959. 
(
13
)  Cf.  Van  Meerhaege,  M.  A.  G.:  Prior  Notification ... ,  op. 
cit.,  p.  35. 
(1
4
)  Cf.  Moniteur  Belge,  6  September  1966. 
(1
5
)  Cf.  Van  Meerhaege,  M.  A  ..  G.:  Prior  Notification ... ,  op. 
cit.,  p.  35. the  new  price,  and  must  justify  the  increase  by 
reference  to costs (Art.  2). If the Minister for  Econ-
omic  Affairs  does  not  accept  the  proposed  increase, 
the enterprise is  certainly not obliged to comply with 
his  refusal;  but this  possibility is  academic,  since  the 
Minister can then fix  a maximum price.  Retailers can 
only  increase  their prices  in  line with  the authorised 
increases  of  their  suppliers  and  observing  the  same 
percentage mark-up (Art. 4 ).  The justification in terms 
of  costs  required  for  any  proposed  increase  shows 
that the fairness  of  the new prices  at the production 
stage  is  assessed,  to use our own words  "in the light 
of distribution". 
In the event  of  a  more  marked  increase  in demand, 
feasibility  of  action  may  be  affected.  The  current 
adjustment  of  prices  to falling  costs  not  being  pre-
scribed,  there is  no  reason  to  expect  any  diminution 
of  the  competitive  spirit.  Any  diminution  in  the 
tendency towards price competition is also counteract-
ed  by  the  fact  that  enterprises  which  reduce  their 
prices have greater facilities for introducing subsequent 
increases. If the market mechanisms  are  functioning, 
the  possible  consequences  of  the  application  of  the 
right  of  veto  in  the  light  of  distribution  have  not 
only a favourable effect on monetary distribution, but 
also  an  adverse  effect  on  the pattern of outputs  and 
the  quantitative  development  function. 
The fixing  of retail mark-ups  at a constant percentage 
counteracts the appearance of unjustified excess profits 
at this stage in the event of excess demand.  It is  true 
that the fixing  of a relatively high maximum generally 
involves  the danger that it may  be in  the interest of 
retailers  to  sell  dear  goods  in  preference  to  cheap. 
If this interest may  result in a relatively low intensity 
of competition on retail markets,  the macro-economic 
pattern of  inputs  may  be  appreciably  distorted.  The 
effect  of  manufacturer's  prices  linked  to  costs  and 
absolute mark-up linked to purchase price may  mean, 
in  extreme  cases,  that low-cost  producers  are  driven 
out of the market by high-cost producers. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, compulsory price 
authorisation  applies  in  the  following  special  cases 
only:  (16) 
( a)  the price of agricultural and forest  land is  exam-
ined  in  the  authorisation  proceedings  to  ensure 
that it is not grossly disproportionate to the value 
of the land (1
7
) 
(b)  fees  for hospital treatment are checked to ensure 
that they are in line with costs (1
8
) 
e
6
)  Cf.  also:  Holzapfel.  W.:  'Obersicht  iiber  die  geltenden 
Preisvorschriften;  in:  Der  Betriebs-Berater,  No.  34  of  10 
December  1964,  pp.  1391  and  foil. 
(
17
)  Cf.  Art.  9  of  the  Act  of  28  July  1961  on  immovable 
property  transactions  (BGBl  I,  p.  1091). 
('
8
)  Cf.  Price  Decree  No.  7  /~4 of  31  August  1954  (BA  No. 
173/9  Sept.  1954). 
72 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
motor  car  insurance  premiums  for  third  party 
liability  require  authorisation; e
9
) 
passenger  transport  fares  are  subject  to  special 
procedure for authorisation by  the authorities of 
the Land Governments; (
20
)  fares  are fixed in the 
light  of  the  economic  situation  of  the  operator 
and  of the public  interest; 
the  rates  fixed  by  the  Freight  Commissions  for 
inland water transport must be authorised by the 
Federal  Ministry  of  Transport. e
1
)  This  author-
isation  must  likewise  take  account  of  the  eco-
nomic situation of the operator and of the public 
interest.  It generally results in fixed  rates. 
As  will be seen,  ompulsory authorisation affects  only 
fields  where the market mechanisms do not or should 
not function. In cases  (d) and (e) the objectives aimed 
at  are  extra-economic.  Objectives  of  this  kind  no 
doubt  also  exist  for  the  other  fields,  but  here,  in 
addition, the fundamental conditions for  the function-
ing  of  the  market  mechanisms  are  lacking;  indeed, 
in cases (b) and (c) aggregate demand is almost wholly 
inelastic  in  relation  to  price,  and  in  case  (a)  the 
disposable  aggregate  supply  is  wholly  inelastic  in 
relation  to price.  In consequence,  any  effect  on  the 
market  mechanisms  is  either  impossible  or  devoid 
of any  importance. 
In France,  there  are  two types  of  supervision,  "free-
dom under supervision" (liberte surveillee) and "free-
dom  under  control"  (liberte  controtee). 
Freedom  under  supervision  is  a  system  of  simple 
reporting, under which sellers must report their price 
lists  to  the  competent  authorities  for  information. 
The  list  of  products  or  groups  of  products  under 
this  system  includes  9  items,  3  at  production  stage 
and  8  at  distribution  stage. (22) 
Freedom under control takes  the form  of compulsory 
reporting  accompanied  by  the  right  of  veto.  As  in 
the  former  case,  the  seller  must  report  his  prices  to 
the  authorities;  price  formation  is  free  and  he  does 
not  have  to  justify  the  amount.  But  the  authorities 
may  object  within  15  days  and  call  for  justification. 
If they do  not exercise their right of  veto within that 
period, the reported prices may be applied as maximum 
prices.  This  system  covers  33  products  or  groups 
('
9
)  Cf.  Articles  8-11  of  the  Compulsory  Insurance  Act  of  5 
April  1965  (BGBI  I,  p.  213). 
(
20
)  Pursuant  to  Art  39  of  the  Passenger  Transport  Act  of 
21  March  1961  (BGBl,  L.  p.  241)  compulsory  authorisation 
applies  to  tramways  and  trolleybuses,  scheduled  services  by 
motor  vehicles  of  all  kinds  and  occasional  transport  by  taxi-
cabs  and  coaches. 
e')  Cf.  Articles  21  and  foil.  of  the  Act  of  1  October  1953 
on  industrial  or  commercial  inland  water  transport  (BGBI 
1953,  I,  p.  1453  and  BGBI,  1961,  I,  p.  1163). 
(22)  Cf.  Annex,  p.  137. of  products,  26  at  production  stage  and  12  at  dis-
tribution  stage. (23 ) 
No  special  influence  on  the  market  mechanisms  can 
be  inferred  from  freedom  under  supervision,  or,  in 
the  absence  of  information  as  to  the  way  in  which 
the  veto  is  exercised,  from  freedom  under  control. 
It  is  true  that  if  these  systems  are  applied  in  the 
light  of  the  distribution  function  the  same  effects 
can  be  expected  as  in  the  case  of  the  compulsory 
reporting in force  in  Belgium. 
By  Ministerial  Order of  29  March  19  56,  producers 
and importers in Luxembourg are in general required 
to report to the Prices Department, not later than ten 
days  before  their  proposed  introduction,  any  price 
increases  proposed  on  the  Luxembourg  market.  Ac-
cording to information received from  the Luxembourg 
Prices  Department (24)  the  Ministerial  Order  of  13 
November 1956 has converted this compulsory author-
isation into compulsory reporting accompanied by the 
right of veto.  The Director of the  Prices Department 
emphasizes  that  "this  Order-at least  recently-has 
been  applied  fairly  "liberally"  so  that  one  can  no 
longer  speak  of  a  real  price  freeze.  But  if  the 
application  of  the  enactment  were  more  restrictive, 
we  should find  the same effects  as  in Belgium. 
In the Netherlands, the law does not expressly specify 
any  general  duty  to  report, but in view of the wide 
price  powers  of  the  Government, (25 )  price  increases 
are  voluntarily  reported  to the  authorities. 
The  report  must  include  a  justification  of  the  new 
price on the ground of costs.  In general, the elements 
of justification are not wage increases, but exclusively 
increases in external costs: 
(  i)  the  purchase  price  of  the  end  product; 
(ii)  the  cost  of  raw  material  and  instrumental  ma-
terial,  and  the  purchase  price  of  semi-manu-
factures; 
(iii)  freight; 
(iv)  advertising  costs; 
(  v)  the cost of maintenance by outside contractors; 
(vi)  taxation; 
(vii)  amortisation  of  net  investments. 
Distributors  cannot  increase  the  absolute  value  of 
their  mark-up.  If the  authorities  do  not  accept  the 
(2
3
)  Cf.  Annex,  p.  138  and  foiL 
(2
4
)  Cf.  letter  ref  Sch/PR  No.  23,514  of  23  May  1967 
from  the  Director  of  the  Prices  Department  Ministry  of  the 
National  Economy  and  Energy.  ' 
(
25
)  Cf.  on  this  subject  Van  Meerhaeghe,  M.  A.  G.:  Prior 
Notification ... , op.  cit.,  pp.  36  and  foil. 
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reported  price  increases,  they  open  talks  with  the 
enterprise concerned. 
Although  the  supervision  of  production  prices  may 
be  regarded,  in  the  Netherlands,  too,  as  essentially 
based on the distribution function,  the recognition of 
the  amortisation  of  additional  investments  as  an  el-
ement  justifying  price  increases  makes  it  easier  to 
adapt capacity to increased demand. Supervision should 
therefore  hardly  prevent  the  necessary  increase  in 
investment ratios  and,  therefore,  the quantitative  de-
velopment  function.  It  is  true  that  the  pattern  of 
outputs, here,  too,  may  be distorted.  Price  increases 
may  no  doubt  serve  as  a  source  of  finance  for 
corporeal  fixed  investments  but cannot  be  used  for 
wage  increases  designed  to entice  the  work force  of 
other branches  of activity.  Furthermore, price is  pre-
vented from  fulfilling  its  information function. 
The  freezing  of  the  absolute  value  of mark-up  calls 
for  a favourable  judgment.  In the event of increased 
demand,  it  prevents  the  non-functional  increase  of 
profits,  without  hindering  the  sale  of  the  most  ad-
vantageous products. 
Under  Netherlands  practice,  however,  compulsory 
reporting  applies  not  only  to  products,  but  also  to 
wages. (2
6
)  The  collective  agreements  negotiated  be-
tween  management  and  labour  must  be  authorised 
by  the  Stichting  van  der  Arbeid,  the  non-govern-
mental  central  body  of  trade  unions  and  trade  asso-
ciations,  and  are  subject  to  the  supervision  of  the 
College  van  Rijksbemiddelaars  (originally  an  official 
arbitration board for  labour disputes).  The Stichting 
van  der  Arbeid  must  verify,  in  particular,  whether 
the  wage  agreements  conform  to  the  rates  judged 
appropriate  to  the  overall  plan  by  the  Social-Eco-
nomischen  Raad  (Social  and  Economic  Council).  In 
exceptional  cases  the  Government  may  intervene  by 
calling a wage halt or delegating its powers of author-
isation to  the College  van Rijksbemiddelaars. 
The  effects  of  this  reporting  and  authorisation  pro-
cedure again depend on the way  it is  applied.  If the 
rules allow wage increases in excess of those provided 
by  the  collective  agreements,  and  tend  to  entice 
personnel  away  from  less  productive  branches,  no 
adverse  consequence  on  the  market  mechanisms  can 
be  inferred.  But  it  they  try  to  prevent  them,  they 
may  hamper  the sectoral  mobility of manpower,  thus 
distorting  the  pattern  of  outputs  and  inputs  of  the 
market  mechanisms. 
(c)  Compulsory  reporting  or  authorisation  by  itself 
can hardly influence economic relations among Member 
States.  It is  true  that if certain  price  increases  are 
(2°)  For  fuller  details  on  Netherland  wage  policy,  see  Busch-
Llity,  Ch.:  Gesamtwirtschaftliche  Lohnpolitik, Basle-Tiibingen, 
1964,  pp.  30  and  foll. rendered impossible by veto or refusal of authorisation, 
the international functioning of the market mechanisms 
cannot remain unchanged.  As  the result of an  assess-
ment  of  the  fairness  of  a  price  level,  based  on  the 
distribution  function,  external  markets  may  be  pre-
ferred  to the internal market, if the  state of demand 
makes  it possible  to  obtain  higher  prices  on  foreign 
markets where prices  are  free  than on the controlled 
home  market.  As  already  repeatedly  pointed  out, 
in this event adverse  effects  may  be  expected on the 
real distribution  function  as  well  as  on  the  regional 
pattern and  the  pattern of  inputs. 
Since  compulsory  general  reporting,  accompanied  by 
the  right  of  veto,  also  affects  imported  products  in 
Belgium,  the  obtaining  of  higher  prices  and  higher 
profits  as  a  result  of  demand  can  be  forbidden  to 
foreign  sellers  on  the  Belgian  market.  This  equality 
of treatment between Belgian supply and foreign sup-
ply  rules  out the possibility of foreign  supply  at un-
favourable costs earning higher profits on the Belgian 
market than Belgian  supply at favourable costs.  This 
prevents  distortion  in  the  regional  pattern  and  the 
pattern  of  inputs.  But  as  a  result  of  the  war  on 
uncompetitive  fixed  price foreign  supply,  the volume 
Summary Table showing the possible effects of national compulsory price reporting and authorisation rules  on  the 
functions of  the market mechanisms. 
Belgium  France  Luxem- Netherland 
bourg  Functions  of market  mechanisms 
A.  Effects  in  the  national  context  in  a closed  economy 
I. Development function 
1.  quantitative 
2.  qualitative 
II.  Allocation  function 
3.  pattern of outputs 
4.  pattern of inputs 
5.  regional pattern 
III. Distribution function 
6.  monetary 
7.  real 
B.  Efficts  in  the  context  of the  BEG in  an  open  economy 
I. Development function 
1.  quantitative 
2.  qualitative 
II.  Allocation  function 
3.  pattern of outputs 
4.  pattern of inputs 
5.  regional  pattern 
III.  Distribution function 
6.  monetary 
7.  real 
Legend: 
•  no maior effect  inferable or probable; 
- =  adverse effect; 
+ =  favourable effect. 
A 
-
-
-(•) 
+ 
-
A  =  compulsory reporting of price rises, subject to assessment of prices in the light of the distribution function; 
B  =  price freedom  under control, with assessment  of prices in the light of the distribution function; 
B  A  c 
- -
- - -
+  +  + 
- -
- -
- - -
C  =  general compulsory price reporting, with assessment of prices in the light of the distribution function; 
D  = compulsory authorisation of collective agreements,  on the understanding that price increases in excess of the agreed wage rates are forbidden, 
(a) may result in freezing the relative value of mark-up at the distribution stage. 
74 
D 
-
-
-
-
I of  Belgian  supply  may  fall  still  further  under  the 
influence  of  this  rule.  Distortions  in  the  allocation 
function are eliminated only at the cost of considerable 
intensification  of  the  adverse  effects  on  real  distri-
bution. 
This reasoning also applies in principle to the Luxem-
bourg  reporting  system,  if-as also  assumed  in  the 
case  of Belgium-the right of  veto tends  to  prohibit 
not only the increase  of importers' margins,  but also 
prices  charged by foreign  sellers  above  the ligitimate 
prices  of Belgian  sellers. 
The special fields  of application of compulsory author-
isation  in  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  have 
no  effect  on  international  economic  relations. 
The  French  rules,  also,  largely  concern  products  re-
served for  internal  trade. (
27
}  The possibility  cannot, 
(2
7
)  C£.  list in Annex,  p.  138  and  foil. 
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however, be ruled out, in certain cases,  of distortions 
in  the  real  distribution  function  and  the  pattern  of 
inputs and the regional pattern if the rules are applied 
in  the  light  of  the  distribution  function  and  solely 
to  national  supply. 
The  same  result  is  possible  from  the  general  price 
supervision  practised  in  the  Netherlands. 
If, as  a result of  the procedure for  the authorisation 
of  collective  agreements,  a  procedure  linked  with 
wage  directives,  real  wages  in  the  Netherlands,  con-
sidered over  a long  period,  are  below  those  in other 
Member  countries,  it  is  not  impossible  that  the 
emigration  abroad  of  Netherlands  workers  may  be 
found.  Since  such  induced  shifts  of factors  may  also 
intervene by counteracting cost advantages, a distortion 
in  the pattern of  inputs  and  in  the  regional  pattern 
is  not impossible. B.  THE EFFECTS  OF DIRECT  PRICE  CONTROLS 
CHAPTER 7 
THE THEORY  OF PRICE  CONTROLS 
Direct price  controls  may  set maximum  prices,  mini-
mum  prices,  fixed  prices,  price  brackets  or  nu-
merical  values.  Von  Mises  had  already  studied  the 
effects of such provisions in his Theory of Price Con-
trols (T  heorie der  Preistaxen ). e)  Since  the substance 
of  this  theory  is  now  generally  accepted e)  we  shall 
adopt it as  the starting point of our analysis. 
Von Mises  selected as  reference point for  his  analysis 
the  price  at  which  the  volume  of  demand  and  the 
volume  of  supply  are  in  equilibrium  in  a  state  of 
perfect competition. e)  He described  a price  control 
as  a  "false control"  (  Ordnungstaxe)  if it simply  set 
the value of the equilibrium price and a "true control" 
(  echte  T axe)  if the  price  set  deviated  substantially 
from  the equilibrium price.  According  to Von Mises, 
false  controls  merely  confirm  the  functioning  of  the 
market  mechanisms.  They  can  therefore  have  major 
effects only where free price formation cannot succeed 
in  reaching  the  equilibrium  price.  Thus,  in  the case 
of monopoly of supply, "the intervention of the auth-
orities has  available  the whole margin lying  between 
the  highest  monopoly  price  and  the  lowest  com-
petitive price". (4)  In this case  a maximum  price  set 
at  the  level  of  the  competitive  price  has  the  effect 
not only of preventing the exploitation of consumers, 
but also  of improving market supplies by eliminating 
the  motive  to  reduce  production  constituted  by  the 
obtaining of a higher  price.  But Von  Mises  attaches 
little  importance  to  the  cases  in  which  it  seems 
valuable  to introduce controls.  The  most  interesting 
fields  for  his  analysis  of  the  effects  lie  above  and 
below  the equilibrium price. 
If the minimum price or the fixed  price of a product 
is  set  below  the  equilibrium  price,  the  volume  of 
demand  falls  and  the  volume  of  supply  increases,  as 
shown on the graph below.  The supply which becomes 
excessive  creates  a  tendency  to  sell  below  the  true 
control.  To  prevent  illegitimate  dumping,  State  in-
tervention or an  agreement between enterprises form-
(I)  Mises,  L.:  Preistaxen  (Theorie);  in:  HdStW,  Vol.  6,  4th 
edition,  1925,  pp.  1055  and  foil.,  reproduced  in:  Mises,  L.: 
Kritik  des  Interventionismus,  Jena,  1929,  pp.  125  and  foil. 
(2)  Cf.  Meinhold,  H.:  Preis  (III),  Preispolitik;  in:  HdSW, 
Vol.  8,  Stuttgart,  Tiibingen,  GOttingen,  1964,  p.  503. 
(1)  Von  Mises  calls  this  price  the  "natural  or  static  price" 
(naturlichen  oder  statischen  Preis)  in  absolute  equilibrium. 
Cf.  Mises,  L.:  Preistaxen ... ,  op.  cit.,  in:  HdStW,  p.  1058. 
(
4
)  Mises,  L.:  Kritik  des  Interventionismus,  op.  cit.,  p.  135. 
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ing  a cartel has  to ensure either a reduction in supply 
or  an  increase  in  the  volume  of  demand.  Since 
the  success  of  measures  to  increase  demand (  5)  is 
somewhat uncertain in practice, it is  generally  supply 
that is reduced.  Demand which is unwilling or unable 
to  pay  the higher price for  the product invades  other 
markets, on which it generates price increases  and/or 
an  extension of production.  If it is  desired  to  avoid 
these secondary effects also, the necessary intervention 
may  involve  the  complete  control  of  all  prices  and 
quantities  of goods  offered. 
p 
Excess  supply  Supply 
PM  =  minimum 
or  fixed  price 
PH  =  maximum 
or  fixed  price 
Excess  demand  Demand 
X 
If the  maximum  price  or  fixed  price  of  a  product 
is  set  below  the  equilibrium  price,  the  volume  of 
demand increases and the volume of supply falls.  The 
demand which becomes excessive generates the creation 
of  black  markets  where  the  illicit  prices  are  higher. 
To  eliminate  this  phenomenon,  supply  must  be  in-
creased  by  constraint,  or demand  must be  restrained 
by  rationing.  The rationing of  a product liberates an 
effective demand which turns to other markets where 
it  generates  price  increases  and/  or  increased  produc-
tion.  The  desire  to  prevent  such  secondary  effects 
may  here again lead to State control of  all  prices  and 
quantities  of  goods  offered. 
As  a  result  of  his  analysis,  Von  Mises  reaches  the 
conclusion  that,  in  a  market  economy,  true  controls 
cannot be an instrument of economic policy consistent 
either with the objective or with the economic system. 
They are  not consistent with the objective, since  they 
are  always  introduced  at  the  cost  of  those  whom 
they  are  designed  to  protect  or  benefit.  Minimum 
or  maximum  prices  above  the  equilibrium  price  are 
e)  For  example,  when  promoting  or  subsidising  demand  (cf. 
Koble- und  Verstromungsgesetz  of  the  Federal  German  Re-
public. no  service  to  the  sellers  since  the  formal  encourage-
ment  resulting  from  these  higher  prices  is  offset  by 
the  fact  that  only  part  of  the  supply  finds  a  taker 
at  that  price.  Fixed  or  maximum  prices  below  the 
equilibrium  price  are  no  service  to  the  consumers, 
since  the  reduction  in  supply  operates  to  their  det-
riment. 
While true controls thus seem inconceivable as isolated 
State intervention,  they  are equally inconsistent with 
the  economic  system.  On the basis  of  experience  of 
the  economic policy  followed  during the First World 
War,  Von  Mises  infers  the  following  escalation  of 
official intervention:  price controls, forced sales, ration-
ing,  forced  production,  and  finally  the  taking  over 
by the State of the planned direction of all production 
and  distribution.  As  Von  Mises  finally  emphasizes: 
"There  is  precisely  no  other  alternative;  either 
to refrain from  isolated intervention in the play 
of the market or to entrust the authorities with 
the overall direction  of production and distribu-
tion.  Capitalism or socialism;  there is  no middle 
way." (6
) 
This  view  is  only  partially  borne  out  by  experience 
of  direct  price  controls  during  and  after  the  Second 
World War.  In post-War Germany the general preva-
lence  of  profiteering  and  black  marketeering  corre-
sponded with the effects described by Von Mises, but 
in  the  United  States  and  France  a  whole  range  of 
products  was  price-controlled  without  any  need  to 
regularise  production  and  without  any  extension  of 
State intervention being  observed. 
It therefore  seems  manifest  that price  control  is  not 
necessarily  followed  by  government  control  of  vol-
umes.  This  shows  that  at  least  the  sellers  do  not 
modify  their  volume  of  production,  as  Von  Mises 
has  said.  In verifying  the traditional  theory  of price 
control in the light of American experience, Galbraith 
questions,  not  the  accuracy  of  this  theory,  but  its 
relevance, when he writes: 
"The doubts  of  economists  as  to  the  technical 
workability of price control prior to World War 
II proceeded not from  an  error of  analysis,  but 
from  an  error of  assumption."(') 
In practice  there  is  no  perfect  equilibrium  of  com-
petition.  The  commonest  form  of  market  is  not 
atomistic  competition  on  perfect  markets,  but oligo-
poly  on  heterogeneous  markets.  In  his  study,  Gal-
braith  gives  a  casuistic  list  of  the  reasons  why  the 
policy  of  State  price  control  does  not  necessitate 
authoritative  control  of  volume  on  markets  where 
(
6
)  Mises,  L.:  Interventionismus;  in:  Kritik  des  Interventio-
nismus,  op.  cit., p.  12. 
C)  Galbraith,  J.  K.:  A  Theory  of Price  Control,  Cambridge, 
Mass.,  1952,  p.  25. 
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sellers  are  few  in  number.  The  following  may  be 
cited  among  Galbraith's  major  conclusion: 
( a)  prices  controlled  at  their highest  level  may  pre-
vent  price  increases,  without involving  a fall  in 
production.  Since  they  generally  have  reserve 
production  capacity  available,  sellers  on  oligo-
polistic  markets  will  certainly  increase  their 
prices,  but even  before making  full  use  of their 
capacity.  Price  control  may  therefore  encourage 
them to make full use of their capacity. 
(b)  If excess  demand  nevertheless  appears,  State 
rationing  is  not  essential,  since  sellers  on  the 
market  exercise  an  informal  control  over  de-
mand.  Such control is  possible since  buyers and 
sellers do not act  anonymously  but as  personally 
identifiable  "suppliers"  and  "customers". 
Galbraith  concludes  that: 
"in the  imperfect  market-in particular,  in  the 
market of small numbers-price control qua price 
control  is  a  workable  instrument  of  economic 
policy,  at  least  in  the  short  run". (
8
) 
But  since,  to  a  large  extent,  he  does  no  more  than 
show that controlled prices  are relatively easy for the 
authorities  to  apply  on  these  markets,  and  explain 
why  there  is  no  occasion,  in  a  state  of  imperfect 
competition, to expect effects which would make price 
control impracticable as a means of achieving relatively 
short term objectives, Galbraith provides "less a theory 
of  price  control  than ...  an  interpretation  that blends 
history  with  ad  hoc  reasoning. (9) 
The oligopolistic market form  is  not enough by  itself 
to explain why  the effects  inferred by Von Mises  are 
rarely  found  in  practice.  It  is,  to  all  appearances, 
because  the number  of  sellers  is  relatively  small  that 
no  excess  supply  appears  as  a  result  of  a  fixed  or 
minimum  price set  above  the  free  market  price.  On 
olipolistic  markets  the  sellers  generally  have  a  rela-
tively  good  overall view  of the  conditions  of supply 
and demand on the aggregate market.  Their business 
behaviour  is  therefore  not  based  on  the  idea  that 
they  can  sell  any  quantity  they  like  at  the  fixed 
minimum price; quite the contrary, in determining the 
volume of their production they evaluate the aggregate 
demand  and  the  aggregate  volume  of  production  of 
their competitors. 
Similarly,  the  possibilities  of  informal  rationing  by 
the  sellers  to which  Galbraith  alludes  are  no  doubt 
all  the  greater,  the  fewer  the  participants  in  the 
market.  The number of  sellers  is  not always  enough 
(
8
)  Ibid. 
(
9
)  Hildebrand,  G.  H.:  A  recension  of  Galbraith's  Theory 
of  Price  Control;  in:  AER,  Vol.  42,  1952,  p.  988. to explain  the  absence  of a reduction  in  the volume 
of supply.  What is  decisive  here is  that free  market 
prices  are  not generally  identical with costs,  contrary 
to what Von Mises  supposed.  Since  the State, as  the 
originator  of  control,  is  conscious  of  the  danger  of 
a diminution  of supply,  it can  be  taken,  in general, 
that the  maximum  price  or fixed  price  which it sets 
covers  at least the average costs  of sellers.  The form 
of  the  market  may  also  be  an  important  factor  in 
determining  the  size  of  the  sector  in which  a  price 
control  policy  is  possible  without  any  reduction  of 
supply.  With regard to the whole possibility of pursu-
ing  such  a policy  in general,  the form  of the market 
is  not  a  decisive  factor.  Prices  above  average  costs 
are  no  doubt the  rule  both  on  oligopolistic  markets 
and  on  atomistic  markets. 
An  oligopolistic  market  situation  affords  no  better 
explanation  of  the  absence  of  secondary  effects  on 
other markets.  The prior condition for the appearance 
of such effects  is  the multilateral interdependence  of 
all  the  markets.  This  generally  results  from  the 
fact  that all  markets  contribute to the given  national 
product  for  a  period  and  to  the  existing  factors 
of production.  The possible effects  of  these relations 
are  often  negligible.  There  is  no  reason  to  fear 
major  secondary  effects  for  other free  price  markets, 
unless  the products  are  interchangeable.  In practice, 
relations  of  substitution  exist,  not  among  all  prod-
ucts,  but  only  within  groups  of  products  which 
satisfy  the  same  basic  need.  In the  absence  of  any 
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other  assumption,  no  other  reliable  indications  can 
be  given  on  the effects  of  price  control  on  the price 
of substitute products. (1°) 
With regard to the short term effects  which we have 
just considered in a closed economy, it is  thus found 
that  price  control,  if it is  applied  with  due  regard 
to the conditions of supply and demand in each market, 
may  perfectly well constitute an instrument of econo-
mic  policy  consistent  with  the  objective  pursued. 
Furthermore,  since  it  does  not  necessarily  produce 
major  secondary  effects  on other markets, it can  also 
be regarded from this point of view as consistent with 
the  economic  system. (  11 )  We shall  therefore confine 
ourselves  to  analysing  below  the  possible  long  term 
effects  and  the  consequences  which  may  result  from 
the reciprocal  penetration  of  national  markets. 
(1°)  Cf.  on  this  subject:  Gould,  ].  R.  and  Henry,  S.  G.  B.: 
The Effects  of  Price Control on a Related  Market;  in:  Econ-
omica,  Vol.  XXXIV,  1967,  pp.  42  and  foil. 
( 
11
)  Willeke,  who has  devoted  himself  to  studying  the theory 
advanced  by Von Mises  and other neo-liberal  writers  concern-
ing cumulative State intervention, concludes  as  follows:  "The-
oretical  analysis  thus  confirms  what  experience  constantly  re-
calls;  the price of various goods, such as  raw materials, metals, 
scrap  metal  and  basic  foodstuffs,  can  be  administratively  con-
trolled  without  resulting  in  cumulative  State  intervention, 
inevitably  leading  to  a  wholly  directed  economy."  Willeke, 
F.-U.:  Das  Theorem  der  kumulativen  Staatsintervention;  in: 
Jfs,  Vol.  12,  1961,  pp.  70  and  foiL CHAPTER 8 
PRICE CONTROL BY  MAXIMUM  PRICES 
(a)  Price  controls  in  the  form  of  maximum  prices, 
set in absolute figures,  are found in all  EEC Member 
States.  Individually, they are  an  instrument of  retail 
price  and  relative  price  policy,  and  in  the  aggregate 
they  are  an  instrument  of  the  government's  price 
level  policy. 
With  regard  to  the  effects  of  these  controls  on 
competition,  it  can  be  said  in  general  that  they  do 
not restrain the institutional freedom  to reduce prices 
in market  competition.  But they  hamper  or prevent 
price increases  connected with demand or with costs. 
Feasibility of action may therefore be limited, not only 
relatively,  by  the  prohibition  on  making  additional 
profits  linked  with  demand,  but  also  absolutely,  by 
the  impossibility  of  passing  on  cost  increases..  Simi-
larly,  the  competitive  spirit  is  bound  to be  affected. 
If the profits  of  all  sellers  on  a  market  are  limited 
by  the  introduction  of  a  maximum  price  fixed  in 
absolute  value,  the  sellers  may  gang  up  against  the 
State,  which  psychologically  weakens  competition 
among themselves. 
Furthermore, on oligopolistic markets,  the fixing  of a 
maximum  unit  price  may  afford  a  reference  point, 
backed by the authority of the State, for the guidance 
of  the  price  policy  behaviour  of  the  sellers,  which 
will  ensure  oligopolistic  peace.  In particular,  a  dim-
inution  of  indirect  pressure  on  competition  may 
therefore be expected. 
The effects  on  national economies  are  often regarded 
as negligible, and sometimes even as desiderable, since 
the  enactment  introducing  the  maximum  price  is 
generally  motivated  by  the  defective  functioning  of 
the  market  mechanisms.  This  argument  cannot  be 
verified  in  specific  cases  without  knowing  the  con-
ditions of supply and demand on the relevant market. 
It is  also  argued  that  price  increases  in  themselves 
already  reflect  a  defective  functioning  of the  market 
mechanisms  or  prevent  them  from  functioning. 
A  policy  of  general  price  control,  or  the  control  of 
certain key  prices ( 
1
)  is  therefore said  to be a proven 
means of preventing inflation and thus restoring sound 
conditions  for  the  functioning  of  the  market  mech-
(I) E.g.  the  prices  which  enter  into  the  cost  of  living  index. 
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anisms.  In considering  this  argument,  we  shall  as-
sume  that  inflation  is  induced  by  excess  demand. e) 
The  elimination  of  aggregate  excess  demand  forms 
part of the  quantitative development  function  of  the 
market mechanisms.  If  factor prices and the monetary 
demand of the State and from abroad remain constant 
after an  isolated  increase  in demand,  the adjustment 
process  takes  the  following  lines:  following  the  in-
sufficiency  of  production  capacity,  many  goods-if 
not  all-become  scarce.  The  prices  of  these  goods 
may  therefore be increased by  all  sellers.  Price rises 
shift  the  distribution  of  incomes  to  the  benefit  of 
enterprises,  i.e.  the  highest  income  earners.  Since 
their  consumption  rate  is  generally  lower e)  than 
that  of  more  modest  income  earners,  the  aggregate 
consumption rate falls  and aggregate demand declines. 
On the supply side, higher unit profits are an incentive 
to  extend  production  capacity.  Since  the propensity 
to  invest  is  sustained  by  better possibilities  of  self-
financing,  the  result  is  increased  investments  and  a 
higher  investment  rate.  Aggregate  supply  does  not 
increase  until  the  new  equipment  is  brought  into 
service.  The quantitative development  function  thus 
brings about a temporary shift in the use of incomes 
in  favour  of  investment,  and,  according  to  the  state 
of  capacities,  a  change  in  the  pattern of outputs  in 
favour  of  the  capital  goods  industries. 
Excess  demand  is  not  without  effect  on  the  other 
functions of the market mechanisms.  Monetary distri-
bution depends more on the macro-economic  state of 
the market  than on market  services.  The regulation 
of  the  pattern  of  inputs  by  the  market  is  partly 
eliminated,  since,  owing  to  the  excess  demand,  the 
(2)  In  practice,  demand-pull  and  cost-push  make  their  ap-
pearance  simultaneously;  but owing to the difficulty  of distin-
guishing  causes,  the  specialised  literature (a)  speaks  of  cost 
inflation  only  when  a  price  rise  is  linked  with. a  fall  in 
employment.  Since  an  "inflationist  depression"  of  this  kind 
manifested  itself  only  in  the  American  recession  of  1957-58, 
we  think it legitimate  to limit our study  to demand inflation. 
(a)  Cf.  e.g.  Rose,  K.:  Bemerkungen  zur  Theorie  der  Kosten-
inflation;  in:  Jfs,  Vol.  12,  1961,  pp.  340  and  foil.  Durr, E.: 
Kosten- und Nachfrageinflation  als  wirtschaftspolitisches  Prob-
lem;  in:  Wirtschaftspolitische Chronik,  1964,  pp. 44  and  foil.  n The  smaller  propensity  to  consume  of  these  categories  is 
no  doubt not purely  a matter of  will,  but arises  partly from 
the fact  that compulsory saving is  enforced on company share-
holders  by  the policy of ploughing back profits  and constitut-
ing  reserves  followed  by companies. manufacturers in a branch with relatively unfavourable 
costs  may,  at  least  temporarily,  extend  their  pro-
duction.  The  variations  in  price  relations  necessary 
to the regulation of the pattern of outputs are reflected, 
no  longer  by  absolute  price  variations  in  both  di-
rections, but solely by differential increases in absolute 
prices.  Although  the  regulation  of  the  pattern  of 
outputs  may  theoretically  continue  to  function  even 
with  such  a  variation  of  relations,  a  distortion  is 
not impossible in practice.  One of the reasons for this 
is  that the sellers  are  probably not immune  to  mon-
etary  illusions  and  that  therefore  a  real  decline  in 
profits  reflected  simply  in  a  highly  differentiated  in-
crease in nominal profits, would not immediately lead 
to  a  change  in  their  production  policy.  But  the 
realisation of  the effects  of  the development function 
in  tending to extend production capacities  will result 
in  competition  again  becoming  intensified,  in  high 
unit  profits  shrinking  and  in  the disturbed functions 
becoming  increasingly  operative. 
In  practice,  the  adjustment  process  no  doubt  does 
not  lead  in  quite  such  a  clear-cut  way  to  a  new 
equilibrium.  If  price  rises  on  their  side  set  off  an 
increase  in  factor  costs,  or  of  the  monetary demand 
of  the State or an  increase  of investments  which  are 
slow  in  coming  into  service,  the  excess  demand  may 
even  be  temporarily  reinforced  and  the  achievement 
of  macro-economic  equilibrium  will  be  thereby  de-
layed.  So  long  as  creeping  inflation  does  not  turn 
into  galloping  inflation,  there  will  be  no  change  in 
the .tendencies  indicated. 
It remains to be noted that the increase in the invest-
ment  rate  through  the  quantitative  development 
function  may  be  accompanied  by  distortions  in  the 
monetary  distribution  function  and  in  the pattern of 
inputs  and  outputs.  It  is  therefore  understandable 
that  the  State  should  try  to  prevent  these  adverse 
effects  by economic  policy  measures.  The only  ques-
tion  is  whether  maximum  price  policy  is  really  the 
appropriate instrument. 
A policy  of this  kind covering  all  products  no  doubt 
does  not do  away  with excess  demand,  but prevents 
a  deterioration  in  the  distribution  of  income.  In 
sectors  where the volume of  supply  is  not enough to 
satisfy effective demand at the prices fixed,  the market 
mechanisms  can  certainly  no  longer  discharge  their 
function  of  real  distribution.  The  answer  to  the 
question  whether,  or when,  demand  is  satisfied  will 
no  longer  depend  solely  on  the  relations  between 
income  and  utility  expressed  in  the  propensity  to 
buy,  but  also  on  the  goodwill  of  the  producers. 
The  necessary  criterion  of  the  urgency  of  variations 
in  capacity  to regulate  the pattern of  outputs  is  the 
sectoral  pattern of  profits,  determined  by  prices  and 
costs.  Since  the market, owing to excess demand,  no 
longer compels  price  reductions,  and  since  price  rises 
are  prohibited  by  price  controls,  price  ceases  to  be 
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a  decisive  factor  in  the  vanatlon  of  the  pattern  of 
profits.  The variation in  the pattern of demand may 
therefore  no  longer  appear  on  the  market  in  a  way 
which would stimulate production above the average. 
Differential cost variations, on the other hand, would 
lead  to  a  change  in  the  sectoral  pattern  of  profits. 
The pattern of outputs therefore tends to change with 
the change in sectoral cost relations.  But such a trend 
may  correspond to the pattern of demand only if  the 
rise  in  costs  and  the  fall  in  demand  and  the  fall  in 
costs  and  the  rise  in  demand  constantly  move  in 
parallel and to the same  extent in each  sector.  Since 
this can happen only in exceptional cases, the patterns 
of  supply  and  of  demand  evolve  separately.  The 
market regulation of the pattern of outputs no longer 
functions. 
Since  price  control  policy  does  not  eliminate  excess 
demand, all sellers will have the possibility of market-
ing.  If factor prices  (especially wages)  are controlled, 
no  improvement will result in the conditions  for  the 
regulation of the pattern of inputs.  On the contrary, 
if the rise in factor prices is legitimate, and its passing 
on in  the price  of  products  is  not, the  rise  in factor 
prices  compels  the  sellers  to  exploit  all  their 
rationalisation possibilities.  The disappearance  of un-
economic  marginal  enterprises  increases  the  average 
productivity of branches and thus improves the overall 
pattern of inputs.  But if the  most  productive  enter 
prises  are  not in  a  position  to increase  their  supply 
in  consequence,  a  supplementary  distortion  in  the 
pattern  of  outputs  may  follow.  The  rise  in  factor 
prices  reinforces, for price-controlled goods,  the tend-
ency  to  develop  cheaper  production  processes.  If 
price  control  does  not  apply  to  new  products,  but 
only to products in existence when it was introduced, 
the tendency to make new products will also increase. 
As  to  the question whether the  tendency  thus  stimu-
lated  will  lead  to  greater  qualitative  improvements, 
this  is  largely  a  matter  of  finance.  Owing  to  the 
reduced  feasibility  of  action,  a  favourable  effect  on 
the  qualitative development  function  is,  at the least, 
doubtful.  The influence of price control on the quan-
titative  development  function  is  unquestionably  ad-
verse.  The prohibition  of  increased  prices  or profits 
hampers or prevents any  increase in investment rates. 
The necessary  extension of capacities  therefore  takes 
place much more slowly, and consumers are compelled 
to wait much longer before they have access  to better 
supplies. (
4
) 
If  the  control  does  not  extend  to  all  products,  the 
effects  inferred  for  the  general  freeze  can  naturally 
appear only  on  the controlled markets.  But the mar-
kets  which  remain  free  may  not  escape  all  influence 
(
4
)  Cf.  also,  on  this  subject,  Kung,  E.:  Lohninfl.ation  und 
Gewinninfl.ation;  in:  Probleme  der  Einkommenpolitik;  (edited 
by  E.  Schneider),  Tiibingen,  1965,  p.  40. of  such  selective  control.  Kung  expects  that,  on  the 
markets  which  remain  free: 
"natural price fluctuations  ( ... ) will follow  their 
free course all the more impetuously.  In practice, 
the sector which remains free will have to ensure, 
on its own,  that equilibrium  is  restored  on  the 
market by price variations". CS) 
But  this  conclusion  is  warranted  only  on  certain 
specific  conditions.  The  macro-economic  pattern  of 
outputs  has  a  horizontal  dimension  and  a  vertical 
dimension.  It must be  recognised  that the nature of 
the effects of a system of partial price control depends 
on the question whether price formation remains free 
in  certain vertical stages. 
In the event of  horizontal differentiation,  Kung  will 
be  right only if  the unsatisfied demand on controlled 
markets  shifts to uncontrolled markets by the substi-
tution of products or of needs. (6
)  But the reinforce-
ment  of  the  price  rise  is  temporary  only,  since  the 
action-free in  this case-of the  market mechanisms 
points to a fairly  rapid elimination of excess  demand. 
The substitution of products and needs brought about 
by  the price control policy  represents  an  involuntary 
reorientation  of  demand.  If the  original  preferences 
of  demand  continue  to  exist,  supplementary  invest-
ments  in  free  price  sectors  may,  after  the  removal 
of  price  controls,  prove  to  be  unsound  investments. 
It may  therefore be feared that selective freeze in this 
case  involves  an  appreciable distortion in  the pattern 
of outputs. 
In contrast,  if  price  freedom  is  left  to goods  which 
have no substitution relation with controlled goods-
and  for  which  the  satisfaction  of  needs  has  almost 
reached saturation point-little major shift of demand 
will be found,  and there will be no reinforcement of 
price  rises  on  price  free  markets. 
In  considering  the  vertical  differentiation  of  price 
control policy, we shall content ourselves with distin-
guishing,  in the case  of markets  with several  stages, 
the production stage and the distribution stage. 
Control at the production .stage  alone is  a convenient 
solution,  since  this  system  is  very  easy  for  the 
authorities to introduce or supervise at a stage where 
there  are  relatively  few  sellers.  But  excess  demand 
is  enough  alone  to  generate  price  increases  at  the 
distribution stage, where there is usually no bottleneck 
due  to  insufficient  capacity.  The  resulting  supple-
mentary  profits  therefore  have  no  function  to  fulfil 
e)  Kung,  E.:  Der  Interventionismus,  Berne,  1941,  p.  172. 
(
6
)  Kung  is  referring  by  this  to  the  following  situation:  de-
mand "turns to entirely different goods,  which also correspond 
to other needs ...  when it is  no longer possible to satisfy needs 
as  in  the  past".  Ibid.,  p.  172. 
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in  connection  with qualitative  development.  An  ad-
verse  distribution  effect  is  therefore  found,  accom-
panied, in certain cases,  by  a tendency  to inflation  at 
the distribution stage.  The tendency towards vertical 
concentration resulting from this type of differentiation 
points  to  the  partial  neutralisation  of  adverse  con-
sequences on the regulation of the pattern of outputs 
and  the  quantitative  development  function.  But  it 
also  involves  the  danger  of  restraint  of  competition 
which may,  in a general way,  impede the functioning 
of  the  market  mechanisms. 
Price  control  limited  to  the  distribution  stage  may 
relate  to  the  total  price  of  the  product,  or  simply 
to  the  price  of  the  service  rendered  at  that  stage. 
Since mark-up at the distribution stage can be reduced 
only to a limited extent, the first .alternative is hardly 
distinguishable  from  a  general  price  control  policy. 
But  it is  different  if  a  ceiling  is  fixed  only  for  the 
price  of  the  service  rendered  by  distribution  (the 
mark-up).  Insufficient capacity at the production stage 
generally gives distributors the opportunity of increas-
ing the price of their service.  As  already pointed out, 
supplementary  profits  at  this  stage  rarely  have  a 
function  to  fulfil  in  connection  with  the  market 
mechanisms.  If  the State limits the mark-up in relative 
value,  the  non-functional  profit  increase  is  not elim-
inated.  But if  it control  the  absolute  value  of  the 
mark-up,  the increase  in the total price of a product 
involves increased profit at the production stage only, 
and  this  profit  then  fully  sustains  the  quantitative 
development  function  of the  market mechanisms.  A 
vertical  differentiation  of  this  kind  is  therefore  gen-
erally  calculated  to  sustain  the  functioning  of  the 
market mechanisms. 
To  sum  up,  it  will  be  found  that  the  setting  of 
maximum  (ceiling)  prices,  as  an  instrument  of  price 
level  policy-except  for  the  fixing  of  the  absolute 
value of mark-up at the distribution stage always  im-
proves  the  long  term  results  of certain  functions  at 
the cost of other functions.  These contradictory effects 
reflect  the conflict  between the distribution objective 
and  the  growth  objective  constantly  encountered  by 
economic policy in the event of overall disequilibrium. 
The  elimination  of  excess  demand  by  the  market 
mechanisms calls for  reinforced action by the State in 
the  context  of  its  distribution  policy.  Contrariwise, 
if the  State's  price  control  policy  prevents  the  de-
terioration  of  distribution,  the  State  must  take 
measures  in favour  of  growth. 
(b)  In Belgium price control by  setting ceiling prices 
applies  to  a  total of  17  products  or groups  of prod-
ucts.(')  The  following  Table  gives  an  idea  of  the 
nature of the provisions and their breakdown between 
the  production  stage  and  the  distribution  stage. 
C)  Cf.  Annex,  p.  128. Nature and breakdown of maximum price controls in 
Belgium. 
~~  Breakdown:  Controlled  at 
Total 
~------
products  produc- distribu-
Nature:  tion  tion 
stage  stage 
1.  Total price 
a)  maximum unit price  4  4  2 
b) price freeze  10  2  9 
2.  Control of mark-up 
a)  in relative value  1  - 1 
b) in absolute value  2  - 2 
(1)  Cf. list in Annex, p. 128. 
Judging  from  this  Table,  the  Belgian  Government 
rarely  seems  to  fix  a  ceiling  price.  But  since  our 
Table only  shows  express  price-fixing provisions,  and 
does not indicate the number of price increases refused 
on the occasion of compulsory reporting accompanied 
by  the right of veto,  the numbers given here do not 
warrant any general judgment on the extent of ceiling 
price  regulations  in  Belgium.  The  small  number  of 
express  price-fixing  rules  nevertheless  justifies  the 
conclusion  that  they  are  not  used  primarily  as  an 
instrument  for  stabilising  the  price  level.  It is  im-
possible,  within  the  scope  of  the  present  study,  to 
assess whether the market mechanisms have ceased to 
function  on  all  the  price-controlled  markets.  It  is 
certainly  doubtful  whether  price  control  can  be  ex-
plained on this ground,  since  in other EEC countries 
market prices are formed freely,  especially for  certain 
products which are  subject to ceiling prices or control 
of  mark-up  in  Belgium.  The  deterioration  of  the 
market  mechanisms  which  may  theoretically  result 
must  be  regarded  overall  as  insignificant  for  most 
of  the  products.  Only  the  setting  of  a  percentage 
mark-up  for  electrical  household  appliances  seems 
delicate.  This provision encourages distributing enter-
prises  in this branch to obtain their supplies  at high 
prices.  If the  intensity  of  competition  and/  or  the 
price  elasticity  of  aggregate  demand  are  not  very 
high,  the  distributors'  profits  will  be  all  the  higher 
the  dearer  they  buy  their  products.  It is  therefore 
possible  that  this  control  of  mark-up  involves  con-
siderable  distortion in  the pattern of  inputs for  part 
of the Belgian electrical equipment industry. 
The list (
8
)  of  ceiling  price  regulation  in the Federal 
Republic  of Germany  covers  seven  items.  All  these 
controls  relate  to  markets  where  the  market  mecha-
nisms  cannot  or  should  not  function  because  of 
(
8
)  Cf.  Annex,  p.  130. 
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overriding extra-economic objectives. (9)  It is therefore 
idle  to  assess  their  effect  on  competition  and  the 
market  mechanisms.  As  a  replacement  instrument, 
the fixing of pharmacists' mark-up as a percentage, and 
architects' fees  according  to the value of the building 
nevertheless seem  open to question.  These provisions 
may  lead  to  distortions  in  the  pattern  of  inputs  in 
the pharmaceutical industry and the building industry. 
The  French  provisions  for  ceiling  prices  or  direct 
control of price levels eo)  cover a total of 396 .items. 
Their  breakdown  by  nature  and  by  stage  affected 
is  shown  in the following  Table: 
Nature and  breakdown of  French maximum price controls. 
~ 
Controlled  at 
Total 
products  produc- distribu-
tion  tion  .  stage  stage 
A.  Total price  343  309  61 
of which: 
a)  maximum unit price  69  43  33 
b) price freeze  274  266  28 
B.  Mark-up  53  - 53 
of which: 
1.  in absolute value  8  - 8 
of which: 
a)  maximum unit mark-up  6  - 6 
b) mark-up frozen  2  - 2 
2.  in relative value  45  - 45 
of which: 
a)  maximum unit mark-up 
- on cost price  14  - 14 
- on selling  price  16  - 16 
b) mark-up frozen  15  - 15 
(9)  Thus,  the  price  control  of  nitrogenous  fertilizers  prevents 
the producers from exploiting prices under the subsidies grant-
ed  to  the  fertilizer  industry.  The  control  of  architects'  fees 
may  be  regarded  as  a  counterpart  to  the  privilege,  deemed 
unjustified  from  the  overall  point  of  view,  enjoyed  by  this 
profession  thanks  to  official  aid  to  building.  The  provisions 
governing  the  price  of  medicaments  and  the  fees  of  doctors 
and dentists, as well as of advocates and notaries, partly counter-
act  the price exploitation  of a virtually  inelastic  demand,  and 
may  be  taken  as  expressing,  to  some  extent,  the  view  that 
contraction  of  demand  owing  to  prices  is  not  desirable  in 
these  fields  for  extra-economic  reasons.  In the  case  of  elec-
tricity  supply,  there  can  be  no  question  of  free  price  for-
mation, since  the suppliers enjoy an  almost absolute monopoly 
at  regional  level.  The  discussions  which  have  taken  place 
in  recent  years  on  the  freeing  of  the  price  of  electricity  can 
be taken  to have  been  unsuccessful. 
(1°)  Cf.  Annex,  p.  139  and  foiL Most  French  maximum  price  controls  are  designed 
to  stabilise  price  levels.  It is  only  in  the  group  of 
provisions imposing maximum unit price controls that 
a  series  of  products  is  found  for  which  it  can  be 
assumed that the market mechanisms are not function-
ing.  The price of products in this group is  controlled 
both at  production  and  at  distribution  stage.  Most 
provisions  relate  to freezing  the selling price of each 
enterprise.  For  more  than  half  of  the  products  in 
this  group  price  control  applies  at  production  stage 
only, price formation at the distribution stage remain-
ing  free.  The  products  for  which  price  freezing  or 
mark-up  control  applies  at the distribution stage  are 
essentially final consumption goods and services which 
play a certain part in the cost of living.  These controls 
are  manifestly  designed  to stabilise  the  cost-of-living 
index.  The dominant  system  of control for  mark-up 
is  that of fixing  relative values. 
The  large  number  of  French  controls  which  cannot 
be  interpreted as  designed  to replace  badly  function-
ing  market  mechanisms,  suggests  considerable  effects 
on those mechanisms.  It is  highly probable that they 
will deteriorate, especially since these ru1es  have been 
in force for a long  time (five  years  and more). 
In cases  where maximum unit prices or frozen prices 
fixed  in absolute values apply both at production and 
distribution stage  the effect  on monetary distribution 
is  unquestionably  favourable.  The  French  controls 
counteract distortions in the real distribution function, 
theoretically  possible  in  exceptional  cases,  in . the 
sense  that  they  raise  the  ceiling  prices  of  products 
if rising costs give  reason  to fear  a  reduction in the 
volume  of demand.  Since  such  adjustment  to shifts 
in  the  pattern  of  demand  does  not  operate,  it  is 
possible  that deliberate  processes  of real distribution 
may  appear in sectors which correspond to the model 
of  a  closed  economy.  With  regard  to  the  pattern 
of  outputs,  it  is  similarly  not  to  be  expected  that 
regu1ation by the market mechanisms  will yield satis-
factory  results.  Sectors  with falling  production costs 
will tend to over-produce and sectors with increasing 
demand,  but  where  production  costs  .are  rising  or 
constant  will  tend  to  under-produce.  Since  there  is 
no  State  wage  control,  the  obligation  to  rationalise 
arising  from  price  control  will  necessarily  have 
favourable  effects  on  the  overall  pattern  of  inputs. 
The  effect  on  the  tendency  towards  the  qualitative 
improvement  of  production  methods  to  lower  costs 
is  no doubt also  favourable.  But such  improvements 
are  often  improbable  owing  to  reduced  possibilities 
of  self-financing.  Efforts  to  develop  new  products 
no  doubt  tend  to  fall  off;  in practice,  ceiling  prices 
fixed  in  absolute  value  first  of  all  have  the  effect 
of  limiting  the  feasibility  of  action,  next,  they  per-
petuate the danger of a weakening of the competitive 
spirit on oligopolistic  markets,  and,  finally,  this  ten-
dency is natural, since both new products and products 
\ 
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whose  quality  has  been  improved  alike  fall  within 
the scope  of maximum price control.  Price increases 
are legitimate in this case  only  if they represent cost 
increases. (11)  Furthermore,  the  effect  on the quanti-
tative development function is unquestionably adverse. 
The  160  or so  products  whose  prices,  while  frozen 
at  the  production  stage,  are  formed  freely  at  the 
distribution  stage,  may  give  rise,  as  already  pointed 
out in general terms,  to excess profits with no utility 
for  the markets  down  the line,  if  demand is  strong. 
In  this  case  general  maximum  price  control  lacks 
a favourable effect on monetary distribution. 
Finally,  it will be noted,  for  the  45  cases  in France 
where the mark-up is  fixed  as  a percentage,  that this 
system  may  have  adverse  effects  on  the  pattern  of 
inputs at the production stage of the relevant products. 
In Italy,  maximum  price  control applies  to 24  prod-
ucts,  21  at  production  stage  and  6  at  distribution 
stage. (12)  To  the  best  of  our  knowledge  mark-ups 
are not controlled.  A large proportion of this control 
relates  to  the  products  of  public  monopolies. 
A  comparison of the relevant markets  in other EEC 
countries  at  least  makes  it doubtful  that  in  all  the 
other cases the market mechanisms are not functioning 
because  the  necessary  conditions  are  not  satisfied. 
Since  the  products  in  question  are  mainly  raw  ma-
terials, it may be assumed that the control is designed 
to lower  the  price  of  inputs  for  the  benefit  of  the 
economic  stages  down  the line. 
If the  market  mechanisms  function,- maximum  price 
controls have  the following  effects  on them: 
A  favourable  effect  on  monetary  distribution  is  pos-
sible.  Since the distribution stages of important prod-
ucts fall outside the scope of control, it certainly does 
not  prevent  this  stage  from  exploiting  this  market 
situation  in  the  matter  of  prices.  Similarly,  other 
processing  activities  down the line may  increase their 
prices in consequence of the inflation of demand.  The 
theoretically  possible  distortions  in  real  distribution 
are  therefore  insignificant.  Distortions  may  appear 
in the pattern of inputs.  When factor prices increase, 
a  favourable  effect  again  becomes  possible  on  the 
pattern  of  inputs,  whereas,  for  the  qualitative  de-
velopment  function,  there  may  certainly be expected 
to be a stimulation of  the tendency to adopt cheaper 
production  methods,  but  also  fewer  possibilities  of 
developing  them.  The effect  on  the  quantitative de-
velopment  function  is  adverse. 
The  list  of  maximum  price  controls  applicable  in 
Luxembourg covers  11  items. (13)  But since  this  list, 
(
11
)  Cf.  Champaud,  op.  cit.,  Part  I,  p.  31. 
(1
2
)  Cf.  list  in  Annex,  p.  154. 
(
13
)  C£.  list  in  Annex,  p.  156. according  to  information  provided  by  the  Luxem-
bourg  Price  Department,  is  incomplete,  and  since 
the  compulsory  reporting  of  price  increases  accom-
panied  by  the  right  of  veto  is  applied  as  a  general 
freeze,  this list may,  to some  extent give  a deceptive 
view of Luxembourg State action to limit prices.  The 
items  listed mainly  concern  agricultural products  and 
therefore  markets  which  should  not  be  regulated  by 
market mechanisms, in the view both of EEC Member 
States  and of the Community itself. 
Since  it may  be  assumed  that,  in  Luxembourg,  too, 
the price  control  of  these products  is  only one  State 
measure among  others, we will refrain from inferring 
its  effects.  With regard  to pharmaceutical  products, 
it  may  be  assumed,  prima  facie,  that  the  market 
mechanisms do not function, or that regulation by the 
market  is  not  desired  for  extra-economic  reasons. 
Major effects  on competition  and  the market mecha-
nisms  can  therefore  be  inferred  only  in  the  case  of 
fuel.  But  in  the  absence  of detailed  information  on 
the relevant controls,  this point cannot be considered 
either. 
In the Netherlands there are 7 maximum price controls 
for  the  direct  control  of  price  levels. e
4
)  But  we 
refrain from inferring their effects here, since they are 
not  primarily  designed  to  stabilise  price  levels,  and, 
furthermore, we know nothing of their motivation or 
their application. 
(c)  Since  they  do  not prohibit price  dumping,  maxi-
mum  price controls create no institutional barriers to 
trade channels  among  Member countries.  As  already 
said in considering stability contracts, (15) the feasibility 
of  action  of  sellers  in  a  country  where  prices  are 
controlled will certainly  tend to be less  than that of 
sellers  in a country where prices  are  free.  An effect 
on economic  relations  among  States can,  however, be 
inferred only on condition that the state of the market 
in  foreign  countries  where  prices  are  free  makes  it 
possible  to  obtain  prices  above  the  maximum  prices 
on the home  market.  If the maximum price controls 
prevent the equalisation of product prices in the inte-
grated  territory,  the  exports  of  sellers  from  price-
controlled  countries  may  reach  a  sub-optimum  level, 
and bring about, in the short or long  term,  an  insuf-
ficiency  of demand  on  the internal market.  If these 
controls  apply  to national products as  well as  foreign 
products,  the  only  result  is  a  distortion  in  the  real 
distribution  function  (trade  optimum). 
On the other hand, if the  prices  of foreign  products 
are  free,  a  distortion  in  the  pattern  of  inputs  may 
also  be  added  when  the potential high  prices  of  the 
e
4
)  Cf.  Table  in  Annex,  p.  158. 
(1
5
)  Cf.  pp.  38  and foil.  above. 
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internal  market  are  obtained  by  foreign  sellers  pro-
ducing  at higher  costs  than  national  sellers.  A  shift 
of production capacities from controlled price countries 
to free  price countries  cannot be  ruled out if  such  a 
situation  lasts  a  long  time.  The  regional  pattern 
would then be distorted. 
As  a result of the controls applicable in Belgium,  such 
effects are certainly not impossible in theory, but they 
can be regarded as  negligible, since most of the prod-
ucts  concerned  have  no  importance  in  trade  among 
Member States.  Only  the maximum rate of mark-up 
applicable to electrical household appliances might have 
the  effect  of  inducing  Belgian  distributors  to import 
the dearest possible appliances instead of the cheapest 
possible, which might distort the pattern of inputs in 
the  European  electrical  appliance  industry. 
In the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  the  maximum 
price  for  fertilizers,  which  also  applies  to  imported 
products  pursuant  to  Article  2  of  the  Prices  Act  of 
10  April 1948, may  have  an  effect  on trade channels 
between Member  countries.  But this  theoretical pos-
sibility is  negligible,  since  the market  price~ for ferti-
lizers  are  often below the maximum  prices. e
6
) 
Pursuant to  the  Medicaments  Act  of  23  June  1964, 
only  the  import  of  medicaments  registered  in  the 
Federal Republic is legitimate.  The fixing of a mark-up 
in  relative  value  may,  so  far  as  these  products  are 
concerned,  distort the pattern  of  inputs  of  the phar-
maceutical  industry  in  the  integrated  territory.  But 
no doubt this  possibility  has  little importance. 
In view of the large number of French  maximum price 
controls and the fact that they have been in force  for 
a long time, the appearance of the effects described in 
general terms above is not improbable.  But since they 
generally  apply  also  to  foreign  supply,  the  French 
controls  may  merely  involve  a  distortion  of  the  real 
distribution function and not of the pattern of inputs. 
Our list (1
7
)  includes  some  special  provisions  for  im-
ports.  It may therefore be assumed that in these cases 
foreign  products  are  treated  differently  from  French 
products.  In the  absence  of  detailed  information,  it 
may  be  emphasized  in  general  that a  foreign  supply 
at more  favourable  costs  may  in  theory  equally  well 
be driven off the French market by setting a very low 
maximum.  Where this happens, distortions in the real 
distribution  function  may  be  expected  as  well  as  in 
the  pattern  of  inputs  and  the  regional  pattern.  A 
distortion  in  these  mechanisms  for  the  regulation  of 
patterns is also possible as  a result of a special control 
(1
6
)  Thus,  for  example,  the  maximum  price  for  nitrogenous 
fertilizer  was  reduced  by  6%  on  1  July  1967  and  thus  ad-
justed  to  the  market  conditions;  cf.  Preissenkung  fiir  Stick-
stoffdiinger;  in:  Handelsblatt,  13  June  1967. 
(1
7
)  Cf.  Annex,  p.  138  and  foll.,  p.  142. Summary Table showing the possible effects of national maximum price controls on the functions of the market 
mechanisms. 
Federal 
Belgium  Republic 
of Germany  France  Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands 
A{B 
A.  Effects  in  the  national  context  in  a closed 
economy 
I.  Development function 
1.  quantitative 
2.  qualitative 
II. Allocation function 
3.  pattern of outputs 
4.  pattern of inputs  -
5.  regional  pattern 
III.  Distribution function 
6.  monetary  + 
7.  real 
B.  Effects in the context of  the  EEC in an open 
economy 
I.  Development function 
1.  quantitative 
2.  qualitative 
II. Allocation function 
3.  pattern of outputs 
4.  pattern of inputs  -
5.  regional  pattern 
III.  Distribution function 
6.  monetary 
7.  real 
Legend: 
A  =maximum percentage mark-up for electrical household appliances; 
B  =maximum percentage mark-up for pharmaceutical products; 
C  =maximum percentage  for  architects'  fees; 
a  =  tendency to develop new production methods to reduce costs; 
b  =possibilities of (a)  and development of new products; 
c  =  adverse effects are not ruled out, if  mark-up is fixed in relative value; 
d  =only where there are maximum price controls at distribution stage also; 
e  =  as  a result of special provisions for imports. 
applicable in general to imported merchandise.  In the 
case  of  merchandise  entitled  to  reduced  customs 
duties (1
8
)  importers are bound to maintain the relative 
margins  applicable  one  month  before  the  reduced 
customs  duties  came  into  effect.  If  the  margin  is 
calculated on cost price, including customs duties, the 
tariff  cut  lessens  the  absolute  value  of  that  margin. 
('
8
)  Cf.  Order  No.  25.013  of  20  January  1965. 
B{C 
- -
+(a)  +  (~) 
-(b)  -(b) 
- -
- +(c)  + 
+  +(d)  + 
-
Germany 
B  only 
-
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-(a) 
-(e) 
- -
Following  representations  by  the  German producers, 
importers  are  similarly  not allowed  to increase  their 
margin  as  a  result  of  price  reductions  by  foreign 
exporters.  The object  of this  provision,  which  is  to 
give consumers the benefit of the results of integration, 
is  certainly praiseworthy, but since  the price elasticity 
of  demand is  relatively  low  for  imported goods,  any 
reduction  in  the  production  price  means  an  absolute 
diminution of the importers' profits.  If, owing to the 
fact  that importers  are  not interested in price  reduc-tions  thus  effected  on  the  French  market,  foreign 
supply  at more  favourable  costs  cannot  impose  itself 
there,  there is  a consequent distortion of  the pattern 
of  inputs;  the  regional  pattern may  also  be  affected. 
Among  the products  with  ceiling  prices  in  Italy,  12 
only play an  important role in external trade.  In the 
case  of  these  products,  the  shift  in  supply  indicated 
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above is  possible in corresponding conditions and may 
involve a distortion of real distribution. 
Most  of  the  maximum  price  controls  in  force  in 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands have no significance 
for trade among Member countries.  Since, in addition, 
we  lack  sufficient  particulars  on  this  subject,  we 
refrain from inferring their effects. CHAPTER 9 
PRICE CONTROL BY  MINIMUM PRICES 
(a)  Minimum  price  controls  can  be  considered  very 
briefly, since they play only a very secondary role in the 
market for products and factors in the EEC countries. 
If the  minimum  price  is  designed  to  guarantee  and 
improve the sellers'  income,  it is merely a unit price 
established  on  the  market  for  products  in  the  light 
of  the  costs  of  the  seller  with  the  least  favourable 
conditions.  Thus,  minimum  price  controls  do  away 
with institutional freedom  to reduce  prices  and elim-
inate all price competition. The feasibility of action in 
respect of preparatory competition no doubt tends  to 
increase for  all non-marginal  sellers.  A shift of price 
competition  towards  quality  competition  and  other 
forms  of non-price  competition  is  therefore  theoreti-
cally conceivable, but in practice it cannot be looked 
for,  since  the  competitive  spirit  cannot  generally 
remain  indifferent  to  the diminution  of  institutional 
feasibility.  Since  a  substantial increase  in  demand  is 
possible  only  by  relatively  substantial  qualitative  im-
provements,  the  spontaneous  impulse  to competition 
will  weaken.  Since  no  one  need  any  longer  fear  a 
price  offensive  by  his  competitors,  indirect  pressure 
will also be considerably reduced.  The virtually com-
plete paralysis  of competition due to minimum  price 
controls, should be reflected, in particular, by a marked 
change  in  the  pattern  of  inputs  and  the  qualitative 
development  function  as  regulated  by  the  market 
mechanisms. 
On the factor market,  minimum  price  controls  apply 
mainly to wages.  We cannot speak here of their effect 
on competition, since price competition among workers 
is, in any event, largely eliminated by the trade union 
policy of collective agreements.  If  the minimum wage 
is set too high, an increased substitution of the capital 
factor  for  the labour factor  must be expected, which 
might lead  to unemployment. 
The pattern of inputs will certainly continue to func-
tion  formally  within  the  enterprise,  but  it  will  no 
longer  reflect  the  relations  of  scarcity  between  the 
factors of production.  If  the controlled minimum wage 
is  set above the average of wages  in certain branches, 
we shall arrive at a distortion of the pattern of outputs, 
as  in the case of an excessive increase of monopolistic 
origin in the price of certain products. 
Minimum price controls can be regarded as  raising no 
problem  for  competition  and  the market  mechanism, 
if they :fix a price which is a certain amount below the 
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market price.  In this  event, they merely  prevent the 
exploitation of certain economic transactors ill inform-
ed  about  market  conditions,  without  having  any 
appreciable  importance  for  the  regulation  of  the 
economic  process. 
(b)  Whereas  there  is  no  control  of  this  kind  in 
Belgium,  the  relevant  list  for  the  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany e>  includes  four  items,  two  on  the 
products market and two on the labour market.  The 
products  relate  to  branches  which,  partly  for  extra-
economic reasons,  it is  thought desirable in Germany 
to  withdraw  from  regulation  by  the  market  mecha-
nisms.  It  is  therefore  unnecessary  to  study  their 
possible  effects  on  these  mechanisms.  Similarly,  we 
shall  refrain  from  considering  the  minimum  wage 
controls  for  homeworkers  and  casual  dock  labourers 
owing to their minor importance. 
In France  and  Luxembourg  minimum  price  controls 
relate  solely  to  the  guaranteed  minimum  statutory 
wage,  indexed  in  both  countries  to  the  retail  price 
index. 
But  since  they  are  generally  appreciably  below  the 
wages  fixed  by  individual  contract  and  collective 
agreement, (2) guaranteed minimum wages cannot .affect 
the  regulation  of  economic  processes  by  the  market. 
Since  it has  been forbidden  in France  since  1959  to 
index agreed wages under collective agreements to the 
guaranteed  minimum  wage,  an  indirect  influence  is 
equally impossible. 
We  have  no  information  on  the  reasons  for  the 
Italian  minimum  price  control  for  olive  cattlecakes 
(I) Cf.  Annex,  p.  131. 
(2)  Thus,  the  average  hourly  earnings  of  Luxembourg  indus-
trial  workers (•)  already  amounted  to  Lux.  Fr.  58.62  in  April 
1965,  whereas  the  minimum  wage  was  fixed  at  Lux.  Fr.  28 
per hour on  25  June  1965.  Since,  according  to the  statistics 
of  industrial  wages (a)  the  actual  wage  (Lux.  Fr.  26.23)  was 
below  the minimum wage  only in the "footwear, clothing and 
bedding" branch, the variation of the minimum wage  can have 
had  no  effect  except  in  this  branch  of  minor  importance. 
(a)  Cf.  Statistique  harmonisee  des  gains.  Series  « Statistique 
sociale »,  1965, No.  5,  1966,  Statistical Office  of the European 
Communities;  for  France,  d.  e.g.  Commission  of  the  EEC: 
Expose  sur  l'  evolution  de  la  situation  sociale  dans  la  Com-
munaute  en  1965,  August  1966,  p.  84. ("sanse").  Since  this  is  an  agricultural  product,  it 
may  be  assumed  that  this  market  is  deliberately 
withdrawn from regulation by the market mechanisms. 
(c)  In principle, minimum prices  are calculated to act 
as  a decisive  obstacle  to international trade channels. 
By  suppressing institutional freedom  to reduce prices, 
these  controls  may  prevent  the  harmonisation  of 
product  prices  in  the  integrated  territory  and  may 
take the place of customs duties in protecting national 
sellers  against  foreign  supply  at  lower  prices  and 
costs.  With  regard  to  the  functioning  of  market 
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mechanisms throughout the integrated territory, there-
fore,  they  involve,  in  particular,  distortions  in  the 
allocation  function  and  the  real  distribution  func-
tion. 
But such effects are theoretically possible only for  the 
German control of sugar beet and the Italian control 
of olive cattle cakes.  Since both these products belong 
to  the  agricultural  sector,  which  the  EEC Treaty  in 
any event brings under a common policy, the relevant 
effect  can  be  disregarded.  For  the  reasons  already 
indicated,  the  minimum  wage  controls  currently  in 
force  are  equally  negligible  in  the  EEC  context. CHAPTER  10 
COMBINED  CONTROLS:  FIXED  PRICES  AND  PRICE  BRACKETS 
(a) So  far as  we are aware, this type of control is  not 
very  widespread  in  the  EEC  countries.  Since  they 
merely  represent  a  combination  of  minimum  price 
controls and maximum price controls, there is no point 
in considering their effects.  According to the state of 
the market, the probable effect will result either from 
the  maximum  price  element  or  from  the  minimum 
price  element.  Fixed  price  controls  therefore  com-
pletely eliminate  the market mechanisms,  while price 
bracket  controls  leave  them  only  a  slight  margin  of 
action,  depending  on  the  range  of  the  bracket.  As 
already  indicated  at  the beginning  of  this  study,  this 
type  of control is  generally  used  as  an  instrument of 
market organisation designed  to  prevent inopportune 
price  variations.  Theoretically,  their  introduction  is 
desirable for  example when, prices being free,  market 
processes  appear  which  correspond  to  the  "Spider's 
web  theory"' e)  particularly  when  equilibrium  is 
unstable as  a result of market conditions. 
(b)  The  only  controls  existing  in  Belgium  are  fixed 
price  controls;  our  list  covers  five  items. (2)  Apart 
from  fees  for  hospital  treatment,  they  all  concern 
transport  charges.  While  supply  and  demand  for 
hospital  services  should  not,  for  extra-economic 
reasons,  obey  the market laws,  the  transport  market 
is  regarded  as  being  in  disequilibrium. e> 
Similarly,  in  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  the 
eight  fixed  price  controls  and  the  two price  bracket 
controls {
4
)  relate  mainly  to  transport  charges.  Our 
list  shows  only  three  other  products,  which  at  least 
originate in the agricultural sector.  All these controls 
are  based  on  the  view  widely  held  in  the  EEC 
countries  that the market mechanisms cannot operate 
in these sectors.  They therefore reflect  the deliberate 
renunciation of regulation by  the market mechanisms 
and  constitute an  element in  the market organisation 
policy  replacing  those  mechanisms. 
Whereas,  to  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  there  are 
manifestly  no fixed  price or price  bracket controls  in 
(I) Cf.  in this connection:  Krelle,  W.:  Preistheorie,  Tiibingen-
Ziirich,  1961, pp. 555  and foil.  and Schneider, E.:  Einfuhrung 
in  die  Wirtschaftstheorie,  Part  II,  Tiibingen,  1961,  pp.  312 
and  foil. 
(2)  Cf.  Annex,  p.  128. 
e)  Cf.  e.g.  Linden,  W.:  Grundzuge  der  Verkehrspolitik, 
Wiesbaden,  1961,  p.  19. 
(
4
)  Cf.  Annex,  p.  131. 
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France  and  Luxembourg,  the only  I tal ian  fixed  price 
control relates to pharmaceutical specialties;  similarly, 
the Netherlands use this method to control the price of 
building workers' housing and of agricultural products. 
As  already  pointed  out in  connection  with  controls 
in other countries, State action on  the price of medi-
caments  is  manifestly  justified  by  extra-economic 
motives.  But it is hard to understand why the priority 
attached to  objectives of public health should lead  to 
fixed  prices.  If the  absence  of patent protection  for 
medicaments  may,  to some  extent, impose fixed  price 
controls  in  Italy,  it would  certainly  seem  more  ap-
propriate  to  introduce  such  protection  and  to  make 
use  of  maximum  price  controls  to  prevent  adverse 
effects  on  the  pattern  of  inputs  and  the  qualitative 
development function.  The desirability of fixed  prices 
is equally questionable in the case of the Netherlands 
legislation  on  the  building  of  workers'  housing.  It 
is  true  that,  for  the  purposes  of  this  study,  it  is 
unnecessary  to inquire whether the protection of this 
part of the  Netherlands  building sector  against  com-
petition is  justified or not from  the overall economic 
point of view. 
(c)  With  regard  to  the  possible  international  effects 
of  fixed  price  and  price  bracket  controls,  it may  be 
noted  that,  in  principle,  they  are  additional  to  the 
effects  already inferred from  maximum  and minimum 
price  controls. 
The  concrete  consideration  of  the  controls  in  force 
may  disregard  the  controls  applicable  to  the  agricul-
tural  and  transport  sectors,  since  the  EEC Treaty in 
any  event  provides  for  a  common  policy  in  these 
sectors  which  has  already  been  defined-at any  rate 
as  to  its  starting points-or implemented.  Since  the 
fixing  of daily charges in Belgian hospitals has not the 
least importance for economic relations among Member 
States, we shall merely consider the Italian fixed price 
control for  pharmaceutical specialties  and  the Nether-
lands  control  of the building  of  workers'  housing. 
In both cases,  the  flow  of  products  among  Member 
States  may  theoretically  be  distorted  if  the  Italian 
medicament  producers  or  the  Netherlands  builders 
prefer to  supply foreign  markets  to the detriment of 
the  national  market when  the  fixed  price  is  too  low 
compared  with  the  price  on  external  markets;  thus, 
at  least  the  real  distribution  function  is  distorted on 
the integrated territory.  The minimum price element may  also prevent foreign sellers from profiting on the 
Italian  and  Netherlands  markets  from  any  possible 
cost  advantage.  In addition  to this  distortion of  the 
real  distribution function,  we should thus arrive  at a 
distortion  of  the  three  components  of the  allocation 
function. 
In practice, there is  no present reason to expect these 
effects  to any important extent from  the Italian price 
control for medicaments.  The export of Italian medic-
aments  to  the  other  EEC  countries  is  partly  con-
siderably  handicapped  by very  severe  import  restric-
tions (5); when import is possible, the imported prod-
ucts are generally subject to maximum price controls, 
which do not normally allow much higher profits than 
in  Italy.  The Italian minimum price control does  not 
hamper  imports  into  Italy,  since  Italian  prices  are 
generally  below  those  on  foreign  markets. 
This  state  of  affairs  is  essentially  explained  by  the 
absence,  so  frequently  deplored,  of  patent protection 
in Italy, which enables  the producers  of  that country 
to profit from the results  of foreign  research without 
incurring  any  cost.  Thus,  the  German  producers 
complain,  not  that  they  cannot  exploit  their  cost 
advantages on the Italian market as  a result of mini-
mum price controls, but that they cannot charge more 
for their products than the price of comparable Italian 
products.  In fact,  the Italian authorities go  so  far  as 
treating  as  "comparable  medicaments",  preparations 
with  an  allied  chemical  composition  or  the  same  or 
similar clinical  indication.  If distortions result in the 
market  mechanisms  in  the  integrated  territory,  they 
must  be  attributed  not  to the existence of the fixed 
price  control  but  to  its  abuse  or to  the  absence  of 
patent protection. 
The  importance  of  the  theoretically  possible  con-
sequences  of  the  Netherlands  fixed  price  control  for 
the construction of workers' housing  should similarly 
not be  exaggerated  at  the present  time.  In practice, 
even  if these  controls  fixed  the  price  at  a  relatively 
high  level,  compared  with  the  production  costs  of 
foreign  sellers (which is  hardly probable), the adverse 
effect  on  the  market  mechanisms  would  be  limited, 
since the export activity of house builders is  certainly 
not very substantial today. 
(5)  In France,  for  example,  the  "autorisation  de  debit"  (mar-
keting  licence)  also  required  for  foreign  products,  has  prac-
tically  the  same  effects  as  an  import  prohibition. 
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But since the importance-which we have assumed to 
be  slight-of the  two fixed  price  controls  may  vary, 
we  adopt  their  theoretically  possible  effects  as  the 
result of our analysis. 
Summary Table showing the possible effects of  national 
fixed  price  controls  on  the  functions  of the  market 
mechanisms. 
Functions  of market  mechanisms  Italy  Netherlands 
A  B 
A.  Effects  in  the  national  context 
closed  economy 
in  a 
I. Developp:tent function 
1.  quantitative  . 
2.  qualitative  - -
II.  Allocation  function 
3.  pattern of outputs 
4.  pattern of inputs  - -
5.  regional  pattern  . 
III.  Distribution function 
6.  monetary  - -
7.  real 
B.  Effects  in  the  context  of the  EEC in 
an  open  economy 
I. Development function 
1.  quantitative 
2.  qualitative 
II.  Allocation function 
3.  pattern of outputs  - -
4.  pattern of inputs  - -
5.  regional pattern  - -
III.  Distribution function 
6.  monetary 
7.  real  - -
Notes:  In considering the national context we have assumed  that the State 
deliberately wishes to withdraw the regulation of the volume of  supply 
and demand from the market mechanisms, while being interested in 
the production, at the lowest possible costs, of high quality products. 
The sign. therefore partly means that the effects are not important, in 
the light of the assumed objectives. 
A  =. pharmaceutical specialties, 
B  =workers' housing. PART  III 
ASSESSMENT  OF  EFFECTS CHAPTER  11 
INTRODUCTION 
The  effects  inferred  in  Part II as  tending  to  distort 
the  functions  of  the  market  mechanisms  may  result 
in loss  of productivity, growth and well-being for the 
economies  they  affect.  The level  of  productivity and 
of  growth  is  a decisive  factor  in  the  competitiveness 
of the various sectors in particular, and of the economy 
in  general.  If price  controls  involve  the  loss  of 
productivity  and  of  growth  they  thereby  prejudice 
competitiveness.  Such  effects  have  a  great  influence 
on the international competitive position mainly when 
they  affect  products  directly  and  indirectly  capable 
of  external  trade.  But,  owing  to  the  general  inter-
dependence  of  economic  processes,  similar  secondary 
effects  cannot  be  ruled  out  when  the  distortions, 
though  limited  to  goods  intended  for  the  internal 
market, are nevertheless on a large scale. 
Now,  the  possible  effects  indicated  can  naturally  be 
important for  the real economic  processes  only  when 
the conception of the economic order accepted in each 
case  assigns  the  regulation  function  primarily  to  the 
market mechanisms.  In the extreme case of a planned 
economy, adverse influences on the market mechanisms 
are  therefore  entirely  negligible,  since  these  mech-
anisms  have  no  role  to  play  in  the  regulation  of 
economic  processes.  Being  unable  to test the efficacy 
of  the different  economic  systems,  we have  to judge 
the  effects  in  the  light  of  the  accepted  idea  of  the 
economic system.  We say  that the effects  are "incon-
sistent  with  the  system"  when  the  distortions  are 
serious for the regulation function if the controls are 
applied  in  the conditions  we  assume. 
An  assessment  of  this  kind cannot be  made  without 
defining  the conceptions  of  the economic  system,  on 
the subject of which  a few preliminary remarks  must 
be  added  to those  already  made  in the general intro-
duction  to Part I. 
In no Member State of the European Community are 
all economic processes left exclusively to the regulation 
of  the market mechanisms.  Quite the contrary, dual 
principles  of  regulation  prevail everywhere,  in  other 
words, automatic regulation by the market and auton-
omous  regulation  by  economic  policy  coexist  and 
operate together.  While these two principles are often 
applied together, the primacy, in each case is generally 
accorded  to one  of  them.  Sectoral  disparities  in  the 
predominance  of  the  principles  of  regulation  appear 
quite clearly, which explains why economic science has 
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been  studying  them  for  a long  time.  In connection 
with  our  analysis  of  effects,  we  have  frequently 
referred  to exceptional  sectors  which  are  not subject 
to  the  primacy  of  the  market  mechanisms..  But  a 
survey of the overall economic policy  of the different 
States nevertheless indicates  that the dualism of regu-
lation principles is  apparent not only at sectoral level, 
but at overall level  for  the different  regulation  func-
tions connected with the fundamental problems listed 
in Part I, namely  development,  allocation  and  distri-
bution.  The dualism involved in a country's conception 
of the economic system can therefore be schematically 
represented as  follows: 
In this example,  sector 5 is  in no  way  subject to the 
market mechanisms,  and,  in  the  case  of  quantitative 
development, it is  autonomous regulation by economic 
policy which dominates in all sectors.  In addition, the 
pattern of outputs in sectors  1-3  and real distribution 
in sector 7 escape  regulation by  the market. 
It is impossible, within the scope of the present study, 
to present complete  and  detailed  conceptions  of  the 
economic system.  In the nature of things, our assess-
ment  must  be  more  modest.  As  we  have  already 
indicated in Part I, we merely intend to infer, on the 
basis of the consideration of post-War economic policy, 
what  are  the  regulation  functions  for  which,  under 
the national  conceptions  of  the economic  system,  the 
market  mechanisms  are  generally  accorded  primacy. 
Our  assessment  cannot  therefore  allow  for  sectoral 
differences.  Even  this  limitation  of  the  problem, 
strictly requires  special  work.  Our results  can  there-
fore  be regarded  only  as  a  first  attempt  along  these 
lines. 
To  prevent  any  misinterpretation,  we  would  recall 
once  again  that,  in  all  countries,  both  the  market 
mechanisms and economic policy affect all fundamental 
problems.  If, on  the  basis  of  the nature  and  extent 
of economic policy action, we try to infer a classifica-
tion of the principles of regulation, our inference will 
always  refer  to  the principle  which,  in our view,  is 
dominant.  If the primacy for a regulation function is 
assigned  to the market  mechanisms,  this  means  that 
they  are  relied  upon  in  principle,  economic  policy 
intervening only by reaction when they fail to function. 
In this  case,  any  adverse  effects  of price controls  on 
the regulation function of the market mechanisms  are 
very important, since, far from coming to the assistance Diagram: Schematic example of the dualism of dominant principles of regulation in a  country's  conception of the 
economic system 
Regulation functions 
1  2 
Development 
11111111111111  11111111111111 
1.  quantitative 
2.  qualitative 
Allocation 
3. pattern of outputs 
11111111111111  11111111111111 
4.  pattern of inputs 
5.  regional  pattern 
Distribution 
6.  monetary 
7.  real 
Blank rectangles:  automatic market regulation. 
Shaded rectangles: autonomous regulation by economic policy. 
of  automatism,  they  merely  hinder it more.  In con-
trast,  if economic  policy  seems  to  us  the  dominant 
instrument  of  regulation,  the  active  implementation 
of that policy will be characterised by a scepticism in 
principle  towards  regulation  by  the  market.  The 
existence of overall plans is  generally regarded as  the 
expression of such  scepticism. 
In this  case  a  distortion  of  functions  due  to  price 
controls can be regarded as  relatively negligible, since 
the State in  question  will  not hesitate  to counteract 
adverse tendencies by the increased use of instruments 
of economic policy. 
We shall  now start by  considering  the  national con-
ceptions of the economic system and inquiring whether 
the  controls  are  consistent  with  that  conception  in 
the light of the effects inferred in the national context. 
The country studies will always be conducted in three 
stages, as  follows. 
(a)  We shall  start with a  rapid review  of  economic 
policy  and  official  statements  on  the  conception  of 
the  economic  system.  It may  be  said  straight  away 
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that, in general,  the dominant  problems  of the early 
post-War years  in all  EEC  countries were  the recon-
struction of the economy, its reconversion to peacetime 
production and the war on unemployment.  The com-
mon characteristic of economic policy was the persist-
ence  of  extensive  rationing  and  the  conviction  that 
the automatism of the liberal market economy of the 
nineteenth  century,  uninfluenced  by  the  State,  was 
incapable on its own of solving the specific  post-War 
problems, any more than it was, in general, of solving 
the fundamental problems of the economy.  The evolu-
tion of  the price  policy  of  the different  countries  is 
therefore particularly interesting. 
(b)  The second  stage  sets  out what,  in our view,  is 
the  dominant  assignment,  under  present  conditions, 
of  the  regulation  functions  between  economic  policy 
and the market mechanisms.  It can be noted straight 
away  that, in general no country leaves  the responsi-
bility for monetary distribution to the market mecha-
nisms. Although the nature and extent of action in this 
field vary, we feel  justified in assigning this regulation 
function  to economic policy  in  all  countries.  On the other hand, real distribution is  primarily a matter for 
the market mechanisms, since  the natural distribution 
actions  of countries  are  of secondary  importance.  It 
should further be noted that there is, in all countries, 
a regulation  of  the  short  term  economic  situation in 
the matter of quantitative development.  But we shall 
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classify  this  regulation  function  only  after  the  long 
term effect on  quantitative development. 
(c)  The third stage will be to tabulate our assessment 
of  the  consistency  with  the  economic  system  of  the 
price controls in  force  in each  country. CHAPTER 12 
THE CONSISTENCY OF NATIONAL PRICE CONTROLS  WITH THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM 
1.  BELGIUM 
(a) The Act of 22 January 194  5, on economic offences 
("loi  ...  sur  la  repression  des  infractions  a la  regie-
mentation economique"), e) (Z) crystallising the exten-
sion  of the powers of the executive in the matter of 
economic controls, still forms  the basis of the Belgian 
price system.  This Outline Act empowers the Minister 
for Economic Affairs to fix  maximum prices and profit 
margins  for: 
"the  purchase  or  sale  of  products,  materials, 
commodities,  merchandise  and  livestock  and  for 
the offer, acceptance or performance of all services 
other  than  services  rendered  under  a  contract 
of  labour,  employment,  apprenticeship  or  do-
mestic  service". e) 
Subsequent judicial decisions have held that interven-
tion of  this  kind is  justified  whenever  the  economic 
interest of the country so  requires. 
Although  this  Act  gives  the  Government  very  wide 
powers  of  intervention,  Belgium  follows  a  relatively 
liberal conception of the economic system. (
4
) Economic 
action  by  the  State  should  essentially  be limited  to 
the  subsidiary  support  of  regulation  by  the  market. 
Since  the  Belgian  economy  suffered  relatively  little 
from the Second World War, it was possible to repeal 
earlier  than  in other countries  the measures  of  State 
control and direction imposed by reconstruction.  Bills 
for the nationalisation of the coalfields, the armaments 
industry, electricity and the banks were rejected.  The 
inflationary experience  of the years  1944-1948 led to 
priority being given  to price stability as  an objective 
of economic policy. (  5) 
(I) Cf.  Champaud,  C.  Part  I,  op.  cit.,  p.  22. 
(2)  Cf.  Moniteur  Belge,  Brussels,  for  the  following  dates:  25 
January 1945,  11  February 1945,  17  May  1945,  16  May  1946, 
23  June  1946,  18  February  1948. 
(l)  French  text  cited  from  Champaud,  C.,  Part  I,  op.  cit., 
p. 26. 
(
4
)  By  a "social pact" concluded towards  the end of the War, 
trade  unions  and employers'  associations  agreed,  in  particular 
on the post-War freedom of prices and supplies. Cf.  Duquesne 
de  la  Vinelle:  Les  traits  essentiels  de  la  politique  belge  de 
la  concurrence;  text  of  report  in:  Zijlstra,  J.:  Wirtschafts-
politik  ... ,  op.  cit.,  p.  8. 
(5)  The  extreme  sensitiveness  of  Belgian  economic  policy  to 
price  rises  is  understandable;  the  import  of  food  and  raw 
materials and the export of industrial products are vital, owing 
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Up to 1959, State economic policy  action was  mainly 
designed to combat inflationary tendencies.  This action 
was crowned with success,  since prices, on the whole, 
rose less than in other countries and the trade balance 
showed a surplus.  The instruments used  to maintain 
stability were  budget policy, (
6
)  fiscal  policy, C)  mon-
etary  and  credit  policy,  and  price  policy.  But  since 
the overall policy to combat strong upward tendencies 
was  too  timid,  or  maladjusted,  it  was  constantly 
necessary  to  resort  to  price  measures  not  simply  as 
instruments of  dissuasion, but as  veritable emergency 
brakes.  It is  true that the obvious and clumsy system 
of  maximum  prices  and  maximum  margins  was  in-
creasingly  replaced  by  the  more  elegant  system  of 
compulsory  reporting of price  increases,  accompanied 
by the right of veto. 
Since  the  stability  policy  constantly  affected  capital 
investments, (8)  the  period  1949-1959  was  marked 
by relatively slight development in Belgium compared 
with  its  EEC  partners,  a  development  which  even 
showed a negative  trend. (
9
)  This  unsatisfactory  situ-
ation led the Government to work out, in 1959, the 
legal basis for overall and regional "programming". eo) 
It was  expressly emphasized on this occasion that the 
formulation of economic programmes did not prejudice 
to  the  country's  small  area  and  dense  population  and  the 
narrowness  of  the  internal  market.  If exchange  rates  are 
fixed,  a  stronger  price  thrust  in  Belgium  than  among  its 
competitors  prejudices  the  competitiveness  of  the  exporting 
industry  and  therefore  the  essential  exports.  But,  in  its 
tum,  the  substantial  share  of  external  trade  in  the  national 
product  (about  40%)  means  that  even  a  slight  surplus  on 
the  balance  of payments  creates  a  strong  inflationary  pull on 
demand. 
(
6
)  Since  the  budget  deficit  was  large  and  constant,  the  tem-
porary  limitation  of  public  capital  expenditure  could  hardly 
have a decisive influence.  Cf.  on this  subject:  Morrissens, L.: 
Economic  Policy  in  Our  Time,  Vol.  III, op.  cit.,  p.  8. 
C)  Owing  to  the  marked  public  dislike  of  taxation,  the  at-
tempt has  sometimes been made  to reduce demand by heavier 
indirect  taxation,  while  endeavouring  by  tax  reliefs  and  sub-
sidies  to  keep  the  retail  price  index  stable,  in  view  of  its 
importance  for  the indexing of wages.  The last set of measures 
certainly helped  to moderate cost-push,  but it had an  encour-
aging  influence  on demand-pull. 
(
8
)  By  the limitation of public capital expenditure,  the restric-
tion  of  external  financing  possibilities  by  means  of  monetary 
and  credit  policy,  and  the  reduction  of  the  possibilities  of 
self-financing  as  a  result  of  price  ceilings. 
(
9
)  Cf.  Kleps,  Kh.:  Langfristige  Wirtschaftspolitik  in  West-
europa, Fribourg, 1966, pp. 116 and foiL 
(1°)  This  character  clearly  shows  that Belgium  does  not  con-
template  adopting  the  French  planning  formula. ) 
Belgium: Table of  major effects of  price controls on market mechanisms deemed important under the conception of the 
economic system. 
Conception  Costing  rules  Normal  Com- Maximum 
Regulation functions  of the econ- Prescribed  A  price  Price  pulsory  prices  omic  prices  rule  ticketing  price  B  system  a  b  reporting 
Development 
1.  quantitative 
11111111111111111  IIIIIIHIIIII  IIIHII
1
111HI  IIIIIIHIIIII  1111111·1111111  IIIIIIHIIIII  1111111·1111111 
2.  qualitative  - - -
Allocation 
3.  pattern of outputs  - - +  -
4.  pattern of inputs  - +  - - +  - -
5.  regional  pattern 
11111111111111111  1111111·1111111  1111·1111  1111·1111  1111111·1111111  1111111·1111111  1111111·1111111  1111111·1111111 
Distribution 
6.  monetary 
11111111111111111  IIIIIIHIIIII  Ill Hill 1111-1111  IIIIIIHIIIII IIIIIIHIIII  IIIIIIHIIIII  IIIIIIHIIIII 
7.  real 
Notes: 
Blank rectangles :  regulation by market mechanisms. 
Shaded rectangles: autonomous regulation by economic policy. 
A  =  price control of pharmaceutical specialties with a  foreign equivalent; 
a  =production costs of Belgian makers above the foreign price; 
b  =production costs of  Belgian makers well below the foreign price; 
-
B  =  ceiling on relative value of  mark-up on electrical household appliances and pharmaceutical  products. 
the  fundamental  liberalism  of  the  Belgian  economy 
and that its aim was simply to increase the transparency 
and  soundness  of  an  economic policy  consistent with 
the market laws,  so  as  to make  that market economy 
more effective. (
11
) 
The first  overall  plan for  the  period  1961-1965  was 
to contribute towards increased growth, better co-oper-
ation between  the  authorities  and  the private  sector 
and  a  reduction  in  State  intervention. e
2
)  The plan 
was  divided into  21  sectors  covering  all  branches  of 
the  economy. (
13
)  Although  the  quantitative  targets 
were not imperative for the private sector, the Govern-
ment  sought,  as  far  as  it could,  to  encourage  their 
achievement.  Not having any new instrument available 
(
11
)  Cf.  Van  Waterschoot,  J.:  Fiinf  Jahre Wirtschaftsprogram-
mierung in Belgien, Kieler V ortrage, New Series, No.  34, Kiel, 
1965,  p.  3.  e
2
)  Cf.  Kleps,  Kh.:  Langfriste ... ,  op.  cit.,  p.  127  and  132. 
(
13
)  Cf.  Carpreau,  R.:  Ziele  und  Instrumente  der  belgischen 
Wirtschaftspolitik,  Tiibingen,  1967,  p.  60. 
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for  this  purpose, (14)  it made  large  use  of  subsidised 
interest rates. 
In order  to  prepare  the  way  for  regional  program-
ming, es)  a  Regional  Development  Committee  was 
created in 1961, which has  since  formulated a series 
of  experimental  programmes  for  seriously  underde-
veloped  regions. 
The main  instrument  of  regional  policy,  in  addition 
to  State  guarantee,  is  also  subsidised  interest  rates. 
Price control has not so far been used for the purposes 
of  precise  planning  objectives.  It  remains  however, 
one  of  the  instruments  of  price  stabilisation  policy. 
The last price freeze  in the form of a general prohibi-
tion of all increases was in force from May to Septem-
e
4
)  C£.  Duquesne  de  la  Vinelle,  op.  cit.,  p.  10. 
(1
5
)  Cf.  on  this  subject:  Waterschoot,  J.:  Vers  une program-
mation  economique  regionale  en  Belgique;  in:  EEC  Commis-
sion:  La Politique Regionale dans  !a  CEE, Brussels, July, 1964, 
p.  92  and  foll. her  1966. e 6)  It was  pointed out when it was  intro-
duced that there was  no intention of neutralising the 
market mechanisms, but merely of combating a general 
rising  climate. (
17
)  The  extent  of  the  price  controls 
discussed  in  the  present  study  must  be  regarded  as 
normal. 
(b)  Quantitative  development  therefore  results  not 
only from a short term cyclical policy, but also,  since 
the  introduction  of  programming,  from  a  long  term 
growth  policy.  Qualitative  development  is  certainly 
the object-as in all countries-of general  encourage-
ment, particularly in the matter of vocational training, 
but, in detail,  State action  is  not decisive. 
With regard  to allocation,  it follows  from  the inten-
tions officially  expressed as  to the pattern of outputs, 
the  somewhat  slight  degree  of  articulation  of  pro-
gramming  and  the  extent  of  differentiated  sectoral 
measures  to  achieve  the  plan,  that  while  it  is  not 
immune from the effects of the plan, it should never-
theless  be primarily  regulated by the  market  mecha-
nisms.  While the regulation of the pattern of inputs 
is  also  a matter for  market automatism, the responsi-
bility for  the regional  pattern will  in future lie  with 
a regional programming policy. 
(c) If, in the following Table, we compare the possible 
effects of Belgian price controls, as  inferred in Part II, 
with the conception of the  economic system  outlined 
above,  it  will  be  seen  that,  with  the  exception  of 
compulsory  price  ticketing  at  the  retail  stage,  these 
controls  are  inconsistent  with  the  economic  system 
for  the  general  assignment  of  regulation  functions 
ruling  in  Belgium. 
2.  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC OF  GERMANY 
(a) The economic situation of West Germany, imme-
diately after the War, was  mainly marked by the loss 
of  territory,  the  division  of  the  country,  the  inflow 
of  refugees,  the  collapse  of  the  currency  and  the 
dismounting of production capacity. In such a precari-
ous  situation the Price Formation Act of 26 Novem-
ber  1936  (Preisbildungsgesetz)  and  the  Price  Freeze 
Order of the same date (Preisstoppverordnung) initial-
ly remained in force. 
('
6
)  Cf. Order:  Moniteur Belge,  11  May  1966;  repeal, Moniteur 
Belge,  6  September  1966. 
('
7
)  According  to Katona,  such  a prize  freeze  limited  in  time, 
when  the  psychological  climate  is  on  the  rise,  combats  not 
only  the  superficial  signs  of  inflation,  but one  of  its  causes, 
namely  the expectation of inflation.  Cf.  Katona, G.:  Das  Ver-
halten  der  Verbraucher  und  Unternehmer,  Tiibingen,  1960, 
p.  317. 
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The  introduction  of  an  economic  system  relying 
primarily  on  individual  action  was  undoubtedly  an 
act  of  extraordinary  courage,  but it could  count  on 
wide public support as  a result of the adverse experi-
ence  of  the  economy  of  constraint  under  the  Hitler 
regime. Basing himself on the theories and conceptions 
of the Freiburg school,  Muller-Armack, (1
8
)  above  all, 
developed  the  idea  of  a  "social  market  economy", 
which Erhard was  to establish on the political plane. 
Under  this  conception  the  contemplated  economic 
system in principle assigned the regulation of develop-
ment and allocation  to the market mechanisms,  while 
at the same time making the State responsible for the 
sound  functioning  of  these  mechanisms  (especially 
competition)  and  for  a  social  policy  modifying  the 
primary distribution of incomes.  The choice of instru-
ments  of economic  policy  was  based on  the criterion 
of consistency with the market, under which the only 
measures accepted  are  those "which do not eliminate 
the price mechanisms and the resulting self-regulation, 
but which  adapt  themselves  to  these  mechanisms  as 
new  'data'". e 9
) 
But since the market mechanisms  themselves are only 
instrumental in character (20)  this principle applies only 
when  those  mechanisms  function  or can  be made  to 
function  by  appropriate  measures.  The  intervention 
of  a price  control  is  therefore  not  ruled  out in  any 
form  and in  each  specific  case. (21)  Before  the begin-
ning  of  the liberalisation  corresponding  to  this  prin-
ciple,  the  price  controls  cited  above  were  replaced 
by the Prices Act of 10 April1948 (Preisgesetz) which 
although  presented  as  a  transitional  measure,  is  still 
in force  today.  Article  2  of  this  Act  empowers  the 
competent authorities: 
"to make Ordinances or Orders fixing or approv-
ing  prices,  rents,  premiums  on  leases,  charges 
and  other remuneration for goods  or services  of 
('
8
)  Cf.  on this  subject,  the collected  articles:  Muller-Armack, 
A.:  Wirtschaftsordnung  und Wirtschaftspolitik, Freiburg 1966. 
('
9
)  Ropke,  W.:  Die  Gesellschaftskrisis  der  Gegenwart,  5th 
edition, Erlenbach-Ziirich, 1948, p. 259.  On the problems rais-
ed by consistency with the market, cf.:  Watrin, Ch.:  Zur Dis-
kussion  um  das  Problem  der  Marktkonformitiit;  in:  Wirt-
schaftspolitische  Chronik,  1957,  pp.  47  and  foiL,  and  Tucht-
feldt,  E.:  Zur  Frage  der  Systemkonformitiit  wirtschaftspoliti-
scher  Massnahmen,  SdVfS,  New Series,  Vol.  18,  ed.  Seraphin, 
H.-].,  Berlin,  1960,  pp.  203  and  foll. 
(2°)  Cf.  Muller-Armack,  A.:  Wirtschaftslenkung  und  Markt-
wirtschaft,  reproduced  in:  Wirtschaftsordnung ... ,  op.  cit.,  p. 
106. 
(2
1
)  Muller-Armack,  in  the  article  cited  in  (') above,  also  de-
votes  a  special  section  to possible  government  intervention  in 
price  policy  (cf.  p.  120  and  foll.}.  A  recent  proposal  by  Mr. 
Gunther,  President  of  the  Federal  Cartel  Office,  has  caused 
some  sensation:  Mr  Gunther  thinks  that  in the event  of  an 
abusive  price  policy  followed  by  a  group  of  oligopolists, 
among  whom  there  is  no real  competition,  it would be sound 
temporarily  to  prohibit  all  price  increases  not  warranted  by 
cost variations.  C£.  Gunther, E.:  Preispolitik und kartellrecht-
liche  Gesichtspunkte;  in:  Wirtschaft  im  Wandel  (ed.  Stackel-
berg,  K.-G.  von)  DUsseldorf-Vienna,  1967,  p.  53. any  kind,  other  than wages,  or for  the  purpose 
of maintaining the price level". e
2
) 
According  to a later  judgment of the Federal Consti-
tutional  Court, {
23
)  Article  2  is  designed  purely  to 
ensure  the  normal  state  of  the  economy  and  cannot 
be applied  to change  the economic system. 
The social  market economy found  its first  application 
in the monetary reform of 20 June 1948 and the Price 
Liberalisation Decree of 24 June 1948 (Preisfreigabe-
Verordnung) which repealed about 90% of direct price 
controls. e
4
) 
The  wage  freeze  was  abolished  in  November  1948 
and  the  dividend  freeze  in  December  1952  and  the 
heavy industries which were still subject to regulation 
by  the  central  authorities,  together  with  the  capital 
market and external trade were progressively restored 
to  the  operation  of  the  market  laws.  To  overcome 
any  obstacles  which  the  private  sector  might  place 
in  the way  of  the functioning  of  the market mecha-
nisms,  an  Act  was  passed  in  1957  against  restraints 
on  competition;  it  was  based  on  the  principle  that 
competition  is  not  an  end  in  itself  but a  means  of 
encouraging  progress  and  increasing  production. (
25
) 
The last  major  measure  of liberalisation was  the ter-
mination, with effect from  1 April 1967, of the fixing 
of  interest  rates  by  the  State.  Only  the  sectors  of 
agriculture,  transport,  fuel  and  power  and  housing 
have  not  yet  been  entirely  restored  to  competition; 
it  is  in  these  sectors  that  provisions  for  the  direct 
control  of  price  levels  are  still  to  be  found.  Price 
control is  therefore not regarded  as  an  instrument of 
price  policy  and  has  therefore  not  been  used  as  a 
weapon against rising trends.  Cyclical action has been 
taken almost exclusively by the Federal Central Bank, 
the Bundesbank,  through monetary  and credit policy. 
If the  results  of  this  policy  were  already  somewhat 
unsatisfactory during the boom period, action limited 
to these means during the depression would inevitably 
have  been  a  complete  failure.  That is  why  the  Act 
for  the  encouragement  of  stability  and  economic 
growth (Gesetz zur Forderung  der Stabilitat und des 
Wachstum der Wirtschaft) came  into force on 9 June 
196  7, described by Mr Schiller, Minister for Economic 
Affairs  as  "the  fundamental  law  of  the  economy" 
(,Grundordnungsgesetz  der  Wirtschaft") e 6)  and  re-
(2
2
)  Cited  from  Champaud,  C.,  op.  cit.,  Part  I,  p.  13. 
(23)  Judgment  of  12  November  1958,  reproduced  in  NJW 
1959,  475. 
(2
4
)  For  fuller  detail,  see:  Besters,  H.:  Economic  Policy  in 
Western Germany,  1949 to 1961;  in:  Economic Policy in  Our 
Time,  Vol.  III, op.  cit.,  pp.  389  and  foll.;  also,  Kleps,  Kh.: 
Langfristige  Wirtschaftspolitik  ... ,  op.  cit.,  pp.  293  and  foll. 
(25)  Cf.  Explanatory Memorandum to the Act against Restraints 
on Competition in Verhandlungen  des  Deutschen Bundestages, 
2 Wahlperiode, Anlage zu den stenographischen Berichten, Vol. 
33,  Bonn,  1954/55, printed paper No.  1158,  p.  21. 
(2
6
)  Schiller, K.:  Der Wettbewerb muss noch intensiver werden; 
in:  Zehn Jahre  Kartellgesetz, special number of Industriekurier 
of  30  December  1967,  p.  25. 
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quiring  the  Federal  Government  and  the  Lander  to 
use  their budgetary and fiscal  policies  as  instruments 
of  an  overall  cyclical  policy. 
(b) In spite of all the criticisms, justifiable in economic 
theory,  against  certain  specific  measures {
27
)  the  pre-
dominance  of  the market  mechanisms  for  most  regu-
lation functions cannot be seriously challenged.  With 
regard  to  quantitative development,  there is  no long 
term  growth policy.  The five-year  financial  planning 
of  the  Federal  Government  and  the  Lander,  rec-
ommended by Articles 9-11 of the Stability Act, serves 
not  to  guide  the  trend  of  growth,  but  merely  to 
contain  the  variations  in  this  trend  which  may  be 
caused  by  demand.  Qualitative  development  is  no 
doubt  favoured  by  isolated  measures,  but,  for  the 
rest, the initiative lies with enterprises; in consequence, 
here,  too,  it  is  the  market  mechanisms  which  are 
dominant. 
With regard  to  the  regulation of  the pattern of  out-
puts,  there  is  no  State  action  designed  to  influence 
the direction  of  structural changes.  Even  the  "Prin-
ciples  of  Sectoral  Structural Policy"  (  Grundsatze der 
sektoralen  Strukturpolitik) es) issued  in  1966 by  the 
Federal Minister for Economic Affairs leave it in prin-
ciple  to  enterprises  to  detect  structural  changes  in 
good  time  and  to  fall  into line  with  them. {
29
)  The 
structural  policy  of  the  State  is  simply  designed  to 
facilitate, in supplementary fashion, structural changes, 
on  the  principle  of  "helping  those  who  help  them-
selves" (Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe ). Similarly, the regulation 
of the pattern of inputs is  left entirely to the market 
mechanisms.  At the present time, the Working Party 
on Competition  (Arbeitsgruppe  W ettbewerb)  set  up 
inside  the  Federal  Ministry  for  Economic  Affairs  is 
confining itself to considering whether the competition 
policy  so  far  followed  has  had  any  undesired  and 
adverse  effect  on  this  regulation  mechanism. 
Regional policy is largely a matter for the Lander, { 30) 
whose  action  is  partly  based  on  subsidised  interest 
rates and  soft loans. 
Since  the overall effect  of these measures is  relatively; 
limited,  and  since  there  is  no  co-ordination  for  the 
whole of the Federal territory, the market mechanisms 
(2
7
)  C£.  e.g.  Kleps,  Kh.:  Zur Konkurrenz  wirtschaftspolitischer 
Konzeptionen in der Europaischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, in: 
Ordo, Vol.  XV /XVI,  1965, pp.  281  and  foil. 
(2
8
)  Published  in  BA  No.  219  of  24  November  1966,  re-
produced in WuW,  17th year,  1967,  pp.  97  and  foil. 
(
29
)  Cf.  ibid.,  p.  199. 
(
30
)  Cf.  also  for  the  assignment  of  competences;  Weller,  F.: 
W irtschaftspolitik  und foderativer  Staatsaufbau  in  der Bundes-
republik Deutschland, Study Papers of the Adolf-Weber Found-
ation,  Vol.  2.  Berlin,  1967,  pp.  36  and  foiL  And  for  the 
regional  policy  of  the  Federal  Government:  Langer,  W.:  Die 
Politik  der  Deutschen  Bundesregierung  auf  dem  Gebiet  der 
Regionalstruktur; in:  EEC Commission:  La politique regionale 
dans  la  CEE,  op.  cit.,  pp.  87  and  foiL Federal Republic of Germany: Table of  major effects of  price controls on market mechanisms deemed important under 
the conception of the economic system. 
Conception 
Prescribed 
Prohibition  of  prices  Rebate  Price  Maximum 
Regulation functions  of  the  eco- discrimin- prices 
nomic  system  atory practices  controls  ticketing  A  a  b 
---------
Development 
1.  quantitative  + 
r~--~  ~lfl  ------------ -----
,. ~.  qualitati~e:  ~  - +  + 
-------
Allocation 
3.  pattern of outputs  - +  + 
------
4.  pattern of inputs  - +  +  +  -
t._:j 
5.  regional  pattern 
--------
Distribution 
6.  monetary 
11111111111111111111111  Ill Hill H  lllllllll+llllllllllillllllllll+lllllllll  1111111111+111111111  IIIIIIIIIHIIIIIIII 
7.  real  + 
I 
Notes: 
Blank rectangles:  regulation by market mechanisms. 
Shaded rectangles: autonomous regulation by economic policy. 
A  ceiling on relative  value  of mark-up on pharmaceutical products and on architects'  fees; 
a  =legitimate prescribed prices for branded goods; 
b  =  prohibition of prescribed prices. 
are  also  dominant  in  the  regulation  of  the  regional 
pattern. 
(c)  The  comparison  (see  Table  below)  between  the 
conception of the economic system set out above  and 
the possible  effects  of  German  price  controls  shows 
that  only  legitimate  price  agreements  for  branded 
goods,  and  the ceilings  for  mark-up on medicaments 
and for architects' fees  can be regarded as  inconsistent 
with  the  system  for  the  assignment  of  regulation 
functions  applicable  in the Federal Republic  of  Ger-
many.  But it must not be forgotten  that the adverse 
effects  of  prescribed  prices  and  the  nature  of  the 
system  of  architects'  fees  have  also  been  recognised 
by  the Federal  Government  and  that  their  abolition 
or  modification  has  already  been  contemplated. el) 
(l
1
)  Cf.  Schiller,  K.:  Der  Wettbewerb  muss  noch  intensiver 
werden,  op.  cit.,  p.  25  and  Hochstpreisregelung  fur  Archi-
tekten;  in:  PAZ  of  22  March  1967. 
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3.  FRANCE 
(a)  In the light of experience of  the market economy 
in the between-War years  and of a  long  tradition of 
centralisation, C
2
)  there  was  a  general  conviction  in 
France,  towards  the  end  of  the  conflict,  that  the 
responsibility  for  economic  initiative  could  only  be 
assumed  by  the  State.  By  means  of  a  considerably 
extended public  sector,  economic  planning extending 
over periods of several years, and instruments of policy 
for  the  phasing  of  programmed  action,  the  State,  it 
was  thought,  should  guide  private  economic  activity 
towards  the  achievement  of  overall  economic  objec-
tives. 
(l
2
)  Cf.  in  this  connection:  Hoselitz,  B.  F.:  Entrepreneurship 
and  Capital  Formation  in France  and  Britain  since  1700;  in: 
Capital  Formation  and  Economic Growth, (ed) NBER, Prince-
ton,  1955,  especially  page  336. Its competence in the matter of prices is derived from 
Ordinances  No.  45.1483 (33)  and  No.  45.1484  of  30 
June  1945,  together  known  as  "the  Price  Charter" 
(charte  des  prix).  In spite of many  amendments  and 
additions (
34
)  these  enactments  are  still  the  basis  of 
French price law.  The Charter empowers the govern-
ment  to control  the  prices  of  all  goods  and  services 
by any appropriate means.  Since then, this power has 
been constantly used.  Starting in 194  7, the economic 
evolution of France has  been more  and more  subject 
to  the  decisive  influence  of  Plans  and  the  measures 
taken  to implement  therri, es)  measures  to which we 
can do no  more  than allude here. eu) 
The  main  object  of  the First  Plan  (1947-1952)  was 
to direct the greatest possible volume of capital invest-
ment  towards  the  basic  sectors  (fuel  and  power, 
transport,  iron  and  steel,  cement  and  agricultural 
machinery) where bottlenecks had been found in 1946. 
Economic policy made use of quotas, price fixing,  and 
investment control, as well as protectionism with a view 
to  central  market  regulation. e 7)  Price  control,  orig-
inally  relaxed in  1949, had  to be tightened up  again 
in  1950 following  the outbreak of hitherto contained 
inflation. es)  The  Second  Plan  (1954-1957)  already 
extended  to  the  whole  of  the  production  of  goods, 
thus covering two-thirds of aggregate investments. (39 ) 
The  objectives,  in  addition  to  the  development  of 
scientific and technical research, included the diffusion 
of  modern  production  methods,  the  adaptation  and 
specialisation of enterprises, the encouragement of the 
planning  spirit  and  the  competitive  spirit. (40)  This 
C
3
)  Cf.  the partial reproduction of  the text in Ulmer, E.  (ed): 
Das  Recht des unlauteren W ettbewerbs in den Mittgliedstaaten 
der  Europliischen  Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft,  Vol.  IV;  Krasser, 
R.:  Frankreich, Munich-Cologne,  1966,  pp.  605  and  fall. 
(l
4
)  Cf.  Champaud,  C.,  Part  I,  op.  cit.,  p.  27. 
(l
5
)  But  Plan  and  economic  policy  have  not always  been  con-
sistent.  Measures  of  application  with  short  term  aims,  often 
inconsistent  with  the  objectives  of  the  Plan,  have  to  some 
extent prejudiced  their  achievement.  Cf.  Rhein,  E.:  Moglich-
keiten  und  Probleme  staatlicher  Investitionsplanung  in  der 
Marktwirtschaft,  Cologne  and  Opladen,  1960,  p.  22. 
(
36
)  See,  in particular,  from  a  very  full  bibliography:  Muller-
Ohlsen,  L.:  Wirtschaftsplanung  und  Wirtschaftswachstum  in 
Frankreich,  Ti.i.bingen,  19'67;  Kleps,  Kh.:  Langfristige  Wirt-
schaftspolitik  ... , op.  cit., pp. 69  and foil.;  Benard, J.:  Economic 
Policy  in  France,  1949  to  1961;  in:  Economic  Policy  in Our 
Time,  op.  cit.,  pp.  287  and  foil.;  Sheahan,  J.:  Promotion 
and Control of Industry in Postwar France,  Cambridge, Mass., 
1963;  Rhein,  E.:  Moglichkeiten ... ,  op.  cit. 
(l
7
)  Cf.  Kleps,  Kh.:  Wirtschaftsplanung  in  Frankreich;  in: 
HJB,  8th  year,  1963,  pp.  37  and  foil. 
(3
8
)  Price controls in particular kept the prices of the products 
of  the  basic  industries  at  a  low  level.  The  prices  of  the 
sectors  of activity down the  line  remaining free,  the industries 
in  question  were  able  to make  exceptional  profits,  which  en-
couraged  the  maintenance  of  unproductive  methods  in  those 
sectors.  Cf.  on  this  subject:  Rhein,  E.:  Moglichkeiten ... ,  op. 
cit.,  pp.  26  and  foiL  and  Sheahan,  J.:  Promotion ... ,  op.  cit., 
p.  223. 
(3
9
)  Cf.  Kleps,  Kh.:  Wirtschaftsplanung  ... , op.  cit.,  p.  51,  note 
36. 
(
40
)  Cf. Bauchet, P.:  La planification franfaise.  Quinze ans d'ex-
perience.  Paris,  1962,  p.  84. 
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apparently  paradoxical  combination  of  objectives  al-
ready indicates  that the functions  assigned  to compe-
tition and  the market mechanisms  were very limited. 
The Third Plan (1958-1961) for the first time attempt-
ed  orientation  towards  long  term  development  and 
consistency  between  the  objectives  of  the  Plan,  the 
national  accounts  and  public  finance.  The  scope  of 
the Plan was  extended  to commerce,  handicrafts  and 
town  planning.  The  investment  plan  was  thus  con-
verted into  an  overall  plan,  whose  detailed  forecasts 
by  branches  indicated  the  growth  prospects  in  all 
fields. 
The  economic  policy  of  this  period  was  marked  by 
the progressive  changeover  from  direct  market  regu-
lation to indirect action on  the market. 
But, as  a result of failure to eliminate excess demand, 
it was necessary to fight price rises in 1954, 1956 and 
1957,  by  a  general  price  freeze. (
41
)  With  the  de-
flationary  measures  proposed  by  Mr  Rueff  and  Mr 
Armand, a price policy was finally followed in 1958-60 
which  attacked  the  cause,  i.e.  excess  demand.  The 
proposals made were designed, in particular, to restore 
the regulatory function  of prices.  With the abolition 
of  some  hundred  price  controls (42 )  the  liberalisation 
movement  reached  its  peak  in  1961. 
During the period of the IVth Plan  (1962-1965), not 
only  the setting  of growth rates,  but also  the listing 
of measures  to be taken by enterprises and/  or by the 
State to implement the  Plan formed  an  integral part 
of  planning.  The  sectoral  breakdown  sometimes  in-
cluded such  combinations  of  targets  and  means  even 
for  particular products  and  services. (
43
)  This  system-
atic  action  on  sectoral  structures  gave  the  program-
ming  aspect  precedence  over  the  forecasting  aspect 
of the Plan. 
But  economic  policy  did  not  succeed  in  orienting 
incomes in line with the Plan. (44)  Faced with a speed-
up  in  the  price  thrust,  the  Government  reacted  in 
Autumn  1962  by  the Giscard  d'Estaing  Stabilisation 
Plan, which reintroduced, in particular, a general freeze 
(
41
)  The resulting  decline  in profits  made  it more  difficult,  in 
particular,  to  extend  the  equipment  of  the  mechanical  and 
electrical engineering industries.  The desire  to eliminate  these 
bottlenecks by means  of imports contributed to the substantial 
balance-of-payments  deficit  of  1956-57.  Cf.  Sheahan,  J.:  Pro-
motion  ... ,  op.  cit.,  p.  224. 
(
42
)  Cf.  Bulletin  officiel  des  prix,  31  April  1961. 
(
43
)  Cf.  Commissariat  General  du  Plan:  Quatrieme  Plan  de 
developpement  economique  et social,  1962-1965  (Act  No.  62-
900  of 4 August  1962,  in:  Journal  officiel  of  7 August  1962) 
Paris,  1962,  pp.  315  and  foil. 
( 44 )  During the first  two years, the disposable income of house-
holds  grew  twice  as  fast  as  the  volume  of  production.  Cf. 
Balassa, B.:  Whither French Planning? in:  QJE, Vol.  LXXXIV, 
1965,  p.  548. of  prices  and  margins. (45)  Some  major  elements  in 
this  freeze  are  still  applicable  in  principle  today  and 
are  to  be  found  in  the  long  list  annexed  to  this 
document.  In order  to  make  the  price  freeze  more 
flexible,  entrepreneurs  were  given  the  facility,  after 
March  1965,  of  regaining  limited  price  freedom  by 
signing  "stability contracts".  On the whole,  the eco-
nomic  policy  of  this  period  was  marked  by  further 
reinforcement  of State intervention. 
Since its main objective was  to improve the economic 
structure while maintaining  the  stability  of  the price 
level,  the  Vth  Plan  (1966-1970)  laid  the  stress  on 
incomes policy,  the encouragement of investment and 
aid  in  the  regrouping  of  enterprises.  Although  the 
Plan itself includes no targets in volume by branches, 
the sectoral breakdown is  given in  annex.  Convinced 
that  international  competitiveness  increases  with  the 
dimensions  of enterprises,  the State also  acts  on  the 
pattern of inputs in certain sectors.  But, according to 
Molsberger, (46)  the  encouragement  of  the regrouping 
of enterprises is explained not by the desire to improve 
productivity, but also partly by the desire  to enhance 
the country's prestige and by the fact that co-operation 
between the State and  the private sector in preparing 
and executing the Plan is  all  the easier, the fewer the 
autonomous production units. 
General  economic  planning  is  completed  by  setting 
regional  development  targets. (47) 
Mr Debre's economic policy has  pursued the achieve-
ment of  the objectives  of  the Plan more  ambitiously 
than  ever.  The  reinforcement  of  the  tendency  to 
concentration  should  be  supported  by  financial  aids, 
government contracts and  the relaxation of price con-
trols  through  contractual  exceptions.  The  existing 
price  supervision  should  continue  in  force  at  least 
until the  end  of  the  Vth Plan. (48 )  Price  freedom  is 
the exception and requires the special approval of the 
authorities.  In order  still  further  to  relax  the  price 
freeze  the  "programme  contract"  was  introduced  in 
March  1966. 
This  survey  clearly  shows  that  French  planning  has 
evolved since  1947 from  an  originally limited invest-
ment  programme  to  become  an  economic  planning 
affecting every economic and social activity, for which 
the name  of  "concerted economy"  (  economie  cancer-
tee)  has  been  invented.  No  doubt  people  are  not 
(
45
}  Cf.  in  this  connection,  Dieterlen,  P.:  Stabilisierungsplan 
und  Einkommenspolitik  in  Frankreich  (Kieler  Vortrage,  New 
Series,  31,  ed.  Schneider,  E.) Kiel,  1964. 
(
46
)  Cf.  Molsberger,  J.:  Konzentration,  Gemeinsamer  Markt, 
und  Planification;  in:  WChr  1966.  Miscellany;  A.  Muller-
Armack,  pp.  210  and  foiL 
(
47
}  On overall  regional  policy  in  France,  cf.:  Weinstock,  U.: 
Regionale  Wirtschaftspolitik  in  Frankreich,  Hamburg,  1968. 
(
48
}  Cf.  ,Verstarkter Preisdirigismus  in Frankreich";  in:  Han-
delsblatt,  15  March  1966. 
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compelled  to  act  in  conformity  with  the  Plan,  but 
merely encouraged to do  so. 
If  the Plan is no longer described today as "indicative" 
or as  an "instrument for  the orientation of the econ-
omy", (49)  but as  "active planning" (
50
)  this  expresses 
the determination of the State "to regularise the flow 
of economic life, and finally  to orient it in a direction 
different from  that which it would have  taken if left 
to itself". (51 ) 
(b) As  an instrument for the regulation of the French 
economy, the market mechanisms play only a secondary 
role. (52)  The dangers  for  competition among  French 
producers  resulting  from  the  co-operation  of  enter-
prises in the modernisation commissions (
53
)  and from 
the encouragement of concentration, are therefore re-
garded as  negligible. To an increasing extent, competi-
tion in France  is  interpreted  solely  as  international 
competition.  With regard to the assignment of regu-
lation functions, it may be noted that quantitative de-
velopment is  subject not only  to government cyclical 
control, but above all to long term planning.  Similarly, 
qualitative development is  the subject, from the point 
of view of organisation (54)  and financing,  of substan-
tial  State  encouragement; (55 )  but  there  can  be  no 
doubt that this development is  not yet predominantly 
regulated  by  economic  policy.  But  as  various  signs 
seem  to  indicate  that  the  State  will  intervene  even 
much more substantially in this field,  we nevertheless 
take the risk  of assigning  this  regulation  function  to 
economic  policy. 
The articulation of the Plan and the large  number of 
measures taken to implement it (56)  leave no room for 
doubt that the regulation of the pattern of outputs is 
(
49
)  Cf.  Article  2  of  the Act  on  the  lind Plan. 
(5°)  Cf.  Masse,  P.:  Preface  to Perroux,  F.:  Le IVe  Plan  fran-
t;ais  (1962-1965)  (Que sais-je ?),  Paris,  1963. 
e')  Cazes,  B.:  Logique  et finalite  du  Plan  frant;ais,  stencilled, 
p.  2;  cited  from  Kugler,  K.  F.:  Entstehung,  Hauptprobleme 
und  Grundsi:itzliches  zur  T echnik  der  Planifikation  unter  be-
sonderer  Beriicksichtigung  Frankreichs;  in:  Fikentscher-Hoff-
man-Kugler:  Rechtsfragen  der  Planifikation,  Stuttgart,  1967, 
p. 7. 
(5
2
)  Cf.  Houssiaux,  J.:  Les  tendances  d'evolution  de  la  poli-
tique economique  en  France,  leurs  incidences  sur  la  politique 
de  la  concurrence;  contents  of  paper  in;  Zijlstra,  J.:  Wirt-
schaftspolitik  und Wettbewerbs  problematik,  op.  cit.,  p.  15. 
(5
3
)  Cf.  Giersch,  H.:  Aufgaben  der  Strukturpolitik;  in:  HJB, 
9th year,  1964, p.  88. 
(
54
}  E.g.,  as  part  of  such  measures,  the  creation  in  1968  of 
the  National  Foundation  for  Education  in  Business  Manage-
ment  and  the  National  Information  Centre  for  Business  Pro-
ductivity.  Cf.:  ,Staatliche Forderung in Frankreich",  in  Han-
delsblatt,  6 March  1968,  p.  6. 
es)  An  influence  is  thus  exercised  on  the  tendency  to  quali-
tative  improvement  when  enterprises  have  to  undertake,  in 
increasingly  numerous  programme  contracts,  to  keep  in  the 
forefront of technical progress and to report to the authorities, 
in  order  to obtain  a  modest  price  freedom. 
(
56
)  The main  ones  are  cited  in:  Kugler,  K.  F.:  Entstehung  ... , 
op.  cit.,  p.  18. F
r
a
n
c
e
:
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
o
f
 
m
a
j
o
r
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
f
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
 
o
n
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
m
e
c
h
a
n
i
s
m
s
 
d
e
e
m
e
d
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
 
u
n
d
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
n
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
.
 
C
o
n
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
 
P
r
e
s
c
r
i
b
e
d
 
j
 
R
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
p
r
i
c
e
"
 
I
 
S
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
 
A
 
B
 
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
·
1
1
1
1
 
1
.
 
q
u
a
n
t
i
t
a
t
i
v
e
 
2
.
 
q
u
a
l
i
t
a
t
i
v
e
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
I
I
I
H
I
I
 
A
l
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
I
 
3
.
 
p
a
t
t
e
r
n
 
o
f
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
s
 
l
l
m
l
_
l
l
l
l
·
l
l
l
l
 
4
.
 
p
a
t
t
e
r
n
 
o
f
 
i
n
p
u
t
s
 
5
.
 
r
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
 
p
a
t
t
e
r
n
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
D
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
6
.
 
m
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
7
.
 
r
e
a
l
 
N
o
t
e
s
;
 
A
 
=
 
e
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
s
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
h
i
b
i
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
p
r
e
s
c
r
i
b
e
d
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
,
 
B
 
=
 
p
r
o
h
i
b
i
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
p
r
e
s
c
r
i
b
e
d
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
,
 
C
 
=
 
p
r
o
h
i
b
i
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
s
a
l
e
 
b
e
l
o
w
 
c
o
s
t
,
 
D
 
=
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
r
a
n
g
e
 
a
n
d
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
,
 
a
 
=
 
t
e
n
d
e
n
c
y
 
t
o
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
 
n
e
w
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
m
e
t
h
o
d
s
 
t
o
 
r
e
d
u
c
e
 
c
o
s
t
s
,
 
b
 
=
 
p
o
s
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
(
a
)
 
a
n
d
 
o
f
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
i
n
g
 
n
e
w
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
.
 
+
 
[
i
l
l
 
I
l
l
 
H
i
l
l
 
1
1
1
1
·
1
1
1
1
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
I
I
H
I
I
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
I
I
I
H
I
I
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
+
 
+
 
u
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
·
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
I
I
I
H
I
I
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
+
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
P
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
 
P
r
o
h
i
b
i
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
C
o
s
t
i
n
g
 
r
u
l
e
s
:
 
P
r
i
c
e
 
C
o
m
p
u
b
o
c
y
 
I
 
M
o
x
l
l
n
w
n
 
d
i
s
c
r
i
m
i
n
a
t
o
r
y
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
 
t
i
c
k
e
t
i
n
g
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
i
n
g
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
s
 
c
 
I
 
D
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
H
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
 
1
1
1
1
·
1
1
1
1
 
1
1
1
1
-
1
1
1
1
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
·
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
1
1
1
1
-
1
1
1
1
 
1
1
1
1
·
1
1
1
1
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
·
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
·
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
!
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
+
1
~
1
1
1
1
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
I
I
I
H
I
I
 
1
1
1
1
-
1
1
1
1
·
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
+
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
+
 
-
+
 
+
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
·
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
·
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
1
1
1
1
·
1
1
1
1
 
1
1
1
1
·
1
1
1
1
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
·
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
·
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
·
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
·
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
H
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
I
I
I
H
I
I
 
I
I
I
H
I
I
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
+
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
H
I
I
I
I
I
\
1
1
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
+
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 essentially within the competence of economic policy. 
Before the encouragement of the regrouping of enter-
prises  figured  among  the  main  objectives  of the Vth 
Plan,  the  regulation  of  the  pattern  of  inputs  could 
have  been  considered  as  left  almost  entirely  to  the 
market mechanisms.  Although  this  has  now become 
questionable  for  productive  enterprises-at any  rate 
for the future-we prefer to accept it for the purposes 
of our study, since aid to concentration in the private 
sector has not yet reached any large overall dimensions 
and the regulation of the factors of production remains 
dominated  by  the  market  mechanisms.  But  the  re-
gional  pattern  is  primarily  regulated  by  economic 
policy,  particularly since  the V  th Plan. 
(c)  The comparison made in  the following  Table  be-
tween  the  conception  of  the  economic  system  just 
described  and the effect  of price controls,  shows  that 
French  legislation  can,  on  the  whole,  be  said  to be 
consistent  with the  system  in the general  assignment 
of regulation functions.  It is  only  in the case  of the 
general  prohibition  of  discriminatory  prices  that  we 
have  inferred  in  Part  II  an  adverse  effect  on  the 
pattern of  inputs.  But  as  this  effect  can  occur  only 
if  price  formation  is  free,  the  adverse  tendency  is, 
on the whole, insignificant.  Furthermore, in view of 
the fact  that stability contracts, programme contracts 
and the prohibition of discriminatory prices may have 
adverse  effects  on qualitative development,  some  res-
ervations must be expressed.  If, however, State activ-
ities  increase  in  this  field,  these  reservations  will 
become  largely  pointless. 
4.  ITALY 
(a) At the end of the War, Italian economic policy was 
particularly concerned to eliminate  the sequels  of the 
Fascist policy of autarky and to overcome the disparity 
between the development of the industrial North and 
the agricultural South.  This policy had to take account 
of  mediocre  natural  resources,  low  productivity,  an 
unsatisfactory  rate  of  savings  and  a  balance-of-pay-
ments  deficit. (57)  Like  other countries,  Italy had  to 
choose between centralised State direction of the econ-
omy  and a transformed market economy.  The delib-
erate  option  was  made  in  favour  of  the  market 
economy.  Under  the  Constitution  of  22  December, 
1947, the Italian economy  is  based  on  private enter-
prise  and  private  property,  provided  that  they  fulfil 
social  functions. (58) 
(
57
)  Cf.  on  the  starting  situation  and  policy:  Tosco  E.: 
Economic  Policy  in Italy,  1949  to 1961;  in:  Economic  Policy 
in  Our Time,  op.  cit., pp.  138  and foil. 
es)  Cf.  Bernini,  G.:  Sur  le  role  de  la  politique  de  concur-
rence  en  Italie,  contents of report in:  Zijlstra, }.:  Wirtschafts-
politik  ... , op  cit.,  p.  19. 
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As  types of State intervention to complete and orient 
private economic activity, the Legislature cites nation-
alisation  and  planning,  while  giving  priority  to  the 
direct  State  management  of  enterprises. (
59
) 
Furthermore, the already  considerable State participa-
tion in the economy was  extended during the adapta-
tion  and conversion  crisis  of  194  7,  by  the taking  of 
holdings in iron and steel and in the processing indus-
tries. (
60
)  Since the taking over, against compensation, 
of  the electricity  supply  industry  in  1962,  Italy  has 
had the largest State participation in  the economy  of 
all West European countries. (61 ) 
But,  except  for  the economic  development  of  South 
Italy,  these  enterprises  have  not  been  used  in  an 
active  and  planned  way  to  serve  the  objectives  of 
State  economic policy.  They  act  largely  on  the prin-
ciples  of  private  economy  and  have  been  able  to 
defend themselves  against  attempts at State direction 
by  relying  on  their competitive position vis-a-vis  the 
private  economy.  Owing  to  the  difficulty  of  acting 
on the  public  enterprises,  less  importance  is  now  at-
tached to nationalisation  than to planning. 
The  first  experiment (62)  in  overall  planning  of  the 
whole public Jlli.tor was  aimed at reconstruction  and 
was  dropped  on  the completion  of  that period.  But 
since  the  market  mechanisms  had  been  incapable, 
even  before Fascism,  of  preventing  the  cleavage  be-
tween North and South, the State, in 1950, began to 
encourage the economic and social development of the 
Southern  Provinces  and  the development  of  regional 
planning.  By  infrastructure  investments  and  direct 
incentives  to  investment,  regional  policy  encouraged 
private  enterprise  and,  by  the  installation  of  enter-
prises, launched State holding companies in what was 
virtually vacant territory; this policy did not therefore 
tend to restrict existing private activities for the benefit 
of public activities. (63) 
It was  not until 1962 that the National Commission 
for  Economic  Programming  (  Commissione  nazionale 
e
9
)  Cf.  Cassese,  S.:  Organe,  Verfahren  und  Instrumente  der 
Planung in  Italien;  in:  Kaiser, J.  H. (ed.):  Planung II, Baden-
Baden,  1966,  p.  210. 
(
60
)  Cf.  Jochimsen,  R.:  Die  offentlichen  bzw.  offentlich  be-
herrschten  Wirtschaftsunternehmen  in  ltalien;  in:  Gemein-
wirtschaft  in  Westeuropa  (ed.  Weber,  W.),  Gottingen,  1962, 
p.  244  and  Tables,  pp.  309-374. 
(
61
)  The  main  State-controlled  holding  companies  are  the  IRI 
(lstituto per  la  ricostruzione  Industriale  =  about  300  enter-
prises),  the  ENI  (Ente  Nazionale  Idrocarburi  =  about  100 
enterprises) and  the ENEL (Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica). 
(
62
)  Cf.  on this subject:  Morgenroth, U.:  Die italienische Wirt-
schaftsplanung;  in:  WA,  Vol.  96,  19'66,  I. pp.  351  and  foil. 
(63 )  This  can  easily  be  believed  on  reading  Kleps,  who  de-
scribes  the  decision  to  follow  an  active  regional  policy  as  an 
attempt "to limit  fundamental  decisions  of a liberal  character 
to  the  North  and  thus  apply  two  different  and  juxtaposed 
conceptions  of economic  policy". 
Kleps,  Kh.:  Langfristige  Wirtschaftspolitik.  .. ,  op  cit.,  p.  218. per la  programmazione ecanomica, CNPE) was  set up, 
responsible for formulating an overall long term econ-
omic  programme. 
After  the  political  setbacks  of  two  projects,  the 
Government for the first time presented to Parliament 
a Plan for the period 1966-1970, designed to serve as 
"a framework for  the Government's economic,  finan-
cial  and  social  policy,  especially  for  public  capital 
investment programmes,  and  as  a framework  for  re-
gional economic plans". (M)  In its nature, this Plan is 
very  close  to Belgian  planning.  The private sector is 
expected to conform voluntarily to the general objec-
tives of the Plan, and subsidies are the main instrument 
of intervention in enterprise decisions,  especially with 
regard  to  the  objectives  of  regional  policy.  The  in-
struments  previously  used  also  remain  available. (65) 
Cassese attaches particular importance to price controls. 
The future will tell whether and how far  this instru-
ment will be used to assist in achieving  the Plan. 
Government  competence  in  the  matter  of  prices  is 
derived  from  Decree  No.  347  of  19  October  1944 
assigning  official  price  policy  to  an  Inter-Ministerial 
Prices Committee (  Comitato interministeriale dei prez-
zi,  CIP), set up for the purpose.  The CIP has power 
to fix  the prices of all  goods  and services  at all  stages 
of  their economic  circuit  and  on  export  and  import, 
but its competence does  not extend either to salaries 
and wages  or to rent. (
66) 
The  very  large  number  of  price  controls  extstmg  at 
the  end of  the  War has  been  steadily  reduced  from 
year  to  year.  Although  price  policy  considerations 
have played a part in particular cases,  maximum price 
controls have primarily been maintained or introduced 
only if the market mechanisms failed to function satis-
factorily  owing to insufficient competition, or for any 
other reason. 
In detail, the products and objectives can be classified 
in  three  categories:  (67) 
( 1)  For unworked products (including energy) and for 
certain  industrial  products,  there  is  the  danger, 
especially  in  the  event  of  excess  international 
demand,  that  the  disappearance  of the  pressure 
of  foreign  competition  will  be  taken  advantage 
(
64
)  Cassese,  S.:  Organe,  Verfahren ...  op  cit.,  p.  218. 
{
65
)  Cf.  the  Table  of  the  possibilities  of  State  action,  de-
scribed-somewhat  arbitrarily-as  "indirect"  in  Cassese,  S.: 
ibid., p. 228. 
(
66
)  Rent  control  is  a matter  for  Parliament:  cf.  Duchini,  F.: 
Kartell- und Wettbewerbsrecht in Italien (1953-1954) in: WuW 
5th year,  1955,  p.  559. 
(
67
)  Cf.  Calcaterra, E., Mazzocchi,  G., Lombardini, S., Vito, F.: 
Main  Outlines  and  Evolutionary  Trends  of  the  Structure  of 
the  Italian  Economy;  in:  Wirtschaftssystem  des  Westens 
(edited  by  Frei,  R.)  Vol.  II,  Basle-Tiibingen,  1959,  pp.  96 
and  foil. 
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of by the relatively few enterprises in the branch 
to increase their prices.  Particularly in periods of 
difficult international supply, the fixing  of ceiling 
prices should therefore prevent a speculative price 
drive (68)  and  thus  avoid  any  interference  with 
distribution and growth. 
( 2)  The prices of public utility services and a number 
of other services  have  always  been  subject  to a 
ceiling. (69)  The objectives have been to prevent 
monopolistic abuse and thus favour the stabilisa-
tion  of  the cost  of  living,  endangered  by  other 
rises  due to the general application of the sliding 
scale.  Unit prices  being generally  set  as  low  as 
possible, it should be possible to obtain, especially 
with the aid of Price Equalisation Funds, a sort 
of  financial  equalisation. C
0
) 
( 3)  There  were  also  price  controls  for  agricultural 
and food products.  In this sector, they were used 
preferably  to  stabilise  price  variations  and  aid 
the  producers.  As  in  other European countries, 
these  measures  thus  constituted  an  instrument 
of sectoral  distribution policy. 
(b)  While  Italian  economic  policy  in  many  respects 
resembles  that of  France, (
71 )  this  is  not  true of the 
conception  of  the  economic  system.  Deliberate  and 
systematic State exercise  of functions  of regula.tion  is 
considerably less  in  Italy than in  France. 
Quantitative development  has  been  subject  since  the 
beginning of overall planning to short term orientation 
by  cyclical  policy,  but also  to  the  commencement  of 
a  long  term  growth  policy  which  will  certainly  be 
reinforced in future.  The qualitative aspect of develop-
ment is  largely  a matter for  the market mechanisms. 
No doubt, as  in other countries, research and training 
outside  the  enterprise  are  the  subject  of  general 
encouragement,  but there  does  not  seem  to  be any 
effective  or  projected  influence  on  the  activity  of 
enterprises in this field. 
On the question of allocation, it is  the market mecha-
nisms  which  are  dominant  in  the  regulation  of  the 
pattern  of  outputs  and  inputs.  The  temporary  tax 
incentives  to mergers,  conversions  and concentrations 
(
68
)  As  this  control  generally  related  to  the  maker's  ex-works 
price,  it  was  sometimes  possible  to  get  round  it  by  vertical 
concentration. 
( 69)  E.g.  telephone  charges,  radio  and  television  licences,  canal 
dues,  transport  charges,  the  price  of  gas,  hotel  charges  and 
house  rents. 
(1°)  Recourse  to  the  Cassa  di  conguaf!}io  prezzi  must  certainly 
have  been  more  widespread  in  1951  (a);  according  to  CIP, 
there  are  now  only  four  Funds,  three  for  the  sugar  market 
and  the  fourth  for  electricity  supply. 
(a)  Cf.  Champaud, C.  op.  cit., Part I, p.  38. 
(1
1
)  This is  the opinion of Champaud, C.  Part I, op.  cit.,  p.  5. Italy: Table of major effects of price controls on market !Dechanisms deemed important under the conception of the 
econonuc system. 
Regulation  functions 
Conception  Permitted  Compulsory  Maximum 
of the economic  price agreements  price  prices  Fixed prices 
system  ticketing 
Development 
1.  quantitative 
11111111111111111111111111111  1111111111111+1111111111111  1111111111111·1111111111111  11111111111/HIIIIIIIIIII  1111111111111·1111111111111 
2.  qualitative  - +(a) 
-(b) 
Allocation 
3.  pattern of outputs  - +  -
--
4.  pattern of inputs  - +  +  -
5.  regional  pattern 
11111111111111111111111111111  1111111111111·1111111111111  1111111111111·1111111111111  1111111111111·1111111111111  1111111111111·1111111111111 
Distribution 
6.  monetary 
11111111111111111111111111111  1111111111111-1111111111111  1111111111111+1111111111111  1111111111111+1111111111111  IIIIIIIIIIIIH/11111111111 
7.  real 
Notes: 
a)  tendency  to  develop  new  lower-cost  production methods. 
b)  possibilities of (a}  and development of new  products. 
under  Act  No.  170  of  18  March  1965,  cannot  be 
deemed to imply the assignment of essential functions 
of regulating the pattern of inputs.  The regional pat-
tern,  on  the  contrary,  is  strongly  and  systematically 
influenced  by  the instruments of economic policy. (
72
) 
Though dominant in this regulation function, economic 
policy endeavours, here,  too, to use  the market forces 
in conformity with its  objectives,  by  creating favour-
able conditions. 
(c)  The comparison, in  the following  Table,  between 
the general assignment of regulation functions and the 
possible  effects  of  Italian  price  controls  shows  that 
both permitted price agreements and part of the maxi-
mum price controls, as  well as  the fixed price controls 
must  be  deemed  inconsistent  with  the  economic 
system. 
(
72
)  For fuller  details,  cf.  CEE  Commission:  La  politique  re-
gionale  dans  la  CEE,  op.  cit.,  p.  118  and  foll,  and  pp.  321 
and foil. 
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5.  LUXEMBOURG 
(a)  In Luxembourg,  the first  price  control  legislation 
made  its  appearance  only  in  1944 C
3
)  to  ensure  the 
country's supplies.  In 1956 general compulsory price 
reporting,  accompanied  by  the right of veto,  already 
referred to, was introduced; the Outline Act at present 
governing State price action dates from 30 June 1961. 
Article 5  of this  enactment  requires  the Government 
to supervise, control and even to fix  the price of pur-
chase  and  sale  of  all  goods  and  services.  This  duty 
is  discharged  by  the  Prices  Department.  The  only 
exceptions to this rule are wages, salaries and fees  and 
certain  prices  for  the  fixing  of  which  other agencies 
are responsible under statute. 
There are few  documents concerning economic policy 
and  organisation  in  the  smallest  of  the  EEC States. 
Since personal research was not possible in the context 
C
3
)  Grand-Ducal Orders  of  11  August  1944,  28  October 1944 
and  8  November  1944.  Cf.  on  this  subject,  Champaud,  C.: 
Part  I, op.  cit.,  p.  39. Luxembourg: Table of  major effects of price controls on market mechanisms deemed important under the conception 
of the economic system. 
Conception  Prescribed  Rebate 
Normal  Declaration  Compul-
Regulation  functions  of  the econ-
prices  rules 
price  price  sory price 
Maximum 
Development 
1.  quantitative 
2.  qualitative 
Allocation 
3.  pattern of outputs 
4.  pattern of inputs 
5.  regional  pattern 
Distribution 
6.  monetary 
7.  real 
Notes: 
A  =  permitted price agreements, 
B  =  prohibition of price agreements, 
C  =  for retail trade, 
D  =  general limitation of rebates. 
omic order 
A 
--
+ 
+ 
11111111111111111  1111·1111 
11111111111111111  IIIHII 
of the present study, all  that can  be done is  to make 
assumptions  about  the  ruling  conception  of  the  eco-
nomic system.  In principle, the opinion of the Conseil 
d'Etat on  the  Prices  Act  of  10  June  1961, confines 
itself to indicating, according to Champaud, that "lib-
eralism is  regarded  as  the normal economic state, but 
that State intervention in the free play of competition 
(  ... )  is  justified  when  the  national  economy  is  in 
danger ... ". e
4
)  Pursuant to this principle, we treat all 
regulation  functions  for  which  there  is,  so  far  as  we 
know, no more important State intervention, as falling 
within  the competence  of  the  market  mechanisms. 
(b)  The  market  mechanisms  are  manifestly  predom-
inant in  the  regulation  both of  quantitative develop-
ment  and  of  qualitative  development.  There  is  no 
doubt,  as  there  is  everywhere,  a  short  term cyclical 
policy,  but  there  does  not  seem  to  be  any  overall 
growth policy. 
('
4
)  Champaud,  C.:  Part I,  op.  cit.,  p.  9. 
rule  ticketing  ticketing 
prices 
B  c  D 
----
+  -
----
+  +  -
-----
+  - +  -
----
+  +  - + 
1111·1111  1111·1111  1111·1111  1111111·1111111  1111111·1111111  1111111·1111111  1111111·1111111 
H  H  1111-1111  1111111·1111111 IIIIIHIIIII IIIIIIHIIIII 1111111·1111111 
+  + 
Similarly,  the regulation of the pattern of outputs and 
inputs is  not, so  far as  we know, systematically influ-
enced  by  the State.  It is  different  with the regional 
pattern.  Since  1962, the Government has itself taken 
in hand the formulation of the necessary  measures  in 
this field.  An Outline Act co-ordinates regional devel-
opment programmes at national level.  The instruments 
of regional policy  are  tax exemptions, direct subsidies 
and  land improvements. (15)  This regulation  function 
should,  to  all  appearances,  be  assigned  to  economic 
policy. 
(c) If  we compare, in the following Table, the possible 
effects  of Luxembourg price controls on our assumed 
assignnient of  the functions  of regulation, we  can  say 
C 5)  Cf.  Carny,  P.:  Problemes  et  perspectives  d'une  region 
frontaliere  au  centre  de  Ia  Communaute;  in:  EEC  Commis-
sion:  Documents  de  la  conference  sur  l'economie  regionale, 
Brussels,  6-8  December  1961,  Vol.  I,  p.  259,  and  similarly, 
La politique regionale  au  Luxembourg;  in:  EEC Commission: 
La  politique regionale  dans  la  CEE, op.  cit., pp.  127  and foiL 
107 that the general limitation of rebates  and  compulsory 
reporting  on  the  assumption  adopted  in  Part II are 
inconsistent with the system.  Maximum price controls 
for  the direct regulation of price levels call in general 
for  the  same  assessment.  Since  the  provisions  in 
question essentially  concern  only  exceptional  sectors, 
this  assessment  carries  little  weight  for  the  markets 
contemplated in the present study. 
6.  NETHERLANDS 
(a)  The rapid  growth of  the  Netherlands  population 
at the end of the War called  for  an  increased  effort 
in  the matter of housing  and the creation of employ-
ment.  Since the capital goods needed to create employ-
ment had to be largely imported, it was also necessary 
to increase  the country's exports. 
The contemplated conception of the economic  system 
was  a  compromise,  described  as  "oriented  market 
economy", between a free  market economy  and State 
control. {'6)  In  the  immediate  post-War  years,  this 
policy  was  centred  on  orientation  by  the  State;  in 
applying it much less  use was  made of the extension 
of "the nationalisation of ownership" (77)  than of the 
maintenance and development of the "nationalisation 
of the power of disposal".  In order to fulfil  its func-
tion of orientation, the State had to intervene indirect-
ly-and,  if  necessary,  directly-in  the  decisions  of 
enterprises.  The  instrument  of indirect  intervention 
today  still  remains  planning.  Since  1946, the choice 
and  mix  of  short  term  economic  policy  measures  is 
effected  pursuant to a central annual plan.  The Cen-
traal  Economisch  Plan  forms  a  consistent  system  of 
macro-economic  forecasts.  Since  the end of rationing 
it has  not  included  either  overall  growth  targets  or 
sectoral targets, and, since  1955, it no longer includes 
economic  policy  recommendations.  Since  it  is  not 
binding either on the private sector or on the govern-
ment, it has  a purely forecast  character. ('8) 
The expression "oriented market economy" also  orig-
inates  from  the  practice  of  preparing  and  executing 
the Plan. (79) 
(1
6
)  Cf.  Estor,  M.:  Der  Sozial-okonomische  Rat  der  Nieder-
llindischen  Wirtschaft,  Berlin,  1965,  p.  121. 
(
77
)  Cf.  in  this  connection:  Hartog,  F.:  Economic  Policy  in 
the  Netherlands,  1949  to  1961;  in:  Economic  Policy  in  Our 
Time,  Vol.  III, op.  cit.,  p.  78  and  110,  and  Vos,  H.:  Die 
offentliche  Hand  im  Wirtschaftsleben  der  Niederlande;  in: 
Offentliche  Wirtschaft  in  Europa,  Schriftenreihe  der  Gesell-
schaft  fur  offentliche  Wirtschaft,  No.  8,  Berlin,  1962,  p.  48. 
(1
8
)  Cf.  Hartog, F.:  Die  Marktwirtschaft in  den  Niederlanden: 
Ihre  Grenzen,  die  Auffassungen  iiber  sie,  ihre  Zukunftsaus-
sichten;  contents  of report in:  Zijlstra, J.:  Wirtschaftspolitik, 
OfJ.  cit.,  p.  24. 
(
79
)  The  plan  sets  indicators  for  the  projects  of  the  private 
sector,  which  is  able,  through  the  Sociaal  Economische  Raad 
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The first  elements  of  long  term  growth planning (
80
) 
were abandoned on the  expiry of  the Marshall  Plan. 
The  other  long  term  plans  related  solely  to  partial 
fields (81)  of public  action.  It was  only  in  1963  that 
the  Government  decided,  starting  with  the  period 
1966-1970, to add to the central plans, focussed solely 
on economic equilibrium, outline growth plans for the 
whole  of  the economy  extending  over  several  years. 
The basis of the new outline plan was to be constituted 
by  a macro-economic  model  and a sectoral model, (82) 
in  the  construction  of  which  economic  groups  were 
invited  to  take  part.  Outline  growth  planning  was 
no  more  binding  on  the  private  sector,  but  it  was 
designed to allow the Government to orient an overall 
growth policy  and  its  economic  action  in the sectors 
for which it is  directly responsible. (83 ) 
Among  economic  policy  measures  it was  not indirect 
intervention,  but direct control of  prices,  wages,  im-
ports, investments  and credit,  and  the rationing of  a 
series of consumer goods, which constituted the dom-
inant  element. (
84
)  The  meticulous  control  inherited 
from War was  repealed only very gradually. 
In 1955, again, the Minister for Economic Affairs was 
empowered to control the installation or extension of 
certain strictly defined enterprises,  and, where appro-
priate  to make  such  installation  or extension  subject 
to prior authorisation, when existing or potential sur-
plus  capacity  threatened  to  prejudice  the  industrial-
isation  policy,  or when  the  co-ordination  of  invest-
ments  was  required  under  an  international  obliga-
tion. (85)  This  power has  been  used  in  certain  cases. 
Since  external  trade  plays  a fairly  important  part in 
the level of internal prices, efforts to increase exports 
explain  why  the  price  trend  (in  addition  to  the 
objectives of distribution policy) has been given special 
attention.  Factor prices  and  product prices  were  for 
a long time directly controlled.  Whereas in the other 
West  European  countries,  wage  trends  were  hardly 
State-controlled,  Netherlands  wages  were  subject  to 
strict  control  by  the  College  van  Rijksbemiddelaars 
(SER)  to  intervene  in  defining  objectives  as  well  as  in  the 
choice  of  the  instruments  and  methods  of  State  economic 
policy.  For  fuller  details,  cf.  Estor,  M.:  Der  Sozial-okono-
mische  Rat...  op.  cit.,  p.  123. 
(
80
)  Outline Plan (1946-1952)  and  Memorandum  on  structural 
development  in  the  Netherlands  (1948-1952/53). 
(
81
)  Territorial  development  policy,  regional  policy  and  in-
dustrialisation policy,  cf.  Kleps,  Kh.:  Langfristige Wirtschafts-
politik  ... ,  op.  cit.,  pp.  286  and  foll. 
(
82
)  The number of sectors has been estimated  at 24  by  Kleps 
and  at  30-40  by  Hartog. 
(
83
)  According  to  De  Wolf,  the  public  sector,  building,  agri-
culture  and  transport.  Cf.  De  Wolff,  P.:  Central  Economic 
Planning  in  the  Netherlands;  in:  WA, Vol.  92,  1964,  p.  202. 
(
84
)  Cf.  Hartog,  F.:  Economic  Policy  ... ,  op.  cit.,  p.  68. 
(
85
)  Cf.  on this  power and  its  application,  Goedhart.  C.,  Hac-
cou, J.  F., Hennipman, P., Van Stuyvenberg, J.  H.:  Das Wirt-
schaftssystem  der  Niederlande  nach  1945;  in:  Wirtschafts-
system  des  Westens,  Vol.  I...,  op.  cit.,  p.  132. up to 1963. (86)  This  control, however, could not be 
accepted by the workers unless the State also acted on 
product prices. 
After the end of  the War, the  1939 price legislation 
came  back  into  effect.  No  doubt  price  control  was 
abolished,  at  the  same  time  as  rationing,  at  the 
beginning  of  1949, but as  early  as  September  1949, 
it became necessary to reinstate a price freeze for four 
months  to  avoid  increases  consequent  on  currency 
devaluation.  Another  occasion  for  the  introduction 
of price control was the increase following the Korean 
conflict  in 19 51.  When, in 19 54,  a number of  wage 
increases threatened to relaunch inflation, the Govern-
ment again  intervened  in  price  formation.  In 1959, 
the Minister of Economic  Affairs  required the indus-
trial and commercial sector to report its price increases 
after the event.  The Outline Law at present in force 
on the adoption of price measures was promulgated on 
24 March  1961. (
87
) 
If the government deems that the prices of goods and 
services  are exaggerated, it can, under the Act,  inter-
vene at three different levels: 
- Pursuant to Article  2 ( 1) (a)  it can  fix  maximum 
prices for  the offer,  sale  or leasing of goods.  The 
validity of these maximum price controls is limited 
to one year  [Art. 2 (2)]. 
Pursuant to Article  2 (3) it may  order the publi-
cation  of  certain  prices,  so  as  to  increase  the 
demand  transparency  of  the market and  to make 
consumers more  sensitive  to questions of price. 
- Pursuant to Article 2 (1) (b) the government may, 
with a view to maximum price control, order that 
accounts shall be kept showing the price formation 
of goods  and  services  subject to control. 
During the whole post-War period, rents and agricul-
tural product prices were fixed by the State. (88)  Except 
for the system applicable to these sectors, the primary 
reason  for  direct price  control was,  for  a long  time, 
stability.  With  the  transition  to  limited  sectoral 
measures the accent was increasingly laid on the desire 
to prevent the abuse of monopolies by applying a com-
petition policy. In recent years less use has been made 
of price authorisations.  "As a stick behind the door" 
these  authorisations  encourage  industry,  voluntarily 
or  quasi-voluntarily,  to  make  agreements  with  the 
State. (
89
)  The  very  small  number  of  price  controls, 
(
86
)  For details on the trend of the wage system in the Nether-
lands,  see,  e.g.  Busch-Luty,  Ch.:  Gesamtwirtschaftliche  ... ,  op. 
cit.,  pp.  30  and  foiL  and  Jansen,  H.  L.:  Der  Sociaal-Econ-
omische  Raad  und  die  niederlandische  Lohnpolitik,  in:  HJb 
8th year,  1963,  pp.  21  and  foiL 
(
87
)  Prijzenwet,  in:  Staatsblad  No.  135/1961. 
(
88
)  It should be noted in this connection  that a large propor-
tion  of  the  dwellings  held  in  common  occupation  belong  to 
public  agencies  and  that private  building  is  largely  encourag-
ed  by  the  State. 
(
89
)  Cf.  Hartog,  F.:  Economic  Policy  ... ,  op.  cit.,  p.  77  and 
p.  111. 
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compared with previous years, collected in the present 
document, must be regarded as  a provisional full stop 
to a liberal trend in this field. 
(b)  With regard  to  the  conception  of  the  economic 
system in the Netherlands, it may be noted that com-
petition and  the market  mechanisms  are  regarded  as 
the fundamental  basis  of economic  activity; (
90
)  thus, 
State intervention is  always  exceptional  in  character. 
If  the force of this principle might have been doubted 
towards  the  end  of  the  1950's  owing  to  the  large 
number of "exceptions" recognised,  the situation has 
profoundly changed  in recent years. 
Quantitative development is subject, in the short term, 
to  the cyclical  policy  based on  the Central Plan and, 
since 1966, to a long term growth policy based on the 
Outline  Plan.  Although  this  regulation  function  is 
therefore attributable to economic policy, the influence 
of  the  market  mechanisms  in this  sphere  is  scarcely 
hampered,  since  micro-economic  interventions  have 
been largely  replaced by  overall macro-economic  con-
trol  in  the  field  of credit,  the  budget  and  taxation. 
In  the  case  of  qualitative  development,  the  State 
exercises  no  major  activity.  As  demonstrated by  the 
review of planning action, the market mechanisms may 
also be taken to dominate the regulation of the pattern 
of inputs  and outputs.  State action in  the matter of 
territorial  development  and  regional  policy  enjoys  a 
long  tradition in  this  country,  but largely  relates  to 
infrastructure  only.  It is  true  that  there  is  an  aid 
programme for the construction of industrial buildings 
in the poles of development, (
91
) but its resources were 
substantially cut in  1962.  Although  the government 
ensures  a  certain  co-ordination  of  regional  policy 
measures,  the Netherlands rejects all central planning 
as  sterile and rigid.  We therefore consider in spite of 
some reservations,  that the regional pattern is  largely 
regulated by  the market mechanisms. 
(c)  From the comparison  in the following  Table  be-
tween the conception of the economic system outlined 
here  and  the  possible  effects  of  Netherlands  price 
controls  on  the  market  mechanisms,  it appears  that 
permitted price  agreements,  and  fixed  prices  for  the 
construction  of  workers'  housing  can  be  deemed 
inconsistent  with  the  economic  system.  The  same 
assessment is permissible as  to intervention in product 
prices  and wages,  resulting from  the practice of com-
pulsory  price  reporting  which  we  have  taken  as  an 
assumption. 
(
90
)  Thus,  Hartog  cites  among  the  objectives  of  Netherlands 
economic  policy,  "naturally,  the  utmost  possible  respect  for 
the  market  mechanisms".  Cf.  Hartog,  F.:  Die  Marktwirt-
schaft  ... ,  op.  cit.,  p.  24. 
(
91
)  Cf.  Verburg,  M.  C.:  La  politique regionale  aux  Pays-Bas; 
in:  EEC  Commission:  La  politique  regionale  dans  la  CEE, 
op.  cit., pp.  131  and foil. Netherlands: Table of major eft"ects  of price controls on market mechanisms deemed important under the conception 
of the economic system. 
Regulation functions 
Conception 
of  the  economic 
system 
Development 
~illlllllllllllllll!llll! 
1.  quantitative 
2.  qualitative 
Allocation 
3.  pattern of outputs 
----
4.  pattern of inputs 
----
5.  regional  pattern 
Distribution 
6.  monetary 
11111111111111111111111111111 
7.  real 
Notes: 
A  =  permitted price  agreements, 
B  =  prohibition of prescribed prices, 
C  =  general spontaneous reporting of increases in product prices, 
D  =  compulsory reporting of wage increases. 
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Prescribed  prices  Compulsory 
price  reporting  Fixed  prices 
A  B  c  D 
IIIIIIHIIIII  1111111·1111111  1111111·11111
1 
1111111·1111111 lllllllllll!l·lllllllllill 
- +  -
- +  - -
- +  - -
+ 
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CONSISTENCY  WITH  THE  ECONOMIC  SYSTEM  AS  CONCEIVED  BY  THE EEC 
1.  CONSISTENCY  WITH  THE  OBJECTIVES  OF  THE 
TREATY CONSTITUTING THE  COMMON  MARKET 
(a) If the economic objectives of the EEC Treaty are 
grouped in two categories, fundamental objectives and 
secondary  objectives,  it will  be  found  that  the  fun-
damental objectives very largely correspond to national 
objectives: 
( 1)  the  constant  and  balanced  maximisation  of  the 
national  product ( 
1
) 
( 2)  the more equal distribution of that national pro-
duct, (2)  and 
( 3 )  the bringing into line  of  regional  productivities 
connected  with  the  labour  factor  by  intensive 
reforms. (3) 
The secondary  objectives  to be  achieved  in  order to 
realise  the  fundamental  objectives,  are  constituted, 
according  to the Treaty,  by  "the establishment  of  a 
common market" and by "the progressive approxima-
tion  of  the  economic  policies  of  Member  States" 
(Article  2),  to  the  extent  necessary  to  achieve  the 
objectives  of the Treaty (Article  6 ). 
In detail, the establishment of a customs union (Art. 9 
and foil.),  the elimination of quantitative restrictions 
(Art.  30  and foiL)  and of government restrictions on 
the free  performance  of  services  (Art.  59  and  foil.) 
are  designed  to  establish the free  movement  of  mer-
chandise and  the free  performance of services.  Thus, 
when  Member  States  do  not  differentiate  between 
e)  Cf.  Preamble and Art.  2.  The "harmonious  and  balanced" 
development  specified  in  Article  2,  must  be  interpreted  not 
as  the  participation  of  all  sectors  of  activity  in the  expansion 
(a)  but simply  as  a balanced overall growth with no  structural 
distortion. 
(a)  Such  is  for  example,  the opinion  of  Wohlfarth,  E.,  Ever-
ling,  U.,  Glaesner,  H.-}.,  Sprung,  R.:  Die  Europaische  Wirt-
schaftsgemeinschaft - Kommentar  zum Vertrag  - Berlin,  Frank-
fort,  1960,  p.  5. 
(l)  Cf.  Preamble,  Art.  2  and  Art.  117. 
e)  The vague  formulation  of the objectives  of  regional  policy 
in  the  Preamble  and  Article  2  is  clarified  only  by  the  subse-
quent complements  and  developments  of Community  practice. 
E.g.  Sixth  General  Report  ... ,  June  1963,  pp.  140  and  foil. 
Cf.  subsequently:  EEC Commission:  General  Reports  on  the 
activity  of the  Community.  EEC Commission:  Documents  de 
la  Conference  sur  les  economies  regionales,  Vol.  I  and  II, 
Brussels,  1961.  EEC  Commission:  Memorandum  of the Com-
mission  on  the Action Programme  of the Community  for  the 
second  stage,  Brussels,  24  October  1962,  pp.  68  and  foiL 
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identical products coming from  anywhere in the inte-
grated territory, but apply  a different  common  treat-
ment  to  products  of  third  country  origin,  then  the 
mobility of products  throughout  the  integrated terri-
tory will tend to be improved. 
The  free  movement  of  workers  is  ensured  by  the 
abolition of all  discrimination based on nationality in 
the  matter  of  employment,  remuneration  and  other 
working  conditions  (Art.  48  and  foil.)  and  by  the 
harmonisation  of  the  social  security  schemes  (Art. 
117 ).  These measures represent a contribution to the 
enhanced mobility of labour as  a factor of production 
within the Community. 
Articles  67  and  following,  also  require  the abolition 
.. of all restrictions on the movement of capital belonging 
to  persons  resident  in  Member  States  and  of  all 
discrimination  based  on  the  nationality  or  place  of 
residence  of  the  parties  or  on  the  location  of  the 
investment, so  far as  necessary for the functioning of 
the Common Market. (
4
)  This liberalisation of financial 
transactions not directly connected with the exchange 
of goods  and services, i.e.  in particular, credits, hold-
ings, direct investment and the repatriation of income, 
helps to enhance the mobility of capital as  a factor of 
production. 
Furthermore,  Articles  52  and  following  also  specify, 
in principle, (5)  the right to freedom  of establishment 
for independent workers on the Community territory. 
The  right  of  establishment,  by  placing  nationals  of 
other EEC countries on the same footing  as  nationals 
of  the  State  in  question,  considerably  increases  the 
mobility of the residual human factor. (6) 
These provisions of the Treaty, designed to introduce 
the  free  movement  of  workers  and  capital  and  the 
right of establishment, can be regarded as contributions 
towards  establishing  the  mobility  of factors. 
(
4
)  This  proviso  refers  back  to  the  fundamental  objective, 
which  may  become  important if,  for  example,  the free  move-
ment of capital, as  a result of speculation, results in short term 
disequilibrium in the balance of payments of certain countries, 
thus  prejudicing  the  sound  functioning  of  the  Common 
Market. 
e)  Exceptions  are  provided  in  the  case  of  official  public  of-
fices  (Article 55)  or for  reasons  of public policy,  public  safety 
or public  health  (Article  56). 
(
6
)  Cf.  Gutenberg,  E.:  Einfiihrung  indie  Betriebswirtschafts-
lehre,  Wiesbaden,  1958,  p.  27. But  States  have  many  other  ways  of  limiting  the 
mobility of products and factors.  In order to prevent 
the direct  obstacles  cited  above  from  being  replaced 
by indirect means to the same end, the Treaty includes 
a series  of  complementary provisions: 
(i)  In the absence of a common monetary system, the 
right  to  the free  exchange  of  natural currencies 
is, on the technical level, the prior condition for 
the  mobility  of  products  and  of  factors.  The 
Treaty (Article 106) no doubt does not prescribe 
total free  convertibility,  but it obliges  Member 
States  to  authorise  the  payments  necessary  to 
achieve  the liberalisation measures  which it lays 
down;() 
(ii)  Measures  of  taxation  may  also  hamper  imports 
or aid  exports.  Under  the Community  taxation 
rules  (Art.  95-99)  the conditions of competition 
for products coming from Member States cannot 
be  worsened  by  the  importing  State  by  means 
of  taxation  at  a  higher  level  than  that  of  sim-
ilar  national  products;  similarly,  the  exporting 
country  cannot  improve  conditions  of  competi-
tion  by  tax  relief.  It  is  thus  clear  that  the 
Treaty  aims  at  favouring  not  all  intra-Com-
munity movement of merchandise, but only those 
which, resulting from differences in productivity, 
serve  the  fundamental  objective  of  growth. 
(iii)  The mobility  sought  for  may  also  be hampered 
by  legislation,  regulation  or  administrative 
measures. (8)  The  Council  and  the  Commission 
must  therefore make  directives  for  the harmon-
isation  of  provisions  "which  have  a  direct  in-
fluence  on  the  establishment  or  functioning  of 
the  Common  Market"  (Art.  100). 
In addition,  the Commission is  required to  take 
action  if  disparities  existing  between  the provi-
sions in question "adversely affect the conditions 
of  competition  on  the  Common  Market  and 
thereby  cause  a  distortion"  which  must  be 
eliminated  in  accordance  with  the  objectives  of 
the  Treaty. e) 
(iv)  Subject to any  derogations  expressly specified  in 
the Treaty, aids which distort competition grant-
ed by States for the benefit of certain enterprises 
or  certain  products  (Art.  92-93)  and  dumping 
practices  (Art.  91 )  are  inconsistent  with  the 
Common  Market. 
C)  Since  free  currency  convertibility  has  been  largely  ensured 
in  all  States  since  1958,  this  limitation  no  longer  raises  any 
problems  today. 
(
8
)  Including  price  controls. 
(
9
)  In connection with approximation, however, only the prob-
lem  of  specific  distortion  arises,  since  general  distortions  can 
be compensated by variations in the exchange rate.  Cf.  Sprung, 
R.:  Die  Bestimmungen  iiber  die  Beseitigung  von  Verzerrun-
gen des Wettbewerbs im Vertrag iiber die EWG; in:  FA  New 
Series,  Vol.  20,  1960,  p.  202. 
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In addition, public and private enterprises are forbid-
den  to  enter  into  any  agreement  or  to  adopt  any 
decision or common practice which hampers or distorts 
the movement of products and factors  between Mem-
ber States (Art. 85-90-). eo)  The object of these "rules 
of  competition"  is  to  prevent  States  or  enterprises 
from  impeding,  restraining  or  distorting  the  free 
movement of merchandise. (11 ) 
The above  are  the main provisions  designed  to estab-
lish  the Common  Market.  It is  clear  from  what we 
have  said  above  that  the  attainment  of  the  direct 
objectives  of  the  Treaty  already  calls  for  a  certain 
common  orientation of economic  policies. 
With regard to the spheres of activity indicated above, 
the treaty requires Member States to ensure the equi-
librium of their balance of payments, and the stability 
of price levels  and "to ensure a high level of employ-
ment" (Art. 104) (1
2
) and recommends the co-operation 
of  cyclical  policies  [Art.  105  (  1 )] .  But  since  the 
different  rules  of  co-operation  are  subject  to  the 
proviso  contained in  Article  6  (  1 ), e 3)  their concrete 
content  depends  on  the  objectives  to  which  they 
relate.  They  may  relate,  in  principle,  both  to  the 
direct objective  of  the establishment of  the Common 
Market  and  to  the  fundamental  objectives  ou dined 
above. e
4
)  In this section, therefore, we shall inquire 
whether the possible effects of price controls prejudice 
the establishment of the Common Market in the light 
of  the minimum  requirements  of the Treaty. 
(b) The EEC conception of  the economic system cor-
responding to the establishment of the Common Mar-
ket relates only  to  the movement of merchandise and 
factors  within  the Community.  As  appears  from  the 
(1°)  In  Mestmacker's  view,  Art.  90 (')  is  also  applicable 
"when  a Member  State  by  law  restricts  competition  between 
enterprises,  for  example,  by  fixing  minimum  or  maximum 
prices,  by  investment orders or by  setting a quota on produc-
tion  or  sales".  Mestmikker,  E.-J.:  Offene  Markte  im  System 
unverfalschten  Wettbewerbs  in der Europaischen  Wirtschafts-
gemeinschaft; in:  W irtschaftsordnung und Rechtsordnung, Mis-
cellany in honour of F. Bohm (edited by Coing, H., Kronstein, 
H., Mestmacker,  E.-J.)  Karlsruhe,  1965,  p.  389. 
(
11
)  Furthermore,  according  to  Gunther,  there  is  no  doubt 
that  these  rules  should  be  regarded  as  "the  nucleus  of  a 
system  of  competition  embodying  all  the  economic  events  in 
the  Community".  Gunther,  E.:  Europrusche  und  nationale 
Wettbewerbspolitik;  in:  Wirtschaftsordnung  und  Rechtsord-
nung,  op.  cit.,  p.  281. 
(
12
)  Article  104  legitimately  assigns  a  certain  priority  to  the 
equilibrium  of  the  balance  of  payments,  since  persistent  dif-
ficulties  of this  kind in a  State could  gravely  compromise  the 
freedom  of  economic  exchange  within  the  Community.  Cf. 
on this  subject:  Gleske, L.:  Die Wahrungspolitik im Gemein-
sam  Markt;  in:  Wiihrungspolitik  in  der  europaischen  Inte-
gration  (ed.  Rieber,  H.,  KoHner,  L.)  Baden-Baden,  1964, 
p.  64. 
(
13
)  "  ...  so  far  as  may  be  necessary  to  attain  the objectives  of 
the  present  Treaty". 
(
14
)  The  last  case  corresponds  to  the  stage  of  integration  of 
the  "economic  union". T
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 summary  of  the  Treaty  provisions,  regulation  from 
the point of  view  of  utility  and  productivity  should 
be ensured by  the market  mechanisms.  In economic 
relations  among  Member  States,  the  market  mecha-
nisms  should  therefore  regulate real  distribution,  the 
pattern  of  inputs  and  outputs  and  the  resulting  re-
gional pattern for  all  national territories.  In the case 
of  the regional  pattern,  there  is  no  doubt an  auton-
omous  fundamental  objective  from  which  regulation 
functions  for  economic  policy  can  be  inferred;  this 
applies,  however,  not  to  the  whole  of  the  national 
territories, but only to less  developed regions, regard-
less of national frontiers. 
The only  sectors  in  which  the regulation  function  is 
not assigned to the market mechanisms are agriculture 
(Art. 39  and foiL)  and transport (Art. 129 and foil.). 
The  Treaty  further  recognises  that,  in  certain  parti-
cular  cases,  exceptions  to  regulation  by  the  market 
are warranted where these are priority non-economic 
objectives,  as  specified  by  Articles  36,  48  (3 ),  56 
and 90. 
(c) One preliminary remark is  called for in connection 
with  the  comparison  made  in  the  following  Table 
between  the  economic  system  as  conceived  by  the 
Common  Market  and  the  possible  effects  of  price 
controls  as  inferred in Part II, in the context of the 
Common  Market.  It must  be  emphatically  recalled 
that  these  effects  are  possible  effects  only.  Their 
appearance in practice depends, in particular, on three 
conditions: 
( 1 )  the  price  controls  in  question  must  relate  to 
products  capable  of  external trade; 
( 2 )  the price controls must be strictly applied in the 
way  we have assumed; 
( 3)  the economic  situation partly taken as  a hypoth-
esis  must be  realised. 
If  these conditions are satisfied, the following national 
controls  must  be  assessed  as  inconsistent  with  the 
economic system as conceived by the Common Market, 
wherever  they  are  not  necessitated  in a specific  case 
by priority extra-economic objectives, on  the basis  of 
the exceptions indicated  above. 
In Belgium,  we  would  cite  the  general  compulsory 
reporting of prices, accompanied  by  the right of veto 
and the ceiling in relative  value  of  mark-up  for  elec-
trical household appliances. 
In the Federal  Republic of Germany only the ceiling 
on  the  relative  value  of  mark-up  on  pharmaceutical 
products  is  inconsistent  with  the  conception  of  the 
economic system. 
The French price controls which are inconsistent with 
the  economic  syste..m  are  the  stability  contract,  the 
programme  contract,  the price  range  and  the system 
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of estimated prices, the two systems of freedom under 
control, and freedom under supervision, and the maxi-
mum  prices  for  the  direct  control  of  price  levels. 
In Italy it is the maximum prices for the direct control 
of price levels  and  the fixed  price controls  applicable 
to pharmaceutical products which  are likely  to preju-
dice  the hoped-for  effects  of integration. 
The  system  of  compulsory  authorisation  in  force  in 
Luxembourg can also be described as inconsistent with 
the system.  It  is, moreover, not impossible that there 
may be maximum prices for the direct control of price 
levels. 
In  the  Netherlands,  we  would  cite  the  practice  of 
quasi-voluntary  price  reporting  and  the  fixed  price 
controls  for  the  construction of workers'  housing. 
2.  CONSISTENCY  WITH  A  COMMON  ECONOMIC 
ORGANISATION  FOR  THE  ECONOMIC  UNION 
(a)  It was  relatively  easy  to  identify  the  Common 
Market  conception  of  the  economic  system.  It is  a 
more  delicate  matter to try  to develop  a  conception 
of organisation if the proviso in Article  6 ( 1) of the 
EEC  Treaty  is  directly  related  to  the  fundamental 
objectives  and if, following  the prevailing opinion of 
the  commentators,  we  regard  the  institution  of  an 
economic  union  as  the  objective of the Treaty.  The 
efforts  made  by  the Contracting  Parties not to com-
promise  the signature of the Treaty by a controversy 
over conflicting concepts of economic organisation has 
had the consequence that the Treaty does  not clearly 
commit  itself  to an  economic  system  generally  valid 
for  the  economic  union.  Since  Member  States  have 
not so far reached agreement on a common conception 
for  the future,  all  that we can  do here is  to attempt 
to outline an  assignment  of  the regulation  functions 
on  which  agreement  seems  likely.  Agreement  on  a 
common  conception  will  probably  result  from  an 
economically  pertinent  interpretation  of  the  Treaty, 
determined by the political conceptions of the majority 
of Member States and implemented under the respon-
sibility of the Commission.  We therefore propose  to 
proceed to a new and wider interpretation of the text 
of  the  Treaty,  a  comparison  of national  conceptions 
of  the  economic  system,  and,  finally,  a consideration 
of  the  attitudes  already  adopted  by  the  Commission 
on  this  subject. 
(b)  As  already  partly  demonstrated  in  the  previous 
section,  the text of the Treaty assigns  the short term 
regulation  of  quantitative  development  to economic 
policy  (Art.  104,  105), but it is  silent on long  term 
growth  policy.  If certain  provisions (15)  allude  to 
('5)  E.g.  Art.  128  on  a  common  vocational  training  policy. qualitative  development,  we  cannot  thereby  say  that 
its regulation is  a matter for economic policy. 
With regard  to  monetary  distribution,  the  Treaty  is 
not content with the results of the market mechanisms, 
and it follows that, in the last analysis, this distribution 
must be regulated by economic policy.  The actual text 
of the Treaty does not indicate any dominant principle 
of  regulation  for  the  regional  pattern.  The  market 
mechanisms,  on  the  other  hand,  are  unequivocally 
called  upon to play  a  decisive  part in trade between 
Member States  and in the mobility of factors  within 
the Community.  The relevant provisions of the Treaty 
are meaningful, in the light of the fundamental growth 
objectives,  only  if the  regulation  of  the  pattern  of 
inputs and outputs, the regional pattern by countries, 
and the real distribution of products capable of inter-
national trade, is  a matter for the market mechanisms. 
The  Treaty  does  not  confine  its  favourable  attitude 
towards  the  market  regulation  of  the  movement  of 
factors  to cases  where  those  factors  are  employed  in 
sectors  producing  such  products.  It may  therefore 
be inferred that the regulation of the pattern of inputs 
in the integrated territory-at least  so  far  as  it con-
cerns  the  employment  of  the  factors  of  produc-
tion-must generally be left to the market mechanisms. 
On the other hand, no general inference can be drawn 
as  to  the  structural  elements  of  the  dimensions  of 
enterprises. 
sector, while economic policy is combating these trends 
by encouraging the production of goods which are the 
subject of internal trade. 
The converse  situation is  equally possible:  restrictive 
economic policy measures may hamper the employment 
in  the  internal  trade  sector  of  factors  of  production 
liberated  by  the  market  mechanisms  in  the  external 
trade sector.  An economic policy embracing the whole 
of the internal trade sector can therefore be conducted 
without prejudicing the objectives  of the Treaty only 
if it regulates  this  sector in conformity  with the  re-
quirement of the external trade sector. But one could 
then  no  longer  speak  of  autonomous  regulation  by 
economy  policy.  An  autonomous  regulation  of  the 
pattern of outputs by  economic policy which did not 
appreciably  distort  the  external  trade  sector  could 
therefore  relate only  to relations  within  the  internal 
trade  sector,  whereas  the  level  of  that sector  is  the 
result  of  the  market  mechanisms  which  are  decisive 
for the external trade sector. 
It is certainly questionable whether such an assignment 
of regulation functions  is  operational and meaningful. 
In  the  light  of  these  comments,  the  elements  of 
economic  policy  contained  in  the  EEC Treaty which 
are  important  for  the  Economic  Union  can  be  sum-
marised in the following Table. 
Table of  principles which can be inferred from the EEC Treaty for the definition of  the conception of  economic policy 
. applicable to the Economic Union. 
Development  Allocation  Distribution 
quantitative  qualitative  pattern 
of outputs 
pattern 
of inputs 
regional 
pattern 
monetary  real 
Data on the regulation of the whole of the pattern of 
outputs (including products which  are  the  subject  of 
internal  trade)  can  be  indirectly  inferred  if, for  the 
purposes of theoretical consideration, we  assemble  in 
a  single  sector  the  branches  which  produce  goods 
capable of international trade and those which produce 
goods  intended for the national market.  If the exter-
nal  trade  sector  is  regulated  by  the  market  and  the 
internal  trade  sector  by  economic  policy,  distortions 
in the effects expected from integration are not impos-
sible, owing to the general interdependence.  Situations 
are indeed conceivable in which, as a result of increases 
in  factor  prices  or  product  prices,  trends  resulting 
from  the  market  mechanisms  become  manifest  and 
have the effect of extending the sector of direct impor-
tance to external trade at the cost of the internal trade 
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Since  information  is  scanty  on economic  policy  con-
cerning the components of development we have mark-
ed them {as  well  as  the regional  pattern) with an  X 
meaning  that the  assessment  remains  uncertain.  The 
blank rectangles  in  the  columns  for  the  pattern  of 
inputs  and  outputs  and  real  distribution  mean  that 
the market mechanisms are dominant, while the shaded 
rectangle for monetary distribution means  that it falls 
within the competence of economic  policy. 
(c)  In order to designate the economic policy concep-
tions  of  Member  States  of  the  Community  we  can 
refer back to the national conceptions already discussed 
and summarised in the Table below.  Since  agreement 
on  a  common  future  economic  organisation  largely 
depends  on majority decisions,  a common conception Table of  conceptions of  the economic system in Member States of  the Community ~d  of  ~he common co!lc':pti<:t ~~the 
organisation of the economic system which would probably result in the Econonuc Umon from a  maJortty  ectston. 
Member States: 
Regulation .  functions 
I 
~- 1.  quantitative 
~5 
::.  ;: 
2  qualitative  Q 
::!  3.  pattern· of outputs 
c· 
-~  4.  pattern of inputs 
...!: 
~  5.  reg10nal  pattern 
::!  6  monetary 
-~ 
~  7.  real  ·;:: 
~ 
Notes: 
Blank rectangles:  predominance of market mechanisms. 
Shaded rectangles: predominance of economic-policy. 
B  =Belgium; 
D  =Federal Republic of Germany; 
F  =France; 
I  =Italy, 
L  =  Luxembourg; 
N  =  Netherlands. 
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can  be inferred from  the existing assignment of regu-
lation  functions  in  Member  States,  under  which  the 
regulation of quantitative development, regional  s~ruc­
ture  and  monetary  distribution  would  be  essentially 
assigned  to economic  policy  and the other regulation 
functions  primarily  to  the  market mechanisms. 
Our deductions  do  not conflict  with our first  indica-
tions of a common conception of the economic system 
inspired  by  the  text  of  the  Treaty.  The probability 
of  such  an  agreement  is,  for  example,  enhanced  by 
the  fact  that  certain  signs  of  approximation  can  be 
noted  between  the  two  countries  which  differ  most 
widely  in  this  respect,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Ger-
many  and  France.  In the Federal Republic,  the first 
elements of overall planning have recently been  intro~ 
duced  and systematic regional policy  is  being increas-
ingly discussed.  As  a first sign of a change of climate 
in the French conception of the economic system, we 
may  cite the fact  that  the sectoral breakdown in  the 
V  th Plan  was  relegated  to the  Annex.  With regard 
to qualitative development, it may be recalled that, by 
B 
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an  isolated  anticipation,  it  has  already  been  partly 
assigned to economic policy. 
(d) The taking into account of these influence  in for-
mulating a common conception of the economic system 
by  the Commission of the Community is most clearly 
evidenced  by  the  official  attitudes  adopted  by  t~e 
Commission  on  the  question  of  common  economic 
programming  and  common  medium  term  economic 
policy. 
The  very  general  Action  Programme  for  the  second 
stage (16)  includes formulations which seem to indicate 
that the regulation of quantitative development (p. 7, 
p.  61  and foil.) regional pattern (p.  68  and foil.)  and 
monetary  distribution falls  within  the competence of 
economic  policy.  The  idea  of  "market  mechanism" 
e
6
)  EEC  Commission:  Memorandum  of  the  Commission  on 
the Action Programme of the Community for  the Second Stage, 
Brussels,  24  October  1962. is  absent from this programme.  The role of the State 
in  the  economy,  which  the  Introduction  emphasizes 
in  general  terms,  is,  moreover  placed  on  the  same 
footing as that of competition, especially in Chapter II. 
Convinced  that  the  aims  of  a  prosperous  and  free 
society  will  be  best  achieved  by  competition,  the 
authors of the programme consider  that it "will have 
an essential role to play in the control of the economic 
process ... ". (1
7
) 
Effective  decisions  on  the  assignment  of  regulation 
functions  to the market mechanisms cannot, however, 
be inferred either from  these passages or from the list 
of  the  favourable  effects  of  competition. (18)  The 
Chapter  on  economic  policy,  when  it  proposes  the 
introduction  of  programming  extending  over  several 
years,  has,  moreover,  a  certain  tone  which  recalls 
French  planning. (1
9
)  It was  not without  reason (20) 
that the guidelines  of  the  action  programme  on eco-
nomic policy aroused criticism, especially in the Federal 
Republic  of Germany,  and  that the Commission  was 
blamed for  seeking  to transpose  into the Community 
the French planning system. (2
1
)  The Commission was 
thus  induced  to  clarify,  and  partly  to  correct,  its 
treatment of common  economic  policy  in its  Recom-
mendation  to the Council  on medium  term economic 
policy for the Community. (22) 
This  appreciably  more  precise  statement  of  attitude 
expressly refers to the market mechanisms.  Whenever 
this  text says  that State intervention may  distort  the 
market mechanisms, it may  be generally inferred that 
certain regulation functions are predominantly assigned 
to these mechanisms. 
(1
7
)  Ibid.,  p.  20. 
( 
18
)  EEC  Commission,  Memorandum  of  the  Commission  on 
the Action Programme  of the Community for  the second stage, 
Brussels,  24  October  1962,  p.  20. 
(1
9
)  For  example,  in  the  establishment  of  a  "consolidated 
programme"  for  the  Community  countries  which  would  spell 
out "the course  that Community  action  should  as  far  as  pos-
sible  follow"  (p.  56)  and  "the probable  breakdown  (or  that 
which  is  desirable  or deemed  acceptable)  of the gross  national 
product  as  between  the  main  sectors  of  activity"  (ib  ).  While 
the  question  of  the  finer  structure  of  the  programme  was 
left  outstanding,  the  section  on  "Structural Policy"  said  that 
"the  Commission  was  not  proposing  that  targets  should,  at 
this  juncture,  be  set  for  individual  industries". 
(
20
)  Cf.  also  Berg,  H.:  Auf dem  Wege  zu einer mittelfristigen 
Wirtschaftspolitik der EWG; in:  WD, 46th year, 1966, p. 490. 
(2
1
)  This  presumption  has  been  particularly  reinforced  by  the 
fact  that it was,  and is,  in the interests of France to diminish 
the  distortions  which  external  trade  creates  in  the  execution 
of  its Plan by extending its  economic  system  to  the whole  of 
the Community. 
Cf.  on  this  subject,  e.g.  Balassa,  B.:  Planung  in  einer  of-
fenen  Marktwirtschaft,  in WD,  47th year,  1967,  pp.  257  and 
foll. 
(2
2)Medium-term  economic  policy  for  the  Community,  Recom-
mendation  by  the  Commission  to  the  Council,  submitted  on 
26  July  1963,  reproduced  in  Supplement  to  the  Bulletin  of 
the  EEC,  No.  8-1963,  pp.  13-22. 
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This assumption is  borne out by the requirement that 
State action shall be made to fit into a coherent frame-
work and shall neither be inconsistent in itself nor 
"upset the free  play  of the market except in  so 
far as  this is  essential and expressly agreed to by 
all  authorities concerned"  (p.  14 ). 
Quantitative  projections  should  not  be  regarded  as 
growth targets for the Community; they should simply 
give  indications  of  the  possibilities  and  probabilities 
of economic development.  The breakdown of projec-
tions  is  thought necessary  for 
"those  sectors  in  which  government  or  Com-
munity  policy  plays  a  predominant  part  (e.g. 
agriculture,  energy,  transport  or  housing)". 
(p.16). 
For the internal test of consistency another breakdown 
is  no doubt provided by major sector of activity, but 
it  should  not  be  made  public.  The  draft  Common 
Medium-Term  Economic  Policy  Programme  aims  at 
co-ordinating national economic policies;  it should in 
no  case  co-ordinate  the  activity  of the  different  eco-
nomic  transactors.  It should lead  nor to an  increase 
but to a diminution in the number of State interven-
tions in the economic process. 
We shall now try to clarify  the assignment of regula-
tion functions which is implicit in this text; whenever 
an  active competition policy  is  advocated because 
" ... the free play of the market is  the most effec-
tive instrument to ensure the best use of available 
resources and is  a fundamental factor making for 
economic progress", (p.  13) 
it can be taken that at least the regulation of the pat-
tern of inputs is  assigned  to  the market mechanisms. 
A similar conclusion  can  in general be drawn for  the 
regulation  of  the  pattern  of  outputs,  since  it  is  re-
cognised  that 
"investment in  the private sector can  be left  to 
the mechanism of  the market" (p.  18) 
and  a  common  policy  is  advocated  only  for  public 
investment to meet public needs. 
While referring back  to the autonomous fundamental 
objective of the Treaty concerning regional policy (see 
above),  this text assigns  the regulation of the regional 
pattern to economic policy through "balanced regional 
development  in  the  EEC".  The Recommendation  is 
silent  on  distribution  and  quantitative  development. 
Qualitative development  is  envisaged  in  the  sections 
on "Teaching and vocational training" and "Scientific 
and  technical  research".  It cannot,  however,  be in-£erred  from  the passages  on the  co-ordination  of na-
tional policies  in these fields  that economic  policy  is 
regarded  as  the dominant principle in  the regulation 
of qualitative development. 
The  First  Medium-Term  Economic  Policy  Program-
me { 23)  throws no fresh light on the conception of the 
economic  system.  The  first  part,  and  the  model 
medium-term economic policy developed by the Com-
mission (Part 2, Chapter 1) stress in general terms the 
importance of competition and the market mechanisms 
for  the development of the Community.  The essence 
of  this  programme  is  centred  on proposals  designed 
to encourage  the economic policy of increasing aggre-
gate  supply.  It is  already more clearly  apparent here 
that quantitative development at least must fall within 
the competence of economic  policy.  Even if compar-
able  tendencies can be noted for  certain partial fields 
of qualitative development (vocational training policy, 
research policy) it does not thereby seem  justifiable to 
assign  all  the  qualitative  components  to  economic 
policy.  The passages on sectoral structure policy seem 
to indicate that economic policy should not assume the 
regulation of the pattern of outputs but should simply 
sustain the structural changes initiated by the market. 
With regard to the pattern of inputs, the programme 
merely proposes the lifting of State-imposed obstacles 
to  economically  reasonable  concentrations  of  enter-
prises.  The guidelines of regional p<)licy, in their turn, 
stress  the  predominance  of  economic  policy  for  the 
regional  pattern.  The passages  on incomes policy  are 
partly based on the State's responsibility in the matter 
of  monetary distribution. 
The overall conception of the economic system  so  far 
established is equally reflected in the recently published 
draft  Second  Medium-Term  Economic  Policy  Pro-
gramme. (24)  This  programme  is  regarded  as  com-
pleting  and  intensifying  the  first  programme  and  its 
keystone  is  the  declaration  of  the  principles  of  a 
general structural policy.  The text begins by recalling 
the responsibility of enterprises themselves in initiating 
the necessary measures of adaptation; but it emphasizes 
that Member  States  and  the Community  institutions 
should create  the general  conditions  to enable  enter-
prises to prepare and pursue their adaptation (I. p. 9). 
In the matter of quantitative development, it is  indi-
cated  that economic  policy  should  ensure  a vigorous, 
continuous  and  balanced  growth  and,  to  this  end, 
should  systematically  encourage  the  mobility  of  the 
factors  of production  (II. p.  12)  and,  where  appro-
priate should encourage,  by  tax measures,  the invest-
ments  of enterprises of all categories (II. p.  18). 
(
23
)  EEC  Commission:  First  Medium-Term  Economic  Policy 
Programme, published in the Official Gazette of the European 
Communities, No.  79  of 25 April  1967.  e
4
)  Commission  of the  European  Communities:  Draft  Second 
Medium-Term  Economic  Policy  Programme.  COM  (68)  148 
(Final),  Brussels,  20  March  1968. 
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In the  matter  of  qualitative  development,  an  active 
policy  is  advocated  in the field  of  vocational  training 
and of scientific and technical research and of innova-
tion (V.  p. 6).  While the programme sets  the target 
of increased total expenditure on research and innova-
tion, (25)  it does  not specify  whether the direction of 
the research and innovation process should be assumed 
by  economic policy.  Such  an  assumption  seems  most 
plausible  in  the  case  of  research,  since  reference  is 
made  to a general  orientation, by  way  of indication, 
of State subsidies  in favour of research in enterprises 
(V.  p.  15) and  of  the  combination  of  subsidies  and 
government  contracts  with  research  contracts  (V. 
p.  16) 
In the case of innovation, on the other hand, the con-
viction  is  expressed that: 
"Competition, if exercised  in  satisfactory  condi-
tions  of effectiveness, constitutes (  ... ) one of the 
essential driving forces of innovation". (V. p. 10). 
A decisive  role is  therefore attributed to competition 
policy in stimulating innovation.  The qualitative regu-
lation  function  therefore  cannot  be  assigned  with 
relative unambiguity.  If, on the basis of the foregoing 
considerations, we assign it to the market, this is  not 
without a certain arbitrary element. 
Although Member States should reinforce their action 
in the field of sectoral structure policy, it is manifestly 
not intended to assign the regulation of the pattern of 
outputs  to economic  policy.  The  competence  of  the 
market  mechanisms  is  clearly  emphasized  when it is 
said  that 
"sectoral evolution is primarily the result of action 
by enterprises" 
and  that it must not be overlooked that 
"the final  responsibility  for  the structural devel-
opment of industry  and  services  lies  with enter-
prises".  (III, p.  4 ). 
Sectoral  structure  policy  should  therefore  first  and 
foremost  improve  the bases  which enable enterprises 
to adapt themselves on their own initiative (I. p.  13 ). 
Measures  of public support for certain sectors  should 
play a subsidiary role or should be regarded as  excep-
tions (III. p. 12).  All measures of sectoral aid should, 
as  far  as  possible,  introduce or reinforce  an  effective 
competition (III. p. 16) and, therefore it is particularly 
necessary  to  refrain  from  manipulating  the prices  of 
certain sectors in order to keep down the input prices 
of other sectors (III. p.  17  and foil.).  The only thing 
(25)  It is  recommended,  for  example,  that  priority  should  be 
given  to resources  assigned  to research  (V.  p.  8) and that the 
fastest  possible depreciation  should be allowed  for  equipment 
used for research. which  seems  out  of  place  in  these  remarks  is  the 
exception of price  manipulations  in favour  of house-
holds. 
Similarly,  the  competence  of  market  regulation  is 
emphasized in the case of the pattern of inputs, when 
it is said that the improvement of productivity and the 
strengthening of competition  depend,  to an  essential 
degree,  on  the  efforts  made  by  enterprises  to bring 
their structures into line with future conditions  (II, 
p.  3)  and  that  competition  is  the  best  incentive  to 
adaptation (II. p.  14  ). 
The policy deemed necessary should therefore not tend 
"to limit,  in  one  way  or  another,  the  freedom 
of decision  of enterprises  in a  matter  which  is 
fundamentally  their  own  responsibility"  (II, 
p. 11). 
It should merely  create  the desired  conditions  which 
allow  this  freedom  of  choice  to be exercised  in  the 
direction most favourable  to the overall plan. 
In the matter of regional patterns, the document again 
stresses  the great  importance  of a  vast regional  pro-
gramme  and  emphasizes  that it must create  the con-
ditions 
"to enable all  the regions  of the Community  to 
share  in  economic  and  social  progress,  and,  in 
particular,  to  make  up  the  leeway  of  the  less 
favoured  regions"  (I. p.  14  ). 
Since all the measures referred to fall into the category 
of intensive reforms,  the decision  on the question of 
allocation is  unequivocally in favour of regulation by 
economic policy. 
The competence of economic policy  to regulate mon-
etary distribution is  confirmed,  since  the distribution 
of incomes must be improved to the advantage of the 
less  favoured categories of the population and capital 
formation  must  be  encouraged  among  wide  social 
strata (1.  p.  16; VI. p. 2). 
Although no unambiguous  attitude has  been adopted 
towards direct State action on prices (VII. p. 20), the 
programme implicitly casts doubt on the value of price 
controls for distribution policy.  The text recalls in this 
connection that: 
"when competition plays  a large  part, especially 
in  the  matter  of  prices,  it...  affords  the  best 
guarantee  against  unwarranted  price  increases, 
provided  that  there  is  no  excess  aggregate  de-
mand" (26)  (VII. p.  18). 
(
26
)  In this case the general recommendation should be applied 
that "it is  principally  the  causes  themselves  of  general  price 
increases which it is necessary to combat and to try to eliminate 
in lasting manner" (VII. p.  20). 
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and that: 
"any  measure  tending  to  control  profits  is  in 
danger of prejudicing free enterprise, the essential 
foundation  of  economic  development,  and,  in 
particular,  of  discouraging  innovation  ... "  (VII. 
p. 17). 
In order to supervise  the functioning  of  the market 
mechanisms,  the  text  recommends  the  continuous 
observation  of  prices  (VII.  p.  18)  and  in  order  to 
improve that functioning, the abolition of resale price 
maintenance (VII. p. 19). 
As  it is  self-evident that real distribution is  governed 
by the market mechanisms, this regulation function is 
not discussed in the draft programme. 
(e)  We  have  thus  seen  that  the  official  attitudes 
adopted by the Commission do not conflict with the 
"average" conception of the economic system inferred 
from  the national  conceptions;  better still,  they  can, 
broadly  speaking,  be  relied  upon  to  support  it.  It 
therefore seems legitimate to assess  the national price 
controls in the light of this conception.  In an economic 
union involving a common economic organisation, the 
consequences inferred in the context of the EEC may 
be  just as  important as  those inferred in the national 
context.  It is  certainly not out of the question that, 
in particular cases,  the effects  studied in certain con-
ditions  may  counterbalance,  or  more  than  counter-
balance each other.  But it is difficult to infer in general 
the  probable relative influence  of these  effects,  com-
pared  with each  other;  this  question cannot,  in  any 
event, be dealt with in the present study, if only for 
reasons of space.  The Table below therefore combines 
the possible effects  resulting from  the Tables in Part 
II.  As it is  primarily the adverse effects in which we 
are interested here, priority has  been given  to them; 
where  the  effects  are  two-way  the  synoptic  Table 
therefore shows  the adverse  effect  only.  This  proce-
dure may lay itself open to criticism, but it nevertheless 
seems to us to be justified by the object of our study. 
It should  once  again  be  pointed  out,  for  the inter-
pretation of the Table, that the effects which it shows 
are simply possible  effects.  It is  certainly not impor-
tant at this stage of the appreciation that each control 
should relate to products capable of external trade, but 
the  conditions  taken  as  a  hypothesis  in our  analysis 
of  the  effects  must  be  fulfilled.  Even  in  this  case, 
however, a control cannot be described as  "inconsist-
ent" with the economic system where its  application 
is  justified,  exceptionally,  by  priority  extra-economic 
objectives.  Subject to these conditions, the following 
national price controls  are inconsistent with the con-
ception  of  the  economic  system  adopted  for  the 
Economic Union. 
In Belgium:  permitted resale price maintenance agree-
ments, the costing rules for pharmaceutical specialties T
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 with  an  equivalent  foreign  supply,  the normal  price 
rule,  compulsory  reporting  accompanied  by  a  right 
of  veto  and  the  ceiling  for  the  relative  values  of 
mark-up on electrical household appliances  and medi-
caments. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany:  permitted resale 
price maintenance  agreements  for  branded goods  and 
printing and publishing products and  the ceiling  per-
centage for mark-up on medicaments and for architects' 
fees. 
In France:  stability  contracts,  programme  contracts, 
the prohibition of discriminatory practices, price ranges 
and estimated prices, price freedom under control and 
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maximum  prices  for  the  direct  control  of  the  price 
level. 
In  Italy:  permitted  resale  price  maintenance  agree-
ments, maximum  prices  for  the direct control of  the 
price level and fixed  prices for  medicaments. 
In Luxembourg:  the  general  control  of  rebates,  the 
normal price rule for  Luxembourg products and com-
pulsory reporting accompanied by the right of veto. 
In the Netherlands:  permitted resale price maintenance 
agreements, the system of quasi-voluntary price report-
ing  and  the  fixed  price  rule  for  the  construction  of 
workers' housing. ON THE OBJECTIVES  OF THE COMMON  ECONOMIC  POLICY 
The aim  of  our  study  is  now  achieved.  It has  been 
to set out as  fully  as  possible  the ·price  controls  at>-
plicable in each Member State of the European Com-
munity,  to  infer  their  possible  effects  and  to  assess 
the  consistency  of  these  controls  with  the  economic 
system.  Our assessment  depended on  the conception 
of the  economic  system  prevailing  in  each  country. 
It has  been  demonstrated  that  certain  controls  can 
be said to be inconsistent with the system in the light 
of the conceptions of the economic system both of the 
country itself  and  of the EEC,  corresponding  to the 
different  stages  of  integration.  Other  controls  are 
certainly  consistent  with the  national  conceptions  of 
the economic system, but cease to be so on the intro-
duction, by integration, of a common economic system. 
A  third  group  of controls  is  not  inconsistent  either 
with  the  national  or  the  common  system  for  the 
assignment of regulation functions.  We were naturally 
tempted to convert our conclusions into concrete econ-
omic policy recommendations, but this conversion did 
not  seem  to us  to be  sufficiently  unchallengeable  in 
every case,  and we  have  therefore  renounced  it com-
pletely.  If, for  some  of  the controls,  the results  we 
have  reached  make  it  perfectly  possible  to infer  re-
commendations, in other cases the weight to be attach-
ed  to  our  results  depends  on  the  practical  validity 
of the assumptions made as  to the conditions of appli-
cation,  assumptions  which  we  have  been  constrained 
to  introduce  for  lack  of  adequate  information.  But 
the  results  of  the  present  work  could  be  used  as  a 
basis for particular research capable, owing to its more 
limited  objectives,  of  paying  closer  attention  to  the 
real  facts  than  we  have  been  able  to do.  We  shall 
conclude  with  some  general  indications  of  the  work 
which still remains to be done if it is  desired to draw 
practical conclusions for the common economic policy. 
These conclusions  might be as  follows: 
(a)  the repeal of controls; 
(b)  the uniformisation  (harmonisation) of  controls; 
(c)  the retention of  controls  in  their  present  form. 
In principle, the repeal of controls should be contem-
plated where they do not correspond to the common 
conception  of the  economic  system.  Even  consistent 
controls, however, cannot be maintained in their pre-
sent form  if  their disparities  of detail .are  in  danger 
of creating major obstacles to the exchange of factors 
and  products  among  Member  States;  in  this  event 
harmonisation  is  essential.  Before  any  decision  as  to 
122 
the policy  to be  adopted in this  field,  it is  necessary 
to ascertain whether the partly hypothetical conditions 
of application assumed in the present study correspond 
to the facts. 
It should,  in  the  first  place,  be  verified  empirically 
whether  the  way  in  which  the controls  are  applied, 
which  may  have  been  taken  as  an  assumption,  cor-
responds  to the true facts,  or whether an  application 
of  this kind is  possible under the legal  interpretation 
of the controls.  If so, there is no obstacle to the deci-
sion to repeal inconsistent controls if they are general 
controls whose validity is  not limited to specific prod-
ucts. (Zl)  Consistent  controls  of  this  kind  should 
again be compared and examined to see whether their 
disparities of detail raise any obstacle to the movement 
of  products  and  factors  between  Member  States. 
Whenever this seems possible, there must be harmon-
isation. If such obstacles are highly improbable, there 
is  no  objection  to  retaining  these  controls  in  their 
existing form. 
For controls of limited application to certain markets, 
further  research  is  necessary.  If we  have  classified 
these  controls  as  inconsistent,  it must be  considered 
in  the  first  place  whether  there  are  valid  arguments 
against the suppression of State intervention. 
These arguments  might  be  the following: 
( a)  the market  mechanisms  are  not capable  of func-
tioning in  the fields  subject  to price control be-
cause  certain  fundamental  conditions  are  not 
satisfied; (
28
) 
(b)  the  market  mechanisms  so  far  as  their  funda-
mental  conditions  are  concerned,  are  certainly 
capable  of  discharging  the  regulation  functions 
assigned  to them  by  the  conception  of  the eco-
nomic  system,  but the results  may  nevertheless: 
- either be unsatisfactory for economic reasons; 
functioning  too  slow,  or collapse of costs  or 
private  and  social  incomes, 
- or may  not be deemed  desirable  in the light 
of priority extra-economic objectives. 
(
27
)  E.g.  the  general  prohibition  of  discriminatory  prices,  the 
normal price  rule, and general  compulsory price  authorisation, 
among .others. 
(2
8
}  Cf.  pp.  18  and foil.  above. But  the  absence  of  fundamental  conditions  or  the 
presence of economically  unsatisfactory  results is  not 
enough in itself to compel the introduction of the cor-
responding control.  It is  only when appropriate ec.o-
nomic  policy  measures  cannot  satisfy  the  conditions 
in  question, or cannot sufficiently  speed up  the func-
tioning,  that the retention of an inconsistent control 
may be justified. 
On  the other hand, in the case  of exceptional sectors 
which  must  systematically  be  regulated  by  economic 
policy in the light of priority extra-economic objectives, 
the repeal of a control because it distorts the regulation 
functions of the market mechanisms cannot be recom-
mended.  In every  case  where  the introduction of  a 
price control is justified, it must be verified in practice 
whether its harmonisation or the co-ordination of its 
application is  not essential. 
All inconsistent controls which show an adverse result 
on the completion of these verifications, should be the 
subject of a proposal for  their repeal.  In the case of 
controls classified as consistent, it must be ascertained 
whether disparities  of detail  are  calculated  to distort 
economic  relations  among  Member States.  If so,  the 
controls must be harmonised with each other. 
A word must be said in conclusion on the urgency of 
the efforts  needed  to repeal  or  harmonise  price  con-
trols.  The degree of urgency of the necessary measures 
depends  both on the controls  themselves  and on the 
stage  reached  in  the  process  of  integration.  If the 
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controls  considered  in  the present document  are  not 
at present applied, or if infringements are not penal-
ised,  their  repeal  or harmonisation  is  not absolutely 
essential today, since the effects inferred are at present 
of  no  importance.  The  controls  in  question  should 
not, however, be entirely disregarded, since they may 
at  any  time  emerge  from  their slumber  and  exercise 
the  corresponding  effects.  From  the  point  of  view 
of the integration process,  attention should primarily 
be  concentrated  on  the  controls  which  have  been 
assessed  as  inconsistent  with the economic  system  as 
conceived by the Common Market.  The achievement 
of  the  Customs  Union,  scheduled  for  1  July  1968, 
and the progress in eliminating barriers to the move-
ment of factors  point to a reinforcement of the tend-
ency to harmonise product prices and factor prices in 
the integrated territory, which the controls in question 
might  distort  to  the  prejudice  of  growth  and  well-
being.  Since  the adverse effects in many cases hit the 
price-controlled country first,  it is  in the interests  of 
each partner to sustain the efforts of the Commission. 
It may be recalled, in general, that national price con-
trols represent only one measure of intervention among 
many  others  which  are  calculated  to  prejudice  the 
favourable  effects  on  growth  and  well-being  to  be 
expected  from  integration.  Thus,  the  measures  ad-
vocated  here,  by  way  of  allusion,  can  make  only  a 
small contribution to the economically sound achieve-
ment  of  the Economic  Community  and  the Customs 
Union. ANNEX 
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1.  Champaud,  C.  op. cit.  Part III, p.  7 and foil. 
2.  Van Meerhaeghe, M.A.G.:  The Belgian  Price Commissions, 
in W.A.  Vol.  99  1967  II, pp.  257  and  foil. 
3.  id.:  Prior Notification of Price  Increases  as  an  Instrument 
of  Price  Stabilisation  Policy;  in  Kyklos,  Vol.  XXII,  1968, 
pp.  26  and foil. 
4.  Ministere  des  Affaires  Economiques,  Administration  du 
Commerce,  Service  des  Prix,  Brussels,  letter  of  19  June 
1967. 
5.  Chambre de Commerce, Brussels:  Reglementation des  prix, 
1962,  pardy translated into  German by  the EEC  Commis-
sion,  2827 /IV  /67-D. 
A.  ENACTMENTS  GOVERNING PRICE  FORMATION 
I.  Enactments  on  price  fixing 
1.  Resale  price  maintenance  in  general  permitted, 
simple  supervision  of  abuse  under  general  pro-
visions 
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2. 
3. 
4. 
II.  G e n e r a I  p r i c e  f i x i n g  c o n t r o 1 s 
1.  Costing  rules  for  pharmaceutical  specialties {MB, 
1 June 1967). 
2.  Normal price rule pursuant to Act of 22 January 
1945 on offences against the legislation on national 
supplies. 
3. 
III.  P u b I i c i t y  a n d  s u p e r v i s i o n 
1.  Compulsory  publication  of prices  for  retail  trade 
and  for  services  of  an  industrial  or  commercial 
character (Ministerial Order of 30 April 1948). 
2.  General  compulsory price reporting,  accompanied 
by right of veto (M.B.  2  September 1966). B - Direct price  controls 
Stage 
Serial  Product  Remarks  Number 
Production  Distribution 
I. Price  controls 
(1)  Unit  prices 
1.  Bricks  X  X  For some sizes  also  frozen  at the 
level  reached  at  1  June  1965 + 
+ 21.2% 
2.  Milk  X  X 
3.  Film  rentals  X  -----
4.  L. T. electricity  X  -----
(2)  Price freeze 
5.  Gas  (mains  supply)  X  -----
6.  Wheat flour  X  X 
7.  Rice  X 
8.  Roast  chicory  X 
9.  Baking powder  X 
10.  Cornflour  X 
11.  Maizeflour  X 
12.  Vanilla  sugar  X 
13.  Biscuits  X 
14.  Tyres and inner tubes  X  Compulsory authorisation 
(3)  Control  of mark-up 
15.  Home-produced and imported butter  X  Maximum %  in absolute value 
16.  Electrical household appliances other than heating &  light-
ing etc.  X  Maximum %  in relative  value 
17.  Pork and beef  X  Maximum %  in absolute value 
II. Fixed  Prices 
1.  Passenger  transport, by: 
a)  Tram or trolleybus  X 
b)  Omnibus  X 
c)  Taxi  X  -----
d)  Light railways  X 
e)  Railway  X 
2.  Goods  transport,  by: 
a)  Light railway  X 
b)  Railway  X  -----
3.  Inland water transport  X  -----
4.  Towage charges  X  -----
5.  Hospital  charges  X  -----
128 PRICE CONTROLS  IN THE FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF GERMANY 
SOURCES 
1.  Champaud,  C.  op. cit.  Part  III, p.  1 and foil. 
2.  Ebisch, H. Preisrecht,  Supplement VIII E - Wirtschafts-
verwaltungsrecht  - Section  I-V  of  the  Series. 
M.v.  Brauchitsch,  Verwaltungsgesetze  des  Bundes  und  der 
Lande  (new  edition  by  ULE,  Ch.)  Cologne,  1966. 
3.  Holzapfel, W.:  Ubersicht iiber die geltended Preisvorschrif-
ten;  in:  Der  Betriebs-Berater,  19th  year  1964,  pp.  1391 
and foil. 
4.  Bundesminister fiir Wirtschaft, I B 1 - 24 00 79  letters of 
23  May  1966  and  19  April  1967. 
A.  ENACTMENTS  GOVERNING PRICE  FORMATION 
I.  Enactments  on  price  fixing 
1.  Resale  price maintenance generally forbidden  pur-
suant to Art.  15  of the Act on Restraint of Com-
petition;  under  Art.  16,  they  are,  however  per-
mitted for branded goods and printing and publica-
tion  products,  subject  to  supervision  of  abuse. 
2. 
3. 
4.  Limited  prohibition  of  price  discrimination  pur-
suant  to  Art.  26  (2)  of  the  Act  on Restraint  of 
Competition. 
5.  Limitation of discount for cash  at the retail stage 
under the Rebates Act of 25  November  1933. 
II.  Genera  1  price  con t r o 1 s 
1.  Costing  rules  for  public  contracts  under  the  fol-
lowing  enactments: 
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2. 
- Decree of 21  November  1953  on the price of 
public  contracts  (VPoA) 
- Directives for determining prices based on costs 
(Annex  to  VPoA  above,  dated 21  November 
1953) 
- Decree  of  9  December  19 55  on  the price  ot 
public contracts (construction) 
- Directives  of  25  May  1940  for  the  determi-
nation  of  the  price  of  public  contracts  (con-
struction)  on  the  basis  of  costs  (  LSBO)  and 
amendments  of  12  February  1942. 
3.  General prohibition of  overcharging under Art.  2 
(a) of the Economic Offences Act of 9 July 1954. 
III.  R u 1 e s  of  pub I i city  and  super  vi-
s ion 
1.  Compulsory  ticketing  of  retail  prices  under  the 
Decrees  on  compulsory  price  marking  of  16  No-
vember  1940 and 6 April 1944. 
2.  Compulsory price authorisation for: 
(a)  agricultural and forest land (Art. 9 of the Act 
of  28  July  1961  on transactions in land). 
(b)  hospital  charges  (Price  Decree  7/54 of  31 
August  1954 ). 
(c)  premiums for compulsory third party liability 
motor insurance (Arts.  8  to  11, Compulsory 
Insurance  Act  of  5 March  1965). 
(d)  Passenger  transport  fares  (Art.  39  of  Pas-
senger  Transport  Act  of  21  April  1961). 
(e)  Inland water transport charges  (Art.  21  and 
foil.  of the Act of  1 October 19 53  on indus-
trial  or  commercial  inland  water  transport. Serial 
Number 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
B - List  of products subject  to direct  price controls in  the  Federal  republic of Germany 
Stage 
Product  Remarks 
Production  Distribution 
I. Maximum  Prices 
Fertilizers  made from  X  X 
a)  lime 
b)  potassium 
c)  nitrogen 
d)  calcium  cyanamide 
e)  basic  slag 
Electricity  X  ----- Exception:  basic  price  for  indus 
trial,  commercial and agricultural 
users, and contractual price varia 
tion clauses  linked to wages  an  d 
coal  prices 
Motor insurance  agents'  commissions  X  ----- Since 1 January 1968,  these scale 
may be blocked under the Com 
pulsory Insurance  Act of 5  Apri 
1945 
Furniture removals (short distance)  X  -----
Residential  rents  X  ----- The consequences of rent restric 
tion have been repealed. Since th  e 
liberalisation  of rents  only State 
aided housing  (" social housing " 
is  subject  to  control  during  th 
period of the State  loan 
e 
Medicaments in pharmacies  X  X (1)  See  scales  of German /hysicia  ns 
in 1936,  in the text o  19  Apri  1 
1952 
(1) ·Mark-up  in  relative  value 
progressive by price brackets 
Professional  fees 
a)  doctors  and dentists  X  ----- medical  fees  (Preugo), 1924 
b)  advocates  and notaries  X  -----
c)  business  and  tax consultants  X  -----
d)  engineers  X  -----
e)  architects  X  ----- Rates  proportional  to  buildin  g 
costs 
--------- ------------------------------------------------1--------l--------l--------------------------
130 Stage 
Serial  Product  Remarks 
Number 
Production  Distn'bution 
II. Minimum  prices 
1.  Sugar beet  X  X.  Fixed annually 
2.  Stevedoring  X  -----
3.  Minimum wage for homeworkers under Act of  14 March 
1951  (BGB1  1951  I,  p.  191)  X  -----
4.  Statutory fixing of  working conditions and wages for casual 
dock labourers  X  -----
III. Fixed  prices  and price  brackets 
1. Fixed  prices 
1.  Colza  and rape  X  -----
2.  Milk  X  X 
3.  Sugar  X  X  Full  control 
4.  Long distance goods  transport by road  X  -----
5.  Customs clearance of  long distance goods transport by road  X  -----
6.  Furniture removals (long  distance)  X  -----
7.  Road transport operated by the railways  X  -----
8.  Road passenger transport  X 
2. Price  brackets 
9.  Short distance  road goods  transport  X  -----
10.  Grouped goods transport through forwarding  agents  X  -----
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Abbreviations  used  in  the  following  list 
as 
B 
cp 
cdp 
ES 
LC 
LS 
rS 
T 
tdm 
maximum  mark-up  in  absolute value 
price  frozen 
programme  contract 
price  range 
stability  contract 
freedom  under control 
freedom  under  supervision 
maximum  mark-up  in percentage 
controlled price 
rate  of mark-up  (on cost  price) 
no  special  distribution  stage 
132 A  - Enactments  governing  price  formation 
I - Enactments  on price fixing: 
1.  Resale  price maintenance is  prohibited. 
2. Table ofproducts or groups ofproducts covered by stability contracts (as  at 27 June 1966). 
-
Stage 
Serial  Product  Remarks 
Number 
Production  Distribution 
1.  Talcum  X 
2.  Cast iron sanitary ware, central heating boilers and radiators  X 
3.  Malleable  cast  iron joints  X  -----
4.  Motor and hand pumps  X 
5.  Industrial  and  commercial refrigerating  plant  X 
6.  Machine tools  X 
7.  Electrical  and pneumatic hand tools  X 
8.  Woodworking machinery  X 
9.  Agricultural tractors  and  motor-cultivators  X  Free import 
10.  Agricultural winches  X 
11.  Land preparation and drainage equipment, sowers,  sprays  X 
12.  Harvesting and haymaking equjpment  X  For reapers and binders B 51 
13.  Threshing and pressing  equipment  X  (1) 
14.  Other equipment for sorting and packing after harvest  X 
15.  Dairy and cheese-making  equipment  X 
16.  Miscellaneous  agricultural  implements  X 
17.  Sewing machines  X 
18.  Agricultural,  domestic and industrial handtools  X 
19.  Ironmongery  X 
20.  Galvanised  and tinned articles  X  rs24 
21.  Cutlery  X  I 
22.  Safes  X 
23.  Industrial  and  commercial metal furniture  X 
24.  Metal  beds  and mattresses  X  rsso 
25.  Hospital  furniture  X 
26.  Metal kitchen furniture  X  rs40 
27.  Metal garden furniture, miscellaneous metal seats, metal indoor 
and  outdoor furniture,  mechanical  steps  and  ladders  X 
28.  Spare  parts and accessories  for  motor cars  X  BS2 
133 Stage 
Serial  Product  Remarks 
Number 
Production  Distribution 
29.  Spare parts and accessories  for  cycles  and motorcycles  X 
30.  Radio  and television  receivers,  record  players  and  tape  re-
corders  X  tdm41 
31.  Incandescent electric lamps  X  (1)  (1) For 25 and 40 W  lamps see T16 
32.  Clocks  and  clockwork  X 
33.  Watches and  chronometers  X  BIOS 
34.  Compasses  and drawing instruments  X 
35.  Surgical,  medical  and veterinary instruments  X 
36.  Handmade and  semi-automatic glassware  X 
37.  Sanitary ceramics  X 
38.  Stoneware  X 
39.  Pottery or stone  facing  tiles  X 
40.  Clay and enamel powders  X 
41.  Asbestos  cement products  X 
42.  Concrete products  X 
43.  Sulphuric  acid  X  rs27 
44.  Hydrochloric acid  X 
45.  Carbon disulphide  X 
46.  Caustic soda  X 
47.  Metal salts  and  oxides  X 
48.  Nitrate  X 
49.  Methanol  X 
50.  Synthetic rubber and elastomers  X 
51.  Sulphamides, vitamins, hormones  X 
52.  Iodine and  salts  of iodine  X 
53.  Detergents  X 
54.  Grinding wheels  and compound abrasives  X 
55.  Wood board and fibres  X 
56.  Man-made continuous fibres  and yam  X  -----
57.  Preserved vegetables  X  rst& 
58.  Preserved fish  X  rsts 
134 3.  List of  main programme contracts. 
Date of signature  Group of products 
----------------------------1-----------------------------------------------------------------------
2-5-1966 
7-7-1966 
31-8-1966 
31-8- 1166 
16-9-1966 
30-9-1966 
30-9-1966 
10-11-1966 
10-11-1966 
30-12-1966 
30-12-1966 
30-12-1966 
7-2-1967 
14-2-1967 
Nov. 1967  a) 
Electrical household appliances 
Motor cars 
Maize flour  and the like 
Confectionery 
Miscellaneous electrical appliances 
Aluminium and products thereof 
Sporting guns and the like 
Foundry products 
Binders 
Incandescent lamps  and valves 
Paper and paperboard 
Blown and semi-automatic glassware 
Chemical products 
Office  machinery 
Electronics:  television and radio  receivers,  electronic spare  parts 
Source:  ,  Aufhebung der Preisblockade in Frankreich "; in: Zeitschrift  der  Deutsch-Franz6sichen  Wirtschqft,  3.1967,  p.  14 
(published by the official Franco-German Chamber of Commerce, Paris). 
(a)  cf.  Handelsblatt, No. 232 of 1-2 December 1967, p. 6. 
4.  General  prohibition of price  discrimination 
- Decree  on competition of 24 June 1958  (Price  Ordinance No. 45  - 1483,  Art.  37  No.  1 a) 
135 II - General  price  controls: 
1.  Costing rules: 
a)  Prohibition of  sale below cost: Art. 1 ofFinance Act 2July 1963, (No. 63-628) 
b)  List of  products and groups of  products subject to system of  estimated prices 
Stage 
Serial  Product  Remarks 
Number 
Production  Distribution 
1.  Heavy forgings  and drop forgings  X  -----
2.  Moulded steel  foundry  and malleable  castings  X  ----- Exception:  malleable  cast 
joints= ES 
3.  Copper and copper alloy foundry  X  -----
4.  Pressure foundry and non-ferrous foundry other than copper  X  -----
5.  Foundry models  X  -----
6.  Brassfoundry,  sheet  metal  working and welding  X (1)  ----- (1)  or: B 
7.  Steam engines,  steam  turbines,  steam  and  gas  turbines  X  -----
8.  Refrigeration plant  X  -----
9.  Lifting  and handling equipment  X (1)  (2)  ----- ( 2)  except:  mass  produced 
10.  Machinery for  the processing  of ores  and materials  X (1)  -----
11.  Machinery for  the ceramics  and glass  industries  X (1)  -----
12.  Foundry equipment  X (1)  -----
13.  Railway equipment  X  -----
14.  Structural steelwork,  sale  or rental  X  -----
15.  Stamping,  forging  and diecasting  presses  X (1)  -----
16.  Shipbuilding  X  -----
17.  Coachwork, tractors and  tip-lorries  X (1)  -----
18.  Aircraft  construction  X  -----
19.  Heavy electrical  engineering  X  -----
20.  Unlisted electrical  industrial  and  commercial appliances  X  -----
21.  Unlisted medium and light electrical machines (rotors, trans-
formers,  converters)  X  -----
22.  Railway  signalling  equipment,  light  electrical  road  or rail 
traction equipment  X (1)  -----
23.  Manufacture and installations of electrical lifts  and hoists  X  -----
24.  Unlisted radio  and electronic appliances  and spare  parts for 
the trade  X  -----
25.  Listed  equipment  for  telegraph  and  telephone  installations 
and  the like  X (1)  -----
26.  Unlisted  measuring  apparatus  and  electrical  and  electronic 
installations  X  -----
136 c)  List of  products and groups of  products the prices of  which are generally limited by a price range 
(List  as  at 27 June 1966) 
Stage 
Serial  Product  Number 
Production  Distribution 
Remarks 
1.  Fuel (ordinary  and high  octane petrol, gas-oil,  paraffin  oil)  LC2  X (1)  (1)  Also:  absolute value of mark-
up; price  reporting 
2.  Imported  crude  sulphur  X  B1s1 
3.  Imported  pyrites  X 
4.  Unadvertised pharmaceutical  specialties  X  rs44 
5.  Linseed  oil for industrial use  X  rs11 
6.  French and imported  furniture  and beds  in any  material  X  T 
7.  Specially  prepared wheat flour  X  T 
8.  Methylated spirits  X  T 
9.  Construction work and the like  X  -----
III - Rules  of publicity  and supervision 
1.  Retail traders are required to ticket and display prices. 
2.  Price reporting  and compulsory authorisation 
a)  List of  products and groups of  products subject to freedom under supervision (as  at 27 June 1966) 
Stage 
Serial  Product  Remarks 
Number 
Production  Distribution 
1.  Special  quality  lubricants  X  X 
2.  Aviation fuel  LC8  X 
3.  Aluminium  and aluminium  oxide  Bu  X 
4.  Zinc and lead  Baa  X 
5.  Imports  of: 
crude aluminium and  crude  unalloyed tin  X  -----
6.  Plate  glass  BUl  X 
7.  Imported  iodine  X 
8.  Advertised pharmaceutical specialties  Bus  X 
9.  Bread  X  X 
137 b)  List ofproducts and groups of  products subject to freedom under control (as at 27 June 1%6) 
Serial 
Number 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
Product 
Refinery repurchase  price for petrolewn products 
Fuels: 
ordinary and high octane petrol, gasoil,  paraffin  oil 
Fuel-oil 
Petrolewn pitch and tar 
Paraffins 
Liquefied petrolewn gases  (butane, propane) 
Ordinary lubricants 
Aviation fuel 
Special  fuels  for  two-stroke engines 
Home  produced  and  imported  coal,  anthracite  and  coking 
briquettes 
Home produced gas  coke 
Imports  of copper, ferro-nickel, nickel matte 
Ceramic electrical insulators in electro-technical porcelain 
Ocular prosthesis for persons insured under Social  Security 
Imported  Chile nitrates 
Schoolbooks  and  technical  textbooks,  first  and  subsequent 
editions 
Textile articles listed in the inter-Ministerial scale for certain 
health services 
Pasteurised milk  in certain Departements 
Sterilised milk 
Assembly work under estimate or by direct labour at enter-
prise wages 
Hiring and  maintenance  of listed  mechanical  and electrical 
engineering products subject  to price scales 
Cold storage, deep freezing and allied operations 
Tourist hotels (1  to 3  stars) 
Meals in dining cars 
Hire of radium for medical  purposes 
Hydropathic establishments 
Spa  establishments 
Professional football  matches 
Entrance fees  and rent of stands at fairs  and exhibitions 
Charges  of hairdressers  (other  than  luxury  establishments) 
and men's barbers 
Industrial railways 
State-approved Customs warehouses and general warehouses 
Services  rendered (new and varied) 
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Stage 
Remarks 
Production  Distribution 
X 
X  X 
X  X 
X  X 
X  X 
X  X 
X 
X 
X  (1)  ECSC provisions 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X I  - Fixed  total  price 
(List  as  at 27 June 1966) 
B - List  of products  and  groups  of products subject  to maximum price  control 
a)  products  controlled 
I 
Stage 
Serial  Product  Remarks  Number 
I Production  Distribution 
1.  Electricity  X  -----
2.  Mains  gas  X  -----
3.  Water  X  ----- Competence of Prefects 
4.  Special  fuel  for  two-stroke engines  LCD 
I 
X 
5.  Imports  of coal,  lignite  and  blast  furnace  briquettes  from 
non-ECSC countries  X 
I 
LClO 
6.  Unalloyed crude nickel  X  I -----
7.  Sporting ammunition  X  (1)  (1)  Compulsory  price  publicatio 
8.  Delivery of vehicles  and  motors to the  authorities  X  (1)  Fixed minimum rebates 
9.  Optical  medical  attention  included  in  the  inter-Ministerial 
list of health services  X 
10.  Copper sulphate  B13o  X 
11.  Processed sulphur for agricultural  use  Btao  X 
12.  Imported  Chile nitrates  LC15  X 
13.  Nitrogenous fertilizers  X (2)  X  (2)  or Btu 
14.  Phosphatic fertilizers,  slag  -x  X 
15.  Simple  superphosphate  BUD  X 
16.  Other phosphatic fertilizers  BliiO  X 
17.  Potassic  fertilizers,  calcium  chloride  But  X 
18.  Compound fertilizers  made  in Metropolitan France  X  X 
19.  Imported  fertilizers  X 
20.  Pharmaceutical products  X (3)  X  {3)  or B165 
21.  Remedies  dispensed non-industrially by pharmacists  X  X 
22.  Oilseeds  X (4)  (4)  market organisation 
23.  Groundnuts  X (6)  (6)  direct sale  to the consumer 
24.  Colza,  rape, sunflower oil,  cardamum  X (5) 
I 
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n --
Stage 
Serial  Product  Remarks  Number 
Production  Distribution 
25.  Leather goods included in the inter-Ministerial list of health 
services,  especially  orthopaedic footwear  X  -----
26.  French  or imported furniture  of all  materials  cdp  X(')  (5)  exceptions  under  Art.  2A  o  f 
ME 24931 
27.  Deliveries of cellulose  to the  Press  free  of VAT  X  -----
28.  Newsprint,  Afnor 1/1  X 
29.  Daily newspapers  X  tdm51 
Agricultural  products 
30.  Turnips  X  -----
31.  Fresh  and dry chicory roots  X  -----
32.  Rice  X  X 
33.  Bananas,  oranges,  apples,  pears  X 
34.  Milk other than high  grade pasteurised  milk  Target  X  Competence of Prefects 
price 
35.  Table poultry  X 
36.  U nfilleted beef  Interven- X 
tion 
price 
37.  Spare-ribs,  neck and breast of mutton  X 
38.  Fresh  pork and ordinary cooked  ham  X  In Corsica: competence of Prefec 
39.  Rindless and fatless  cooked ham; cooked shoulder  X 
40.  Dry sausages  X 
41.  Skate  X  Competence of Prefects 
42.  Mackerel  and  whiting  X 
43.  Salt  cod fillets  X 
44.  Semolina  X 
45.  Specially prepared wheat flour  cdp  X 
46.  Methylated  spirits  cdp  X 
47.  Sugar  X  X 
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Number 
48. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
59. 
60. 
61. 
62. 
63. 
64. 
65. 
66. 
67. 
68. 
69. 
Product 
Baking yeast 
Mineral waters and table waters 
Cooking and eating chocolate 
Wine vinegar 
Roast  coffee 
Laundering (sheets  and working clothes by weight) 
Dyeing and cleaning of men's and boys' coats, waistcoats and 
trousers  (other than formal  dress) 
Non-approved tourist hotels and furnished  accommodation, 
with certain exceptions 
Seasonal  furnished  lettings 
Property management 
Medical  analysis 
Private nursing homes, not under contract with social Security 
Hospitals,  public assistance 
Camp sites 
Renting  bungalows  and  other  group  holiday  and  leisure 
services 
Holiday centres 
Men's hairdressing 
Tug and  towage charges and inland  water freight 
Handling  charges in seaports  and  river ports;  loading  and 
unloading in seaports 
Public port facilities 
Taxis and ambulances 
Fees  of Customs agents 
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Stage 
Remarks 
Production  Distribution 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
( 6)  retail trade only: for wholesale 
trade;  B241 
----- Competence of Prefects 
----- Competence of Prefects 
Competence of Prefects 
Competence of Prefects 
----- Competence of Prefects 
- --- - Competence of Prefects 
- - - - - Competence of Prefects 
--- - - Competence of Prefects 
----- Competence of Prefects b)  Selling  price  frozen  for  each  enterprise 
Stage 
Serial 
Number 
Product  Remarks 
Production  Distribution 
1.  Steam  X  -----
2.  Gas  coke  X  LC11 
3.  Alumina bauxite  X  -----
4.  Other bauxite  X  -----
5.  Non-ferrous base  metal ores  X  -----
6.  Ferro-alloy ores  X  -----
7.  Precious  metal  ores  X  -----
8.  Miscellaneous metal ores  X  -----
9.  Asphalt blocks  and products  X  -----
10.  Barium and strontium ores  X  -----
11.  Fluor-spar  X  -----
12.  Fossil  silicon  X 
13.  Felspar and quartz  X 
14.  Asbestos  X 
15.  Iron oxide and the like  X 
16.  Aluminium and alumina  X  LS8 
17.  Magnesium  X  -----
18.  Electric furnace  or thermit welded ferro-alloys  X  -----
19.  Silicon,  chrome, manganese,  cobalt  X  -----
20.  Remelted copper  X  -----
21.  Electrolytic copper  X  -----
22.  Zinc and lead  X  LS' 
23.  Cadmium, antimony, bismuth  X  -----
24.  Gold, silver,  platinum, platinous metals  X  -----
25.  Remelted metal  X  -----
26.  Graphite and amorphous carbon electrodes, Soderberg paste  X 
27.  Home produced non-ferrous metal semi-manufactures  X  X (1)  (1)  nickel  semi-manufactures 
28.  Steel wire drawing,  drawing and cold rolling  X  rs2s 
29.  Steel  tubes  X  tdm38 
30.  Custom foundry  X  Except:  ES;  sanitary  castings, 
central  heating  boilers  and  radi-
a  tors 
CP:  domestic  cooking  and heat-
ing appliances 
142 Stage 
Serial  Product  Remarks 
Number 
Production  Distribution 
31.  Pressure  foundry:  non-ferrous  metal  foundry  other  than 
copper  X 
32.  Hydraulic ironfoundry  X 
33.  Listed  coppersmith sheet metal  and  welding  products  X 
34.  Brassfoundry, joints and fittings,  greasing  appliances  X 
35.  Listed equipment for combustion, air-conditioning and heat-
ing plants  X 
36.  Engines  X 
37.  Air and gas  compressors  X  rsto 
38.  Fire-fighting equipment  X 
39.  Lifting  and handling  equipment  X  or estimate 9 
40.  Apparatus  for  the mechanical  preparation of ores  and  rna-
terial  X  or estimate 10 
41.  Equipment for  the ceramics and glassware industries  X  or estimate  11 
42.  Special  equipment for  metallurgical factories  X 
43.  Foundry equipment  X  or estimate 12 
44.  Special equipment for mines and for oil prospecting, drilling 
and  operation  X 
45.  Permanent railway installations  X 
46.  Machine tools  X 
47.  Welding machinery and equipment  X 
48.  Welding products  X 
49.  Machine accessories  X 
50.  Testing  machines,  cabling  machines  X 
51.  Reapers  and binders  ESts  X 
52.  Milking machines  and  skimmers  ESto  X 
53.  Tractors  and farm  vehicles  X 
54.  Other agricultural  transport  X 
55.  Machinery  for  food  and  chemical  industries,  flour  milling, 
packing and baling machines, moulds and surfacing equipment  X 
56.  Footwear machinery  X 
57.  Listed  textile  machinery  X 
58.  Listed  paper,  paperboard and printing machinery  X 
59.  Sporting weapons,  shotguns  and  defensive  weapons  X 
60.  Cutting, drawing and embossing of  metal foil, metal cutting, 
fl.ans  ..  X (1)  (1)  Listed  products  only 
143 Stage 
Serial  Product  Remarks  Number 
Production  Distribution 
61.  Screw cutting,  turning, nuts  and bolts,  threaded screws  X (1)  (1)  Listed  products only 
62.  Forge stamping and  diecutting  X  ----- or estimate 15 
63.  Fittings for  electric lines  X 
64.  Forged nuts  and bolts  X  X (2)  {2 )  For sleeper-screws  only 
65.  Horseshoe nails,  crampons  X 
66.  Springs 
I 
I 
X 
67.  Mechanical  chains  X 
I 
68.  Tinsmith's work, sheet metal  X 
69.  Household and kitchen articles in steel, wrought iron, nickel,  X 
tin and  wire  X 
70.  Enamelware  X 
71.  Household articles in aluminium  X 
72.  Razor  blades  X  X 
73.  Metal barrels  and  drums  X  X 
74.  Metal boxes and packaging  X  X 
75.  Metal stoppers  and  containers  X 
76.  Milk churns  and dairy equipment in tinplate  X 
77.  Metal tubes  X 
78.  Metal smallware  X 
79.  Powder metallurgy products,  magnets  X 
80.  Motor vehicles  and engines therefore  X  For  sale  to  the authorities  T 8 
81.  Coachwork, tractors and tip-lorries  X  or estimate 17 
82.  Spare parts  and accessories  for  motor vehicles  ES2S  X 
83.  Motor cycles  and  cycles  X 
84.  Listed  apparatus  for  electricity  distribution  and  industrial 
applications  X 
85.  Listed small and medium power electrical machinery (rotors, 
transformers,  converters)  X 
86.  Railway  signalling  equipment,  light electrical  road  or  rail 
traction equipment  X  ----- or estimate 22 
87.  Listed electrical insulated wire and cables  X  rs25 
88.  Radio and electronic appliances and their listed spare parts  X  Subject to special 
89.  Electrical installation fixtures  and fittings  X 
90.  Electric lighting equipment  X 
91.  Listed  telegraph  and  telephone  installation  equipment  and 
the like  X  or estimate 25 
144 Stage 
Serial  Product  Remarks 
Number 
Production  Distribution 
92.  Insulating  tubes  X 
93.  Fixed condensers  X 
94.  Ceramic electrical  insulators  X  (2)  (2)  Insulators  in  electrotechnica 
porcelain v.  LC13 
95.  Listed electric and electronic measuring appliances and devices  X 
96.  Electric meters  X  -----
97.  Medical  electrical  and  radiological  apparatus  X 
98.  Miscellaneous  electrical equipment  X 
99.  Accumulators  X 
100.  Electric batteries  X  X 
101.  Electric lamp  sockets  and accessories  X  X 
102.  Clockwork 
except:  large  clockwork 
watches  ESa2 
chronometers  Esaa  X 
103.  Metal  pressure  gauges  and thermometers, pyrometers  X 
104.  Water and gas  meters  X 
105.  Taximeters  X 
106.  Automatic regulators  or controls for  industrial plant  X 
107.  Fuel distributors  X 
108.  Weighing machines  X 
109.  Non-optical precision instruments  X 
110.  Optical precision instruments  X 
111.  Optical glass  X 
112.  Spectacle  frames  X 
113.  Laboratory equipment  X 
114.  Photographic and cinematographic equipment  X 
115.  Bearings,  precision  controls  X  (1)  (1)  Bearings  cf.  rS2 6 
116.  Ofllce  machinery  X 
117.  Orthopaedic and prosthetic appliances  X  -----
118.  Surgical equipment and furniture  sterilisation equipment  X 
119.  Dentists equipment  X 
120.  Ocular prosthesis  X  (2)  (2)  For prosthesis for  insured  per-
sons under Social Security cf. LC14 
121.  Plate  glass  X 
I 
-LS6 
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Serial  Product  Remarks  Number 
Production  Distribution 
122.  Working plate glass  X 
123.  Mechanical and technical  glass  hollow-ware  X 
124.  Pharmaceutical flasks  and  ampoules  X 
125.  Blown glass  X 
126.  Fibreglass  X 
127.  Small mirrorware  X 
128.  Medical optical treatment other than that listed in the inter-
Ministerial scale  X 
129.  Bricks,  roughcast,  builders'  pottery  X 
130.  Tiles  X 
131.  Refractory products,  with exceptions  X 
132.  Porcelain articles  X 
133.  Water binders (cement)  X 
134.  Fat lime  X 
135.  Copper sulphate  X  -Tto 
136.  Crude sulphur, produced in Metropolitan France from natural 
gas  or residual  petroleum gases  X  X 
137.  Imported crude sulphur  cdp2  X 
138.  Processed  sulphur for industrial use  X 
139.  Processed  sulphur for agricultural  use  X  -Tu 
140.  Sodium products  X  (3)  (
3
)  For caustic soda ES46 
141.  Compressed gases  X 
142.  Calcium chloride and calcium  carbide  X 
143.  Hydrogen peroxide and salts  thereof  X 
144.  Boric  acid  and  salts  thereof,  other boracic  compounds  X 
145.  Ammonia  X 
146.  Nitric acid  X 
147.  Nitrogenous fertilizers  X (1)  (1)  or Tta 
148.  Nitrogenous products for  industrial use  X 
149.  Simple superphosphates  X  -Tto 
150.  Other phosphatic fertilizers  X  -Tl6 
151.  Potassic fertilizers  (potassium  chloride)  X  -Tt7 
152.  Industrial potassium  salts,  except nitrate ES48  X 
153.  Home produced pyrites  X 
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Serial  Product  Remarks  Number 
Production  Distnbution 
154.  Pure and compound mineral colours  X 
155.  Plastics  and synthetic resins  X 
156.  Resin  distillation products (turpentine, picth,  rosins)  X  tdm43 
157.  Tanning extracts  X 
158.  Household cleansing  products  X  X 
159.  Gelatine  and dextrine glues,  of any  origin  X 
160.  Vegetable  oils,  processed,  cooked,  blown and oxidised  X 
161.  Essential oils, floral oils and compounds thereof, with natural 
or synthetic aromatic products  X 
162.  Tar and its  derivatives  X 
163.  Benzene products  X 
164.  Explosives  X 
165.  Medicaments  X (2)  = T2o  (2)  or T20 
166.  Advertised pharmaceutical  specialties  X  -LS8 
167.  Abrasives  other than grindstones and compound abrasives  X 
168.  Paints and varnishes  X  tdm45 
169.  Artist's colours  X 
170.  Special  mastics  X 
171.  Printers' ink  X  X (3)  (3)  printers' ink for the Press  only 
172.  Plant health products  X 
173.  Wine-growing products  X 
174.  Photographic and cinematographic products  X 
175.  Luxury perfumery  X 
176.  Certain eau  de  cologne and lavender waters  X 
177.  Shampoos  X  tdmu 
178.  Toothpaste,  shaving  soaps  X  tdm47 
179.  Rubber industry products  X 
180.  Asbestos  products  X 
181.  Unmedicated sticking plaster  X  tdm48 
182.  Refmed edible vegetable oils  X  X (1)  (1)  other than  olive  oil,  cornseed 
oil  and health oils 
183.  Oils of copra,  palmetto, karite, castor  oil  X 
184.  Household soap  and  various  cleansing  products  X 
185.  Toilet soaps  X 
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186.  Candles,  tapers  X 
187.  Margarine  X 
188.  Vegetable fats  X 
189.  Cattlecake  X 
190.  Leather and  unworked hides  and skins  X  X 
191.  Leather industry products  X (2)  ( 2)  For  orthopaedic  footwear  v. 
T2o 
192.  Industrial timber (pit-props,  poles,  sleepers)  X  -----
193.  Unworked hardwood  X 
194.  Unworked softwood  X 
195.  Softwood in logs  X  -----
196.  Sawnwood,  all  species  X 
197.  Parquet flooring  (all  species)  X 
198.  Mosaic floors  X 
199.  Reinforced latticework  X 
200.  Fibreboard  X 
201.  Plywood and laths,  particle board  X 
202.  Structural  timber and builders joinery  X 
203.  Wooden packaging  X 
204.  Cooperage  X 
205.  Furniture, beds  X  tdm49 
206.  Paper pulp other than that delivered  to the Press  T 27  X 
207.  Newsprint Afnor  1/1  other than for  the Press  X 
208.  Wallpaper  X  tdm50 
209.  Unworked paper and paperboard other than newsprint 1/1  X 
210.  Waste paper  X  X 
211.  Daily newspapers  X  tdm52 
212.  Paper and paperboard products  X  X 
213.  Exercise  books  and  the like  X  tdm
63 
214.  School  books  and technical  textbooks  (first  and  subsequent 
editions)  X  -LC16 
215.  Stencilled lecture  courses  X  -----
216.  Other book publishing,  miscellaneous  printing,  other  than 
the Press  X 
217.  Jewellery,  goldsmiths'  and silversmiths'  work  X 
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Number 
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218.  Sporting and juvenile goods,  baby carriages  X 
219.  Musical  instruments  X 
220.  Brush  ware  X 
221.  Fancy  goods  X  X 
222.  Office  requisites  X 
223.  Raw materials, products and services of  the textile and clothing 
industries with certain exceptions  X (1)  (1)  Except imported  materials 
224.  Textiles  included  in  the  inter-Ministerial  scale  for  certain 
health benefits  X  X (2)  (2)  or LC17 
225.  Official  contracts for  textiles,  ready-made clothing, bespoke 
tailoring  and the like services  X (3)  X  Subject  to  a  margin for  revision 
clauses  (wages) 
Agricultural  products 
226.  Dried vegetables  LC19  X 
' 
227.  Sterilised  milk  X (4)  X 
228.  Concentrated milk,  powdered milk  for  children  or special 
purposes  X  (4)  Except powdered milk in bulk 
or large packs 
229.  Cream cheese  and yoghurts  X 
230.  Semolina  X 
231.  Pasta  X  rS14 
232.  Biscuits,  rusks  and health foods  X 
233.  Flour  X 
234.  Bakers'  yeast  T4s  X 
235.  Bock beer  X  X 
236.  Luxury beer  X  -----
237.  Brewers' malt  X 
238.  Spirits  X 
239.  Fruit and vegetable juice, syrups  X 
240.  Aerated beverages  X 
241.  Mineral  waters  and table  waters  X  X (1)  (1)  Only for  retail  trade,  T4D;  in 
Corsica,  Prefect 
242.  Preserved fruit  X  rS15 
243.  Preserved meat  X  rS17 
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244.  Preserved foie  gras,  game, rabbit and poultry  X 
245.  Jams, jellies, marmalades, fruit mash  and pastes  X (2)  r$19  (2 ) Power to pass  on the absolute 
value of any rise in raw materials 
246.  Confectionery  X 
247.  Cooking and eating chocolate  X  ToO 
248.  Other chocolate, including powder and cocoa  butter  X 
249.  Condiments  X 
250.  Vinegar of wines and spirits  X  Tot(a)  (8)  for  wine vinegar 
251.  Liquid coffee  extracts  X 
252.  Roast  coffee  x(")  T62  (')  at  roasting stage 
253.  Coffee  powder  X  rs2o 
254.  Roast  chicory  X (2)  r$21 
255.  Tea  X  rs22 
256.  Soups  and broths  X 
257.  Animal feeding  stuffs  X 
258.  Water ice  X 
259.  Red wines  X 
260.  Public garages  X  -----
261.  Woodworking  X  -----
262.  Marking  up  and  handling  in the woodworking industries; 
printing and graphic industries  X  -----
263.  Bookbinding  X  -----
264.  Billposting and advertising  rates  X  -----
265.  Press  agency  rates  X  -----
266.  Development of films  and  photographic work  X  -----
267.  Hire of linen  X  -----
268.  Meals  in hotels  and restaurants  X  ----- Prefects  also  empowered  to  fi  1X 
prices 
269.  Analysis,  research  and tests  in industrial laboratories  X  -----
270.  Driving school  charges  X  -----
271.  Self-drive private car hire  X  -----
272.  Cinemas  X  -----
273.  Furniture removals  and repositories  X  -----
274.  Forwarding agents'  commission  X  -----
150 II - Control  of mark-up 
Stage 
Serial  Product  Remarks 
Number 
Production  Distribution 
1.  Absolute  value  of mark-up 
a)  Unit  price fixed  by  authorities 
1.  Fuels  (motor spirit and high  octane, gas-oil,  paraffin  oil)  LC2  X (1)  Also:  cdp1 
(1)  price reporting 
Agricultural  products 
2.  New potatoes and high season  potatoes  X 
3.  Home-produced and imported  butter, except butter in tubes  Interven-
or individual portions  tion 
price 
4.  Table poultry, with some exceptions  X  also:  rS 
5.  Fresh  fruit and vegetables  X 
6.  Eggs  X  occasionally  only 
b)  Freezing  of individual  mark-up 
7.  Leather and unworked hides and skins  X 
8.  Bakers'  yeast  X 
2.  Relative  value  of mark-up 
a)  Percentage  mark-up 
9.  Iron and steel industry products  X 
10.  Water and gas  condensers  Ba7  X (2)  (2 ) corresponding, tax included to 
the absolute value of the mark-up 
in force  at 15 June 1956  (tax in-
eluded) for retail trade only 
11.  Linseed  oil  for industrial use  cdp5  X (2) 
12.  Exercise books and the like  B2ta  X (3)  (3)  wholesale  trade  only;  corres-
ponding to the permitted absolute 
value of  mark-up at 31 July 1957; 
for  retail trade  tdm53 
13.  Cauliflowers,  endive,  broad-leaf  chicory,  lettuce,  onions, 
leeks  and carrots  X 
14.  Pasta  B2s1  X 
15.  Preserved fruit other than imports  B=u  X (2) 
16.  Preserved vegetables other than imports  ESs7  X (2) 
17.  Preserved meat  B24s  X (2) 
18.  Preserved fish  Esss  X (2) 
19.  Jams, jellies, marmalade,  fruit mash  and  paste  B241i  X (2) 
20.  Coffee  powder  B2ss  X (2) 
21.  Roast  chicory  B254  X (2) 
22.  Tea  B2ss  X (2) 
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b)  Freezing  individual  mark-up 
23.  Steel  wire-drawing,  drawing  and cold  rolling:  B2s  X (2) 
- drawn wires 
- certain products derived from  steel  wire  or turned and 
pressed  drawn steel 
- cold rolled strip in tempered steel 
24.  Galvanised  and tinned products  ES2o  X (2) 
25.  Listed insulated electrical  wire and cables  BS7  X (2) 
26.  Roller bearings  Bu5  X 
27.  Sulphuric acid  ES43  X (2) 
28.  Meatmeal and fishmeal  X 
29.  Razor  blades  X 
30.  Safety  razors  X 
31.  Electrical  batteries  X 
32.  Electric lamp  sockets  X 
33.  Equipment, spare  parts and  accessories  for  motor cars  X 
34.  Accumulators  X 
35.  Bearings  X 
36.  Watches and chronometers  X 
37.  Cleansing  products  X 
c)  Rate of mark-up 
38.  Steel tubes, except jointed and riveted tubes, seamless bottles  B29  X 
39.  Metal beds  and mattresses  E$24  X 
40.  Metal kitchen furniture  E$26  X 
41.  Radio  and  television  receivers,  record  players  and  tape  re-
corders  E$30  X (3)  (3)  limited rate of mark-up 
42.  25  and 40  W  electric lamps  ESai  X 
43.  Resin distillation products (turpentine, pitch and rosins)  Bt6s  X 
44.  Unadvertised pharmaceutical  specialties  ddp4  X 
45.  Paints  and varnishes  BI68  X 
46.  Shampoos  BI77  X 
47.  Toothpaste and shaving  soaps  BI78  X 
48.  Unmedicated sticking  plaster  BISl  X 
49.  Articles in wood  B2o5  X 
50.  Wallpaper  Baos  X (4)  (4)  aggregate mark-up 
51.  Daily newspapers  T29  X 
52.  Periodicals  B2n  X 
53.  Exercise books and  the like  B2Ia  X (5)  (5)  retail trade only 
C)  Minimum  Prices 
Statutory minimum wage indexed to cost-of-living index  X  X  Act of 11  February 1950 
(Journal  Officiel,  1950  p.  9,059) 
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SOURCES 
1.  Champaud,  C.  op. cit.  Part  III,  pp.  76  and  foiL 
2.  Letters  from: 
Presidenza del  Consiglio  dei  Ministri,  Comitato  Intermini-
steriale dei  Prezzi, II Segretario Generale of  7 June  1967, 
No.  2511  and  30  June 1967,  No.  4764. 
A.  ENACTMENTS  GOVERNING  PRICE  FORMATION 
I.  Enactments  on  price  fixing 
1. 
2. 
3. 
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4. 
5. 
II.  Genera  1  price  con t r o 1 s 
1. 
2. 
3. 
III.  R u 1 e s  o f  p u b 1 i c i t y  a n d  s u p e r v i -
s ion 
1.  Compulsory  publication  of  the prices  of  products 
subject  to direct  price  controls 
2. Serial 
Number 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
1. 
B  - Direct Price  Controls 
Product 
I.  Maximum  price  controls 
Electricity 
Gas 
Water 
Coal  from  the ECSC and third countries 
Petrol, mineral  oil and  gas-oil 
Naphtha 
Steel  tubes 
Pyrites 
Aluminium 
Calcium  carbide 
Cements 
Sodium 
White spirit 
Chemical fertilizers 
Anti-cryptogamic products 
Sugar 
Molasses 
Milk 
Hotels and pensions 
Radio  and  television licences 
Goods  and passenger  rail  transport 
Motorway tolls 
Newspapers 
Insertions  in Provincial  Official  Gazettes 
II.  Minimum  price  controls 
Olive-cakes  (sanse) 
Stage 
Production  Distribution 
X  -----
X  -----
X  -----
----- X 
X  -----
X  X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X  X 
X 
Remarks 
Also  three price 
Equalisation  Funds 
x  Price fixed by the Communes 
X  -----
X  -----
X  -----
X 
X  X 
X  -----
X 
Only  provisions  already  intro-
duced  before 1942 
-------- -------------------------------------------------1----------------
III.  Fixed  price  controls 
1.  Pharmaceutical  specialties  X 
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SOURCES 
1.  Champaud, C.  op. cit.  Part III, pp. 80  and foiL 
2.  Letter from Ministere de l'Economie Nationale et de l'Ener-
gie,  Directeur du Service  des  Prix,  23  May  1967  (Sch/PR 
No.  23514). 
A.  ENACTMENTS  GOVERNING PRICE  FORMATION 
I.  Enactments  on  price  fixing 
1.  Prohibition  of  resale  price  maintenance  under 
Decree of 9 December  1965. 
2. 
3. 
4.  Prohibition of price discrimination in  two specific 
cases: 
( a)  prohibition  of  discounts  to  members  of  as-
sociations  and  societies. 
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(b)  prohibition  of  price  discriminations  to  cir-
cumvent the prohibition of resale price main-
tenance. 
5.  Rebate control under Decrees of 23 February 1963 
and  23  December  1963. 
II.  G e n e r a 1  p r i c e  c o n t r o 1  s 
1.  Costing rules  for  public contracts:  decision  of  29 
December  1956. 
2.  Normal  price  rule  under  Outline  Law  of  30 
June  1961. 
3. 
III.  R u 1  e s  of  pub  1  i city  and  super vi-
s ion 
1.  Compulsory price  ticketing  at retail  stage. 
2.  Compulsory price reporting, accompanied by right 
of veto:  Ministerial Order of 13  November  1956. B- List of products or groups of  products subject to direct price control in Luxembourg (according to a communica-
tion from the Luxembourg Price Department,  this  list  is  incomplete) 
Stage 
Serial  Product  Remarks 
Number 
Production  Distribution 
I.  Maximum  price  controls 
1.  Livestock  on the hoof  X 
2.  Beef and veal 
3.  Breadmaking cereals  X 
4.  Butter 
5.  Milk  X 
6.  Fruit and vegetables 
7.  Sugar 
8.  Fuel 
9.  Pharmaceutical products  X  X 
10.  Renting of cinema  films  X  -----
11.  Cinema entrance  ----- X 
II. Minimum  price  controls 
1.  Statutory minimum wage (a)  indexed on the cost-of-liv-
ing index  X  X 
(a)  Pursuant to the Grand-Ducal Order of 22 April 1963, this wage was fixed on 25 June 1965  at Fr. 28 per hour or F. 5,600 per month, with a reduction of  20% 
for workers under 20 and an increase of 20 % for skilled workers. The Order does not apply to domestic service, agriculture, wine-growing or horticulture. 
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SOURCES 
1.  Champaud, C.  op. cit.  Part I, pp. 43  and foil. 
2.  Hartog,  F.  Markteconomie  in  Nederland;  beperkingen, 
opvattingen  en  vorintzichten,  substantially  reproduced  in: 
Zijlstra, J.:  Politique economique et problemes de la concur-
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A.  ENACTMENTS GOVERNING  PRICE FORMATION 
I.  Enactments  on  price  fixing 
1.  Declaration of the invalidity of resale price main-
tenance  for  certain  durables  and  for  collective 
agreements,  under  Decrees  of  31  August  1964 
and  1 April  1964. 
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2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
II.  Genera I  price  con troIs 
1. 
2. 
3. 
III.  R u 1 e s  o f  p u b I i c i t y  a n d  s u p e r v i -
s ion 
1. 
2.  Spontaneous reporting of price increases and super-
vision  of wage increases. B - Direct Price  Controls 
Stage 
Serial  Product  Remarks 
Number 
Production  Distribution 
I. Maximum  Price  Controls 
1.  Leases  of agricultural land  X  -----
2.  Residential rents  X  --·---
3.  Milk 
4.  Employment agencies  X  ----- Price freeze 
5.  Family doctors  X  ----- Price  freeze 
6.  Rooms, meals,  food and drink in hotels and restaurants  X  ----- Price freeze 
7.  Gas water heaters and boilers, other than sales to building 
contractors  X  Mark-up control 
I 
II. Minimum  Price  Controls 
--------
------
III.  Fixed  Prices 
1.  Construction of workers' housing  X  -----
2.  Agricultural  products 
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